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Preface
The workshop on Disability, Work and Cash Benefits convened some 50-60 
of the nation's leading scholars in disability studies, income security policy, 
labor economics, and rehabilitation to explore the overarching policy question 
before the workshop: How might we alter public policy to promote employ 
ment, where feasible, as well as foster community integration and economic 
self-sufficiency of working-age Americans who find themselves, through ill 
ness, injury, aging, birth, or environmental barriers, to be counted among the 
nation's persons with disabilities.
The workshop, held December 8-10, 1994, in Santa Monica, California, 
was jointly sponsored by the National Institute of Disability and Rehabilita 
tion Research (NIDRR) of the U.S. Department of Education and the National 
Academy of Social Insurance (the Academy). It proved to be a highly produc 
tive collaboration between our two organizations' complementary roles in 
promoting research and understanding of disability policy.
The mission of NIDRR is to promote the independence of persons who 
have disabilities by seeking improved systems, products, and practices in the 
rehabilitation process. It does this by funding research and training in medical 
or vocational rehabilitation, the development of assistive technology, and pol 
icy research on issues of particular importance to persons with disabilities. Its 
support of this workshop aptly fits within this mission.
The Academy encourages research, understanding, and sound policy for 
the nation's social insurance programs ~ the largest of which is Social Secu 
rity, or Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance. In the United States, as 
in other industrialized countries, social insurance programs have the common 
purpose of protecting workers and their families against the risk of severe 
financial hardship when they lose income from work because of insured- 
against events. In the United States those include work injury (workers' com 
pensation), involuntary job loss (unemployment insurance) or retirement, 
death of a family worker or severe long-term work disability (Social Security). 
Coverage under social insurance programs is broadly based, generally pooling 
the risk of wage loss that all workers share by covering workers across the 
occupational, earnings, and age spectra. Such programs are closely tied to 
work. They are financed by contributions from earnings while people are 
employed, and they provide income continuity to workers and their families 
when earnings are lost for reasons beyond the worker's control.
Because of its expertise in social insurance, the Academy in 1991 was 
asked by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U. S.
in
House of Representatives and the Chairman of its Subcommittee on Social 
Security to undertake a comprehensive review of the Social Security disability 
programs, with a special emphasis on disability and work. In particular, the 
Academy was asked: Can an emphasis on rehabilitation and work be incorpo 
rated into the disability income programs without greatly expanding costs or 
weakening the right to benefits for those who cannot work? Are there ways to 
encourage beneficiaries to use their residual work capacity? In answering 
these questions, the Academy was encouraged to take into account experience 
in the private sector and in foreign disability income programs.
Given the Academy's on-going task, it was particularly appropriate for the 
Academy to collaborate with NIDRR in commissioning papers for this work 
shop. The purpose was to bring together current research on a range of topics 
that ultimately affect employment prospects for persons with work disabili 
ties. Relevant topics include analyses of the size and composition of the work 
ing-age population who have work disabilities (variously defined), the 
implications of broader economic and labor market trends for the opportuni 
ties and barriers to employment that persons with disabilities face, lessons 
learned from varied models of linking rehabilitation to cash benefit programs, 
including historical experience in the United States, approaches adopted in the 
social insurance programs in other countries, and innovations tested by private 
employers and insurers in the United States. Further analyses emphasized the 
role of health care and personal assistance services in reducing barriers to 
employment in the United States.
The collaboration between our two organizations brings a rich and varied 
blend of perspectives to research questions related to disability income and 
work. NIDRR brings broad experience with how diverse policies weave 
together to affect the lives of Americans with disabilities. Disability policy 
broadly construed extends well beyond income support and rehabilitation to 
include education and training, technology, transportation, civil rights, job 
accommodations and public access. Further, the changing universe of disabil 
ity highlights the close connection between new risks of work disability and 
social and economic conditions. The Academy brings a breadth of expertise in 
the design and financing of income support and health care financing through 
social insurance, assistance, and private insurance that includes but is not lim 
ited to disability policy. Its membership includes social insurance experts from 
a variety of disciplines and professions — including actuarial science, econom 
ics, health policy, law, medicine, philosophy, political science, public adminis 
tration, social work, and sociology.
The papers in this volume constitute an important companion to the Acad 
emy's report, Balancing Security and Opportunity: The Challenge of Disabil 
ity Income Policy, which is being issued in 1996. More important, this volume
stands on its own as a valuable resource for students of social policy and uni 
versity faculty who offer cross-disciplinary approach to the teaching of eco 
nomics, social sciences, rehabilitation and disability policy. Policy makers, 
journalists, and other participants in debates on disability and income security 
policy will gain from the papers that follow an understanding of the breadth 
and diversity of the population of persons with disabilities and the need for 
equally broadly based interventions to foster their economic security and full 
participation in American life.
Katherine D. Seelman, Ph.D.
Director
National Institute of Disability and Rehabilitation Research
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services
U.S. Department of Education
Peter A. Diamond
Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
President
National Academy of Social Insurance
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Overview
Jerry L. Mashaw
Yale University
Virginia P. Reno
National Academy of Social Insurance
The papers in this volume are devoted to the analysis of disability, 
work, and cash benefits. The authors seek to understand the causes of 
work disability and the types of interventions that might enable indi 
viduals to remain at work, return to work, or enter the workforce for 
the first time, despite having chronic health conditions or impairments. 
There are several reasons for this interest, and these concerns form the 
backdrop for the studies included here.
First, all would agree that a life of productive employment, when it 
is practical, is far more desirable for individuals with disabilities and 
for their families and society at large than a life of relying on cash ben 
efits as a substitute for wages. Moreover, even when persons with dis 
abilities cannot be fully self-supporting, there may be major gains in 
family economic welfare and substantial contribution to aggregate pro 
ductivity when impairments can be ameliorated or accommodated to 
permit some paid work.
Second, after a period of stability in the last half of the 1980s, the 
cost of Social Security disability benefits grew rapidly in the early 
1990s, prompting concern about the long-term future of these pro 
grams. In 1994, Congress provided temporary additional funding for 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), but called for research to 
determine whether the recent growth in applications and allowances 
was a temporary phenomenon or a long-term trend, and, if the latter, 
what should be done about it.
Third, the main disability policy initiative in the 1980s focused on 
civil rights and culminated in the enactment of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990. The Act rests on the belief that low 
employment rates among people with disabilities are due to prejudice 
and environmental barriers in public access and accommodation. Since
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passage of the law, however, employment rates have not significantly 
increased, leading to new questions about what is needed to improve 
employment outcomes.
Finally, the rates of Social Security benefit terminations due to med 
ical recovery or return to work have always been modest, but have 
reached all-time lows. This has prompted calls for new approaches to 
link beneficiaries to the services that will enable them to earn enough 
to leave the public assistance rolls completely.
These concerns form the backdrop for the discussion in this volume. 
The papers were presented at a conference on Disability, Work, and 
Cash Benefits held December 8-10, 1994 in Santa Monica, California. 
The conference was jointly sponsored by the private, nonprofit 
National Academy of Social Insurance and the National Institute for 
Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the U.S. Department of Edu 
cation.
Who Are the Work Disabled?
A recurrent theme of all the papers is the vast diversity within the 
population of persons with disabilities. That diversity results not just 
from the range of physical or mental impairments but also from varia 
tions in age, education, prior work experience, and existing social sup 
ports, and in the possibilities for accommodation of differing 
impairments in distinct work environments.
At one level, determining the population of persons with work dis 
abilities seems relatively straightforward. The work disabled are those 
persons who have significant physical or mental impairments that pre 
vent these individuals from earning enough to support themselves at a 
decent standard of living. At another level, however, determining who 
has disabilities is an enormously complicated question to which a large 
range of responses might be given.' We, therefore, devote some consid 
eration to how those with work disabilities might be categorized.
If we were concerned with everyone who has some chronic health 
condition or impairment that might impose a limitation on their func 
tioning, our research would involve perhaps one-half of the entire pop 
ulation of the United States, including the elderly and children. If we
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narrow our focus to those whose impairments or health conditions 
limit their major activity—such as work or housework for working-age 
adults, activities of daily living for the elderly, and playing or attending 
school for children—then about 36 million would be counted, based on 
estimates of the household population from the National Health Inter 
view Survey (HIS), and of the institutionalized population (LaPlante 
1991, 1992; National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) 1994).
For this volume on work and disability, our interest centers on the 
working-age population. If we consider working-age people who have 
any of a broad range of functional limitations, or disabilities, that 
include but are not limited to work,2 then nearly 30 million or almost 
one in five Americans aged 15-64 would be counted, according to the 
1991-1992 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). On 
the other hand, if we were concentrating only on those who have the 
most significant functional limitations—for example, persons who 
require assistance with one or more of the basic activities of daily liv 
ing—we would be interested in about 1.5 million persons in the house 
hold population, or less than 1 percent of those aged 15-64; if we 
narrowed our focus to only those who use wheelchairs, then about 
500,000 persons would be of interest (McNeil 1993).
There might be perfectly sound policy reasons to study either these 
very large or very small groups of "persons with disabilities." Our con 
cern with work disability policies, however, is one that focuses on per 
sons who have relatively severe impairments that put them at 
considerable risk of serious disadvantage in the labor market. These are 
people whose impairments pose a substantial threat to their economic 
well-being, but who nevertheless might work.
A relatively narrow subset of the work disabled consists of those 
who are receiving either DI or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
disability benefits. As of December 1993, this group comprised about 
6.7 million working-age Americans. By statutory definition, the indi 
viduals in this group have an impairment that, when considered in light 
of their age, education, and work experience, makes them unable—for 
at least a year—to engage in substantial gainful employment (that is, 
with earnings of more than $500 per month). Note that while this is a 
severely impaired population, the receipt of cash benefits does not nec 
essarily imply that persons who receive DI or SSI assistance cannot
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work at all or that they will never again work at a level that might pro 
duce substantial income.
The cash benefit programs of interest, DI and SSI, provide modest 
substitutes for wages that, on their face, would seem to make work a 
preferred alternative. Social insurance payments from DI replace a dis 
abled worker's prior earnings under a sliding scale, with lower replace 
ment rates for higher earners. For average earners and above, the 
benefits replace far less than half of what the worker had earned while 
working. For low earners, whose replacement rates approach half the 
worker's prior earnings, the benefits nonetheless provide a level of liv 
ing that is less than the poverty threshold for an individual (figure 1). 
Studies of replacement needs across the earnings range indicate that 
about 70-80 percent of prior earnings is required to yield a comparable 
level of living (Palmer 1994). The estimates take account of the differ 
ence in tax treatment of various sources of income and the absence of 
work-related expenses. These estimates are for reasonably healthy 
retirees and do not take account of the added cost associated with dis 
ability.
Figure 1. Social Security Provides Only Partial Earnings Replacement 
Percent of Prior Earnings Replaced by Social Security Benefits, 1993
$15,000 $25,000 $40,000 
Prior Annual Earnings
$60,000
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SSI provides means-tested benefits for disabled persons with little or 
no other income or financial assets. The full federal benefit, $458 a 
month in 1995, amounts to 71 percent of the poverty threshold for an 
individual. 3 For some, SSI supplements very low benefits from DI. 
Others who receive SSI do not qualify for DI because they lack the 
covered work experience needed before the onset of their disability. In 
brief, while these two programs provide a critical safety net of cash 
support for those who are unable to work, the modest level of benefits 
makes work a far preferable alternative for those who have the capacity 
to do so. Hence, several of the papers focus particularly on the work 
prospects for this population, or for some part of it (Monroe Berkowitz, 
Edward Berkowitz and David Dean, H. Allan Hunt et al., and Martynas 
A. Yeas).
We must remember, nevertheless, that there is great diversity even 
among the 3.8 million disabled-worker beneficiaries in the DI pro 
gram, all of whom must have had significant work records before the 
onset of their disability. Some have life-threatening diseases such as 
cancer or AIDS. The majority are older workers—just over half are 
over the age of 50—and they tend to have impairments or diseases that 
are associated with aging, such as cardiovascular or respiratory ill 
nesses, complications of diabetes or arthritis, or other musculoskeletal 
impairments. Over the past two decades, however, there has been an 
increase in the number with mental illness as their primary diagnosis, 
from about 11-12 percent in the 1970s to about 25 percent today; these 
individuals tend to be workers in their thirties and forties (U.S. Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration 
(SSA) 1994; NASI1994).
Working-age adults who receive SSI benefits because of disability 
or blindness, who numbered 3.1 million at the end of 1993, are also a 
very diverse group. They include about 0.6 million whose SSI benefits 
supplement DI; the rest do not qualify for DI because their disabilities 
began before they had sufficient work records (NASI 1994). Many 
have disabilities that started in childhood or early adulthood. Just over 
a quarter have mental retardation as their primary diagnosis, and an 
additional quarter have other mental disorders as their primary diagno 
sis. The paper by Aaron Prero focuses on young adults with mental 
retardation who receive SSI and on their experience with transitional 
employment services to aid their entry into the workforce.
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Other authors in this volume defined the group of interest as consid 
erably broader than those in current DI or SSI payment status, by 
including those who self-report in household surveys that they have a 
physical, mental, or other health condition that limits the kind or 
amount of work they can do or that prevents them from working alto 
gether. This increases the population of concern to something between 
16 and 17 million persons, approximately 10-11 percent of the work 
ing-age population, according to the 1993 Current Population Survey 
and the 1991-1992 SIPP (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993; McNeil 
1993).
Those who report that they have work disabilities are of special con 
cern because a number of these individuals are not receiving cash ben 
efits yet are at a particular disadvantage in the labor market. 
Consequently, they are at a high risk of having inadequate incomes and 
of needing to rely on some form of cash support.
Persons who report themselves as having work disabilities are more 
than twice as likely as other workers to be unemployed, that is, without 
jobs but in the labor force actively seeking work. In March 1993, when 
the unemployment rate for workers without disabilities was 7.3 per 
cent, it was 16.4 percent for those aged 16-64 with work disabilities. 
Viewed in another way, the unemployment figures show the particular 
challenges faced by job seekers with disabilities: for each one who was 
looking for work, there were ten other persons without disabilities also 
seeking work. Further, thfe job seekers without disabilities were, on 
average, younger than the job seekers with disabilities (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1995).
Perhaps it should not be surprising that persons with work disabili 
ties are far more likely than other workers to be out of the workforce 
altogether. That was the case in March 1993, when fully 66 percent of 
those with work disabilities were neither employed nor looking for 
work, compared to about 16 percent of other persons aged 25-64 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1995). Similar disparities existed in past years, 
when the economy was stronger and overall unemployment was lower. 
For example, in 1988, 70 percent of persons with work disabilities and 
17 percent of other persons aged 25-64 were out of the workforce 
(Bennefield and McNeill 1989).
Because employment is the primary means of support for most 
Americans, these differentials translate easily into much higher risks of
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poverty for persons with a work disability. Nearly 30 percent of people 
with a work disability had incomes below the poverty level in 1992, as 
compared with 10 percent of the working-age population without a dis 
ability (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993).
Within the working-age population, both age and educational attain 
ment are strong predictors of work disability (table 1). The risk of work 
disability rises sharply with age, with persons aged 55-64 being four 
times as likely to have a work disability (22 percent) as persons aged 
16-24 (under 5 percent). The sharp increase in disability with age also 
indicates that the onset of work disability usually occurs during the 
work life—often relatively late in the work life—rather than before.
Table 1. Prevalence of Work Disability, by Age and Educational 
Attainment, March 1993
Elementary 
only,
Age
Total, aged 
16-64
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Total
0-8 
years
Educational attainment 
High school College
1-3 
years
4 
years
1-3 
years
Percentage reporting a work disability
9.5 27.3 13.3 10.0 7.3
4.5
6.6
8.6
12.1
21.7
9.8
18.4
23.0
31.0
41.9
5.9
12.8
17.3
22.6
31.7
5.2
7.2
9.2
12.0
18.1
2.4
5.6
8.3
10.6
17.4
4 years 
or more
4.1
1.0
2.0
3.5
5.1
11.1
Distribution of educational attainment of total population
Aged 25-64 100______6______9 35 26 24
SOURCE Unpublished tabulations from the Current Population Survey, March 1993, US 
Bureau of the Census
The minority of working-age Americans over 25 years old who did 
not enter high school (6 percent) or did not complete it (9 percent) are 
at great risk of work disability, a risk that rises with age. On the other
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hand, the advantages of post-secondary education in averting or com 
pensating for the disabling consequences of chronic health conditions 
are evident among workers in all age categories.
African-Americans and Hispanics also are more likely to have 
severe work disabilities than nonminorities. Some level of work dis 
ability was reported for 14 percent of African-Americans aged 16-64 
and for about 9 percent of Hispanics and of whites. Severe work dis 
abilities, which generally means the persons are prevented from work 
ing by their condition, were reported for 10 percent of African- 
Americans, 6 percent of Hispanics, and 5 percent of whites (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1993).
At the same time, according to the SIPP, a narrow majority (52 per 
cent) of 21-64 year-olds with functional limitations were employed 
(McNeil 1993 p. 62). Furthermore, some persons reporting quite sub 
stantial limitations had jobs. For example, 46 percent of persons with 
difficulty seeing normal newsprint even with corrective lenses were 
employed, as were 26 percent of those unable to see newsprint, 58 per 
cent of those unable to hear a normal conversation even with a hearing 
aid, 31 percent of those with difficulty walking three city blocks, and 
20 percent of those requiring personal assistance in keeping track of 
money and bills (McNeil 1993).
These data suggest that the population of persons with work disabil 
ities is extraordinarily heterogeneous. Individuals' work limitations 
result from a wide variety of medical problems that have differential 
impacts on success in the labor market. People have varying levels of 
education and radically different levels of social supports to assist them 
in coping with their impairments. Equally important, the employment 
of persons with functional limitations shows that workplaces can 
accommodate and individuals can adapt to quite significant disabilities 
under some circumstances. The question is whether and how such 
adaptations and accommodations can be broadened.
Changes in the labor market will obviously affect this diverse popu 
lation in different ways. The progressive shift from manual labor to 
service and "mind work" may reduce the barriers to successful 
employment for those with serious physical limitations but with high 
intelligence and educational levels. On the other hand, the same devel 
opments disadvantage those with lower educational attainment, limited 
cognitive ability, and mental disorders that make it difficult for them to
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work in customer- or team-oriented employment situations. Hence, an 
overall theme of the conference proceedings was that, given the hetero 
geneity of the population with work disabilities and the shifting nature 
of the job market, there was no magic policy "bullet" that would 
improve employment prospects for all persons with disabilities. Any 
single solution, however generally available, is likely in practice to be a 
partial solution with respect to a subset of the total population of con 
cern.
The Plan of the Volume
The papers have been organized into three major groupings. The 
introductory section concerns work disability as a function of the eco 
nomic and programmatic environment and considers the ways in which 
labor market changes, policy interventions, and individual choices 
shape the workforce participation of those with disabilities. The 
authors in the first section emphasize different aspects of this complex 
interaction, drawing on both national and cross-national experience.
The second section analyzes return-to-work policies provided by 
both the public and the private sectors for persons with disabilities. 
Although the workforce participation rate for all persons with any form 
of chronic health condition is quite high, it drops sharply for those with 
a work disability and much more sharply for those with severely dis 
abling conditions. The emphasis in this section is on the latter two 
groups and on various strategies for preventing a severing of workplace 
ties or for promoting return to work after a period of disability.
Finally, the last two papers in the volume focus on particular needs 
of persons with disabilities that strongly affect their workforce partici 
pation. These needs include access to health care, to personal assis 
tance, and to assistive technologies. The policy concerns in the last 
section shift from specific attempts at improving return-to-work out 
comes to the broader social interventions that may be the necessary 
preconditions for the success of more targeted return-to-work efforts.
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Work Disability and the Economic and Programmatic Environment
The volume leads off with a paper by Edward Yelin and Miriam Cis- 
ternas entitled "The Contemporary Labor Market and the Employment 
Prospects of Persons with Disabilities." The authors' interest is in the 
similarities and differences between the workforce experience of those 
with and without a disability, given these workers' other characteristics 
and changes in the labor market itself. As do all the authors, Yelin and 
Cisternas find that workers with disabilities are quite heterogeneous in 
terms of their age, gender, prior work history, education, and skill lev 
els. Generally, these characteristics are predictors of labor force suc 
cess, so they should be expected to have similar effects for those with 
disabilities. Indeed, that is the authors' finding. On the other hand, it is 
clear from the data that persons with disabilities are uniquely disadvan- 
taged in labor market competition. With respect to either cyclical or 
structural changes in the economy, individuals with disabilities seem to 
be the leading edge out of the labor market, and they lag behind other 
workers in returning to work.
These results are particularly strong for certain workers, such as 
males over 50, but are less strong for other groups, such as young 
females entering the labor market. Disability thus seems to amplify 
negative effects for those who are already disadvantaged by changes in 
the contemporary labor market. Conversely, disability may have a 
lesser effect on those who have been entering the labor market in 
increasing numbers. Yelin and Cisternas caution that we currently have 
relatively poor models of how the labor market is shifting. Moreover, 
no one has yet analyzed data concerning persons with disabilities in 
relation to newer descriptions of the characteristics of the labor force, 
such as the increasingly important distinction between "core" and 
"peripheral" workers.
In their paper, "Employment and Economic Well-Being Following 
the Onset of a Disability: The Role for Public Policy," Richard V. 
Burkhauser and Mary C. Daly take a different cut at understanding the 
workforce participation rates of persons with disabilities. Through 
careful manipulation of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam 
ics (PSID), they are able to trace the employment history of persons 
who have an onset of a work disability and to analyze the transition out 
of and back into work by these persons. The authors find that first,
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most persons who report the onset of work limitations are employed 
after that onset, with only the most severe conditions leading to an ulti 
mate transition entirely out of the workforce. Second, the transition out 
of the workforce is relatively slow. Most persons who experience a dis 
abling event still have significant attachment to the workforce during 
the first five years following that event.
Third, those who are never forced to sever their ties to the workforce 
completely have considerably better success in maintaining their posi 
tion in it. There is substantial return to work by even those persons who 
spend a year out of the workforce, but never leaving seems to be 
strongly associated with longer-term retention. Burkhauser and Daly 
thus stress the importance of accommodation and early intervention in 
preventing long-term work disability. They urge a renewed emphasis 
on policy interventions that would reenforce both accommodation and 
the worker's desire to maintain attachment to a job.
In his paper, "Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse 
Disabilities," Walter Oi underlines both the diversity of persons with 
impairments and the poor labor force results of those with a work dis 
ability. He is particularly concerned with the policy environment 
within which such persons must determine whether to remain in the 
workforce or to move into a relatively permanent benefit status. Oi is 
critical of both the existing major cash benefit programs and of the 
ADA for their failure to focus explicitly on the diversity of the popula 
tion that they serve.
In analyzing the work decisions individuals face from the perspec 
tive of economic theory, Oi observes that poor health tips the work-lei 
sure trade-off on several dimensions. First, it makes work more 
difficult, thereby reducing the individual's preference for employment; 
it can lower the individual's wage rate, thereby decreasing the financial 
return from work; and finally, disability steals time by requiring more 
attention to "maintaining the human agent," leaving less time for work, 
leisure, or both.
Attributes of the disabling condition also influence whether work is 
an economically rational outcome for the individual or for society at 
large, according to Oi. The severity of the impairment clearly is a fac 
tor. Other considerations are the age at onset, the anticipated duration 
of the condition, and its impact on life expectancy. Both age at onset 
and life expectancy influence the returns that can be anticipated from
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investment in human capital, such as training or preparation for a new 
career. Duration of an impairment is often difficult to predict but is crit 
ical to the worker's response to its onset. If the duration is believed, or 
hoped, to be only temporary, the rational investment might be in curing 
or in reversing the condition by having the individual remain away 
from work to rest and recuperate. On the other hand, persons who have 
conditions with early onset, which are expected to be permanent but 
not life-threatening, are the best candidates for investment in human 
capital, training, and return-to-work efforts. Oi observes that recipients 
of DI and SSI tend to be older and to have more serious, life-threaten 
ing conditions. They are not representative of the larger population 
reported in surveys to have a work disability, and they are not particu 
larly good candidates for return-to-work efforts. He concludes that dis 
ability policy needs to draw proper distinctions in order to target the 
remedies offered by income support, training, wage subsidies, and 
accommodations to the particular subsets of the population for whom 
they are appropriate. To be treated fairly, people in different circum 
stances have to be treated differently.
In the last paper of this section, "European Experiences with Dis 
ability Policy," Leo J.M. Aarts and Philip R. de long provide a master 
ful and concise description of four different European systems. 
Because this chapter gives us both an historical account and a cross- 
sectional comparison, it is difficult to summarize in a few words. Four 
points appear to be particularly salient. First, our West European neigh 
bors—the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden— 
have experimented with a number of different approaches to disability 
policy. This is true both within individual systems and across the four 
systems studied. Second, the data suggest that all four of these systems 
have higher public expenditures for disability programs than does the 
United States, whether measured in terms of the prevalence of disabil 
ity benefit receipt or the share of gross domestic product allocated to 
disability benefits, rehabilitation, and employment programs. Third, 
these higher disability benefit expenditures occur despite policies that 
emphasize rehabilitation, public-sector jobs, private employer quotas 
or subsidies, and partial pensions to encourage employment. Finally, in 
evaluating the consequences of disability income policy, incentives 
matter, not just those faced by workers with chronic health conditions,
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but those faced by employers, by disability adjudicators, and by those 
offering services to workers with disabilities.
Return-to-work Policy
In the first paper in this section, "Patterns of Return to Work in a 
Cohort of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries," Martynas Yeas analyzes 
data from the New Beneficiary Survey and from subsequent samples 
sometimes characterized as the "New Beneficiary Data System." He 
cautions that his particular analysis is limited to persons who survived 
about a decade after entering the DI rolls. As such, it excludes about 
four in ten of the original group, because they had died. Relying on his 
own analysis and that of others, Yeas seeks to understand who among 
the survivors might have been prime candidates for return to work after 
they entered the disability benefit rolls.
Yeas' results are complex, nuanced, and tentative, but several find 
ings stand out in fairly sharp relief and buttress Oi's conceptual 
approach. First, when the results are controlled for age, reported health 
status seems to be the primary determinant of labor market participa 
tion. Second, age is strongly predictive of the likely return to work or 
of the substantial labor force participation of beneficiaries. Workers 
over age 50 or 55 seem to be poor candidates for return-to-work inter 
vention, while the (considerably smaller) group of comparatively 
young workers has much better prospects.
These findings are not terribly surprising, but they support certain 
policy conclusions. On one hand, these data suggest that current pol 
icy—making qualification for benefits somewhat easier for workers 
over age 50—is probably justified. Yeas suggests that the criteria 
should perhaps be relaxed somewhat further. These older workers are 
more like "retirees" than they are like younger disabled workers. By 
contrast, the failure to pursue the prospects for medical recovery or 
return to work with respect to younger beneficiaries may be overlook 
ing a substantial pool of potential labor force returnees.
The paper by Hilary Williamson Hoynes and Robert Moffitt is enti 
tled "The Effectiveness of Financial Work Incentives in Social Security 
Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income: Lessons from 
Other Transfer Programs." The lessons that Hoynes and Moffitt give us 
are highly cautionary. Work incentives designed to lower the marginal
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tax rate on earnings of existing beneficiaries have theoretically ambig 
uous net effects on program participation and on work effort. The 
empirical literature suggests that net increases in employment, if any, 
are quite small overall. The ambiguity results from the fact that lower 
marginal tax rates increase the incentives for work effort by those 
already on the rolls but simultaneously may attract new entrants and 
forestall exit by those who could then earn more without losing their 
benefit status. Numerous studies in nondisability programs suggest that 
these offsetting effects make standard work incentive provisions rela 
tively ineffective in either increasing employment or reducing program 
participation.
Hoynes and Moffitt are careful to point out that the population of 
persons with disabilities may be different from that in other cash sup 
port programs, and that the complex rules in the DI and SSI programs 
present somewhat different incentive structures from provisions found 
in Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the Food Stamp program, 
or a negative income tax. Nevertheless, the data concerning work 
incentives related to receipt of disability benefits also suggest modest 
responsiveness by disabled beneficiaries to changes in the economic 
incentives built into the programs. Given these sobering findings, 
Hoynes and Moffitt suggest that new policy instruments, such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, might have significantly greater effects in 
increasing work effort among all income transfer program beneficia 
ries, including those receiving disability benefits.
Edward Berkowitz and David Dean have a somewhat similar story 
to tell in their paper, "Lessons from the Vocational Rehabilitation Link 
for DI Beneficiaries." While virtually everyone agrees that rehabilita 
tion and return to work are preferred to labor force nonparticipation 
and receipt of disability benefits, there is little evidence to suggest that 
rehabilitation policy has been or can be made effective for a large seg 
ment of the population with such significant work disabilities that they 
receive DI benefits.
Although there have been strong proponents of incorporating reha 
bilitation into the DI program dating back to the earliest proposals for 
public disability insurance, both politics and objective factors have pre 
vented a fruitful marriage between DI and vocational rehabilitation 
(VR). As a matter of disability policy, Congress has stipulated that DI 
trust funds could be used to finance rehabilitation only for beneficia-
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ries, not for applicants or denied applicants. Yet it is an article of faith 
in the rehabilitation community that early intervention holds the best 
prospects for promoting return to work. Further, the legislative ratio 
nale for spending DI trust funds for rehabilitation is to reduce trust 
fund expenditures. Hence, the cost of rehabilitation should not exceed 
the benefit savings that accrue when beneficiaries leave the rolls and 
return to work. Since 1981, DI has paid only retrospectively for VR 
successes among beneficiaries, and the number of successes has been 
small.
On the other hand, the problem is not just the micro-politics of pro 
gram finance. On average, persons with significant work disabilities 
who receive DI benefits are not particularly good candidates for voca 
tional rehabilitation services. Hence, it is not obvious that large num 
bers would be successfully returned to work by vocational 
rehabilitation activities, even if potential beneficiaries could be tar 
geted before obtaining beneficiary status. Still, dramatic program shifts 
in the direction of the rehabilitation ideal might have substantial 
impacts, particularly with respect to younger workers.
The team of H. Allan Hunt, Rochelle V. Habeck, Patricia Owens, 
and David Vandergoot, has a much more encouraging story to tell in 
"Disability and Work: Lessons from the Private Sector." Through the 
review of case studies of private-sector interventions, these authors find 
that an aggressive approach to managing disability claims has signifi 
cant payoffs in maintaining employees in their current jobs or in some 
job with their present employer. Firms use a multitude of strategies, but 
each successful strategy is characterized by (1) early intervention, (2) a 
commitment to the twin goals of illness and injury prevention and 
return to work, and (3) continuous attention to the medical, vocational 
rehabilitation, and accommodation needs of their disabled workers. As 
this study recognizes, private sector employers have major advantages 
in carrying out these aggressive return-to-work strategies in compari 
son to public programs like DI or SSI. Indeed, the authors note that 
these public programs provide places for firms to lay part of their 
potential long-term disability burdens in the cases where a return to 
work is not achieved.
Nevertheless, these authors are optimistic that public policy could 
be reshaped to provide incentives for return to work, early intervention, 
and strong case management. They are under no illusions that this
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could be accomplished without major changes in public policy, includ 
ing, among other things, the elimination of waiting periods, the provi 
sion of partial disability payments, and enormous increases in services 
and supports to those at risk of long-term disability. These would be 
costly interventions, but, in these authors' views, would be appropriate 
public policy by comparison with the system that now sorts individuals 
into two lumpy baskets: the disabled who receive an entitlement to 
long-term benefits and the nondisabled who receive virtually nothing.
The uncertain returns to focused public interventions to promote 
work are underlined by Aaron Prero's paper, "Quantitative Outcomes 
of the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration: Summary of 
Net Impacts." Prero provides a retrospective analysis of a transitional 
employment training demonstration program for mentally retarded 
adults sponsored by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The 
demonstration was conducted as a formal experiment with randomly 
assigned participants and control group members. At issue was the 
effect of placement in real jobs in the community, with training by job 
coaches, on the earnings and SSI outcomes of a cohort of SSI recipi 
ents, ranging from 18 to 40 years of age. The six-year experiment 
showed a small decline in receipt of SSI, but the dollar savings from 
that decline were much smaller than the costs of the training provided. 
There was a similar result for earnings. The author cautions that these 
negative findings should not be over-interpreted. When the benefits of 
training were measured only in terms of savings in SSI payments, they 
were less than the cost of the training. Nonetheless, the trainees' 
employment rate, earnings, and income did increase as a result of their 
participation, suggesting positive outcomes by measures other than SSI 
program savings. Moreover, the study cannot exclude the possibility 
that more precisely targeting services to groups where gains are likely 
to be large might produce better results in terms of program savings.
In "Policies for People with Disabilities in U.S. Employment and 
Training Programs," Burt Barnow looks at a broader range of initia 
tives to improve work outcomes for persons with disabilities. Included 
in his review are vocational rehabilitation funded through the Rehabili 
tation Services Administration; vocational education funded under the 
Perkins Act; the Job Training Partnership Act, Title II, training for eco 
nomically disadvantaged adults and youth; labor exchange activities; 
the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit and testing programs run by the U.S.
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Employment Service; and the Special Minimum Wage Program for 
people with disabilities administered by the Employment Standards 
Administration. In general, Barnow finds very modest effects from any 
of these interventions.
It is not clear whether these results flow from the inherent difficulty 
of the task or from the structure of the programs. The employment ser 
vice, for example, has a very low application rate by disabled individu 
als for its programs, but when disabled individuals do apply, they 
receive greater-than-average services and their placement rates are 
above the average for all applicants. On the other hand, programs like 
the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit seem to serve very few people with dis 
abilities and almost certainly could be allowed to expire with no 
adverse effects. In general, Barnow finds that there is no overall strat 
egy for assessing the employment and training needs of the population 
of persons with disabilities or for developing a comprehensive 
approach to serving that population. Little serious work has been done 
in evaluating the capacity of existing programs to help those with a dis 
ability. Barnow concludes, therefore, that there is currently no way of 
ascertaining whether sufficient resources are being devoted to improv 
ing the workforce participation rate of persons with work disabilities.
The section concludes with a paper by Monroe Berkowitz, "Improv 
ing the Return to Work of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries," 
which proposes an entirely new approach to involving the private sec 
tor in return-to-work efforts. Berkowitz suggests that the creative ener 
gies of the private sector be harnessed by providing substantial 
incentives to successful return-to-work activity. Providers who manage 
to return beneficiaries to work and to eliminate the need for further DI 
payments would receive a percentage of the long-term savings to the 
trust fund attributable to their efforts. A novel aspect of the Berkowitz 
proposal is the incentive to maintain prior beneficiaries in the work 
force by making compensation payments to providers on an annual 
basis, conditional upon the recipient of services remaining off the DI 
program rolls. Given the high risks involved, it is uncertain how many 
providers could be attracted by this proposal or what percentage of the 
population could be served effectively. On the other hand, given the 
extremely low success rates of current return-to-work interventions 
and its provision for paying providers only after benefit savings accrue, 
the Berkowitz proposal has obvious attractions.
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The Role of Health Care and In-Kind Benefits in Promoting Work
In "People with Disabilities: Access to Health Care and Related 
Benefits," the findings of Robert Friedland and Alison Evans suggest 
that our current arrangements are not "work friendly," but that they 
may be quite difficult to change. Persons with disabilities face substan 
tial barriers to obtaining health care coverage in private markets. This 
situation makes these individuals difficult to hire and retain and 
increases their incentive to participate in public programs with rela 
tively comprehensive attachments for health care coverage—Medicaid 
for SSI recipients and Medicare for DI beneficiaries after a 24-month 
waiting period. The recent failure of comprehensive health care reform 
is particularly salient from this perspective.
The authors discuss a wide range of piecemeal reforms to the regu 
lation of health insurance practices and modifications of the current 
Medicaid and Medicare programs. However, these initiatives hold out 
modest prospects for assisting persons with disabilities to maintain 
needed coverage while returning to the workforce. Even if available, 
employment-based coverage frequently does not provide the range of 
services required by those with significant disabilities. Moreover, a 
number of the incremental reforms discussed might exacerbate work 
disincentives, perpetuate inequities across different groups, or acceler 
ate the decline of the availability of private insurance for the nondis- 
abled. Recent state initiatives seem designed more to spread a thin 
public health care dollar over a greater number of eligible people than 
to provide the chronic care or long-term care coverage options that are 
often most needed by persons with disabilities. In short, if the goal is to 
uncouple health care provision from cash benefits entitlement, and thus 
to eliminate incentives to seek cash benefits in order to get needed 
health care, we seem to be making little progress.
Andrew Batavia attacks these work disincentives through a different 
route in "Health Care, Personal Assistance, and Assistive Technology: 
Are In-Kind Benefits Key to Independence for People with Disabili 
ties?" Batavia postulates that the objective of disability policy is to per 
mit independent living by persons with a disability. He recognizes, 
however, that this objective consists of two potentially conflicting sub 
ordinate goals: (1) assisting disabled individuals to live in their com 
munities (the support goal), and (2) assisting disabled individuals to
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live self-sufficiently (the employment goal). In his view, the linking of 
in-kind benefits such as health care, personal assistance, and assistive 
technology to participation in cash benefit programs may promote the 
support goal but is likely to have the negative effects that Friedland and 
Evans postulate on the employment goal. Batavia's solution is to 
uncouple in-kind benefits from cash payments by providing benefits 
through cash equivalents, such as vouchers or refundable tax credits, 
not tied to eligibility for income support. The cash equivalents would 
be phased out incrementally as incomes rise. Hence, Batavia would 
provide benefits to people with disabilities regardless of their employ 
ment status. Assuming that administrative and fiscal difficulties could 
be surmounted, a major assumption, Batavia argues that such programs 
would give persons with disabilities greater control in achieving their 
twin goals of living in their communities while remaining self-support 
ing.
Policy Implications
We now return to the policy issues that are the backdrop for our dis 
cussion: the rising cost of cash benefit programs; the limited success to 
date of attempts to improve employment of persons with disabilities 
through legal remedies called for in the ADA; and the all-time low in 
the rate at which persons are leaving cash benefit rolls because of med 
ical recovery or return to work.
Balancing Policy Goals: Income Support and Work
We started with the fundamental belief that productive employment, 
when it is feasible, is the optimal outcome for both individuals with 
disabilities and for society at large. At the same time, income support 
during periods of long-term work incapacity is an essential element of 
disability policy. Virtually all industrialized countries have some type 
of social insurance system for ensuring income support to workers who 
have lost their earning capacity due to illness, injury, or chronic health 
conditions. Most also provide social assistance for those who do not 
achieve a basic minimum income from either work or social insurance
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benefits. Initiatives, therefore, must necessarily strive for a balance 
between policies that facilitate employment and those that ensure a fair 
and decent level of income support during periods of work incapacity. 
Further, that balance has to be found in an environment where new 
public spending for social welfare purposes is sharply constrained.
The paper by Aarts and de long offers a cross-national perspective 
for evaluating U.S. disability policy. Several observations emerge. 
First, if the success of disability policy is equated with low national 
spending on cash support for disabled workers (an equation that some 
would dispute), then the United States is highly successful when com 
pared with its European neighbors. Among the five countries reviewed, 
federal spending for long-term disability benefits in 1991 was lowest in 
the United States, at 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This 
compared with 1.9 percent in the United Kingdom, which has strict eli 
gibility rules and relatively low benefits; 2 percent in Germany, which 
is notable for its emphasis on "rehabilitation before disability pen 
sions"; 3.3 percent in Sweden, a mature welfare state that emphasizes 
both rehabilitation and publicly financed employment; and a whopping 
4.6 percent in the Netherlands, which generally serves as a model of 
runaway disability costs not to be emulated elsewhere. When federal 
spending for vocational rehabilitation and employment programs for 
persons with disabilities is added to benefit spending, the United States 
remains the most frugal, with total disability spending of 0.75 percent 
of GDP compared to 2.22 percent in Germany, for example, where 
both rehabilitation and private sector employment are more strongly 
emphasized and subsidized.
The relatively low spending on long-term disability benefits in the 
United States is even more noteworthy because, as Aarts and de long 
point out, the United States does not have other policy instruments in 
place that reduce pressure on disability pensions. All of the other coun 
tries studied have systems that aid in preventing reliance on long-term 
disability benefits, such as universal short-term sickness benefits, 
which provide support while rehabilitation and return to work are tried; 
national health care coverage for all residents regardless of changes in 
their disability or employment status; and comprehensive programs to 
help pay for long-term supports such as personal assistance or assistive 
technology and devices. As Batavia and Friedland and Evans discuss, 
the lack of secure financing of health care and related long-term sup-
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ports poses severe constraints on the employment choices people with 
disabilities face in the United States. To date, efforts to remedy this 
problem through comprehensive health care reform have not been suc 
cessful. Incremental reforms that target particular subgroups may have 
better prospects.
However, the fact that the United States spends less than other 
industrialized countries on disability remedies does not, in itself, sug 
gest obvious reforms in a period of tight budget constraints. It also 
does not answer other important questions. What caused the rapid 
growth in Social Security disability benefit claims and allowances dur 
ing the early 1990s? Is it a temporary phenomenon or a long-term 
trend? What can be done to improve the employment outlook for work 
ers with disabilities? In particular, how might we improve the return- 
to-work prospects of those who receive benefits?
Cyclical Changes in the Economy
"The economy matters" is the clear message in the papers by Yelin 
and Cisternas, Oi, Burkhauser and Daly, and others. Cyclical 
changes—periods of economic expansion and recessions—alter the 
choices available to both employers and people with disabilities. When 
the economy is growing and firms are expanding, employers are in a 
much better position to accommodate workers with disabilities. 
Employers' assessment of what constitutes a reasonable accommoda 
tion may be more expansive when firms are competing for skilled 
workers and they have valued employees that they do not want to lose. 
On the other hand, when firms are laying off employees, opportunities 
decline for workers with disabilities along with the prospects for other 
workers, according to Yelin and Cisternas. They also find that people 
with disabilities—particularly older workers—are less likely to return 
to work when the economy improves.
For these kinds of reasons, cyclical changes in the economy affect 
the number of people claiming and receiving Social Security disability 
benefits. In fact, the recent, unexpected growth in DI claims and allow 
ances coincided with an economic recession in 1990-1991. The num 
ber of people applying for and being allowed benefits reached an all- 
time high in 1992. Since then, the number of new entrants to the DI 
rolls has leveled off and declined. The number of people receiving ben-
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efits, however, continues to grow because more people are being added 
to the benefit rolls than are leaving. Policy approaches to address the 
low rate of terminations from the benefit rolls are discussed subse 
quently.
The condition of the economy also influences the effectiveness of 
the ADA because it alters the environment in which decisions about 
reasonable accommodation are made. Momentum for enacting the 
ADA built during a period of sustained economic growth during the 
1980s. The actual implementation of the ADA, however, fell on the 
heels of the recession of 1990-1991. Perhaps it should not be surpris 
ing that the beneficial effects of the ADA on employment of people 
with disabilities are being realized more slowly than had been hoped 
during its development and enactment.
Structural Changes in Employment and Wage Differentials
Structural changes in the economy over the past two decades have 
also differentially affected opportunities for workers with disabilities. 
Technological advancements and the decline in physically demanding 
jobs may bring better prospects for skilled workers with physical 
impairments. On the other hand, increased emphasis on intellect, 
advanced education, and flexibility may make cognitive limitations or 
mental illness greater impediments to work. In general, changes in the 
demand for workers with different aptitudes and education have 
brought about increased disparity in opportunities and earnings 
between highly educated and less-skilled workers (NASI 1994). This 
disparity is also likely to become evident within the highly diverse 
population of people with disabilities. In noting the great diversity 
within the disabled population, Oi's analysis suggests that the ADA 
remedies—banning discrimination, requiring reasonable accommoda 
tion, and breaking down architectural barriers—will be most effective 
for highly skilled workers who have faced these obstructions in the 
past. However, workers who face the double disadvantages of low 
skills and physical or mental impairments may need other remedies.
Burkhauser and Daly offer a solution for the problem faced by low- 
skilled workers with disabilities. They propose a wage subsidy built on 
the concept of the Earned Income Tax Credit, but one that is targeted at 
workers with disabilities. The subsidy is seen as a way to encourage
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entry into the workforce among young persons and to delay withdrawal 
from the workforce among older workers. For young workers with 
developmental disabilities, a wage subsidy encourages employment, 
even part-time or at low pay, that over the long run can improve human 
capital through on-the-job experience. Burkhauser and Daly also view 
the subsidy as a means of encouraging older workers with disabilities 
to remain at work even if their hours of employment or wage rates 
decline.
Hoynes and Moffitt's analysis lends support to the wage-subsidy 
proposal. Hoynes and Moffitt suggest that a wage subsidy—modeled 
after the EITC for workers with disabilities—might be more cost effec 
tive than adding new work incentives to the DI program. They note that 
expanding DI by offering a partial benefit offset to those who return to 
work is likely to increase program expenditures and to yield ambigu 
ous results, at best, in terms of net increases in labor supply.
Oi observes that, because disability steals time, part-time or flexible 
work schedules may be the kinds of accommodations some employees 
need. If such adjustments are accompanied by lower wages for workers 
in general, that result is likely to occur for workers with disabilities as 
well. A publicly financed wage subsidy, like that proposed by 
Burkhauser and Daly, is one way to alleviate these effects.
Oi also argues for a wholly different approach to cash support, 
which he offers as a substitute for DI. This alternative is based on the 
veterans' compensation concept of paying individuals based on their 
impairments, irrespective of the impairments' effects on earning capac 
ity. While this approach was not specifically modeled by Hoynes and 
Moffitt, it appears to hold many of the same risks of increased program 
participation. The eligible population of benefit recipients would be 
significantly expanded even if eligibility were limited to persons with 
an impairment rating of 50 percent or more on the scale used for veter 
ans' compensation. Paying benefits to a larger population of persons 
with disabilities, regardless of their ability to work, would significantly 
raise benefit costs unless current benefits were substantially reduced, 
and it would clearly result in more workers among the benefit recipi 
ents. As far as increasing the amount of labor supplied by the target 
population, Hoynes and Moffitt's analysis suggests that the outcomes, 
at best, would be ambiguous. Oi's proposal, however, for targeting
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return-to-work efforts on young persons with disabilities is consistent 
with that of Monroe Berkowitz, as discussed in the following section.
Rehabilitation and Return-to-work Services
Prero's analysis raises important issues about the purpose and 
financing of rehabilitation services. One obvious goal is that of 
improving the quality of life and the community integration of persons 
who receive services. That, clearly, is among the objectives of the fed 
eral/state vocational rehabilitation program. The program is required 
by law to give first priority to persons with the most significant imped 
iments to employment, and it is permitted to define rehabilitation suc 
cess as placement in either competitive or sheltered employment or in 
unpaid homemaking activities.
As Prero notes, a different rationale has been used to justify the 
financing of rehabilitation services out of funds earmarked for cash 
benefit programs. In this case, the purpose is to reduce benefit expendi 
tures. The measure of success is whether the client returns to work at a 
level of earnings that results in savings in cash benefits exceeding the 
cost of rehabilitation provided. To this end, services would be appro 
priately targeted on those with the best prospects of leaving the benefit 
rolls because of those services. This is the rationale used by private 
insurers, according to Hunt et al.
Monroe Berkowitz proposes a radical new approach to linking DI 
beneficiaries with return-to-work services, based on this latter ratio 
nale. The plan offers consumers a choice in selecting their private or 
public provider of services; it enlists private sector providers in the task 
of returning DI beneficiaries to work; and it offers them incentives to 
produce that result by basing their payment, not on the cost of services 
they give, but on their success as measured by their clients' return to 
work and departure from the benefit rolls. Providers would be paid 
only after their success had been documented, and the amounts would 
be based on savings to the trust funds (from benefits not paid) as those 
savings accrue.
This reimbursement mechanism encourages service providers to 
select clients with the best long-term prospects for employment. It nat 
urally targets those identified by Yeas and Oi as being good candidates 
for return-to-work efforts—the small, but growing, minority of DI ben-
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eficiaries who are relatively young and have stable impairments that 
are not life-threatening.
Because service providers are paid for their results, not for their 
inputs, they would have incentives to use whatever other resources they 
are able to locate. This strategy could include negotiating accommoda 
tions with an employer, or assisting clients in gaining access to the 
complex array of existing vocational education, training, and employ 
ment programs described by Barnow. Presumably, rehabilitation pro 
viders would build on the lessons learned from private sector 
employers and insurers about successful return-to-work methods, 
which are discussed by Hunt et al.
A question remains as to whether private sector rehabilitation pro 
viders would choose to participate in a system in which they would be 
expected to assume the financial risks and would be paid only after 
success had been demonstrated. Some payments to providers may be 
needed as their clients achieve milestones along the way toward fully 
withdrawing from the benefit rolls.
In their paper, Edward Berkowitz and David Dean recount the some 
times fitful marriage between DI and publicly financed vocational 
rehabilitation services. However, a glimmer of good news exists in 
their findings about the cost-effectiveness of investing in rehabilitation 
services for beneficiaries. Between 1965 and 1980, the Social Security 
Act provided for allocating up to 1.5 percent of DI benefit expenditures 
for vocational rehabilitation services to return DI beneficiaries to 
employment. There were few strings attached to the way in which pub 
lic VR agencies expended the funds, and guidelines for their use were 
not strictly enforced. Audits by the General Accounting Office con 
cluded that the monies were not well-managed, and the policy was 
abandoned in 1981. Nevertheless, even the most critical of the cost- 
benefit evaluations of that program, poorly managed as it may have 
been, found that it returned savings to the DI trust fund of about $1.15 
for each $1.00 spent for rehabilitation services. Subsequent and more 
refined cost-benefit analyses found savings ranging from about $1.40 
to $2.70 for each $1.00 spent (McManus 1981). These studies suggest 
that there are savings to be gained by financing rehabilitation services 
from DI trust funds. With the proper mix of incentives and with 
accountability for service providers, some payment to providers for
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milestones their clients reach on the road to leaving the benefit rolls 
could be justified on cost-benefit grounds.
Administration and Disability Management
Aarts and de Jong emphasize that administrative accountability mat 
ters. They attribute part of the runaway cost of disability benefits in 
Holland to an administrative structure where adjudicators—disability 
boards made up of employer and labor representatives—are not 
accountable for the public costs of the decisions they make to allow 
benefits. In the United States, SSA, which administers the DI and SSI 
programs, is directly accountable.
There is, nevertheless, a parallel to this problem in American budget 
policy. Congressional policy makers work under a set of rules whereby 
disability cash benefits themselves are outside of a budgetary cap (as 
they are in other European countries studied), but the funds used to 
administer those benefits must compete with all other "discretionary" 
spending, which is sharply constrained. Still, private sector experience, 
recounted by Hunt et al., shows that sound disability management 
more than pays for itself. Some types of disability management initia 
tives available to private employers and insurers are not available to 
SSA without costly changes in policy; such initiatives include the elim 
ination of the five-month waiting period for cash benefits or of first-day 
coverage under Medicare. However, other steps would be possible; 
these would include individualized attention in order to correctly 
decide who is eligible for benefits, who should be referred for rehabili 
tation, and who should be subject to periodic review of continuing eli 
gibility, and in order to make accurate and fair decisions on the 
outcome of those reviews. The United States currently spends about 
2.6 percent of DI outlays on administration, considerably less than the 
percentage for private insurers. Both the backlogs of pending applica 
tions and appeals and the shortfall in conducting the number of con 
tinuing disability reviews required by law suggest that the United 
States is not investing enough in administration. SSA's actuaries esti 
mate that investments in continuing disability reviews, even when only 
a small proportion result in benefit terminations, pay for themselves in 
benefit savings.
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Conclusions
Some answers emerge to the questions raised earlier. What caused 
the recent rapid growth in disability benefit costs? Is it a temporary 
phenomenon or a long-term trend? What can be done to improve the 
employment opportunities of workers with disabilities? In particular, 
how might we improve the return-to-work prospects of those who 
receive benefits?
First, the economy matters. The economic recession of 1990-1991 
contributed to the growth in claims and allowances. The number of 
new benefit awards reached an all-time high in 1992 and has since 
declined. As such, the surge in benefit awards appears to be a wave 
rather than a long-term trend.
The number of people receiving benefits, however, continues to 
grow because more people are entering the rolls than are leaving. There 
are four reasons people leave the rolls: they die; they reach age 65, 
when they are shifted to the retirement benefit rolls; they medically 
recover; or they return to work despite the continuation of their impair 
ments. The last two reasons have always accounted for a small portion 
of benefit terminations, but they are now at a record low. Benefit termi 
nation rates because of retirement also are down. Part of the explana 
tion is that more people are entering the rolls at younger ages, that is, 
under age 50. This is due, in part, to population changes (NASI 1994). 
The baby boom is now in the 35-to-50 age range. Just as these individ 
uals swell the ranks of the labor force, they add to the ranks of the dis 
ability rolls when they become disabled. In addition, as more women 
are in the paid workforce, they qualify for social insurance benefits 
when they become disabled. Had they been housewives, as many of 
their mothers were, they would not have had disability income protec 
tion. To the extent that the low rate of terminations is due to the bulge 
of the baby boom cohort, it is a temporary phenomenon rather than a 
long-term trend. In the next decade, as the baby boom ages, we can 
expect more entrants to the disability rolls to be over 50 years old and 
therefore to have relatively shorter duration on these rolls.
The historically low rate of benefit terminations due to return to 
work or medical recovery may be more amenable to policy prescrip 
tions. First, the innovative proposal for enlisting private sector provid-
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ers in offering return-to-work services to DI beneficiaries could 
improve employment outcomes for some subset of beneficiaries, par 
ticularly those who are relatively young and have stable, nonfatal 
impairments.
In addition, as discussed by several authors, a wage subsidy for dis 
abled persons, patterned after the EITC, would improve returns to 
work for persons attempting to leave the benefit rolls. Perhaps more 
importantly, it could reduce entries onto the cash benefit rolls, first, by 
encouraging young workers to enter the labor force, and second, by 
encouraging older workers to delay their exit from the labor force even 
though their hours of work or wage rates decline because of the onset 
of a chronic health condition. The wage subsidy also could help 
increase the effectiveness of the ADA in promoting employment and 
accommodations for young or low-skilled workers with disabilities.
Finally, the rate of benefit terminations due to medical recovery is 
expected to be relatively low because of the nature of the strict test of 
long-term disability that is used. But SSA's own estimates indicate that 
this rate could be improved if more continuing reviews were con 
ducted. Further, the effectiveness of both return to work and medical 
reviews could be enhanced by better disability management when 
claims are first allowed. Sorting new beneficiaries according to their 
prospects for either medical improvement or return to work and 
informing individuals of those expectations seem to be easily transfer 
able lessons from private sector disability management. Allocating 
adequate resources to more fine-tuned management of initial disability 
awards and conducting ongoing disability reviews are expected to 
more than pay for themselves through benefit savings. To date, how 
ever, obstacles to allocating those resources through the federal budget 
process have proven insurmountable.
The volume's overarching theme is that the population of working- 
age persons with disabilities is extraordinarily diverse. Therefore, dis 
ability policy, broadly construed, has to match that diversity with a 
wide range of remedies appropriate for different subsets of the popula 
tion. Those diverse remedies include the following: access to health 
care and related services, which is highly problematic for some persons 
with disabilities in the United States; civil rights protections and 
employer accommodations, as called for in the ADA; wage subsidies 
for low-income workers with disabilities; and access to appropriate
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rehabilitation, which may be financed from different sources, such as 
the federal/state VR program, employers, insurers, or public cash bene 
fit programs, for different subsets of the population. More generalized 
education and employment policies also can be considered as part of 
disability policy. To the extent that such approaches enable Americans 
to gain and maintain the ability to compete in today's labor market, 
they aid in preventing even quite significant impairments from result 
ing in work disability. Finally, cash support programs—social insur 
ance and social assistance—remain critical elements of disability 
policy for those who experience periods of work incapacity.
NOTES
1 See particularly LaPlante (1992), and LaPlante, Miller, and Miller (1992)
2. The functional limitations are defined in the 1991-1992 Survey of Income and Program Par 
ticipation to include the following, a work disability, a functional limitation in seeing, hearing, 
speaking, lifting, climbing stairs, or walking, a limitation in activities of daily living that include 
bathing, eating, toileting, getting around inside the home, getting in or out of bed or a chair; or 
instrumental activities of daily living that include going outside the home, keeping track of money 
and bills, preparing meals, doing light housework, or using the telephone, or a mental or emo 
tional disability
3. The poverty threshold for an individual under age 65 was $7,357 in 1993, while federal SSI 
benefits were $434 a month Both are adjusted each year by changes in the Consumer Price Index.
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of Persons with Disabilities
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University of California, San Francisco
The employment of persons with disabilities is a central focus of 
disability policy, for the positive reason that the Americans with Dis 
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA) targets increasing jobs (Jones 1991) and 
for the negative reason that the rise in the number of beneficiaries has 
jeopardized the fiscal integrity of public and private disability insur 
ance programs (Stapleton, Barnow, Coleman, Furman, and Antonelli 
1994). In trying to project the work prospects of persons with disabili 
ties in the near future, the labor market dynamics of the recent past 
may be our best guide. While major discontinuities in long-term pat 
terns do occur, and cyclical downturns interrupt the patterns, overall 
employment trends are remarkably stable.
There have only been two major discontinuities in the past fifty 
years, the first occurring with the end of World War II, when all the 
Rosie the Riveters went home to take care of their children and were 
replaced by men returning from the war, and the last occurring with the 
energy crisis of 1973, when declining real wages spawned an increase 
in the proportion of women working (Evans and Nelson 1989; Levy 
1987). Few of those observing the labor market in the late 1960s fore 
saw the end of the rapid increase in the standard of living that occurred 
in the early 1970s. Similarly, few writing now foresee a major disrup 
tion of the principal forces shaping the contemporary labor market. 
The trends in the labor market since 1973, particularly stagnant wages 
accompanied by the increase in labor force participation among 
women, have been so strong that, in the absence of a major shift in 
employment patterns, one can state with a fair degree of certainty what 
the patterns in the near future will be.
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In this paper, then, we will review the overall labor market trends for 
the last two decades to show the extent to which the employment of 
persons with disabilities fits these more general developments. In addi 
tion, we will describe some of what is known about the characteristics 
of persons with disabilities that affect the probability that they will be 
able to find work if unemployed and to stay employed if already in the 
labor force. Our goal is to show the basic parameters for job prospects 
for individuals with disabilities and the likely success of efforts to alter 
those prospects.
Our research draws upon analyses of data from two surveys, the 
National Health Interview Survey (Kovar and Poe 1985) and the March 
supplement to the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Cen 
sus 1993a). The National Health Interview Survey (HIS) is the princi 
pal survey evaluating the health status of the noninstitutionalized 
population. We use data from the 1970 through 1992 HIS to trace the 
trends in labor force participation among persons with disabilities. In 
the HIS, respondents are asked if they are unable to do their major 
activity or are limited in the amount or kind of their major or outside 
activities. For the purposes of the analyses reported here, persons who 
report one of these forms of limitation are said to have a disability.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is the principal survey evalu 
ating the labor market behavior of the U.S. population. However, since 
1981, the March supplement to the CPS has asked whether respondents 
have a health condition that prevents work or limits the amount or kind 
of work. For this study, persons who report one of these forms of work 
limitation are said to have a disability. We use data from the 1981 
through 1993 March supplement to compare trends in the length of the 
workweek among persons with and without disabilities and to trace the 
pattern of transitions into and out of the labor force among the two 
groups.
Labor Force Participation Since 1970
In the 25 years between the end of World War II and 1970, labor 
force participation rates appeared to match the stereotype for the 
American family. Men had consistently high labor force participation
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rates, somewhat reduced in time of recession, and women generally 
had low participation rates, with the exceptions that most young 
women worked prior to having children and some older women 
returned to work after their children had grown (Levy 1987). Most men 
worked full-time, and most had long tenures on the job. The economic 
situation in the U.S. reinforced the stereotype. Relatively rapid growth 
in real wages enabled most families to do well on one full-time 
income. Indeed, the expectation of rising wages allowed Americans to 
plan for large families, which, in turn, reinforced the decision that most 
women would not work outside the home. Women were needed in the 
home economy, if not remunerated for that role.
In reality, the postwar period might better be viewed as an aberration 
in long-term trends, since women had had relatively high labor force 
participation rates at several points prior to that time (Evans and Nel 
son 1989). The stereotype did not even fit the postwar period perfectly. 
During the 1960s, at the height of American prosperity, women in 
every age group experienced increasing labor force participation rates 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1981). Indeed, in 1970, about half of all 
working-age women were in the labor force, an increase of more than 
15 percent relative to 1960, and the sectors of the economy in which 
they took jobs were those in which they have always been well repre 
sented. Thus, the entry of women into the labor force in the ensuing 
two-and-a-half decades may represent less of a break with historical 
precedent and more of a quickening of trends already underway.
The employment trends among men after 1970, however, do repre 
sent a major change from the immediate postwar period, both because 
their overall labor force participation rates fell and because they expe 
rienced a shift in the kind of jobs held and in the working conditions at 
those jobs. Figure 1 traces the labor force participation rates among 
men 18-44, 45-54, and 55-64 from 1970 through 1992. The sharpest 
fall in labor force participation rates was among men 55-64, with most 
of that decline occurring early in the period under study. Thus, in 1970, 
79 percent of men in this age group were in the labor force, but by 
1983, their labor force participation rate had fallen to 65 percent, or by 
about 18 percent in relative terms, before leveling off. In contrast, labor 
force participation rates held relatively steady among men 45-54, only 
declining from 91 to 86 percent over the entire period, and among men 
18-44 there was almost no net change in labor force participation,
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although such men experienced greater volatility in employment than 
their older counterparts as a result of short-term economic cycles.
Figure 1. Labor Force Participation of Men, by Age, 1970-1992
Percent in Labor Force
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
SOURCE Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey
The employment trends among women are almost the exact oppo 
site of those affecting men (figure 2). Labor force participation rates 
among women 18-44 and 45-54 have risen substantially since 1970, 
pausing only during economic downturns. Overall, women aged 18-44 
saw their labor force participation rates rise from 48 to 69 percent dur 
ing this time, or by about 44 percent in relative terms, whereas women 
45-54 experienced about a 37 percent increase. While men 55-64 had a 
precipitous fall in employment in the 1970s, followed by relatively 
stagnant labor force participation rates in the interim, women in this 
age group had relatively stagnant rates in the 1970s, before experienc 
ing a substantial and steady increase after 1982.
Figure 3 summarizes the labor market dynamics of the period from 
1970 through 1992. Rapidly growing labor force participation rates 
among women, interrupted only by the recession in the early 1980s, 
more than offset a slight decline in labor force participation among 
men, in the process radically increasing the proportion of all working-
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Figure 2. Labor Force Participation of Women, by Age, 1970-1992
Percent in Labor Force
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey.
Figure 3. Labor Force Participation, by Gender, 1970-1992
Percent in Labor Force
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey.
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age adults in the labor force. Thus, in 1970, 66 percent of all persons 
18-64 were in the labor force, but by 1992, that proportion had risen to 
74 percent, or by more than 12 percent in relative terms. This increase 
is all the more remarkable because, due to the baby boom generation, 
the number of adults 18-64 swelled during the period. The U.S. labor 
market accommodated a rising proportion of a rapidly growing work 
ing-age population, resulting in the addition of more than 10 million to 
the workforce than would have been the case had the 1970 labor force 
participation rates continued.
Persons with Disabilities and the Labor Market
How did the surge of women into the labor force and the flow of 
men out of the labor force affect persons with disabilities? The short 
answer is that men with disabilities fared much more poorly than men 
without them, experiencing a far greater decrease in labor force partic 
ipation rates. In contrast, women with disabilities fared almost as well 
as women without them, sustaining only a slightly smaller increase in 
labor force participation rates than all working-age women without 
disabilities and, among young women, actually registering a larger pro 
portional increase (Yelin and Katz 1994a). Nevertheless, for both gen 
ders, the labor market trends of persons with disabilities were similar 
to those affecting persons without disabilities.
Thus, older men with disabilities sustained a rapid decline in labor 
force participation rates from 1970 through 1982, and have experi 
enced relative stasis since then (figure 4). Overall, men aged 55-64 
with disabilities saw their labor force participation rates fall from 52 
percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1992, or by about 37 percent in rela 
tive terms. During the same period of time, men aged 55-64 without 
disabilities experienced about a 16 percent decline in their labor force 
participation rates (data not in figure). Similarly, while men 18-44 and 
45-54 years old sustained only about 1 and 3 percent relative declines 
in labor force participation rates, respectively (data not in figure), men 
with disabilities in both age groups saw their labor force participation 
rates fall by about 17 percent. Older men with disabilities experienced 
a disproportionate decline in their access to employment relative to
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older men without them, and younger men with disabilities, unlike 
younger men without disabilities, sustained significant reductions in 
their labor force participation rates.
Figure 4. Labor Force Participation of Men with Disabilities, 
by Age, 1970-1992
Percent in Labor Force
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey
Among women with disabilities, those 55-64 years old held their 
ground, with labor force participation rates about the same in 1992 as 
in 1970 (figure 5). Middle-aged and young women with disabilities, 
however, sustained substantial increases in labor force participation 
over this time span, with the exception of the severe recession of the 
early 1980s and, among women aged 18-44, during the recession just 
ended. The gains among women aged 18-44 with disabilities are par 
ticularly striking, with their labor force participation rates increasing 
by 50 percent in relative terms, from slightly over one-third to more 
than half. These increases occurred while the number of young women 
with disabilities was expanding rapidly. In 1970, fewer than 900,000 
women 18-44 years old of the more than 2.6 million such women with 
disabilities were in the labor force; by 1992, this proportion had 
increased to 2.7 million out of more than 5.3 million.
Table 1 summarizes the employment dynamics among persons with 
and without disabilities over the 23 years ending in 1992. While the
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market was accommodating an increase of 12.2 percent in the propor 
tion of working-age adults in the labor force, persons with disabilities 
experienced a slight decline in their overall labor force participation 
rates, while those without disabilities experienced a 14.7 percent 
increase. The slight net decrease in labor force participation rates 
among persons with disabilities is the net result of a substantial decline 
among men with disabilities (16.6 percent) and a substantial increase 
among women with disabilities (32.4 percent). Men with disabilities 
experienced more than eight times as large a decrease in labor force 
participation rates as men without disabilities. Meanwhile, women 
with disabilities saw their labor force participation rates increase by 84 
percent as much as women without disabilities (32.4 versus 38.6 per 
cent).
Figure 5. Labor Force Participation of Women with Disabilities, 
by Age, 1970-1992
Percent in Labor Force
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey
Clearly, persons with disabilities, like members of racial minorities, 
have become one of the principal ways the labor market accommodates 
change. Men with disabilities are the leading edge of the decline in 
labor force participation rates among older men, while women with 
disabilities follow just behind other young women in gaining increased
Table 1. Labor Force Participation Rates of Persons 18-64 with and without Disability, U.S., 
by Gender, 1970 and 1992
Participation rate (percent)
Year
1970 
1992 
Percent change
With 
disability
69.7 
58.1 
-16.6
Men
Without 
disability
93.3 
91.4 
-2.0
Total
90.1 
86.8 
-3.7
With 
disability
34.3 
45.4 
32.4
Women
Without 
disability
53.7 
74.4 
38.6
Total
51.5 
70.2 
36.3
With 
disability
52.5 
51.5 
-1.9
Total
Without 
disability
72.2 
82.8 
14.7
Total
69.8 
78.3 
12.2
SOURCE Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey.
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access to the labor force. Indeed, race and disability interact, with older 
minority men with disabilities experiencing a larger proportional 
decline in labor force participation rates than such white men. Simi 
larly, minority women with disabilities have experienced smaller pro 
portional gains in their labor force participation rates than such white 
women, in part because minority women had higher labor force partic 
ipation rates in the past (Yelin 1989).
The exit of men, particularly older men, and the entrance of women, 
especially young women, do not course evenly throughout the econ 
omy. Instead, these changes are part and parcel of the gradual eco 
nomic transformation from the production of goods to the provision of 
services. In the next section, we show how disability interacts with 
these occupational and industrial shifts.
Disability and the Shifting Mix of Occupations and Industries
The transformation of the American economy was described more 
than a decade ago as a process of de-industrialization (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982). Since then, American manufacturing has undergone a 
type of renaissance, as some old industries (e.g., automobiles) have 
become more efficient and some relatively new ones (e.g., computer 
chips) have successfully recaptured markets thought lost forever 
(Jablonski 1994). However, by and large, these improvements in the 
prospects for manufacturing have not stanched the employment 
declines in occupations and industries related to this sector (Kutscher 
1993). Instead, older manufacturing concerns have learned to operate 
with fewer workers, sometimes making current employees work longer 
hours, while newer ones have been founded with the goal of minimiz 
ing the amount of labor required. Thus, notwithstanding the cyclical 
increase that comes with the end of recession, the decline in manufac 
turing-related employment continues, along with the expansion of ser 
vice-related employment.
While many analysts were concerned with the impact of de-industri 
alization on the overall economy, others argued that de-industrializa 
tion might lead to a proletarianization of the workforce, with more of 
us in low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs (Wright and Singleman
Table 2. Mix of Occupations by Disability Status, U.S., 1970 and 1992
Percentage distribution
With disability
Occupation
Professionals
Farm occupations
Managers
Clerical
Sales
Crafts
Operatives
Service
Laborers
Total
1970
12.6
4.6
11.6
15.0
7.1
14.8
16.9
13.6
3.9
100.0
1992
17.2
2.8
13.3
14.9
11.6
9.6
11.2
16.1
3.3
100.0
Percent
change
36.5
-39.1
14.7
-0.7
63.4
-35.1
-33.7
18.4
-15.4
-
Without disability
1970
15.3
2.8
10.8
18.4
5.9
13.7
18.0
11.3
3.8
100.0
1992
18.8
2.6
14.3
15.1
11.4
10.9
10.7
12.4
3.8
100.0
Percent
change
22.9
-7.1
32.4
-17.9
93.2
-20.4
-40.6
9.7
0
-- .
1970
15.0
3.0
10.9
18.1
6.0
13.8
17.9
11.5
3.8
100.0
Total
1992
18.7
2.6
14.3
15.0
11.4
10.8
10.8
12.8
3.7
100.0
Percent
change
24.7
-13.3
31.2
-17.1
90.0
-21.7
-39.7
11.3
-2.6
--
SOURCE- Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey. 
NOTE. Totals of items may not equal 100 due to rounding
Table 3. Mix of Industries by Disability Status, U.S., 1970 and 1992
Percentage distribution
With disability
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, utilities
Wholesale/retail trade
Finance, insurance, real estate
Service
Public administration
1970
6.0
6.7
24.0
6.4
19.1
4.8
26.1
7.0
1992
3.2
5.2
15.8
7.2
19.2
6.0
37.3
6.2
Percent
change
^6.7
-22.4
-34.2
12.5
0.5
25.0
42.9
-11.4
Without disability
1970
4.0
6.6
27.2
7.2
18.4
5.4
25.3
6.1
1992
3.3
6.4
17.8
7.3
19.2
6.7
34.6
4.8
Percent
change
-17.5
-3.0
-34.6
1.4
4.3
24.1
36.8
-21.3
1970
4.2
6.6
26.9
7.1
18.5
5.3
25.3
6.2
Total
1992
3.3
6.3
17.7
7.3
19.2
6.6
34.8
4.9
Percent
change
-21.4
-4.6
-34.2
2.8
3.8
24.5
37.6
-21.0
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the National Health Interview Survey
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1982). The fears about the nature of jobs proved unfounded. The num 
ber of service jobs increased, and many of them were poor jobs, but 
many of them were high-wage, professional jobs in such sectors as 
research organizations or financial services (Nasar 1994). Just as the 
loss of manufacturing employment did not signify the demise of manu 
facturing, the rise of service employment did not signify the demise of 
high-wage labor.
However complex employment dynamics have become, the same 
set of forces have affected persons with and without disabilities alike. 
Between 1970 and 1992, the two groups experienced similar rates of 
increase in the growth occupations and industries and similar rates of 
decrease in most of the declining sectors of the economy (tables 2 and 
3). Thus, as the demand for craft workers and machine operatives 
sagged, persons with and without disabilities experienced a decline in 
the proportion of jobs in these occupations (table 2). In contrast, both 
groups sustained substantial increases in the proportion of jobs in pro 
fessional, managerial, sales, and service occupations. The growth in 
professional and managerial job categories was particularly gratifying, 
since it indicated that as the economy shifted away from craft and 
machine operative occupations, persons with disabilities were not con 
signed to low-paying jobs, disproportionately located in services.
The data on the proportion of jobs in various industries tells a simi 
lar story (table 3). Persons with and without disabilities saw their share 
of jobs in agriculture and extractive industries, construction, manufac 
turing, and public administration decline, and their share of jobs in 
finance, insurance, and real estate, and in services increase. Again, per 
sons with disabilities were able to gain proportionate access to growth 
sectors with good jobs, such as finance, insurance, and real estate, and 
they did not sustain a disproportionate share of the losses in the well- 
paying manufacturing sector.
Disability and the Workweek
As the proportion of all working-age adults in the labor force 
increased and as a growing fraction of the employed moved from 
goods to service production, persons with and without disabilities
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experienced these changes in tandem. However, their experience 
diverged on the other major trend in employment, the length of the 
workweek (table 4). 1 Persons with disabilities sustained a much larger 
decline in the proportion working full-time than did those without dis 
abilities. They experienced a much sharper increase in the proportion 
working part-time for economic reasons, and, unlike persons without 
disabilities, they also experienced a rapid increase in the proportion 
stating that they worked part-time for noneconomic reasons. Thus, 
while the average workweek increased by 1.2 hours among persons 
without disabilities, it declined by 2.2 hours among persons with them.
The disproportionate increase in part-time work, especially involun 
tary part-time work, among persons with disabilities suggests that 
when employers foresee downturns in the economy, they shift a larger 
percentage of employees with disabilities to part-time work and that 
when employers foresee upturns in the economy, they hire a greater 
percentage of persons with disabilities in part-time jobs. Alternatively, 
persons with disabilities may seek part-time work as a way of protect 
ing jobs when they fear impending work loss, and they may seek part- 
time work when they are trying to find employment.
Overall, however, persons with disabilities experienced both the 
positive and negative trends in the labor market in roughly the same 
way as persons without disabilities (Yelin 1992), with older men shed 
ding jobs in manufacturing and younger women obtaining them in the 
service sector. In the next section, we study the factors affecting transi 
tions into and out of the labor force in greater detail, focusing on the 
impact of the specific work history of individuals on their labor market 
prospects.
Transitions Into and Out of Work
Static measures, such as the labor force participation rate or average 
workweek, mask the extent to which individuals flow into and out of 
jobs. The ability to retain jobs is particularly important to persons with 
disabilities because they may be subjected to the preexisting condition 
clauses in health insurance policies should they have to change jobs 
and because employers are more likely to provide long-term workers
Table 4. Workweek of Persons with and without Disabilities, 1981 and 1993
Percentage of persons employed
Full-time
Year
1981 
1993 
Percent change
With 
disability
72.1 
65.9 
-8.6
Without 
disability
83.3 
82.8 
-0.6
Part-time, economic reasons
With 
disability
6.3 
9.7 
54.0
Without 
disability
4.3 
5.3 
23.3
Part-time, noneconomic 
reasons
With 
disability
21.6 
24.5 
13.4
Without 
disability
12.4 
12.0
-3.2
Hours per week
With 
disability
37.2 
36.4
-2.2
Without 
disability
40.8 
41.3 
1.2
SOURCE: Authors' analysis of the March supplement to the Current Population Survey
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with flexibility in how they perform their work. Moreover, with the 
passage of the ADA, increasing the proportion of persons with disabil 
ities in the labor market has become a central tenet of public policy, 
making such transitions all the more important.
In 1993, slightly more than 8 percent of persons without disabilities 
who had not worked in the preceding year reported being employed in 
the week prior to the interview for the March supplement (table 5). 2 
Persons with disabilities who had not worked in the previous year fared 
much more poorly, with only about 2 percent reporting that they had 
worked in the week prior to the interview. For both groups, persons 
who had a history of labor force participation at some point in the past 
were much more likely to be employed. Among persons with disabili 
ties, 6.5 percent of those with a work history but only 1.8 percent of 
those without one had found employment; among persons without dis 
abilities, 24.3 and 7.9 percent of those with and without work histories, 
respectively, found employment.
Table 5. Transitions into and out of Employment among Persons with 
and without Disabilities, 1992-1993
Percentage of persons
Transitions in work status
Employed: Did not work prior year, worked 
prior week
Without previous work history
With previous work history
Best combination of occupation and industry
Worst combination of occupation and industry
Unemployed: Worked in prior year, did not work 
in prior week
Best combination of occupation and industry
Worst combination of occupation and industry
With 
disability
1.9
1.8
6.5
8.7
0.3
56.2
36.5
98.3
Without 
disability
8.3
7.9
24.3
30.4
1.1
24.7
12.8
93.6
Total
5.9
5.6
18.2
23.2
0.7
25.6
13.4
93.8
SOURCE- Adopted from Yelm and Katz (1994b, tables 3 and 4).
The specific work history also affects the probability of finding 
work. Whereas 8.7 percent of persons with disabilities with a work his 
tory in the combination of occupations and industries most conducive
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to finding work were employed in the week prior to the interview, only 
0.3 percent in the worst combination had found jobs, a 29-fold differ 
ence. Thus, although the prospect that an individual with a disability 
will enter the labor force in any one year appears small even in the best 
circumstances, those who had established a work history and espe 
cially those who had established a history in occupations and industries 
with growth potential were much more likely to find work. In contrast, 
for those with a history in occupations and industries rapidly shedding 
workers, finding work was almost unprecedented.
The specific work history of individuals also profoundly affects 
whether they will be able to retain jobs. In 1993, slightly less than 26 
percent of the respondents to the March CPS reported that they had 
worked at some point in the year preceding the survey but were not 
working in the prior week. Among persons with disabilities, about 56 
percent reported having worked in the past year but not in the past 
week. Of those persons with disabilities in the combination of occupa 
tions and industries most conducive to the maintenance of employ 
ment, 36.5 percent stopped working, while among those in the 
combinations least conducive, fully 98.3 percent stopped working. 
Interestingly, persons without disabilities with a history of employment 
in the combination of occupations and industries least conducive to the 
maintenance of employment did not fare much better, with 93.6 per 
cent reporting that they stopped working. Thus, the presence of a dis 
ability is more of a hindrance in the combination of occupations and 
industries less likely to shed workers, while in the industries more 
likely to shed them, even good health will not preclude losing one's 
job.
Overall, persons with disabilities were less likely than those without 
disabilities to find work, and they were more likely to stop working. 
Nevertheless, those with a work history prior to disability fared much 
better than those without a work history prior to disability in finding 
work, and such persons with a history of work in the combination of 
occupations and industries most conducive to the maintenance of 
employment fared much better in staying employed than those with a 
history in the least conducive combinations.
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Is It the Disability or the Characteristics of Persons 
with Disabilities?
The labor market difficulties of persons with disabilities extend far 
beyond the conditions themselves (Burkhauser and Daly 1994). While 
the media sometimes focuses on the well-educated, relatively young 
population with congenital problems or impairments arising from 
trauma, the majority of persons with disabilities have an onset of 
chronic conditions in the mid-to-late stages of working ages (LaPlante 
1988). These individuals have less education than persons without dis 
abilities and are more likely to reside in rural, particularly southern, 
areas and to live in families in which the other workers have .low 
wages. Thus, although some of the gap in employment between per 
sons with and without disabilities is due to the condition itself, much is 
due to differences between the two groups in demographic characteris 
tics and work history. Moreover, when persons with disabilities do 
have jobs, they earn about 40 percent less than those without disabili 
ties. Indeed, almost half of employed persons with disabilities earn less 
than the poverty level income for their family size (Yelin and Katz 
1994b).
In addition, the population of persons with disabilities is shifting, 
with dramatic increases in the number of young persons, including 
those with congenital conditions that were previously fatal prior to 
adulthood and those with a history of mental illness or substance abuse 
problems (Chirikos 1993; Stapleton, Barnow, Coleman, Furman, and 
Antonelli 1994). Recall that having established a work history is one of 
the most important determinants of current employment status. Persons 
whose onset of conditions was at an early age are much less likely to 
have established a work history prior to the development of disability, a 
problem amplified by the discrimination those with conditions such as 
mental disorders face in the labor market. The population of persons 
disabled by the onset of chronic conditions in middle age or later is 
very different from the population without disabilities, making them 
less likely to succeed in the labor market even in the absence of disabil 
ity (Yelin and Katz 1994b). However, when the onset of disability is at 
an early age, establishing a significant work history is difficult to
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accomplish and is made even more so by the kinds of conditions preva 
lent among younger adults.
Qualitative Changes in Working Conditions
During most of the twentieth century, employment could be divided 
neatly into two groups: those paid a salary to design and monitor 
other's work and, perhaps, to sell the fruits of this labor, and those paid 
a wage to do the actual production (Osterman 1988). The first group 
was accorded greater rewards and security than the second group and 
relative autonomy to carry out tasks. The second group was expected to 
complete tasks without exercising much autonomy, because in the suc 
cessful industrial system that evolved in the U.S., production was 
designed away from the shop floor and any variation was thought to 
undermine productivity (Hirschhorn 1984). In time, the combination of 
unionization and productivity increases enabled wages and benefits to 
rise and a measure of security to be provided, in effect allowing pros 
perity (or its prospect) to offset the absence of autonomy (Levy 1987). 
The system worked so well that salaried workers frequently earned less 
than those paid hourly wages. Incomes grew increasingly more equal 
as the 1950s and 1960s unfolded (Burtless 1990).
After 1973, the slowdown in productivity growth led many analysts 
to bemoan the American system of manufacture and to argue that the 
distinction between those designing and those completing production 
processes was outmoded (Zuboff 1988). The success of our Japanese 
and European competitors who opted for flatter hierarchies and the 
lack of success for American firms using more traditional methods of 
work provided some evidence that the demarcation between design and 
implementation was no longer working. In the last decade or so, Amer 
ican firms have increasingly adopted the methods of continuous 
improvement manufacturing, reducing the number of layers in the 
employment hierarchy so that communication is eased between those 
designing production processes and those implementing them. In this 
way, production workers are involved in the improvement, if not the 
original design, of those processes.
52 Contemporary Labor Market and Employment Prospects
Paradoxically, as production workers are given more autonomy, 
blurring the distinction in actual work between salary and wage earn 
ers, employment conditions of salaried workers have grown to resem 
ble those of production workers, with smaller proportions having 
health insurance or pension coverage (Yelin 1992; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1993b), with temporary layoffs becoming more common 
(Gardner 1994), and with permanent displacement of white collar 
workers occurring more frequently (Gardner 1993). Indeed, there have 
been substantial increases in the proportion of employees displaced 
from managerial and professional occupations over the last decade, 
while the displacement rate has actually declined for craft workers and 
operatives. Equally surprising, the fastest increase in the displacement 
rate has occurred in the growth sectors of the economy, including the 
financial, insurance, and real estate, and wholesale and retail sectors 
(Gardner 1993).
As the proportion of all workers with permanent, secure jobs has 
declined, the proportion of workers hired temporarily has increased 
(Blank 1990) as have the mechanisms to accomplish this (Belous 1989; 
Polivka and Nardone 1989). Temporary employees can be part-time, 
impermanent personnel or independent contractors of the hiring firm or 
they can work for a temporary agency or on the permanent staff of 
another subcontracting firm. The separation between those designing 
and those implementing production processes has been blurred. How 
ever, this distinction has been replaced by another: that between a core 
group hired permanently by successful firms, and given wages or sala 
ries and benefits befitting that success, and a peripheral group hired in 
a temporary manner to work alongside the core employees when 
needed or to work in other organizations, albeit in close interaction 
with the firm's core employees (Osterman 1988).
Information on many dimensions of the shift in the nature of work is 
difficult to obtain. We know that persons with disabilities experienced a 
disproportionate amount of the increase in part-time work, and we sus 
pect that employers' concerns about the impact of persons with disabil 
ities on health insurance premiums have reduced these individuals' 
access to jobs. However, we do not know the extent to which the fear 
of jeopardizing their Medicare or Medicaid benefits keeps persons with 
disabilities from venturing into the labor market. We also do not know 
the extent to which they have made inroads into the core group of
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workers with permanent positions or have been disproportionately rel 
egated to the peripheral group. Contemporary labor market surveys do 
not fully reflect the changes in the nature of work that have occurred in 
the last decade or so (Bregger and Dippo 1993), making it impossible 
to assess the costs and benefits of the current employment scene for 
persons with disabilities.
In the absence of information about the extent of the changes that 
have occurred, it becomes easy to lament the loss of job security and to 
fear the prospects of this trend continuing into the future. However, 
persons with disabilities might profit from the flexibility inherent in 
temporary and part-time work (Blank 1990), especially if significant 
health reform enables them to purchase health insurance without the 
albatross of their preexisting conditions. Armed with health insurance, 
they become less risky to potential employers, and, in turn, they can 
choose to trade increased flexibility in when and how they work for a 
decrease in security of employment.
Nevertheless, the power and rewards come to those in the core group 
of permanent employees. That being so, we need much better tools to 
assess the extent to which persons with disabilities are relegated invol 
untarily to the secondary labor market, or choose such employment 
because of a better fit between job requirements and the limitations 
imposed by the disabilities. We need to know who will retain employ 
ment in good times and bad and who will be central to the mission of 
the organization as it attempts to succeed in uncertain circumstances. 
Tenure is no longer a good proxy for future work, and individuals on 
part-time status are but a small fraction of those whose prospects for 
secure employment are poor. Even objective measures of skill levels 
have proven an imperfect guide to success in the labor market, as the 
displacement of professionals and managers in successful firms attests. 
Thus, although we know that being at the core of a firm's mission is 
probably the key to one's job outlook, current labor market surveys do 
not gauge this characteristic.
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Summary of the Impact of Recent Labor Market Trends 
on Persons with Disabilities
There can be no doubt that the employment prospects of persons 
with disabilities are tied to the general trends in the labor market, 
favorable and unfavorable. Indeed, persons with disabilities would 
appear to be at the leading edge of some of these trends. As older men 
generally withdrew from the labor market, older men with disabilities 
withdrew in greater proportions. As young women generally entered 
the labor force, young women with disabilities followed, their labor 
force participation rate rising in tandem. As the share of all workers 
declined in goods production and rose in services, the share of workers 
with disabilities did so as well. Finally, as the proportion of the labor 
force in part-time work increased, persons with disabilities experi 
enced a disproportionate amount of this increase.
The tie between general trends in the labor market and the fate of 
persons with disabilities is underscored by the importance of the spe 
cific work history of individuals in determining whether they were able 
to find work if unemployed or to retain work if employed. Those with a 
history in the best combination of occupations and industries were able 
to ride the positive trends in the labor market and to avoid being 
harmed by the negative ones.
Despite growing inequality of incomes and relatively stagnant aver 
age earnings among those in the labor force, the U.S. economy has 
generated millions of well-paying jobs in the last decade (Nasar 1994), 
in the process disproving fears that the manufacturing sector would die 
or that proletarianization of the workforce would occur. There do not 
appear to be any major discontinuities in labor market trends in the off 
ing. Projections call for continued erosion of manufacturing employ 
ment and for further gains in the service sector. On the high end, 
managerial and professional specialty occupations appear targeted for 
more growth, and, on the low end, so do service occupations (Franklin 
1993; Silvestri 1993).
Thus, the trends of the last few years will probably be the best guide 
to the immediate future for employment among persons with disabili 
ties. We know that the recent past has taken older men out of the labor 
force, albeit at a slower rate than in the 1970s, and put younger women
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in it, that these dynamics were related to the shift from manufacturing 
to services, and that they affected persons with and without disabilities 
alike. We know, too, that smaller proportions of the entire labor force 
are in secure, permanent positions with good benefits and that larger 
proportions are in peripheral positions. What we do not know is 
whether persons with disabilities are increasingly relegated to periph 
eral jobs within both the growing and declining sectors of the economy 
or whether, instead, they get the kinds of jobs and the working condi 
tions they want and in which they and their workplaces can succeed.
When the ADA was passed, providing equal employment opportuni 
ties for persons with disabilities became a central tenet of public pol 
icy. We hardly have the means to assess the extent to which persons 
with disabilities are finding employment possibilities in quantitative 
terms. To fully implement the ADA, we must develop the tools to mea 
sure the potential for quality employment. In the mid-1990s, equal 
employment opportunity means access to a proportionate share of jobs 
with good working conditions and good prospects, not just an equal 
quantity of jobs.
NOTES
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National Institute of Arthritis, Musculoskeletal, and Skin Diseases.
1 The previous analyses used the National Health Interview Survey and covered the period 
from 1970 through 1992 In the remainder of this section and in the next one, we draw upon anal 
yses of the March supplement to the Current Population Survey for the period 1981 through 1993.
2 In the March supplement to the CPS, respondents report on their employment in the entire 
year prior to the interview as well as in the past week This creates an asymmetry in the time 
frames covered by the present study's proxy measures for finding and retaining work. The number 
reporting that they stopped working between the prior year and the prior week is necessarily 
greater than the number finding employment, since the former includes any individuals who 
worked at all in the past year and were not working in the past week, while the latter includes only 
the few who did not work at all in the past year and who were working in the past week The CPS 
also includes many who did not work in the past year who may not have worked for even longer 
periods
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Employment and Economic Well-Being 
Following the Onset of a Disability
The Role for Public Policy
Richard V. Burkhauser 
Mary C. Daly 
Syracuse University
Work in the marketplace is the principal source of income in all 
modern societies, and, for people of working age, it is the key to finan 
cial independence. 1 For this reason, a critical objective of those inter 
ested in the economic independence of people with disabilities is their 
full access to and participation in market work. The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is the most recent example of federal 
legislation aimed at ensuring that this goal is achieved. Title I of the 
ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for 
workers with disabilities unless this would cause undue hardship to the 
operation of business. One of the hopes underlying the ADA is that 
accommodation at the onset of a health impairment will delay job exit 
and subsequent movement onto the disability rolls. Yet, before the 
ADA was enacted and even now, in 1996, little is known about the 
labor force experiences of people with disabilities and how they and 
their employers respond when a health condition begins to affect work.
Most studies of the work experience of people with disabilities have 
concentrated on the "official" disability transfer population and have 
thus restricted the analysis to individuals who, at the present time, are 
either not working or are working less than full-time. While this is a 
reasonable approach for evaluating how public policy might return 
such people to full-time work, for those interested in a broader menu of 
public policy initiatives, it is important to recognize that the transition 
onto the disability transfer rolls may neither be swift nor certain for the 
majority of those with disabilities. To see the role that employment 
plays in the lives of people with disabilities and to begin to understand 
the paths that people take following the onset of a health condition, we 
must look at the entire population with disabilities, including those
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who are full-time workers. To do otherwise would be to ignore the 
"successful" work outcomes that policies such as the ADA seek to pro 
mote. In addition, we must expand our analysis across time and 
observe the changes in work and economic well-being that follow the 
onset of a health condition. Since the vast majority of those with dis 
abilities are not born with them, understanding the transition into dis 
ability and the changes in well-being and work that it entails is critical 
to developing successful and supportive public policies. 2
In this paper, we first look at the broad population with disabilities, 
including those working full-time and part-time who are not currently 
receiving government transfers, and compare their labor force activi 
ties and economic well-being to those without disabilities in 1988 and 
1989, the years just prior to the passage of the ADA. We then focus on 
the transition into disability for men and women who became disabled 
at some time between 1970 and 1988. We trace their economic well- 
being and work experience over the years before and after the onset of 
their disability. We use our multiperiod data to see, among other things, 
how long after the disability begins a person first stops working, 
receives disability transfers, or recovers. We conclude with a discus 
sion of the importance of accommodations on job retention and of the 
policies that might encourage additional accommodation and employ 
ment for people with disabilities.
Defining the Population with Disabilities
The ADA defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such 
an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. 3 This 
definition of disability is much broader than the widely accepted mea 
sure developed by Nagi (1965, 1969, 1991).
The Nagi measure, the dominant one in the literature, distinguishes 
among three states of diminished health. The first state describes the 
existence of a pathology, the presence of a physical or mental malfunc 
tion and/or the interruption of normal process. The second level, an 
impairment, combines a pathology with functional requirements— 
physiological, anatomical, or mental loss or abnormality that limits a
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person's capacity and level of function. The final state, disability, is 
then defined as an inability or limitation in performing roles and tasks 
that are socially expected. For men and, increasingly, for women of 
working age, market work is a socially expected role.
What is most controversial about Nagi's definition is the relative 
importance of pathology and environment in determining how a given 
pathology results in an impairment that then leads to disability. Less 
controversial is the recognition that the definition gives to "disability" 
as a dynamic process in which individual pathology and the socioeco- 
nomic environment interact. This measure of "disability" is more lim 
ited than the ADA measure in that it ignores the broader "population 
with disabilities" that has successfully integrated into society as well as 
those who are not integrated because of perceptions concerning an 
impairment that does not exist.
In our analysis, we want to examine the changes that follow the 
onset of health-related impairments. To do so, we must expand the 
Nagi definition to one more in line with the broader ADA concept by 
including the portion of the population with disabilities that is success 
fully integrated into the workforce.
An Empirical Estimate of the Working-Age Population 
with Disabilities
In most surveys of income and employment, the data available on 
health are self-reported and are couched in terms of work limitations. 
The problems inherent in these types of data are well documented (see 
Parsons 1980, 1982; Bazzoli 1985; Bound 1991). Still, researchers 
have shown these measures to be highly correlated with more objective 
assessments of health (see Bound 1991 and Stern 1989) and, as dis 
cussed more fully in the appendix, we believe such data are capable of 
identifying people with serious pathologies.
In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSIE>), which we use in 
this paper, the population with disabilities is defined by a survey ques 
tion that asks respondents, "Do you have any physical or nervous con 
dition that limits the type or the amount of work that you can do?" By 
including in our sample only those individuals who report a limitation
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for two consecutive years, we eliminate from our analysis those indi 
viduals whose health limitations are short term. In this way, the analy 
sis is restricted to the population with long-term impairments. In the 
appendix, we provide a comparison of this measure of disability and of 
more objective health and functional measures asked of PSID respon 
dents in the 1986 Health Supplement.
Throughout this paper, we rely on data from the PSID to examine 
the population with disabilities and the patterns of individuals with 
transitions into and out of a state of disability. Although the PSID is not 
commonly used for studies of disability, its long history and consis 
tently asked core questionnaire make it a useful data source for study 
ing the employment behavior, transfer receipt, and economic well- 
being of individuals before and after a spell of disability. Since 1968, 
the PSID has interviewed annually a representative sample of some 
5,000 families. At least one member of each family was either part of 
the original families interviewed in 1968 or born to a member of one of 
these families. In this paper, we use data from the 1989 PSID response- 
nonresponse file to represent the noninstitutionalized U.S. population 
of household heads and their spouses. 4 For a more complete discussion 
of these data, see Hill (1992).
To place the population with disabilities that we will use in our anal 
ysis in the context of those described with other data sets, in table 1 we 
report the prevalence of disability within age and gender groups in the 
United States in studies using data from the PSID, the Current Popula 
tion Survey (CPS), and the Survey of Income and Program Participa 
tion (SIPP). All three data sets have a self-reported health question that 
can be used as a disability marker. In addition to this question, the SIPP 
has self-reported questions relating to function. These questions are 
also reported in table 1.
Using the PSID and our two-year definition of disability, we esti 
mate the disability prevalence for men and women of prime working 
age (25 to 61 years old) and for older men and women (62 years old 
and over). 5 We find that 9.2 percent of working-age males and 10.6 per 
cent of working-age females have a disability. These rates lie between 
estimates based on the CPS and SIPP data. Using 1990 CPS data, we 
find that 8.1 percent of working-age men and 7.8 percent of working- 
age women have a disability. In contrast, McNeil (1993), using the 
1991 SIPP, finds higher prevalence rates of 11.7 and 11.6 percent for
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Table 1. Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Population with Disabilities 
across Data Sources
Percent of 
population 
Data Year Survey questions Population with disabilities
PSIDa
CPSb
SIPP0
1989
1990
1990
Do you have any nervous or
physical condition that limits
the type or the amount of work
you can do? (Must have
responded yes in both 1988 and
1989.)
Do you have a health problem
or disability which prevents you
from working or which limits
the kind or the amount of work
you can do? or
Main reason did not work in
1989 was ill or disabled; or
Current activity reason not
looking for work ill or disabled.
Do you have a physical, mental,
or other health condition which
limits the kind or amount of
work you can do?
Do you have difficulty with one
or more ADLs or lADLs, or
have a learning disability,
Alzheimers/dementia, an
emotional condition, or use a
wheelchair?d
Severely disabled are the subset
of yes respondents to the
question above who are unable
to perform one or more of the
ADL or IADL activities.*1
Aged 25 to 61
Men
Women
Aged 62 and over
Men
Women
Aged 25 to 61
Men
Women
Aged 21 to 64
Men
Women
Aged 65 and over
Men
Women
Aged 65 and over
Men
Women
9.2
10.6
23.0
38.1
8.1
7.8
11.7
11.6
50.9
56.0
29.1
37.4
a Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
b. Current Population Survey (CPS).
c Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) as reported in McNeil (1993). 
d. Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) include tasks such as walking, eating, and bathing, Instru 
mental Activities of Daily Living (lADLs) include tasks such as shopping and working.
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men and women, respectively, aged 21 to 64. 6 Unlike the PSID or CPS 
survey question, the SIPP explicitly includes mental health as a work- 
limiting condition, as can be seen in table 1. This more explicit ques 
tion might explain why the population captured by the SIPP is larger.
Our prevalence rate calculations for those aged 62 and older are also 
based on the single PSID work-limit question. Thus, we would expect 
our estimates of disability among those aged 62 and older to be lower 
than those from the SIPP, where more general questions about health 
and functional status are asked. Among men aged 62 and over, we esti 
mate that 23 percent have a disability. McNeil (1993), using a broader 
health- and function-limitation question in the SIPP, estimates a 50.9 
percent prevalence rate among men aged 65 and over, of whom 29.1 
percent are "severely" disabled. Our estimate seems to correspond to 
McNeil's severe measure. The same pattern holds for women.
Although estimates of the size of this population fluctuate across 
data sets, the PSID seems to capture a population with disabilities 
between those defined by the CPS and SIPP data. These results suggest 
that the PSID is a reasonable source of data for studying the effects of 
disability on working-age adults.
The Importance of Employment to the Working-Age Population 
with Disabilities
A Cross-Sectional View
To understand the impact of employment policies on the diverse 
population with disabilities, it is important to see how successfully 
people of working age with disabilities are integrated into the labor 
force. Table 2 uses data from the 1989 PSID response-nonresponse file 
to measure labor force participation and public disability or retirement 
transfer receipt of people with disabilities prior to the passage of the 
ADA. Past studies of the "disabled" population have concentrated on 
that part of the population with disabilities receiving Social Security 
benefits or working less than full-time because of a health-related 
impairment. (See, for example, Haveman and Wolfe 1990; Burkhauser, 
Haveman, and Wolfe 1993.) Table 2 shows that, in 1988, this definition
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would have excluded over a third of the male population with disabili 
ties, who both worked full-time and received no disability-related 
transfers [43.0 * (1-.159)] and more than one-sixth of the female popu 
lation. It is only among the older population, where full-time work 
among people with disabilities is rare, that such limited definitions 
capture the majority of people with disabilities.
While full-time work remains less common among the working-age 
population with disabilities than it is among those without disabilities 
using our broader definition, we still find that it is an extremely impor 
tant activity that belies the notion that people with disabilities do not 
work. Among working-age men with disabilities, two of every three 
worked in the labor market, and 43 percent worked full-time in 1988. 
Even among the men with disabilities who worked part-time, there was 
a major commitment to work. The average hours worked by men with 
disabilities employed part time was over 1,000 per year. Only 38 per 
cent of men with disabilities received a disability transfer payment. 
The patterns are similar for women. In 1988, more than one-half of 
women with disabilities worked. Comparing those with and without 
disabilities, table 2 verifies that people with disabilities worked less, 
but it also shows that, even prior to the passage of the ADA, a majority 
of both men and women (aged 25 to 61) with disabilities worked at 
least part time and a large fraction worked full time.
However, this finding does not suggest that pathologies cannot result 
in serious employment limitations or that health never prevents work. 
Approximately one-third of working-age men and almost one-half of 
working-age women with a disability had no labor earnings in 1988. 
Among this subgroup of the population with disabilities, nearly 70 per 
cent of men and 43 percent of women received a disability transfer 
payment in that year.
In table 3, we look more closely at the differences in economic well- 
being and work between the populations with and without disabilities. 
Since we are interested in examining the relative position of those with 
disabilities within the context of public policy, we measure economic 
status both in the absence of government taxes and transfers (before 
government income) and in their presence (after government income). 7 
We compute household income by combining all sources available to 
the household. To account for differences in family size, we apply the 
equivalence scale weighting factor contained in the U.S. Bureau of the
Table 2. Labor Force Participation and Transfer Receipt among People with and without Disabilities in 1988
Aged 25 to 61
Men
Total population13
Percent of total population:
Percent receiving public 
disability or retirement 
transfers0
Percent working
Labor force activity.
Percent engaged in full-time 
workd
Average hours
Percent receiving public 
disability or retirement 
transfers0
Percent engaged in part-time 
worke
Average hours
Percent receiving public 
disability or retirement 
transfers0
Percent not workmgf
With 
disabilities9
4,778,859
9.2
38.0
65.0
43.0
2,263
15.9
22.0
1,094
33.6
35.0
Without 
disabilities
46,999,206
90.8
2.9
97.5
83.6
2,398
2.5
13.9
1,267
4.5
2.5
Women
With 
disabilities3
6,491,730
10.6
25.8
52.1
18.7
2,224
8.7
33.4
1,025
11.1
47.9
Without 
disabilities
54,845,708
89.4
4.4
80.5
42.5
2,195
3.3
38.0
1,141
4.7
19.5
Aged 62 and above
Men
With 
disabilities9
4,686,946
34.0
95.4
13.4
3.5
2,583
37.5
9.9
727
88.7
86.6
Without 
disabilities
9,084,164
66.0
79.0
38.1
19.1
2,334
25.8
19.0
870
84.9
61.9
Women
With 
disabilities3
7,735,634
38.1
95.7
5.4
1.5
2,323
41.6
3.9
768
79.0
94.6
Without 
disabilities
12,572,785
61.9
87.1
21.1
4.5
2,069
27.0
16.7
896
70.2
78.8
Percent receiving public
disability or retirement
transfers0_____________68.0_____92_____428_____64_____98.5_____93.6_____97.2_____94.1 
SOURCE: 1989 response-nonresponse file of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Sample is weighted to reflect population values, 
a. People who reported a physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount of work they could do in both 1988 and 1989 
b Population is limited to those aged 25 and older who were either household heads or spouses and were so in both the 1988 and 1989 PSID surveys 
c. Public transfers include Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Veterans Disability Benefits, Workers' Compensation, and 
Social Security Retirement Insurance
d. People who worked at least 1,820 hours in 1988 (35 hours per week) 
e People who worked at least 52 hours but no more than 1,820 hours in 1988. 
f People who worked less than 52 hours in 1988.
Table 3. Economic Well-Being and Employment of Working-Age Men and Women with and without Disabilities
With disabilities11
Percent working positive hoursc
Median labor earnings'1
Median before government income3
Median after government income6
Income-to-needs ratio of median
personf
Number of observations
65.0
11,513
20,307
20,343
2.93
366
Men3
Without 
disabilities
97.5
32,237
31,635
27,069
3.90
3,524
Ratio With disabilities11
0.67
0.36
0.64
0.75
0.75
52.1
576
18,786
18,705
2.70
433
Women3
Without 
disabilities
80.5
12,664
27,600
24,102
3.48
4,111
Ratio
0.65
0.05
0.68
0.78
0.78
SOURCE 1989 response-nonresponse file of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Sample is weighted to reflect population values.
a. Population is limited to those aged 25 to 61 who were either household heads or spouses in 1988 and 1989
b. People who reported a physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount of work they could do in both 1988 and 1989.
c People who worked at least 52 hours in 1988.
d Median labor earnings includes zero earnings Earnings are in 1991 dollars
e. Before and after government incomes are adjusted for household size using the equivalence scale implied by the U.S. poverty line. Income is in 1991
dollars See appendix table 1 for the weights by household size.
f. The mcome-to-needs ratio is computed as equivalence-weigh ted postgovernment household income divided by the 1991 one-person poverty threshold of
$6,932
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Census poverty measures to each individual household income (see 
appendix table 1 for the weighting factors). Labor earnings include all 
income from labor market sources, including primary and secondary 
jobs, professional practices, and bonus income. 8
As reported previously, in table 3 we find that both men and women 
with disabilities work less than those without disabilities but that work, 
nonetheless, is still very common. Both working-age men and women 
with disabilities were about two-thirds as likely to have been employed 
in 1988 as their counterparts without disabilities. Because men with 
disabilities are less likely to have a job, and more likely to be employed 
part-time when working, the median working-age male with a disabil 
ity in the United States received only 36 percent of the labor earnings 
of his able-bodied counterpart. The median working-age woman with a 
disability had an even smaller ratio, 5 percent. Hence, other private 
sources of income, as well as government taxes and transfers, have a 
substantial gap to fill in order to assure that the household economic 
well-being of those with disabilities does not fall below that of their 
counterparts without disabilities.
As can be seen in row 3, the before government household-size- 
adjusted income of both men and women with disabilities was about 
two-thirds that of their counterparts without disabilities. 9 This shows 
that, prior to accounting for government policy, other sources of house 
hold income have made up a large part of the initial gap caused by dif 
ferences in labor earnings. Government policy then narrows the 
remaining income gap. When taxes are removed and government trans 
fers included, the gap narrows to around 25 percent. 10 These findings 
suggest that, on average, the economic well-being of working-age men 
and women with disabilities in the United States is substantially 
improved by other private sources of household income as well as by 
government tax and transfer policies but that the large difference in 
labor earnings between those with and without disabilities is not fully 
offset. 11
A Multiperiod View
The previous tables show substantial differences between the labor 
earnings and economic well-being of working-age people with and 
without disabilities in 1988. However, such cross-sectional analysis
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may not accurately portray the impact that a disability has on individu 
als. First, cross-sectional analysis cannot distinguish between differ 
ences caused by the onset of a work-limiting health condition and 
differences that may have existed prior to onset. From the perspective 
of policy makers, this distinction is important. Economic disparities 
that exist prior to the onset of a disability may not be eliminated by dis 
ability-based programs. In addition, cross-sectional "snapshots" of the 
population with disabilities reveal little about the transition to disabil 
ity, the opportunities for intervention, or the time frame during which 
individual economic well-being declines. Finally, as Bane and Ell wood 
(1986) have shown, cross-sectional data oversample "long-stayers." 
Thus, any cross section of people with disabilities will have a dispro 
portionate percentage of individuals whose disability occurred long 
ago. If work and economic well-being deteriorate as a spell of disabil 
ity lengthens, then cross-sectional samples may overstate the impact 
that disability initially has on economic well-being. 12
In table 4, we try to address these points by providing a multiperiod 
view of disability. We use the 1970-to-1989 waves of the PSID to fol 
low the life course of men and women with an onset of disability after 
their 25th but before then" 61st birthday. The onset of disability is cap 
tured by requiring individuals to have two periods of no reported dis 
ability followed by at least two periods of disability. Applying these 
criteria over 20 years of PSID data, we collected a sample of 725 men 
and 303 women. 13 Each of these men and women experienced the onset 
of a disability between 1970 and 1988. Some members of our sample 
experienced multiple spells of disability over the 20 years. However, 
since we are trying to capture experiences following the first occur 
rence of a disability, we excluded subsequent spells from our analy 
sis. 14 We use this longitudinal sample to examine the labor market 
activity and economic well-being of individuals prior to, during, and 
after disability onset. By examining these transitions, we hope to get a 
more accurate picture of the impact that the initial onset of disability 
has on work and on individual and family economic well-being.
As table 4 shows, two years prior to the onset of their health-related 
work limitation, 90.4 percent of men and 67.3 percent of women 
worked. In subsequent rows, we see that, after the onset of the disabil 
ity, there is a decline in work. As was true in table 3, labor earnings are 
more seriously affected. For men, median labor earnings fall from
Table 4. Economic Changes Following the Onset of a Disability among Working-Age Men and Women in the 
United States, 1970-1989
Mena'b
Onset of disability
Two years prior
One year prior
Year of disability event
One year after
Two years after
Median percentage changes from
One year prior to one year after
disability
One year prior to two years
after disability
Percent 
working
positive
hours
90.4
90.8
87.2
72.3
68.2
Equivalent median 
1991 dollarsd
Median
labor
earnings0
21,215
21,543
18,760
13,220
11,798
-24.0
-31.0
Before
government
income
17,347
18,381
16,434
14,567
13,930
-9.7
-12.1
After
government
income
16,224
16,812
16,160
15,739
15,406
-2.6
-3.7
Percent 
working
positive
hours
67.3
68.0
700
63.6
57.6
Womena'b
Equivalent median 
1991 dollars*1
Median
labor
earnings'
5,063
6,582
5,995
3,277
1,699
-41.0
-61.7
Before
governmen
t income
18,247
19,921
19,827
18,446
20,251
1.7
5.5
After
government
income
16,842
17,370
17,923
17,859
18,537
50
7.6
SOURCE: 1989 response-nonresponse file of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
a. The sample is based upon data from the 1970-1989 waves of the PSID The sample includes household heads and spouses who reported two consecutive 
periods of no disability followed by two consecutive periods of disability, who were between the ages of 25 and 61 at onset A period of disability is one in 
which the respondent reported that a physical or nervous condition limits the type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do. 
b. The sample size for men in the first four periods is 725 It is 677 in the fifth period (two years after onset). The sample size for women in the first four 
periods is 303 It is 236 in the fifth period (two years after onset). The sample size is smaller for women because the PSID did not ask about spouses' dis 
ability status until 1981
c. Median labor earnings includes zero earnings Earnings are in 1991 dollars
d. Before and after government incomes are adjusted for household size using the equivalence scale implied by the U S poverty line. See appendix table 1 
for the weights by household size. Income-to-needs ratios can be computed by dividing equivalent median income by the 1991 one-person poverty thresh 
old of $6,932
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$21,543 the year before onset to $13,220 the year following onset. 
Among women, median labor earnings fall from $6,582 one year prior 
to onset to $3,277 one year after onset. The final two rows of table 3 
show the median percentage change in labor earnings and family 
income between one year prior and one and two years after the onset of 
disability. The median change in labor earnings for men is a decline of 
24 percent one year after onset and 31 percent two years after onset. 
For women, the median drops are even larger. However, while employ 
ment falls following the onset of a disability, the median man or 
woman experiences a much smaller drop in labor earnings than is 
implied by the cross-sectional results in table 3.
Moreover, the drops in labor earnings that are observed after onset 
do not carry over to household income. We find median real house 
hold-size-adjusted income does not fall by the same amount as labor 
earnings for either men or women immediately following the onset of a 
disability. This is true for both before and after government income. 
For men, before government income drops from $18,381 one year 
before onset to $14,567 one year after onset. 15 For women, the values 
are $19,921 and $18,446, respectively. After government income, 
changes are even smaller. When we look at the median percentage 
change, which describes the change in income for the median individ 
ual, we find that among men, before government income falls by 9.7 
percent and after government income falls by 2.6 percent during the 
period one year before and one year after onset. Over this time, the 
median percentage change for women is positive, with an increase in 
before government income of 1.7 percent and an increase in after gov 
ernment income of 5 percent. These results suggest that the picture cast 
by cross-sectional data, one in which individuals and their families 
face precipitous declines in economic well-being following the onset 
of a disability, do not represent the short-term consequences of disabil 
ity for the typical individual.
In table 5, we use our longitudinal PSID sample to further examine 
the pattern of work and economic well-being of men and women fol 
lowing the onset of a disability. We report the cumulative "risk" of 
occurrence of certain events after the start of a disability. 16 Since our 
findings were not significantly different when we segmented our sam 
ple by gender, we combine men and women and separate the sample 
by age at disability onset.
Table 5. Cumulative Occurrence of Economic Consequences Following the Onset of a Disability
Years since
onset of a
disability
1
2
3
4
5
Median years
to outcome
Stop working3
Age
25-50
0.15
(0.013)
0.26
(0.016)
0.32
(0.017)
0.38
(0.019)
0.44
(0.019)
5+
51-61
0.24
(0 023)
0.35
(0 026)
0.42
(0.027)
0.49
( 0.028)
053
(0.028)
5
Return to work3
Age
25-50
028
(0.025)
0.46
(0.029)
052
(0.030)
0.58
(0.031)
0.61
(0.032)
3
51-61
0.14
(0.021)
0.19
(0.025)
0.22
(0.027)
0.24
(0.028)
0.28
(0031)
5+
Fall into povertyb
Age
25-50
0.08
(0.019)
0.13
(0.012)
0.17
(0.013)
020
(0015)
0.22
(0016)
5+-
51-61
0.08
(0.012)
0.13
(0.016)
0.17
(0.018)
0.20
(0.019)
0.22
(0.020)
5+
Recovery from 
Economic recovery0 disability*1
Age
25-50
046
( 0016)
0.63
(0.016)
072
(0.016)
0.77
(0.016)
0.84
(0.016)
2
51-61
0.46
(0 022)
0.57
(0.022)
064
(0 023)
0.69
(0.023)
0.75
(0 024)
2
Age
25-50
f
0.02
(0.005)
0.04
(0.007)
0.13
(0.013)
0.13
(0013)
5+
51-61
f
0.01
(0 003)
0.02
(0.006)
0.07
(0012)
007
(0.013)
5+
Receive transfers6
Age
25-50
0.14
(0.016)
0.22
(0.019)
0.30
(0.022)
0.36
(0.024)
0.45
(0.027)
5+
51-61
0.19
(0.021)
029
(0.024)
0.40
(0.027)
0.53
(0.029)
0.70
(0 029)
4
SOURCE. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
NOTE Values represent the probability that an outcome has occurred by time t. Values in parentheses are standard errors assuming simple random sam 
pling. Sample is based upon data from the 1970-1989 waves of the PSID. Sample includes household heads and spouses who reported two consecutive 
penods of no disability followed by two consecutive penods of disability and who were between the ages of 25 and 61 at onset. A penod of disability is one 
in which the respondent reported that a physical or nervous condition limits the type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do. 
a Excludes individuals who were not working one year before onset. Stop working means not working for one full year, 
b. Poverty calculated using the U S. poverty thresholds and the official income definition 
c Includes individuals who expenence no loss of income at the onset of a disability.
d Recovery occurs when a respondent reports that he/she does not have a physical or nervous condition that limits work.
e Excludes individuals who receive transfers in the year before onset. Transfers include Social Secunty Disability Insurance, Supplemental Secunty 
Income, Veterans Disability Benefits, Workers' Compensation, and Social Secunty Retirement Insurance, 
f Not applicable.
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In the first two data columns of table 5, we track the subsequent 
employment history of men and women who were employed in the 
year before the onset of their disability. We disaggregate our sample by 
the age of individuals when they first experienced their disability. Our 
younger group was aged 25 to 50 at onset. Our older group was aged 
51 to 61. The values in columns 1 and 2 show how many years elapse 
before members of these age groups first experience an entire year of 
not working following onset of a disability. 17 (As in our other tables, 
our definition of not working includes anyone working fewer than 52 
hours per year.) In the first year following the onset of a disability, 15 
percent of people between the ages of 25 and 50 have experienced a 
year of not working. In our older sample, this holds true for nearly one- 
quarter. After two years, 26 percent of our younger sample and 35 per 
cent of our older sample have experienced a year of not working. At 
the end of five years, nearly 45 percent of younger workers and over 50 
percent of older workers have had a year of no work since the onset of 
disability.
Such findings suggest that the onset of a disability does have a sub 
stantial impact on subsequent employment. For older workers, the risk 
of experiencing a year of not working is significantly higher than for 
younger workers. The median or typical older person in our sample 
will have experienced at least one year of not working five years after 
the onset of his or her disability. For younger workers, however, the 
median person has maintained yearly employment over the entire five 
years.
While 44 percent of younger workers have not worked for at least 
one year in the five years following disability onset, some of these 
workers may have returned to work. Columns 3 and 4 of data in table 5 
show the share of those in our sample who stop working for at least 
one year and return to work. Among younger workers who stop work 
for one year after onset, more than one-quarter return to work the next 
year, and nearly one-half return to work after two years. The pattern is 
very different among older workers. Only about one-quarter have ever 
returned to work five years following their initial employment stop 
page. While the median younger person who leaves work for at least 
one year following a disability has returned to market work three years 
later, the median older worker is still not working five years later and
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may have moved permanently onto the disability or retirement transfer 
rolls.
The patterns in the first four data columns of table 5 suggest that the 
majority of workers maintain a link to the labor force for several years 
after a disability begins. In the next section, we will speculate on the 
effectiveness of public policies aimed at extending the period of work 
following the onset of a disability.
The consequences of the onset of a disability on economic well- 
being are measured in the next two columns, which report the number 
of years following a disability before younger and older individuals fall 
into poverty, excluding those who were in poverty the year before 
onset. Although poverty experience increases over time, less than one- 
quarter of the population ever experiences it. Only about 8 percent of 
the populations of older and younger workers fall into poverty in the 
first year following disability onset. Moreover, fewer than one in four 
do so after five years. The drops in employment traced out in columns 
1 and 2 do not translate into poverty for the majority of individuals 
who experience a disability. Still, five years following onset of a dis 
ability, about one-quarter of our population has had at least one year of 
poverty.
Table 5 shows that a substantial proportion of people experience a 
work reduction and/or poverty spell at some point following the onset 
of a disability even though the median experience with respect to 
income loss (as reported in table 4) following onset is relatively mod 
est. Columns 7 and 8 in table 5 suggest an explanation for these small 
changes in median income. Fully 46 percent of our sample of younger 
and older workers have at least as much income in the year following 
the onset of a disability as they had in the year prior to the disability. 
By the second year following onset, more than one-half have experi 
enced a year of household income at least as high as in the year before 
onset of their disabilities. Five years after onset, nearly 85 percent of 
younger workers and 75 percent of older workers have had a year of 
household income better than or equal to their pre-onset income.
To sort out part of the heterogeneous patterns of income and work 
following the onset of a disability, we look at two other trends for this 
population. The first is recovery from disability. Since our definition 
requires individuals to report having a health condition that affects 
their ability to work for two consecutive years, no one recovers in the
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first year following onset of a disability. However, recovery is possible 
thereafter. Subsequent recovery can explain only a small part of the 
experience of economic recovery reported in the previous columns. 
Only 2 percent of our younger sample and 1 percent of our older sam 
ple recover in the second year following onset. After five years, only 13 
percent of our younger sample and 7 percent of our older sample have 
experienced a recovery year.
A more important reason for economic recovery is the growth in the 
receipt of government transfer payments. In the first year following 
onset, 14 percent of our younger sample and 19 percent of our older 
sample begin to receive disability or retirement transfers. This closely 
matches the share of our samples who stop working in that first year 
after onset. After five years, 45 percent of our younger sample and 70 
percent of our older sample are receiving transfers. Because at onset a 
large number of our older population is within five years of age 62, the 
earliest age for Social Security retirement benefits, undoubtedly many 
of the older transfer recipients are receiving early retirement rather 
than disability payments.
Table 5 shows that patterns of work stoppage, poverty, and transfer 
receipt following the onset of a disability are relatively complex. The 
vast majority of people with disabilities do not stop working immedi 
ately following the onset of a disability. A majority of younger workers 
and almost one-half of older workers are continuously employed dur 
ing the five years following onset. The transition onto government 
transfer programs is also not instantaneous. Less than 20 percent of 
people with disabilities receive such transfers one year after onset, and 
a majority of younger workers do not do so even after five years. How 
ever, the great majority of older workers who experience the onset of a 
disability are receiving either retirement or disability transfers five 
years later.
Once one has a disability, it is relatively rare to experience a health 
recovery. Only about 13 percent of younger workers and 7 percent of 
older workers have done so after five years. Somewhat surprisingly, 
while it is normal for people to continue working for several years fol 
lowing the onset of a disability, it is also common for younger individ 
uals to return to work after a year of not working. In contrast, only a
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minority of older people return to work after not working for at least 
one year.
Economic well-being is even more complex. The vast majority of 
people who experience a disability are able to match or improve their 
economic well-being in the year before onset at least once over the first 
five years following onset: the majority do so after two years. However, 
some individuals also experience substantial drops in economic well- 
being at some time following onset, with over 20 percent falling into 
poverty for at least one year of the five-year period.
All of this suggests that the time period between onset of a health 
condition and either exit from the labor market or admittance onto the 
disability or retirement rolls is longer than first imagined. What is less 
clear is whether the time between these events is completely health 
driven or whether it can be influenced by employee and employer 
actions and, even more importantly from a policy perspective, by gov 
ernment actions.
Consequently, in order to address these questions, we shift our focus 
in the next section from an analysis of work and economic well-being 
to an evaluation of the existing research on the impact of the ADA. To 
assess the impact that this legislation might have on the population 
with disabilities, we combine data from the Health and Retirement Sur 
vey (HRS) regarding the pre-ADA prevalence of employer accommo 
dations with research on the influence of accommodation on post-onset 
employment duration.
Maintaining People with Disabilities in the Workforce
In the previous section, we report that the onset of a disability is 
synonymous neither with a long absence from the workforce (at least 
one year) nor, at least for younger workers, with permanent withdrawal 
from work following an absence. In this section, we review the evi 
dence on what prolongs duration on the job and then suggest ways 
government policy may affect employment. As was the case in our 
other sections, all of the experiences reported here occurred prior to the 
passage of the ADA.
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When a pathology begins to affect one's ability to work, important 
job-related decisions must be made by both the worker and his or her 
employer. These decisions may also be influenced by government poli 
cies. The relative rewards of continued work versus applying for trans 
fer benefits will be considered by the worker. In like manner, an 
employer's willingness to accommodate the worker will be influenced 
by the social institutions and legal mandates within which the firm 
must operate.This is not to suggest that all workers can or will trans 
form themselves into candidates for disability transfer benefits. How 
ever, those with some work limitation who are having difficulty with 
their current job or who are no longer working will be influenced by 
the relative rewards provided by the disability or retirement transfer 
system in deciding whether to try to remain in the labor force or to 
apply for such benefits.
We are also not suggesting that all those with disabilities can con 
tinue to work. Some have work limitations so severe that continued 
employment is impossible and a movement onto the transfer rolls is 
inevitable. However, for others who experience a pathology that affects 
their ability to work, the length of time they stay on the job depends on 
the social institutions that are in place as well as on their specific con 
dition. It is this subset of the population with disabilities that public 
policy can influence. Pro-work measures such as accommodation or 
rehabilitation can affect an individual's ability and desire to continue 
working, as opposed to becoming additions to the disability benefit or 
welfare systems.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In the spirit of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, the ADA 
attempts to provide people with disabilities the same access to employ 
ment as people without disabilities, thus extending protection from 
employment discrimination to those with disabilities. Title I of the 
ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to 
workers with disabilities unless this would cause an undue hardship on 
the operation of business. On July 26, 1992, all employers of 25 or 
more workers were subject to its rules. On July 26, 1994, the standards 
of antidiscrimination were extended to all employers of 15 or more 
workers. However, when considering the actual influence of this Act on
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the work of people with disabilities, it is important to recognize when 
the law is most likely to be used and by whom.
It is unlikely that any of the 3.9 million persons receiving disability 
benefits or the 3.3 million blind or disabled adults under age 65 receiv 
ing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in December 1994 
will return to work (U.S. Social Security Administration 1995). 
Despite some efforts to encourage reentry into the labor market, by 
extending the eligibility period for Medicaid and Medicare benefits 
and allowing labor earnings during a transitionary period before ineli- 
gibility occurs, only a tiny percentage of those who go into these pro 
grams ever return to the workforce. 18
The same is likely to be the case for those who have applied for dis 
ability insurance or welfare programs and have been denied entrance. 
The legal process to official disability can be lengthy. Both those who 
succeed and those who fail to gain entrance to the disability rolls have 
already traveled a long road. To be eligible for benefits, a worker must 
not have performed any "substantial gainful activity" for at least five 
months and must be expected not to do so for at least a year. However, 
lack of work for five months or more is only the beginning of the pro 
cess.
A combination of reductions in disability determination staff, from 
13,302 in 1986 to 11,168 in 1991, and the growth in applications 
fueled by the recession of the early 1990s increased the time needed to 
process claims, from 64 days in 1989 to 91 days in April 1992. Access 
time has been estimated at 213 days, as of fiscal year 1993 (Beedon 
1993). This is only the first step in the elimination process, and it does 
not include delays in a final determination attributable to appeals. 
Before all potential appeals are exhausted, the ultimate eligibility out 
come for those who are denied benefits at every step can take several 
years to unfold. Of course, reapplication is then possible.
For individuals with disabilities who are not employed throughout 
this process, a return to work may be quite unlikely, even if they are 
ultimately rejected by the system (see Parsons 1991 for a fuller discus 
sion). Hence, deciding to remain on the job after a health condition first 
affects performance may bear little resemblance to the decision to 
work of those who have long since left the job they held when their 
work impairment began. For those who have already left employment, 
it will be difficult to return even with the ADA. The hope provided by
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the ADA is that intervention at the point when a health condition starts 
to affect job performance will delay job exit, as well as application for 
disability benefits. Thus, the ADA will actively reduce transfer depen 
dency, not so much by increasing exits from the disability rolls, but by 
reducing the risk at any moment that the onset of a pathology will lead 
to job loss and entrance onto the disability rolls.
Does Accommodation Prolong Work?
Since the initial effective date for the employment provisions of the 
ADA was July 26, 1992, it is far too early to determine the law's influ 
ence on accommodation. However, an important new data set begun in 
1992 provides a glimpse of how workers with disabilities in that year 
were accommodated when their health condition first affected their 
ability to work.
Tables 6 and 7 use data from the HRS to show the pattern of disabil 
ity onset and accommodation experience of a random sample of men 
and women aged 51 to 61 in 1992. The population of people with dis 
abilities, as before, is based on self-reported work-limitation questions. 
As is the case with the PSID, the HRS asks respondents, "Do you have 
any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of 
paid work you can do?" Because in 1995 only one wave of data was 
available to researchers, we are unable to apply our cross-sectional 
rule, two consecutive years of reported disability, to distinguish short- 
term from long-term health problems. Our alternative approach is to 
exclude "short-term" health problems by not including respondents 
who report that their disability just began. Thus, our sample of people 
with disabilities from the HRS includes all individuals who answer yes 
to the work-limits question and report retrospectively that the onset of 
disability was at least one year ago. Using this definition, we have a 
sample of 2,076 individuals with disabilities, consisting of 947 men 
and 1,129 women. Most importantly, while all of these individuals had 
a health condition that affected their ability to work in 1992, the onset 
of their impairments and their employers' responses to them predate 
the implementation of the ADA.
As previously noted, the ADA is likely to be of greater benefit to 
those individuals employed at the onset of their impairment. However, 
as the data in table 6 show, this includes most people with disabilities.
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Nearly 70 percent of the men and women in the HRS with a disability 
in 1992 report that their impairment began during their work life. 
Moreover, as the results in table 2 show, the majority of working-age 
people with disabilities remain in the labor market and do not receive 
disability transfers. These percentages suggest that, for a large fraction 
of people with disabilities, the ADA may be able to extend work life 
and to delay entry onto disability rolls.
Table 6. The Timing of the Onset of Work-Limiting Health Impairments
Number of observations
Onset of impairment
Before work life
During work life
After work life
Never worked
Total
Total
2,076
12.3
68.4
8.2
11.1
100.0
Men
947
(percentage)
9.5
81.0
4.5
5.0
100.0
Women
1,129
14.6
57.7
11.3
16.4
100.0
SOURCE: Beta Release of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 1992 Sample is weighted to 
reflect population values
NOTE. Includes persons in the HRS sample born between January 1, 1931, and December 31, 
1941, who reported that they are currently impaired and have been so for at least one year.
In table 7, we examine the incidence of accommodation prior to the 
implementation of the ADA among individuals who were employed at 
the onset of their impairment. 19 In this pre-ADA sample, about one per 
son in five was accommodated by his or her employer at the time 
health first began affecting the individual's ability to work. Better-edu 
cated workers were significantly more likely to be accommodated than 
less well-educated workers. Somewhat surprisingly, older workers 
were more likely to be accommodated than younger workers (34.9 per 
cent versus 19.3 percent). However, no significant differences are 
observed by gender or firm size.
Direct employer accommodation most frequently came in the form 
of a change in job duties or schedule and someone to help, but varied 
by firm size and, to a lesser extent, by gender and education. Accom 
modated workers in small firms (fewer than 15 employees) were more 
likely to receive changes in schedule and shorter work days and less
Table 7. Incidence of Employer Accommodation Following the Onset of a Health Impairment
Gender
Number of observations
Percent accommodated
Total
1,209
22.2
Men
659
22 1
Women
550
22.4
Age at onset
Younger 
than 50
993
19.3**
50 and 
older
216
34 9**
Education
High 
school 
dropout
431
18.2**
High 
school 
graduate
778
24.1**
Itol4
232
21 8
Firm size
15 to 499
112
22.6
500 and 
over
865
223
Percent of those accommodated
by type of policy:
Someone to help
Shorter work day
Change in schedule
More breaks
Special transportation
Different job duties
Training or new skills
Special equipment
Assistance with tasks
Emotional support
Medical care
Medical leave
Time off
Parking
384
312
336
38.5
4.9
46.5
12.7
11.7
5.6
21
63
22
4.1
1.5
37.5
30.9
31.8
392
47
519*
10.4*
13.2
6.6
1.4
7.8
10
38
00*
39.4
31.5
35.8
37.7
5.1
40.0
15.5
9.9
4.5
2.8
4.5
3.7
4.5
3.4
37.8
30.5
32.5
38.0
5.1
46.8
13.3
9.7
4.4
1.5
7.5**
1.8
4.4
1.5
39.7
328
36.2
39.7
4.3
45.7
11.2
16.4
8.6
3.4
3.4
3.0
3.4
1.7
466**
267
32.5
31.6
58
500
14.6
15.0
6.8
1.0
4.4
1.0
1.9
0.0
354
328
340
410
45
452
12.0
10.5
5.2
2.4
7.0
2.6
4.9
2.1
399
45.8**
536**
484
52
327**
9.2
6.5*
7.8
2.6
6.5
1.0
2.6
0.0
44.6
27.0
29.7
45.9
0.0
58.1
13.5
8.1
8.1
0.0
1.4
8.1
8.1
0.0
371
277
28.6
34.8
5.4
48.7*
13.6
13.6
4.7
2.2
6.9
1.8
4.0
2.2
SOURCE Beta Release of the Health and Retirement Survey (1992) Sample is weighted to reflect population values.
NOTE Sample includes all persons aged 51 to 61 m 1992 currently impaired and impaired while employed by someone other than themselves.
*Statistically significant at the .05 level.
**Statistically significant at the .10 level
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likely to receive different job duties. Workers with less than a high 
school education were more frequently provided with someone to help 
them than were those with at least a high school degree. Finally, men 
were more likely than women to get different job duties following an 
impairment but were less likely to receive training or new skills. Other 
forms of accommodation, such as special equipment or special trans 
portation, were less likely to be provided to any group or in any setting. 
In other research, Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995) used data 
from the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work to investigate the extent 
to which individuals continued with their employer following the onset 
of a health condition that limited their ability to work. The authors 
found that 30 percent of men with disabilities in 1978 had been accom 
modated by employers subsequent to the development of a work-limit 
ing health condition. By simulating the results of their hazard model 
for an otherwise average worker who was accommodated, the 
researchers estimated that the worker would continue on the job 
another 7.5 years. For the same worker who was not accommodated, 
they estimated a continued tenure of 2.6 years. Table 8, which comes 
from Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995), shows the simulated distri 
bution of employment exits that their hazard model predicts for men 
after the development of health conditions. For those without accom 
modation, the prediction is for 76.7 percent to exit within three years. 
In contrast, it takes more than nine years before three-quarters of those 
with accommodation leave their employer. The results from these two 
pre-ADA samples suggest that employers do make accommodations 
for their employees and that this accommodation does prolong work 
life following the onset of a health condition.
The Power of Policy Intervention
Indications are that accommodation can extend employment for 
people with disabilities. The dimensions of this impact, however, must 
be put in perspective. The median age at onset of the health condition 
that limited work in the HRS sample in table 7 was 49. Age 62 is the 
earliest year of eligibility for Social Security benefits. Hence, even if 
accommodation nearly triples postdisability work life to 7.5 years, as 
reported by Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995), this will not keep the
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average person in the workforce until the Social Security early retire 
ment age.
Table 8. Distribution of Expected Job Exits for the Average Male Worker 
with and without Accommodation
Years on the job 
following onset
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
More than 10
With 
accommodation
0.134
0.116
0.100
0.087
0.075
0.065
0.056
0.049
0.042
0.037
0.239
Without 
accommodation
0.386
0.236
0.145
0.089
0.055
0.034
0.021
0.013
0.008
0.005
0.008
SOURCE. Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995)
In addition, for at least two reasons, the Burkhauser, Butler, and 
Kim results probably represent the upper limit of the effect of ADA- 
enforced accommodation. It is unlikely that, prior to the ADA, employ 
ers randomly chose whom they accommodated. In the absence of the 
ADA, a profit-maximizing firm would be more likely to assist those 
whose chance of success per dollar spent on accommodation was high 
est. If successful, the ADA, which requires accommodation unless it 
imposes an undue hardship on the employer, is anticipated to widen the 
scope of accommodation to workers with more significant conditions 
and lower expected success rates. (See Chirikos 1991 for a review of 
the literature on accommodation prior to the passage of the ADA.)
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A second, and potentially more important, concern is whether the 
law will, in fact, increase accommodation significantly from its previ 
ous levels. In 1992, 1.3 million people applied for Social Security Dis 
ability Insurance (DI) benefits, and 0.6 million benefits were awarded. 
In that same year, the adult population on the Blind and Disabled SSI 
program increased by 344,000 or 9.4 percent. In the first 13 months of 
the ADA's existence, July 1992 to August 1993, 14,334 charges were 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
While those numbers do not provide a systematic comparison of the 
relative importance of the ADA, their orders of magnitude suggest that 
more than the ADA will be needed to keep people with disabilities on 
the job.
Conclusions and Policy Considerations
Applying the fuller ADA-based definition, which includes people 
with health impairments and functional limitations regardless of their 
labor market activity or disability benefit receipt, we find that a major 
ity of men and women of working age with disabilities are employed. 
In 1988, over 40 percent of these men and nearly 20 percent of these 
women worked full-time. More men with disabilities worked full-time 
than received disability transfers.
Furthermore, analyses using cross-sectional data tend to understate 
the successful integration into the labor market of people with disabili 
ties. Cross-sectional analyses are limited to comparisons of those with 
and without disabilities at a given moment in time. Using multiperiod 
data for those individuals who first experience a disability after age 25, 
we find much smaller average declines in economic well-being or in 
employment than simple cross-sectional comparisons would imply. 
Our findings suggest that, even before the passage of the ADA, the 
majority of working-age people first experiencing disabilities were 
able to stay in the labor force for four years without a long spell of not 
working (not working for an entire calendar year). The transition onto 
disability transfer rolls was also of about this same duration, at least for 
younger persons. More importantly, even among those who experi-
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enced a full year of not working following the onset of a disability, a 
majority were able to return to work.
Such findings suggest that, for the majority of people who experi 
ence a disability, work continues for a significant period thereafter. 
One possible avenue for reducing the disability transfer rolls in the 
long run may be to put more resources into keeping people with dis 
abilities in the labor force rather than into returning those already on 
the disability rolls to work. This suggests shifting to policies that attack 
the employment problem before individuals begin to receive disability 
transfers.
The ADA is an important example of this focus. It will most likely 
be used to ensure the accommodation of people with disabilities in the 
workforce at the time of disability onset. As we have seen, however, 
accommodation existed before the passage of the ADA, and it is 
unclear how successful this legislation will be in increasing accommo 
dation.
The policy options sketched below are not meant to represent a spe 
cific legislative agenda but to provide a sample of the kind of creative 
pro-work changes in government policy that would increase the likeli 
hood of employment for people with disabilities. Some proposals are 
marginal, while others are radical. Unlike the ADA, all would directly 
affect the government budget, but each is likely to affect employment 
at least as much as the ADA.
Direct Government Subsidies for Accommodation
Prior to passage of the ADA, section 190 of the Internal Revenue 
Code permitted businesses to deduct up to $35,000 for expenses 
incurred in removing physical barriers to access by handicapped and 
elderly individuals. In a revenue-neutral move following passage of the 
ADA, section 190 deductions were reduced to a maximum of $15,000, 
but an "access credit" was permitted, which enables small businesses 
to claim a credit against taxes for one-half of their first $10,000 of eli 
gible costs of complying with the ADA. This extremely modest credit 
was expected to result in an annual revenue loss to the Treasury of less 
than $10 million. (See Schaffer 1991 for a fuller discussion.) This is a 
trivial government expenditure when compared to transfer payments or 
even to current rehabilitation programs. A more controversial strategy
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for increasing accommodation would be for the United States to follow 
the example of European countries where employers who provide 
accommodation and training to workers with handicaps receive gener 
ous government-funded reimbursements. Making government, rather 
than employers, primarily responsible for financing the costs of accom 
modation would shift public policy from the stick of ADA mandates to 
the carrot of accommodation tax credits.
The Earned Income Tax Credit
Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was the single 
most important piece of welfare legislation passed in the first years of 
the Clinton administration. It effectively raised the hourly pay of a 
minimum wage earner with two children in 1996 from $4.25 per hour 
to $5.95 per hour. (See Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn forthcoming for 
a more detailed treatment.) Expanding EITC eligibility to people with 
disabilities who live in low-income households would increase their 
reward for work. This would target government funding to those with 
disabilities and poor job skills, whose current productivity in the pri 
vate sector is not great enough to command wages sufficient for their 
families to reach a minimum living standard.
Education and Job Training
The EITC is an effective method of providing low-wage workers 
who live in or near poverty with greater income until they acquire the 
education, skills, and training to earn higher wages on their own. For 
those with disabilities and low job skills who are capable of work, 
transfer payments tied to wages offer a pro-work alternative to SSI. In 
the longer run, however, the road to higher wages for people with dis 
abilities and low job skills is the same as for those without disabilities 
but with poor job skills. In developing new job and welfare programs, 
policy makers must recognize that most people with disabilities are 
capable of work and should have the same access to job programs and 
the same responsibility to leave the welfare rolls as other Americans.
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Rehabilitation
More substantive changes would shift current U.S. disability policy 
from one primarily driven by transfers to one with a return to work as 
the primary goal. An example of such change would be to require all 
DI or SSI applicants to go through a temporary benefit phase in which 
they were evaluated for rehabilitation, as is done in Sweden and Ger 
many. Linking rehabilitation to federal disability transfer programs is 
especially important given the drop in age and the changing mix of 
conditions of new beneficiaries.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify the optimal mix of 
policies and programs to best integrate people with disabilities into 
society. What this paper does recognize is that the goals of economic 
independence and full participation in market employment are signifi 
cant and that accommodation will extend the work life of those with 
disabilities. It is far from clear if the mere passage of the ADA will 
ensure the achievement of these important social goals. It is more 
likely that some mix of pro-work policies will prove necessary to sup 
plement current approaches.
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Appendix
Equivalence Weights
Appendix table 1 lists the equivalence weights used in our estimations of the 
relative economic well-being of people with and without disabilities. These 
weights are derived from the official U.S. Department of Commerce poverty 
thresholds for families of different sizes.
Appendix Table 1. U.S. Equivalence Weights for Adjusting Household 
Income
Household size Weight
Single person 1.00
Couple 1.29
Couple plus child 1.55
Couple plus two children 1.95
Couple plus three children 2.29
Couple plus four children 2.57
Couple plus five children 2.88
Couple plus six children 3.16
Couple plus seven children 3.87
NOTE. The equivalence weights for the United States are denved from the Bureau of the Census 
poverty thresholds, U.S. Department of Commerce (1991).
Spell Lengths From a Cross-Sectional Draw
As Bane and Ellwood (1986) point out, cross-sectional draws from a popu 
lation will oversample individuals in the midst of longer spells. In appendix ta 
ble 2, we show the proportion of individuals captured in our 1989 cross- 
sectional estimates whose spell of disability began in 1988, 18.7 percent for 
men and 31.6 percent for women, and the percentage whose spells began at 
some earlier point in time. More than 80 percent of men and about 70 percent 
of women in the cross-sectional sample had spells of disability that began ear 
lier than 1988. Overall, about 40 percent of the men and 30 percent of the wom 
en in our cross-sectional sample reported spells of disability of more than five 
years. The average spell length for persons in this sample is 6.6 years for men
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and 4.8 years for women. If the patterns of work and economic well-being 
change over the course of a disability spell, cross-sectional estimates will not 
accurately portray the experiences of the average individual after the onset of 
a disability.
Appendix Table 2. Distribution of Spells among the Population with 
Disabilities Captured by the Cross-Sectional 
Definition from Table 2
Population with disabilities3
Number of observations
Spell length (years)
2
3-5
6-10
More than 10
Average spell length0
Men
336
18.7
39.3
19.8
22.2
6.6
Womenb
443
(percent)
31.6
38.8
24.7
4.9
4.8
SOURCE. Panel Study of Income Dynamics
a Answered yes to the question, "Do you have a nervous or physical condition that limits the 
amount or type of work you can do7" in 1988 and 1989.
b The distnbution of spell lengths for women is influenced by the fact that, prior to 1981, the 
PSID did not regularly ask health-related questions about spouses.
c The actual spell length may be longer since none of the spells we observed in 1989 are com 
pleted
Measuring Disability
In most surveys of income and employment, the data available on health 
come from a small set of questions that ask respondents to assess whether their 
health limits the kind or amount of work that they can perform. Other questions 
ask respondents to rate their health relative to others in their age group. Re 
searchers have been suspicious of these measures for a number of reasons. 
First, self-evaluated health is a subjective measure that may not be comparable 
across respondents. Second, these indicators may not be independent of the ob 
served variables one wants to explain, such as economic well-being, employ 
ment status, or family structure. Third, since social pressures make it
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undesirable to retire before certain ages, reasonably healthy individuals who 
wish to exit the labor force prematurely may use poor health as their excuse 
(Parsons 1980, 1982; Bazzoli 1985). Finally, in the United States, federal dis 
ability transfer benefits are available only to those judged unable to perform 
any substantial gainful activity, so individuals with some health problems may 
have a financial incentive to identify themselves as incapable of work because 
of their health. Misclassification based on self-reported health can underesti 
mate the true number of persons who suffer from a particular condition and 
overestimate the negative effects of health impairments on economic well-be 
ing. Such problems are exacerbated when these measures are used to track 
changes in the population with disabilities over time.
Although the problems inherent in disability measures based on self-evalu 
ated health have led some researchers (Myers 1982, 1983) to conclude that no 
useful information can be gained from such data, objective measures of health, 
which are much less available, also suffer from inherent biases (Bound 1991). 
Moreover, as Bound and Waidman (1992) show, even when a clear relation 
ship between changes in public policy and changes in disability prevalence 
rates is demonstrated, it does not imply that those who come under the disabil 
ity classification are erroneously classified. The information available in most 
microdata sources does not allow us to determine the extent to which changes 
in pathology have contributed to changes in the prevalence of disability. How 
ever, it is possible to inform the debate about the relationship between health, 
employment, and public policy by consistently applying a definition of disabil 
ity and by being cautious when interpreting the results.
In the PSID, the population with disabilities is defined using a survey ques 
tion that asks respondents, "Do you have any physical or nervous condition that 
limits the type or the amount of work that you can do?" In our cross-sectional 
analysis, we eliminate individuals from our sample whose health limitations 
are short term by classifying as disabled only those people who report a limi 
tation for two consecutive years. In our longitudinal analysis, where we are ex 
amining the effects of the onset of a disability, we define as having a disability 
only those individuals who report two consecutive years of no health-related 
work limitations followed by two consecutive years of such limitations.
To assess whether these measures of the population with disabilities accu 
rately capture a group of people in poorer health or with more functional limi 
tations than the remaining population, we use data from the 1986 PSID Health 
Supplement. Using these data, we compare the health and functional status of 
our sample of individuals with disabilities with the status of other groups in the 
population. The 1986 Health Supplement is the most recent detailed look at the 
health and functional status of respondents available in the PSID.
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To evaluate our cross-sectional measure, we define four mutually exclusive 
groups: (1) individuals who report having no health-related work limitation in 
both 1985 and 1986; (2) individuals who report having a limitation in 1985 but 
not in 1986; (3) individuals who report having a limitation in 1986 but not in 
1985; (4) individuals who report having a limitation in both 1985 and 1986 (our 
definition of a disability). We begin by comparing these groups over the set of 
health-related questions asked in the 1986 Health Supplement. The Supple 
ment includes questions about current health status; current health compared to 
health two years ago; expected health in two years; functional limitations in ac 
tivities such as walking and climbing, bending, lifting, and stooping, or driving 
a car; as well as questions about general health limitations and minor health 
problems. We then compare the labor force status and economic well-being of 
these four groups. Finally, we examine the responses to these questions for the 
subset of our cross section that would be included in our longitudinal defini 
tion: individuals who report a work-limiting condition in both 1985 and 1986 
and who report no limitation in both 1983 and 1984 (group 5). If our disability 
measures are consistent, we should find group (4), those with a health-related 
work limitation in both 1985 and 1986, to be in poorer health and to have more 
functional limitations than any of the other cross-sectional groups. In addition, 
if our cross-sectional sample overrepresents those in the midst of a long spell 
of disability, then we should find group (5) to be better off than group (4).
In appendix table 3, we report the results of these comparisons separately 
for men and for women. In both cases, the findings are consistent with our ex 
pectations; those captured by our cross-sectional definition of disability (col 
umn 4) are in worse health than the remaining three cross-sectional groups. 
Moreover, a large fraction of the individuals classified as having a disability 
under our definition indicate that they are in relatively poor health and/or have 
some functional limitation. For example, 54.2 percent of men and 67 percent 
of women whom we defined as having a disability report that their health rela 
tive to others in their age group is fair or poor. In contrast, among those who 
have no health-related work disabilities in both 1985 and 1986, only 5.2 per 
cent of men and 6 percent of women say that they are in fair or poor health rel 
ative to others. Looking at changes and expected changes in health over time, 
a similar pattern emerges. Among those we classify as having a disability, only 
one in ten men reported that his health improved between 1984 and 1986, and 
fewer that two in ten men expected their health to improve in the next two 
years.
The most dramatic differences among these four groups are in the measures 
of functional ability. More than one-half of men we classify as having a disabil 
ity have difficulty in walking or climbing stairs and nearly two-thirds report 
difficulty in bending, lifting, or stooping. For women, the percentages are even
Appendix Table 3. Consistency of Multiperiod Measures of Disability with Other Measures of Disability
Men
Groups8
Number of observations
Health status compared to others your age:
Excellent/very good
Good
Fair/poor
Health compared to two years ago:
Better
Same
Worse
Expected health in two years:
Better
Same
Worse
Limitations:
Walking/climbing
B ending/lifting/stooping
No limitation
in either
1985 or 1986
(1)
3,154
72.3
22.4
5.2
14.9
75.2
9.9
18.2
79.4
2.4
2.8
4.4
Limitation
in 1985,
not in 1986
(2)
175
47.6
28.2
24.2
17.1
66.0
16.8
20.0
73.1
6.9
23.9
331
Limitation
in 1986,
not in 1985
(3)
151
30.8
22.6
46.7
17.1
38.7
44.2
30.8
55.3
13.9
30.2
47.6
Limitation in
1985, 1986
(4)
269
21.1
24.8
54.2
10.4
46.7
43.0
17.4
67.4
15.2
54.4
61.7
No limitation
in 1983, 1984;
disability in
1985, 1986
(5)
46
18.2
29.5
52.3
0.0
34.4
65.6
33.9
58.9
7.2
45.7
59.2
(continued)
Appendix Table 3. (continued)
Groups3
Driving a car
Traveling unassisted
Confined indoors
Confined chair/bed
Uncorrectable eye trouble
Minor health problems
Health limits physical activity
Outcomes:
Labor force status
Full-time
Part-time
No work
Economic well-being
Median labor earnings
Median before government income
Median after government income
No limitation
in either
1985 or 1986
(1)
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.0
1.7
12.8
5.2
81.3
16.3
2.4
$33,544
$29,456
$25,406
Limitation
in 1985,
not in 1986
(2)
2.4
0.0
1.4
0.0
8.5
24.9
25.4
68.6
24.2
73
$22,784
$24,785
$21,416
Men
Limitation
in 1986,
not in 1985
(3)
8.9
4.2
5.2
5.5
7.2
23.4
56.7
61.5
27.1
11.4
$22,658
$22,611
$19,332
Limitation in
1985, 1986
(4)
17.2
10.1
12.7
11.9
11.1
43.2
78.4
36.9
26.6
366
$9,493
$18,949
$19,666
No limitation
in 1983, 1984;
disability in
1985, 1986
(5)
18.2
4.8
10.1
4.8
2.1
14.0
70.7
47.1
30.7
22.2
$15,569
$22,991
$19,666
Appendix Table 3. (continued)
Groups8
Number of observations
Health status compared to others:
Excellent/very good
Good
Fair/poor
Health compared to two years ago:
Better
Same
Worse
Expected health in two years:
Better
Same
Worse
Limitations:
Walking/climbing
Bending/lifting/stooping
Driving a car
Traveling unassisted
No limitation 
in either 
1985 or 1986
(1)
3,472
62.8
31.2
6.0
17.4
74.9
7.7
18.8
79.4
1.8
6.5
7.4
0.1
0.1
Limitation 
in 1985, 
not in 1986
(2)
304
28.1
46.7
25.2
20.0
61.1
18.9
23.1
71.3
5.6
28.1
30.8
4.6
1.3
Women
Limitation 
in 1986, 
not in 1985
(3)
186
34.4
30.9
34.8
19.0
52.9
28.1
36.5
53.5
10.0
43.7
45.1
4.2
3.0
Limitation in 
1985, 1986
(4)
339
10.4
22.6
67.0
12.5
36.4
51.1
23.0
56.4
20.6
72.9
71.6
21.8
17.6
No limitation
in 1983, 1984; 
disability in 
1985, 1986
(5)
70
24.9
36.0
39.2
11.0
40.5
48.5
48.0
44.0
8.0
56.0
62.6
5.0
1.3
(continued)
Appendix Table 3. (continued)
Groups3
Confined indoors
Confined chair/bed
Uncorrectable eye trouble
Minor health problems
Health limits physical activity
Outcomes:
Labor force status
Full-time
Part-time
No work
Economic well-being
Median labor earnings
Median before government income
Median after government
No limitation
in either
1985 or 1986
(1)
0.3
0.1
1.8
11.3
9.2
39.7
40.6
19.7
$12,658
$27,117
$23,514
Limitation
in 1985,
not in 1986
(2)
0.9
0.8
5.1
38.1
26.9
25.4
37.7
36.9
$3,797
$22,484
$20,291
Women
Limitation
in 1986,
not in 1985
(3)
1.8
4.0
5.2
46.9
47.6
31.0
45.7
23.3
$6,962
$24,043
$22,616
Limitation in
1985, 1986
(4)
15.7
14.6
13.0
59.8
66.1
14.0
30.3
55.8
$0
$17,415
$16,331
No limitation
in 1983, 1984;
disability in
1985, 1986
(5)
0.7
0.7
7.7
53.4
44.8
22.4
53.8
23.7
$5,696
$21,891
$19,106
SOURCE- 1989 response-nonresponse file of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
NOTE: Population is limited to those aged 25 to 61 in 1986 who were either household heads or spouses in both the 1985 and 1986 PSID surveys
a Group 1 Individuals who reported no health-related work limitations in both 1985 or 1986. Group 2 Individuals who reported a health-related work limitation in
1985 but not in 1986 Group 3 Individuals who reported a health-related work limitation in 1986 but not in 1985 Group 4: Individuals who reported a health-related
work limitation in both 1985 and 1986. Group 5 Individuals who reported no health-related work limitation in 1983 and 1984 but reported such limitations in both
1985 and 1986
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 97
larger. For the population of individuals who report having no health-related 
work limitations in this time period, less than 5 percent report limitations in 
walking or climbing or in bending, lifting, or stooping. The same pattern of re 
sults holds for our other measures of functional status. About 20 percent of 
those we classify as having a disability have trouble driving a car, about 12 per 
cent are confined to a chair or bed, and more than 10 percent need assistance in 
traveling. Among the remaining population, including those with shorter-term 
health-related work constraints, the percentages with functional limitations are 
significantly lower.
Finally, in column 5 of appendix table 3, we record the responses for indi 
viduals who satisfy our longitudinal definition. As expected, we find that in 
general these individuals are in worse health and have more functional limita 
tions than groups (1), (2), and (3), but are in better health than those in group 
(4). In general, this pattern holds for the outcome measures of labor market ac 
tivity and economic well-being. We expect group (5) people to be in worse 
health and to have more functional limitations than groups (1), (2), and (3) be 
cause, by 1986, those in column 5 have been in the state of disability longer 
than the other groups. We expect persons in the last column, because they have 
been in the state of disability for a shorter period, to be in better health and to 
have fewer functional limitations than group (4).
The results from these questions indicate that individuals who report having 
two years of consecutive health-related work limitations are in poorer health 
and are more likely to have functional limitations than either individuals who 
do not report work limitations or individuals who reported limitations only in 
1986. Moreover, examining the labor force status and economic well-being of 
these individuals, we find that those with longer-term health-related work lim 
itations are less likely to work and have lower median labor earnings and lower 
household income than do other groups. These patterns hold for both men and 
women. These findings support the idea that our two measures of disability, 
while not perfect, are able to identify, both in the cross section and dynamical 
ly, populations with substantial differences in health status and functional lim 
itations.
NOTES
1. Because Social Security retirement benefits based on past wage earnings and employer pen 
sions based on past service with a firm dominate the income of older people, it is also true thai 
past work is the principal source of income for older Americans.
2 As we will discuss later, using data from the Health and Retirement Survey, we find thai 
about 70 percent of the population of men and women aged 51 to 61 with a work-limiting health 
condition reported that it originated during their work life
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3 LaPlante (1991) provides a useful discussion of various methods that can be used to esti 
mate this population.
4. The PSID does not ask about the health of all household members. Hence, this sample will 
exclude adults aged 25 and over who live in a household in which they are neither a head nor a 
spouse It is likely that a disproportionate percentage of such people will have a work limitation
5 The choice of "working age" is somewhat arbitrary. We chose age 25 because that is gener 
ally the age when women and men have fully expenenced the transition out of school and into the 
permanent workforce and have established their own household. We chose age 61 because it is the 
last year before eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits
6 Bennefield and McNeil (1989) report that estimates from the CPS are lower than estimates 
from both the SIPP and the National Health Interview Survey (HIS).
7 In developing our after government measure, we used the tax estimates supplied on the 
PSID public release file
8 To estimate labor earnings, we used the annual hours worked and annual labor market 
income variables provided in the PSID
9 After government income is based on actual income data from the PSID Before govern 
ment income is a "counterfactual" concept, which makes the strong assumption that behavior does 
not change in the absence of government. This is clearly only an approximation of what would 
actually occur without government. Hence, our before government values are best thought of as a 
means of showing to whom current benefits go, given present government policy, rather than as a 
measure of what would actually occur in the absence of government To account for families of 
different sizes, family income was adjusted by using the equivalence scale in the official poverty 
measures
10. These results hold for the mean as well as for the median individual. Tables using mean 
values are available from the authors
11 Pre- and post-government income is adjusted for family size and reported in 1991 dollars 
To compute the income-to-needs ratio for the median person, one can simply divide median post- 
government household income by the 1992 one-person poverty threshold of $6,932. This would 
not alter the relative position of such persons in the income distribution and our ratio values (col 
umns 4 and 7) would not change
12. For a fuller discussion of the differences between our cross-sectional and longitudinal 
samples, see the appendix, in which we show that the average spell duration in the disability state 
of our cross-sectional sample is quite long and that income and economic well-being are reduced 
for long-stayers
13. The sample size is smaller for women because the PSID did not ask about spouses' dis 
ability until 1981, therefore we only have nine years of data on disability for married women com 
pared to almost twenty years of data for men
14. Our sample is a proxy for first occurrence. The PSID does not ask respondents about pre 
vious disabilities Therefore, we only have an individual's first spell of disability recorded in the 
survey. This may not be an individual's first spell over a lifetime, if an individual had a spell of 
disability prior to becoming a PSID respondent.
15 This represents a reduction in income-to-needs from 2.65 to 2 10, obtained by dividing the 
median values by the 1991 one-person poverty threshold of $6,932
16 The "event history" analysis in table 5 shows the cumulative share of the population that 
had expenenced an event of not working for one year, returning to work after not working for one 
year, falling into poverty, experiencing a year of economic well-being as high or higher than in the 
year pnor to onset, or of recovering from disability in each of the five years of our analysis. Note 
that this does not imply that these are all "absorbing" states. That is, for instance, while we show 
that 22 percent of the younger population expenenced a drop into poverty after five years of onset,
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some may have escaped poverty thereafter. Thus, this table does not report how many people are 
in poverty five years after onset
17 The results in table 5 were computed using the Kaplan-Meier method, which accounts for 
right-censored observations, or observations that have not experienced the event in question by 
the end of the survey penod We report the values from the cumulative distribution function, 
which is simply the probability that a person experiences the outcome in question by time t 
Results were computed using the SAS life test procedure, Version 6 2.
18 Hennessey and Dykacz (1993) compared recovery termination rates (based on those who 
leave the program because they are judged able to engage in substantial gainful activity) of Social 
Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries entitled in 1972 and 1985 and found that, after four 
years, 7 7 percent of new beneficiaries in 1972 recovered while only 3 9 percent of new beneficia 
ries in 1985 recovered after four years. Bound (1989, 1991) showed that the prognosis is not much 
better for those who apply for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits but are rejected. Using 
data from the 1978 Survey of the Disabled, he found that fewer than 50 percent of rejected appli 
cants in the 1970s were employed in 1978 and only about two-fifths of that 50 percent were work 
ing full-time.
19 To obtain this sample, we exclude all individuals who experienced the onset of their cur 
rent impairment prior to or after work life, as well as those who never worked. In addition, we 
exclude all those individuals who were not employed or were self-employed when the impairment 
began. This leaves us with a sample of 1,209 Of these, 659 are men and 550 are women.
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Employment and Benefits for People 
with Diverse Disabilities
Walter Y. Oi 
University of Rochester
The Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA or, simply, the Act) 
became the law of the land over four years ago and was supposed to 
improve the lives of 43 million disabled individuals. It has not pro 
duced the anticipated growth in employment. There are proportionally 
more persons getting disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) today. Employers are reluctant to talk about the 
ADA, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
has reported a sharp increase in the number of lawsuits filed by dis 
gruntled workers charging that employers are violating the law. The 
problem can be traced to the fact that the ADA embraced a civil rights 
approach to achieve its employment goal. As stated by Nancy Lee 
Jones:
Seldom do race, sex, or national origin present any obstacle to an 
individual in performing a job or participating in a program. Dis 
abilities by their very nature, however, may make certain jobs or 
types of participation impossible (Jones 1991).
Insufficient attention was paid to the nature of a disabling condition 
and to the wide diversity of such conditions. This paper tries to develop 
a theory of the labor market for people with disabilities, recognizing 
the great range and instability of disabling conditions. Work is not the 
preferred path to a higher level of satisfaction for all disabled persons. 
The employment goal of the ADA should be coordinated with a larger 
policy portfolio providing training, income transfers, and medical care 
to people with disabilities. Further, these policies should recognize the 
wide differences across individuals identified by the age at onset and 
the impairment. Not everyone ought to get the same monthly benefit or 
access to training and job placement services. It is surely true that if 
you want to treat people fairly, you have to treat them differently.
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A Person with a Disability
The ADA implies that there is a minority distinguishable from a 
majority of nondisabled persons. A large body of literature deals with 
the concept of disability and its measurement. Johnson and Lambrinos 
(1985) turned to the definitions set forth by the World Health Organiza 
tion to distinguish among three terms.
Impairment is a psychological, anatomical, or mental loss or some 
other abnormality. Disability is a restriction on or lack (resulting 
from an impairment) of an ability to perform an activity in the 
manner or within the range considered normal. Handicap is a dis 
advantage resulting from an impairment or disability (p. 265, 
emphasis added).
Policy makers seem to prefer a definition based on functional limita 
tions. A problem arises because the definition for a substantial limita 
tion, "an inability to perform an activity in the manner or within the 
range considered normal," depends on the activity and the environ 
ment. An inability to reach or to lift may be a seriously disabling con 
dition for a lobster fisherman but only a nuisance for a preacher. The 
latter might not even report such a limitation in a survey. The language 
of the Act sets forth the following definition.
Disability means with respect to an individual (1) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual, (2) a record of such an 
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Major life activities means functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working. There is no requirement for a 
medical certification of the impairment, a record or being 
regarded as having such an impairment is sufficient. The interpre 
tative guidance to the Act argues that the ADA is intended to 
establish a process wherein disability will be determined on an 
individual basis.
This case by case approach is essential if qualified individuals of 
varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for 
an infinitely diverse range of jobs. For this reason, neither the 
ADA nor this regulation can supply the correct answer in advance
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for each employment decision concerning an individual with a 
disability (emphasis added).
According to the EEOC regulations, disability would seem to be a 
highly subjective state that defies quantification.
The surveys that have been undertaken mainly rely on self-reporting 
of functional limitations, activities of daily living (ADL), and impair 
ments or chronic disabling conditions. They yield varying estimates of 
the overall prevalence of disability but show agreement on differences 
in the relative incidence rates due to age, race, gender, and education. 
Based on data from the March 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS), 
Bennefield and McNeil (1989) estimated that there were 13.4 million 
working-age Americans (8.6 percent) with a work disability. The pro 
portion with a reported disability is higher in surveys conducted to 
ascertain health and program participation status; 11.5 percent of 
working-age adults were disabled in the 1984 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) and 11.3 percent in the 1983 National 
Health Interview Survey (HIS). LaPlante (1988) reported that orthope 
dic impairments were the leading factor, accounting for 29 percent of 
the 17.4 million adults with a work disability in 1983-1985. 1 The ele 
ments of the health capital vector A deteriorate at different rates, with 
sharply rising incidence rates for cancers, digestive, and circulatory 
impairments. Only 11.4 percent of work limitations reported by adults 
18-44 years old were caused by these three conditions, but this figure 
climbs to 32 percent for the group aged 45-69. The shorter life expect 
ancy of mentally retarded persons is responsible for the declining 
importance of mental conditions as a cause for work limitations.
Table 1 presents the LaPlante estimates in relation to the age-spe 
cific U.S. populations. Some 5.8 percent of Americans 18-44 years old 
reported a work limitation, and this incidence rate rose to 21 percent 
for the group aged 45-69, a 3.6-fold increase in the work disability rate. 
The work disability rate due to orthopedic impairments rose from 2.4 
to 4.8 percent. The functional limitations associated with ulcers are dif 
ferent from those due to hypertension or from partial paralysis of the 
lower extremities, and these differences will surely affect the kinds and 
costs of reasonable workplace accommodations.
From an analytic viewpoint, disability ought to be described by both 
the functional limitation and by the impairment. A person's manual
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Table 1. Incidence of Work Limitations by Age and Sex
Percentage of U.S. Population
Both sexes
All causes
Percentage caused by
Musculoskeletal
Orthopedic impairments
Blind and visually impaired
Deaf and hearing impaired
Digestive
Circulatory
Respiratory
Miscellaneous
Cancer
Mental
Male
All causes
Percentage caused by
Musculoskeletal
Orthopedic impairments
Blind and visually impaired
Deaf and hearing impaired
Digestive
Circulatory
Respiratory
Miscellaneous
Cancer
Mental
Female
All causes
Percentage caused by:
Musculoskeletal
Orthopedic impairments
Blind and visually impaired
Deaf and hearing impaired
Digestive
Circulatory
Respiratory
Miscellaneous
Cancer
Mental
All ages
11.07
1.46
3.21
0.38
020
035
2.10
0.76
1.46
029
084
10.98
100
3.63
0.43
0.21
029
2.19
0.83
1.25
0.27
088
11.15
1.90
281
0.33
0.19
042
2.02
0.70
1.66
0.32
0.81
18-44 years
5.82
0.39
2.38
0.22
0.15
015
0.42
0.38
089
0.09
076
5.96
030
2.69
0.29
0.16
015
0.33
0.33
0.80
007
0.83
5.69
0.47
207
0.15
0.14
0.16
0.50
0.42
099
Oil
0.68
45-69 years
20.98
3.49
4.78
0.68
0.30
0.73
5.29
1.49
2.52
0.67
1.01
2100
2.41
5.50
071
0.31
057
5.91
1.81
214
0.66
0.98
20.95
4.46
4.14
066
0.28
0.88
4.74
1.20
286
069
104
SOURCE- Derived from data in LaPlante (1988, table 1A)
NOTE Percentages may not sum precisely to totals due to rounding
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dexterity might be constrained by an injury to a muscle or by the devel 
opment of arthritis. As Yelin (1991) points out, on a bad day, an 
arthritic individual may need more time in the morning to get started, 
but the person with the muscle injury may be permanently limited. The 
former may need a flextime work schedule for his or her accommoda 
tion, while the latter may require special equipment. Additionally, 
knowledge about both the impairment and functional proficiency con 
veys more information with respect to the length of the remaining work 
life.
Supplying Time to the Labor Market
Over two-thirds of working-age adults with a disability are out of 
the labor force or unemployed. According to Bennefield and McNeil 
(1989), only 27.8 percent of disabled men were gainfully employed in 
March 1988, as compared to 74.4 percent of nondisabled men. Dis 
abled men earned only $15,497 a year, 64 percent of the annual earn 
ings of nondisabled men. A third of the disabled respondents to the 
1983 HIS and 44 percent of disabled persons in the Louis Harris poll 
who were not employed indicated that they wanted to work. Brown 
(1989) analyzed the HIS data and found that persons with three or 
more functional limitations expressed a far stronger preference for 
work than persons with one or two limitations.
The familiar model of Sir Lionel Robbins (1930) serves as a useful 
point of departure. The utility maximizing supply of work hours H (the 
difference between a time endowment T and the demand for leisure 
hours L;H= T-L), is determined by tastes (for a consumption good and 
leisure) and a budget constraint describing the opportunity set. The 
equilibrium depicted in figure 1 satisfies two equations, a budget con 
straint and an equality of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) to the 
wage rate:
X + wL = F = wT+ 7 and MRS = UL/Ux =
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where w is the hourly wage, Y is nonwage income, and F is full 
income. (X stands for consumption, UL and Ux denote the marginal 
utilities of leisure and consumption.)
Figure 1
The onset of a disabling condition can displace the equilibrium in 
three ways. First, poor health is likely to affect tastes by raising the 
marginal value of leisure time, meaning a larger MRS. The adjustment 
involves an increase in the demand for leisure and reduces the supply 
of work hours, possibly to zero if the person is pushed to the corner at 
point Y in figure 1. Second, the disability might reduce the person's 
productivity, implying a decrease in the hourly wage w which he or she 
can command in the market. The disability pushes the individual to a 
lower indifference curve, but its impact on the supply of labor time H 
depends on the strengths of the opposing substitution and income 
effects. Third, disability steals time. We all get the same endowment of 
calendar time, r* = 168 hours a week, but the time required for mainte 
nance of the human agent varies. Stafford and Duncan (1980) discov 
ered that individuals with lower wages devoted more time to sleep. A 
rigorous model of the demand for sleep was developed by Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1990). Time for medical and personal care ought also to 
be included in maintenance time Tm. The pertinent discretionary time 
endowment that can be allocated to work and leisure, T = T*-Tm, is 
surely a function of the individual's stock of health capital. 2 A dis-
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abling condition can be expected to shove T to the left, which unam 
biguously reduces work hours H (= T-L). Some disabled persons may 
choose to accept part-time employment, while others may opt to with 
draw from the labor force. That disabled individuals supply less time to 
the labor market can be explained in the context of the Robbins model, 
where disability can affect tastes, wages, or discretionary time endow 
ments.
Equal Employment Opportunities
The hearings before the House and Senate committees preceding the 
passage of the ADA supported the following findings:
• Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals 
with disabilities and such discrimination continues to be a serious 
and pervasive social problem.
•Discrimination persists in such areas as employment, housing, 
public accommodations, education, transportation.
• Unlike individuals who face discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, or sex, people with disabilities have often had no legal 
recourse to redress such discrimination.
•Census data have documented that people with disabilities as a 
group occupy an inferior status in our society and are severely dis- 
advantaged.
• The nation's goals are to assure equality of opportunity, full partic 
ipation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.
These findings were mainly supported by testimony involving cases in 
which individuals were denied access to places, housing, and, most 
importantly, to jobs because of their disabilities. In a 1972 survey, the 
average hourly wages of handicapped workers were some 44.5 percent 
below the average for nondisabled men. Johnson and Lambrinos 
(1985) estimated that 15.2 percentage points of this differential could 
be attributed to discrimination in the labor market. 3 The ADA was
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enacted to guarantee equal employment opportunities, but to do so, it 
had to define what constituted labor market discrimination.
In section 1630.g of the Regulations, the ADA adopts a three- 
pronged approach. First, a person is said to have a disability if he or 
she has "an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individuals." Whether the substantial activ 
ity limitation or limitations affect the capacity to do the work is to be 
determined by the concept of "a qualified person with a disability." 
This qualification is to be determined in two steps: (a) whether the 
individual has the requisite skills, experience, education, licenses, etc., 
and (b) whether the individual can perform the essential functions with 
or without accommodations, the two remaining prongs in the three- 
pronged approach. The EEOC has apparently embraced a fuzzy crite 
rion, namely, a threshold hiring standard that will be determined by the 
essential functions of the job. 4 If a job is narrowly described (e.g., 
proofreading aloud, lifting, etc.), it will be easier to ascertain if a per 
son is qualified. The "interpretative guidance" contained one example 
in which an applicant might be asked for a driver's license because, in 
some exceptional instances, the person might be asked to drive. If driv 
ing is a marginal function of the main job, and if there are enough other 
employees with licenses among whom to distribute any driving chores, 
the employer could not deny employment because the applicant had no 
driver's license. The set of essential functions associated with a job 
will be smaller, the larger the size of the employer's workforce. If a 
clerk at a garden store is occasionally required to lift 100-pound bags 
of fertilizer, lifting would be essential in that position for a store hiring 
only two clerks but not for a store with twelve clerks. If a requirement 
is defined by a work load (e.g., typing 75 words a minute or standing 
for eight hours), the employer must demonstrate that the standard was 
not set to exclude a disabled person.
The phrase "with or without accommodations" is crucial in the pro 
cess of determining who is "a qualified person with a disability." An 
employer will voluntarily invest in training, superior equipment, and a 
more pleasant workplace if such investments raise labor productivity 
by more than the cost. The argument in Decker (1964) and Oi (1962) is 
that, if training increases productivity in all employment, its costs will 
be borne by the worker who receives a lower wage during the training 
period. If, however, the increased productivity is firm-specific, Hash-
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imoto and Yu (1980) have shown that it is optimal to share the costs. 
According to the EEOC regulations,
In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environ 
ment or the way things are customarily done that enables an indi 
vidual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities 
(a) ... in the application process, (b) . . . that permit the person to 
perform the essential functions and (c) . . . to enjoy equal benefits 
and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employees with 
out disabilities (emphasis added).
An employer would have voluntarily made the accommodation if it 
raised the individual's productivity by more than the cost. With the pas 
sage of the ADA, the decision is no longer left to discretion but is 
instead imposed as an obligation: "[covered] Employers are required to 
make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual unless to do so would 
impose an undue hardship" (emphasis added).
The effect on demand will depend on what is construed to be a rea 
sonable accommodation and on what penalties are placed on employ 
ers for noncompliance. 5 The undue hardship defense favors the smaller 
employer with a shallow pocket. The burden of providing jobs for the 
disabled is likely to be borne by the large employers, who both have 
the wherewithal to assume the accommodation costs and who have big 
enough workforces to reduce the number of essential functions that 
have to be performed by qualified persons with a disability.
If job restructuring and part-time and part-year work schedules are 
accepted as reasonable accommodations, the employer faces a difficult 
problem in the equitable treatment of all employees. In most firms, 
part-time employees are paid at a lower hourly rate than are full-time 
employees in the "same" job. The hourly wage discount for part-time 
work is larger in manufacturing industries, but it is still observed in 
sales, service, and clerical occupations because the part-time employee 
typically receives less "on-the-job" training, has less work experience, 
and is asked to perform fewer tasks than his/her full-time counterpart. 
The existing part-time wage discounts would thus seem to reflect a 
compensating difference reflecting the lower productivity of the part- 
time employee. If disabled persons need modified work schedules 
because of then: physical/mental impairments, should they be entitled
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to the same pay as full-time employees? The correct answer is no if we 
want to discourage nondisabled persons interested in part-time jobs 
from claiming that they are disabled to avoid the part-time wage dis 
count. In short, accommodations that affect worker productivity should 
be accompanied by compensating wage differences.
There are at least two serious problems with this civil rights 
approach to disability policy. First, it forces employers to adopt a satis- 
ficing employment policy. A qualified person with a disability who 
needs only a reasonable accommodation has as much right to a job as 
any other applicant. The employer is discouraged from searching for 
the most highly qualified individual. The efficiency loss from such a 
satisficing strategy might be small if the variance in performance 
across job applicants is small. If, however, the variance is large, as it is 
perceived to be when recruiting for a highly skilled position, an obliga 
tion to accept an applicant who meets the minimal job requirements 
could result in a significant opportunity cost to the employer.
Second, disability is not an easy state to define or to determine; the 
essential functions that have to be performed can vary depending on 
the size of the workforce and on the nature of the job. The efficacy of 
reasonable accommodations is uncertain, and the legislation and the 
enforcement agencies cannot promulgate clear-cut guidelines. The 
ADA is intended to establish a process.
The intent of the Act is to promote employment by placing an obli 
gation upon covered employers to make job offers to qualified persons 
with a disability and to provide them with reasonable accommoda 
tions. Failure to do so puts the employer in a position where he or she 
can be sued for discrimination. Enforcement of the law is likely to be 
left to civil litigation. 6
Disability: Its Duration and Impact on the Length of Life
Disabling conditions are not all alike. Severity is surely an important 
dimension, which might be measured by the capacity to perform the 
various activities of daily living or by the disadvantage that accompa 
nies such limitations. In addition to severity, a disability can be 
described by (1) the age at onset, (2) the anticipated duration of the
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condition, and (3) the impact of the condition on the expected length of 
life. Disability is rarely congenital. It can sometimes be linked to a spe 
cific event, an accident, or illness, but it is usually a by-product of 
aging. The age at onset is rarely reported, but the nature of the dis 
abling condition (the diagnostic group) serves as an imperfect proxy. 
For example, mental retardation and mental illness occur relatively 
early in life, while disabilities related to cancers and to circulatory and 
digestive impairments have a later onset.
The difficulty in identifying the target population derives from the 
fact that disability is usually a transitory state. Some 13 percent of 
1,760 white male, married household heads in 1972 reported that they 
had a work disability, but only about 5 percent said that they had a dis 
ability in each of the five consecutive years, 1968-1972. 7 At onset, 
there is uncertainty about the anticipated duration. Functional limita 
tions are unstable and fluctuate from week to week. Workers hope that 
their loss of sight or difficulty in walking is only temporary. They may 
wait to ascertain the extent of the limitation before taking the next 
step—return to work, retrain for a new job, or withdraw from the labor 
force. Time and money will be spent to see if the condition can be 
reversed. The individual's response clearly depends on whether the dis 
abling condition is perceived to be temporary or permanent.
The impact of a disability on the length of life depends on the sever 
ity and nature of the impairment. Severely disabled individuals who 
qualify for benefits under the Social Security Administration's Disabil 
ity Insurance (DI) program experience substantially higher mortality 
rates. In addition, unsuccessful applicants to the DI program (who 
were denied benefits) have exhibited death rates higher than those of 
nondisabled persons (Bound 1989). Bye and Riley (1989) followed the 
cohort of 18,782 persons who were awarded benefits and enrolled in 
the DI program in 1972. 8 The percentages of this cohort who died or 
recovered (and hence were dropped from the program) during the next 
two years were determined from SSA records. Table 2 reproduces their 
findings, classified by gender and race, age at entry into the program, 
years of education, occupation, and diagnostic group. These people 
were in poor health, as evidenced by the fact that over one-eighth, 12.8 
percent, died within two years. Only 5.3 percent recovered and were 
dropped from the SSA rolls. The two-year mortality rates were higher 
for men and blacks, rising with age at entry. 9 Education and the two-
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year mortality rate are positively correlated, but this is likely a result of 
the interaction between education and age at onset. The more-educated 
disabled persons probably became disabled after they were 50 or older.
Table 2. Two-Year Death and Recovery Rates for 1972 Entrants to the 
Social Security Administration's Disability Insurance Program
1972 cohort
Total
Sex and race
Men
Women
White and unknown
Black
Other
Age in 1972
Under 40
40-49
50-59
60-61
Years of education
None
1-8
9-12
13 or more
Unknown
Occupation
Professional
Clerical and sales
Service
Farming
Number
18,782
13,150
5,632
15,958
2,617
207
2,961
3,602
9,407
2,812
215
6,540
8,180
1,459
2,388
1,878
2,266
2,656
757
Percent
100.0
70.0
30.0
85.0
13.9
1.1
15.8
19.2
50.1
14.9
1.1
34.8
43.6
7.8
12.7
10.0
12.1
14.1
4.0
Percentage in the first 
two years who
Died
12.8
13.9
10.4
12.8
13.2
8.2
6.7
13.4
14.0
14.8
10.7
12.2
14.4
15.4
8.1
17.2
14.5
12.1
10.8
Recovered
5.3
6.0
3.7
5.4
4.7
5.8
15.2
7.9
2.6
0.6
1.4
3.2
6.7
8.4
4.7
9.9
9.1
8.1
4.4
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Table 2 (continued)
1972 cohort
Processing
Machine
Benchwork
Structural
Miscellaneous
Unknown
Diagnostic group
Infectious
Neoplasms
Endocrine
Mental
Nervous
Eye and ear
Circulatory
Respiratory
Digestive
Genitourinary
Musculoskeletal
Traumatic
Other
Number
564
1,632
1,164
2,220
2,847
2,798
319
1,582
613
1,736
681
385
5,321
1,163
542
128
2,883
1,260
2,179
Percent
3.0
8.7
6.2
11.8
15.2
14.9
1.7
8.4
3.3
9.2
3.6
2.0
28.3
6.2
2.9
0.7
15.3
6.7
11.6
Percentage in the first 
two years who
Died
13.3
12.8
10.3
12.5
12.8
11.2
7.2
64.5
12.6
3.3
6.3
4.2
12.3
10.2
22.5
25.0
2.7
2.5
6.6
Recovered
4.8
5.8
4.4
6.1
6.4
5.6
23.2
1.9
1.6
4.7
2.8
4.9
2.5
1.0
4.2
6.3
6.8
22.1
5.2
SOURCE- Bye and Riley (1989)
The surprising finding is the wide variance in death rates by diag 
nostic group. Nearly two-thirds, 64.5 percent, of those who were dis 
abled by neoplasms (cancers) passed away within two years of 
admission to the DI program. High mortality rates were also observed 
for those with genitourinary and digestive conditions: 25 and 22.5 per 
cent died within two years. People whose disabilities were caused by
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traumatic injuries had the lowest mortality rate, 2.5 percent, followed 
by musculoskeletal impairments, at 2.7 percent. Disabled beneficiaries 
whose limitations were caused by infectious diseases and traumatic 
injuries reported the highest recovery rates, 23.2 percent and 22.1 per 
cent, respectively.
Disabling conditions are not all alike and ought to be differentiated 
by severity, age at onset, duration, and longevity. Variations in mortal 
ity and recovery rates due to age and the approximate cause of the dis 
ability indicate not only the probable returns to policies promoting 
employment but also the budgetary costs of changing the standards to 
earn entitlement to DI benefits. We are sure to learn more from the 
New Beneficiary Survey about how age and diagnosis are related to 
mortality risks and to the odds of recovery. 10
Work and Welfare
In designing policies to deal with poverty, we confront the insoluble 
problem of distinguishing between the deserving and nondeserving 
poor. Garraty (1978) noted that, in the Middle Ages, doubts arose 
about the need to supply food to beggars who looked as if they might 
be able to provide for themselves. The community was unwilling to 
assist big beggars, malingerers, and free riders. There is no bright line 
separating the disabled from the nondisabled. More importantly, the 
target population of people with disabilities is not a stable minority, 
such as one differentiated by race or gender, but changes from day to 
day. Additionally, policies have to be designed to recognize the wide 
diversity among people with disabilities.
Implicit and Explicit Wage Subsidies
Wage subsidies were introduced to reduce teenage unemployment. 
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program is an explicit wage subsidy 
which reduces the net labor costs for an employer who hires an individ 
ual eligible for tax credits. Vocational rehabilitation can be viewed as 
an implicit subsidy because the agency assumes the cost of counseling, 
training, and placing the client. The workers' compensation program
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also offers an implicit wage subsidy for the largest employers. A cov 
ered employee who is classified as totally disabled, temporary or per 
manent, becomes eligible for weekly benefits. Most employers with 
500 or more employees are self-insured (except in a few states), and 
the workers' compensation benefits become a direct cost.
Suppose that the person in question had been earning a weekly wage 
of W = $500 before the onset of the disability and the mandated work 
ers' compensation weekly benefit B = $200. If the disabling condition 
reduces this person's productivity so that he or she is worth retaining 
only at a weekly wage of, for example, W\ = $400, a self-insured 
employer has an incentive to retain the worker, pay him or her a wage 
equal to the pre-injury wage of W = $500, and save the outlay for 
workers' compensation benefits of B = $200. Indeed, if the worker's 
net product after the onset of the disabling condition exceeds his or her 
net wage of Wn = (W - B) = $300, it is in the firm's best interests to 
retain the disabled worker. This implicit wage subsidy is not available 
to a small employer who is not self-insured. Casual observations sug 
gest that the implicit wage subsidy under workers' compensation is 
effective. The workforces of larger firms seem to contain a higher frac 
tion of disabled employees.
Training
At the onset of disability, a worker may be uncertain about how the 
condition will affect his or her productivity and time endowment. If the 
condition is perceived to be temporary (a short anticipated duration), 
the individual is likely to exhibit a high intertemporal elasticity of sub 
stitution, sharply cutting back on his or her labor supply until the con 
dition improves. 11 When workers are not recalled by their previous 
employers and are out of the labor force, they may be eligible for train 
ing and vocational rehabilitation. A theory of human capital predicts 
that the returns to an investment in training will be larger, the greater 
the increment to earnings due to more human capital and the longer the 
anticipated period of employment. 12 The odds that individuals will 
elect to enroll in a training program and to return to work are higher, 
the younger the age at disability onset. A shorter remaining work life 
reduces the return to training, but in addition, older workers are less 
adaptable and experience higher attrition rates in vocational rehabilita-
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tion and formal training courses. We want to believe that an individual 
is unable to find suitable work because she or he lacks the requisite 
skills that can be taught in a training program, formal or on-the-job. By 
allocating more resources to training, the problem of underemploy 
ment can allegedly be solved, but only for a subset of people with dis 
abilities.
Civil Rights and Accommodations Again
The ADA obligates an employer to offer equal opportunities to "a 
qualified person with a disability who can perform the essential func 
tions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations." This 
civil rights approach ignores the caveat voiced by Jones, that disability 
is not like race and gender. Some accommodations, such as the provi 
sion of a reader or interpreter, are expensive. Under the ADA, 
"employers are required to make reasonable accommodations ... unless 
to do so would impose an undue hardship." Disputes are certain to arise 
about what are the essential functions of a job and what is a reasonable 
accommodation. The EEOC regulations explicitly state that these mat 
ters have to be settled on a case-by-case basis because the disabling 
condition and the requirements of the job can change from day to day 
or from place to place. Litigation could be reduced by replacing the 
"undue hardship" criterion with an explicit rule that specifies a cost cap 
defining what is reasonable.
It is not surprising that many disabled persons ask for flexible, part- 
time, or part-year schedules. A disability increases both the average 
maintenance time for sleep and care as well as its variance. The 
demand for short hours and more "time off' privileges will rise in 
response to a wider dispersion in the number of physician visits or in 
the days of restricted activity. The Civil Rights Act calls for "equal pay 
for equal work." But what is equal work! The hourly rate of pay for an 
employee on a part-time or flexible schedule is usually below that for a 
full-time worker. The size of the wage discount for an irregular work 
schedule varies across industries and occupations. If a job has to be 
restructured or a work schedule shortened to accommodate a disabled 
person, is the firm obliged to pay that person the same wage as that 
paid to a full-time nondisabled employee facing different working con 
ditions? If a competitive labor market establishes compensating wage
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differences for special working arrangements, these differences should 
also apply to a regulated labor market for disabled workers.
Program Participation
A disabling condition may be so severe and/or the circumstances 
may be such that work is an infeasible or inferior option. The preferred 
path could be one in which the individual withdraws from the labor 
force and applies to the SSA for DI benefits (if the person has the nec 
essary work history) or for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In 
deciding on which path to follow, the person has to assess the extent of 
the health loss, its duration, including the chances for recovery, and the 
application costs, which entail lengthy waiting periods and delays in 
the appeal process. The returns to becoming a DI or SSI beneficiary are 
greater, the older the age at onset and the higher the anticipated mortal 
ity rate.
The number of DI/SSI beneficiaries is growing (it is nearly 7 million 
today), and the median age of new awards is falling; these develop 
ments threaten the solvency of the trust funds. A trial work period 
(TWP) was introduced as an incentive for program participants to 
return to work; they could exceed the substantial gainful activity 
(SGA) level of earnings during the TWP and still retain their monthly 
benefits and Medicare. This incentive was enhanced in 1986 by an 
extended period of eligibility (EPE), which increased the grace period 
from 15 to 36 months. Muller (1992) analyzed the New Beneficiary 
Data System data. Only 10.2 percent of the cohort who were awarded 
DI benefits in 1981 reported doing "any work," and an even smaller 
fraction, 2.8 percent, actually left the rolls in the next ten years (see the 
SGA terminations in table 3). A younger age at entitlement and more 
years of education raise the odds that a DI beneficiary will recover and 
leave the rolls. 13 Only about 6 percent of SSI beneficiaries, who are, on 
average, younger and less educated than DI beneficiaries, reported 
doing "any work" in the decade of the 1980s. The DI and SSI program 
participants are older and have more serious life-threatening impair 
ments. They are not representative of the 13-to-18 million working-age 
adults with an employment disability, and it is not surprising that a 
majority of them elect to remain out of the workforce.
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Table 3. Work Experience of Disability Insurance Beneficiaries, 
1982-1991
Characteristic
Total
Education
0-8 years
9-11 years
12 years
13 or more years
Age at entitlement
Under 40
40-49
50-59
60 or older
Family income
Under $5,000
$5,00049,999
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000-$39,999
$40,000 or more
Number
192,774
58,580
43,038
57,684
32,583
36,335
29,969
94,359
32,111
30,434
56,281
66,495
35,504
4,060
Any work 
(percent)
10.2
4.9
8.2
11.6
19.8
29.1
12.4
4.8
2.5
15.7
10.1
7.3
11.0
11.7
SGA termination 
(percent)
2.8
0.8
1.8
3.0
7.2
9.3
3.0
1.1
0.2
3.6
2.2
2.1
4.2
4.6
SOURCE Muller (1992, table 3, pp 9-10)
A Wider Policy Portfolio
The employment record is dismal, as documented by the finding that 
only about 28 percent of persons with a work disability in 1988 held a 
job. In addition, research by Haveman and Wolfe (1990) shows that the 
well-being of disabled persons (judged by family income) has been 
declining. Further evidence of the problems of individuals with disabil 
ities is provided by the Harris poll, which in 1984 reported that 44 per 
cent of disabled persons who were out of work wanted a job. Title I of 
the ADA tries to raise the employment-to-population ratio in two ways. 
First, it adopts a broad definition of a person with a disability. Second, 
the Act widens the window of prospective jobs by requiring employers 
to provide equal employment opportunities to "a qualified person with
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a disability." The essential functions of the job have to be identified to 
determine if the disabled person is qualified. If an accommodation is 
needed for the worker to perform the essential functions, the employer 
has to provide it unless an undue hardship is imposed. The ADA invites 
litigation, an outcome that I had predicted when the Act was being 
debated, and the caseload at the EEOC has exploded.
Employment prospects have, if anything, deteriorated since the pas 
sage of the ADA. Only 31 percent of disabled individuals held a job 
last year, down from 33 percent in 1986. The share of disabled SSI 
beneficiaries with a job has also dropped, from 6.5 to 5.8 percent 
(Holmes 1994, p. 26). 14 The passage of the ADA was intended to create 
jobs, thereby promoting a movement out of dependency and idleness. 
The burden of supplying work and paying for reasonable accommoda 
tions was legislatively shifted to employers, a policy labeled by 
Burkhauser (1990) as "Morality on the Cheap." We have witnessed a 
sharp increase in the number of lawsuits charging employers with vio 
lations of Title I but no significant rise in employment.
Although the diversity and instability of disabling conditions were 
emphasized in the hearings, the mandate in Title I assumes that gainful 
work is the way to improve well-being for a majority of people with 
disabilities. The presumption implies that the target population exhibits 
a substantial degree of homogeneity in tastes and productive traits, a 
presumption that is not supported by the data. Training for a new job is 
neither practical nor desirable for persons who become disabled at 
older ages, especially when life expectancy is also shortened by the 
onset of the condition. Some may be eligible for benefits under work 
ers' compensation or private disability insurance, but SSA is the 
agency to which most turn for income support. Although monthly DI 
benefits vary depending on the recipient's work history, the dispersion 
is relatively small. Given the high application costs and the SGA limits 
on earnings, a person who applies for DI benefits seems to be making a 
commitment to a more or less permanent withdrawal from the legal 
labor market. A trial work period is available for up to 36 months to 
induce individuals to give up their disability benefits and to return to 
the world of work. The ones already on board are, however, different 
from other disabled individuals. We may be directing the work incen 
tives to the wrong group.
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It is instructive to review the policy of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. An individual with a service-connected disability is evaluated 
and assigned a rating, which fixes the size of the monthly compensa 
tion. There is no earnings test; everyone who is entitled to a pension 
gets it irrespective of his or her earnings in the labor market. Cohany 
(1987) found that 95.8 percent of Vietnam-era veterans with no disabil 
ities were gainfully employed. The employment rate was 79.9 percent 
for those with a service-connected disability and was closely related to 
the disability rating: 92.2 percent with a disability rating of l-to-30 
percent were working, as compared to 79.5 percent for disability rat 
ings of 30-to-60 percent and 34.5 percent for disability ratings of over 
60 percent. Although the supply of labor will be inversely related to the 
size of the pension, I suspect that the data largely reflect a response to 
the severity of the disabling condition.
The present DI program has the effect of locking in its clients, such 
that very few voluntarily terminate their monthly benefits to return to 
work, and should be replaced by a social insurance program that 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of people with disabilities. The fol 
lowing modifications should be made. First, admission to the program 
should be based on a medical assessment of the applicant's physical 
and mental impairments. The waiting period during which the appli 
cant performs no work should be abandoned. Second, monthly benefits 
should be a function of the applicant's disability class, which could be 
•based on the applicant's age and diagnostic group. 15 Third, the earnings 
test should be abolished, and DI benefits should be subject to income 
taxation. The youngest DI beneficiaries with the lower mortality risks 
receive the smallest monthly benefits; they can supplement their 
monthly disability benefits by working, and the sum of earnings and 
disability benefits should be subject to income taxation. Fourth, each 
beneficiary should be obliged to undergo a disability review to confirm 
that his or her disabling condition still persists and warrants keeping 
him or her on the DI rolls. The time interval before the scheduled dis 
ability review should be shorter for persons with lower disability class 
rankings. A disabled beneficiary in a low disability class is younger 
and stronger. The individual is entitled to a smaller monthly disability 
benefit, which raises the opportunity cost of remaining out of the work 
force. Since there is no earnings test, and benefits will continue until
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the next disability review, the opportunity cost of seeking and obtain 
ing a job is small.
It is unclear if the costs of administering this modified DI program 
will be higher or lower than those of the present system. The placement 
of each client into a disability class and a periodic disability review 
will raise administrative costs, but the proportion requiring appeals is 
likely to be smaller. My proposal has been questioned by the Panel of 
the National Academy of Social Insurance on at least two grounds. 
First, the military relies on a draft to obtain personnel, who are not free 
to choose their assignments. This is simply not true; conscription was 
abolished over 20 years ago. Second, risks are allegedly higher in the 
military, and the recommended changes would lead to inordinately 
high costs or inadequate benefits. These are conjectures that cannot be 
resolved without a careful analysis of the proposal. 16
The current policy portfolio is one in which SSA is mainly responsi 
ble for welfare (supplying income and medical care for seriously dis 
abled individuals), workers' compensation provides support for the 
short-term disabled, and state rehabilitation agencies assist in training 
and job placement. The earnings and dignity from employment are cer 
tainly important. The ADA has adopted a civil rights model, which 
worked well in reducing the height of employment barriers for women 
and racial minorities. The burden of creating jobs and paying for 
accommodations for people with disabilities has been placed on 
employers. When an accommodation is person-specific (and can be 
transported from one employer to another), its cost ought to be 
financed out of general funds rather than placed on an employer.
The ADA has failed to raise the employment-to-population ratio. 
Individuals with disabilities are a diverse group; not all seek work in 
the market. As Jones has pointed out, "Disabilities make certain jobs 
and types of participation impossible." Retirement is a superior option 
for an older individual who experiences the onset of a condition that 
seriously limits performance and shortens longevity. The size and 
availability of disability benefits should be calibrated to the likelihood 
that the individual can be rehabilitated and returned to the world of 
work. One income maintenance policy will not be efficient for a popu 
lation of people with widely different disabling conditions.
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NOTES
1. The working-age adult population in the LaPlante study includes persons up to 69 years old. 
The impairments and chronic conditions identified by LaPlante were combined into 10 groups
2 The concept of health capital is well developed by Grossman (1972) in the context of a life 
cycle model.
3. The data came from the 1972 SSA Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults Separate 
wage equations were estimated for handicapped workers (using the narrow definition from the 
World Health Organization classification) and nonhandicapped workers The validity of this esti 
mate is questionable; a critical review of the methodology is contained in the appendix notes to Oi 
and Andrews (1992)
4 The language of Title I of the Act spells out what is meant by the essential functions of a 
job I have taken the liberty of summarizing the basic clauses, as follows 1. The term pertains to 
the fundamental duties and excludes the marginal functions of the position 2. A job function may 
be considered essential for several reasons it is the reason for the creation of the position, only a 
limited number of employees can perform this function, and/or it is highly specialized 3. The Act 
spells out what constitutes evidence.
5 To paraphrase the EEOC regulations, (1) the term reasonable accommodations means mod 
ification of the job application process, modification of the work environment, or modification 
that allows an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges; (2) reasonable 
accommodations may include, but are not limited to, equal access, job restructuring including 
part-time or flexible work schedules, reassignment, acquisition of equipment or devices, appropri 
ate examinations and training materials, provision of readers or interpreters; and (3) it may be 
necessary to engage in an interactive process with a qualified person with a disability.
6. Chinkos (1991) has reviewed the studies that revealed modest accommodation costs for the 
comparatively small number of disabled persons who were gainfully employed. These accommo 
dation costs mainly deal with such factors as the acquisition of special equipment, modifying the 
physical layout, or training procedures To the best of my knowledge, no attempt is made to esti 
mate the cost of job restructuring, providing a flexible work schedule, or extra leave for physician 
visits. Chinkos argues that, if the Act is successful in expanding employment, workplace accom 
modation costs could sharply rise as employers hire individuals with more functional limitations 
and impairments The efficiency of placing the cost burden entirely upon employers is questioned 
by Rosen (1991). If the accommodation is reasonable and specific to the particular worker-firm 
attachment, a strong case can be made to share the costs
7 The panel data from the Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics, Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, were screened to obtain samples of married male household heads. Records with data 
for five consecutive years were obtained for 1,760 whites and 771 nonwhites In 1972, 13 1 per 
cent of the whites and 18.3 percent of the nonwhites were disabled However, only 4 9 and 5 8 
percent of these two samples reported a work disability in each of the five years, 1968-1972. 
Details of these tabulations can be found in Oi (1978)
8 All of these persons were judged under the SSA disability determination process to be so 
severely disabled that they were unable to work The DI program imposes a two-year waiting 
period before a beneficiary is entitled to Medicare benefits The objective of the Bye and Riley 
study was to evaluate the merits of eliminating the two-year waiting period
9 The death rate was 6 7 percent for those under 40 years of age but jumped to 13 4 percent 
for the 40-49 age group It continued to climb, but the increment to the oldest age group was only 
1 4 percentage points
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10 The survey covered persons who entered the SSA rolls in 1980-1981 as new beneficiaries 
of the DI, Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or retired worker programs. Follow-up surveys 
were conducted in 1982 and 1991 Some 42 percent of the DI beneficiaries died in the decade fol 
lowing entitlement, the death rate was highest in the first six months on the DI rolls. The kinds of 
data included in the New Beneficiaries Data System (NBDS) are described by Yeas (1992). It is 
my understanding that Howard lams and Barry Bye are preparing an analysis of the DI sample 
from the NBDS in a forthcoming article
11 Lucas and Rapping (1969) showed that the labor supply response to a temporary wage cut 
will be larger than the response to a permanent wage cut because the worker will substitute cur 
rent for future leisure One should expect a similar difference in labor supply responses to dis 
abling conditions that are temporary versus permanent
12. See Oi (1962), Becker (1964), and Ben-Porath (1967)
13. There are three ways to leave the DI rolls: death, attainment of age 65 (and automatically 
transferring to the Old Age and Survivors fund), and recovery (SGA termination). In the Muller 
study, 9.3 percent of those under the age of 40 at entitlement recovered, as compared to only 1.1 
percent of those who were 50-59 years of age in 1981. Notice in table 3 that the percentage sepa 
rated for SGA terminations is only weakly related to family income The surprising result 
reported by Muller is the small dispersion across diagnostic groups in the percentage doing "any 
work," varying from a low of 5.5 percent (respiratory) to a high of 12.8 percent (nervous disor 
ders).
14. Holmes points out that the recession in 1993 may have depressed the employment-to-pop- 
ulation ratio.
15 The Veterans Administration rating scheme assigns a score to each applicant that ranges 
from 0 to 100 percent. Several variables might be consulted to define disability classes for a new 
DI program: quarters of covered work expenence, age, diagnostic group, medical rating of sever 
ity, and education I assume that eligibility will be restricted to persons with X or more quarters of 
covered employment A simple plan might identify only four disability classes: (1) under 50 years 
of age and in diagnostic group DG-A, (2) under 50 and in DG-B, (3) 50 or older and in DG-A, and 
(4) 50 or older and in DG-B. The classification DG-A includes those diagnostic groups exhibiting 
low two-year mortality rates, and DG-B includes diagnostic groups with high mortality rates.
16 An excerpt from a memo prepared for the Panel of the National Academy of Social Insur 
ance noted that there were 2.2 million on the VA disability rolls, of which only 9 percent were 
unable to work Reference to the SSA''s Annual Statistical Supplement, 1993 (p 329) reveals that, 
m 1992, there were 2,181,000 VA pensioners with service-connected disabilities and that 
1,245,000 were under 65 years of age. Only 141,000 VA pensioners were under 65 years of age 
and had ratings of 70 to 100 percent In my proposal, the medical assessment would serve as a 
screen excluding anyone with a rating of under 50 percent This would have excluded an individ 
ual with one eye who would have received a VA disability pension.
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The general aim of public policies toward disability is to share and 
to contain the associated social cost. Each country develops its own 
response with respect to disability. National policies typically are a 
mixture of three main objectives: (1) to ease the burden of impairments 
and the loss of earning capacity, which Haveman, Halberstadt, and 
Burkhauser (1984) call the ameliorative policy response; (2) to recover 
the earning capacity and the ability to perform normal social functions, 
so-called corrective policies; and (3) to prevent the occurrence of 
health impairments and to promote swift restoration of capacities if 
impairments prove to be irreversible, e.g., by adapting job demands or 
job conditions, which is the preventive approach.
In this paper, we discuss European experiences with disability pol 
icy over the last decades and current trends. We do so by presenting 
four typical national policies, from the Netherlands, Sweden, West 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Each of these puts different 
emphases on compensation levels, on the linkage of ameliorative with 
corrective approaches, and on employment opportunities for disabled 
workers. 1 We start by tracking the disability records of the United 
States in comparison with the other four countries indicated and illus 
trate how different policy mixtures result in different outcomes. Next, 
we discuss how these various policy outcomes relate to cross-national 
approaches to disability insurance and to rehabilitation. We then focus 
on incentive structures as defined by the design and administration of 
disability programs and by their broader socioeconomic and policy 
environment. In the concluding section, we draw some lessons from
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other nations' experiences that may be relevant for redesigning U.S. 
disability policy.
Cross-National Comparison of Disability Records
Over the past two decades, virtually all Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have been con 
fronted with excess supplies of labor resulting from demographics (the 
influx of baby boomers) and changed tastes for market work (the 
increasing participation of married women). Most of these countries 
have seen substantial declines in older male labor force participation as 
well as considerable increases in the availability and generosity of dis 
ability, and other early retirement, benefits. The concurrence of these 
tendencies suggests that disability programs have been generally used 
to achieve more general social policy goals, such as low (youth) unem 
ployment.
In their comprehensive cross-national study of disability policy, 
Haveman, Halberstadt, and Burkhauser (1984) attribute the generally 
observed growth of disability income support to faltering economic 
growth. According to them, it made older workers with more or less 
serious impairments targets for layoffs while reducing their opportuni 
ties to obtain a job if out of work. In response, eligibility criteria for 
disability were relaxed. The disability option was attractive to older 
workers, as benefit payments became increasingly more adequate, and 
relatively little stigma was attached to the receipt of disability transfer 
income. Employers, likewise, found this development attractive, as it 
made release of long-term older, low-skilled, or impaired workers less 
difficult. With large cohorts of better-educated youths and women 
entering the labor market, replacement of older workers was not diffi 
cult. Disability income support programs became an instrument to 
encourage early retirement.
To the extent that this scenario holds for most Western countries, 
disability policy, at least in the 1970s, has emphasized income support 
rather than rehabilitation. A closer comparison of five countries (table 
1), however, reveals that the age-specific trends in the number of dis 
ability beneficiaries show significant cross-national differences. To
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contain unemployment, the Netherlands clearly chose the income 
maintenance option, even for those under 45. Sweden and Germany, on 
the other hand, largely opted for employment security for ailing work 
ers under 60 and restoration of their earning capacities where possible. 
Part of the German excess labor supply was captured by relaxing bene 
fit eligibility criteria, both for disabled and able-bodied workers over 
60. The United States initially showed a tendency towards the income 
maintenance option but started to tighten eligibility standards at the 
end of the 1970s. Considering the full 1970-1990 period, the United 
States accommodated an excess supply of labor by letting wage rates 
drop and allowing market forces to create low-productivity employ 
ment for impaired workers. After 1990, however, disability transfer 
recipiency shows a steep increase (for a short description, see U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1994).
Like the United States, Germany introduced stricter eligibility stan 
dards in 1985, which brought the relative size of the 1990 beneficiary 
volume back to the low level that had prevailed in the 1970s. Note also 
that the German prevalence rates for younger workers were relatively 
low over the whole period, and lower in 1990 than in 1970. This sug 
gests that by making older workers redundant, younger workers' 
employment could be secured. Finally, the United Kingdom has seen 
disability growth in all age brackets but, contrary to the other countries, 
only after 1980.
The data in table 1 highlight the unique position of the Netherlands. 
For those younger than 60, disability prevalence rates have been about 
three times as high as in other countries (Aarts, Burkhauser, and de 
long 1996). Furthermore, the average Dutch beneficiary age is 49, 
which compares to 57 in Sweden and Germany. As one can plausibly 
assume that the Dutch do not have significantly poorer health status 
and job conditions than other European populations, the difference 
must be sought in the way disability benefits are being allocated.
Table 1 also shows that, despite having a disability beneficiary vol 
ume which is two-to-three times as large as that in comparable welfare 
states, the Dutch unemployment rate is at about the OECD average 
level. As a consequence, the employment rate, i.e., employed persons 
as a percentage of the working-age population, is low, especially 
among older workers (see OECD 1993). These data on the Dutch labor 
market suggest that other comparable countries have a stronger capac 
ity to reintegrate, or keep, less productive individuals in the workforce.
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Table 1. Disability Transfer Recipients per Thousand Active Labor Force 
Participants by Age, Unemployment Rates, and Older Male 
Labor Force Participation Rates, in Five OECD Countries, 
1970-1994
1970
15-44 years
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany3
Sweden
45-59 years
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany3
Sweden
60-64 years
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany 3
Sweden
Total population, 15-64 years
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany3
Sweden
Unemployment rate (percent)
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany3
17
11
8
7
18
113
33
48
75
66
299
154
219
419
229
55
27
29b
51
49
1.0
4.8
2.9C
0.6
1975
32
17
9
6
20
179
68
46
64
95
437
265
195
688
382
84
42
28
54
67
5.2
8.3
3.9
3.6
1980
57
16
11
7
19
294
83
51
84
99
1,033
285
209
1,348
382
138
41
31
59
68
6.0
7.0
6.4
2.9
1985
58
20
20
8
20
305
71
97
103
108
1,283
254
357
1,291
512
142
41
56
72
74
10.6
7.1
11.2
7.1
1990
62
23
23
5
21
339
72
119
75
116
1,987
250
413
1,109
577
152
43
68d
55
78
7.5
5.4
6.8
4.8
1994
66
38
5b
27
289
96
80b
143
1,911
294
l,064b
658
151
62
54b
97
7.2
6.0
9.6
6.9
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Table 1. Disability Transfer Recipients per Thousand Active Labor Force 
Participants by Age, Unemployment Rates, and Older Male 
Labor Force Participation Rates, in Five OECD Countries, 
1970-1994
Sweden
1970
1.5
1975
1.6
1980
2.0
1985
2.8
1990
1.5
1994
8.0
Labor force participation rates (x 100) for males, 55-64
The Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
Germany2
Sweden
81
81
88C
80
85
72
76
88
70
82
63
72
82
67
79
47
68
69
60
76
46
68
68
58
75
43
67
66
50
73
SOURCE: United Kingdom age-specific data are denved from Lonsdale (1993) and Employment
Gazette (several issues), UK disability beneficiary data for 1993 or 1994 were not available.;
other data are updates from Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong (1992).
a German data refer to the former Federal Republic.
b Figure refers to 1993
c Figure refers to 1971
d. Figure refers to 1991.
Table 2 provides data on "active," or corrective (vocational rehabili 
tation, work for the disabled), versus "passive," or ameliorative (dis 
ability benefits), program expenditures. Of the countries listed, Sweden 
and Holland devote by far the largest shares of their national resources 
to both types of disability policies. In these countries, the largest parts 
of redeployment budgets are used to create jobs outside of the market. 
While in Sweden only a minority of this budget is allocated to shel 
tered workshops (see "Cross-National Comparison of Rehabilitation 
Policies" on p. 141), in Holland, the entire budget is used to keep dis 
abled workers who want jobs out of regular employment. Recent 
changes in Dutch disability insurance legislation seek to reduce dis 
ability benefit dependency and to keep people with disabilities in paid 
work. The Dutch figures for 1993 suggest that these amendments were 
unsuccessful; however, the disability volume decreased in 1994, for the 
first time in an almost 30-year history of relentless growth.
The low U.S. spending on disability as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product suggests that this section relies more than do West 
ern European countries on policies that induce impaired persons to
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seek private solutions for their employment problems. Germany stands 
out as a country that emphasizes rehabilitation and spends a moderate 
proportion on cash benefits, mainly on older workers.
The costs involved with private solutions to the employment prob 
lems faced by the disabled depend on regulations such as employment 
quotas, job protection, and equal opportunity legislation. These types 
of costs are mainly borne by the employer. Moreover, countries with 
stringent award policies and low benefit levels shift a larger part of the 
social cost of disability to the household budgets of people with dis 
abilities. National policies, therefore, not only determine the level of 
the total, social cost of disability, but also the way in which this cost is 
shared between the private and public sectors. Countries with compar 
atively tight budgets for cash benefits are likely to have relatively low 
social costs, e.g., efficiency losses, and a relatively large share of pri 
vate costs (to employers and households).
Table 2. Public Expenditures on Labor Market Measures for the
Disabled and on Cash Benefits, as a Percentage of GDP, 1991
F.R. Germany
United Kingdom
United States
Sweden
Netherlands
Vocational 
rehabilitation
0.13
0.01
0.05
0.10
a
Work for the 
disabled
(Percent of GDP)
0.09
0.02
a
0.68
0.64
Disability 
benefits
2.0
1.9
0.7
3.3
4.6
SOURCE- OECD (1992, 1993), Sociale Nota (1993), and authors' calculations 
a Less than 0.01 percent.
Cross-National Comparison of Disability Benefit Policies
In this section, we describe several aspects of disability policies as 
elements of a broader set of income maintenance and labor market pro 
grams. We start with an outline of common features of selected social
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security systems and their divergent underlying philosophies. Specific 
approaches toward disabled citizens are reflected primarily by differ 
ences in the accessibility, generosity, and administration of disability 
transfer programs. The main characteristics of such programs will be 
discussed and are summarized in an appendix table. Also important is 
the broader institutional setting, in which the availability of alternative 
transfers and the scope of rehabilitation and redeployment programs 
are crucial elements. At the beginning, and at the end of this section, 
we therefore devote a few paragraphs to more general aspects of social 
policy.
Common Features: Social Insurance and Welfare Provisions
European social security systems include both social insurance and 
social assistance (welfare) programs. Social insurance flows from the 
vision of Bismark, the German politician who, in the second half of the 
19th century, introduced the first legally established insurance funds to 
cover work injuries. Other types of social insurance, covering wage 
loss due to temporary sickness, nonwork-related invalidity, old age, 
and unemployment, followed.
Welfare programs germinated from ideas in the Atlantic Charter, 
drafted by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941. This document offered a 
blueprint for the postwar Keynesian welfare state, which rested on the 
twin principles of "freedom from want" and "freedom from idleness." 
For the United Kingdom, this blueprint was elaborated by Beveridge, 
who proposed a national safety net to protect every citizen against pov 
erty.
Both types of programs are based on the principle of solidarity and 
on its legal counterpart, the constitutionally established responsibility 
of the state to protect its residents from poverty. This goal is achieved 
by two provisions: wage-replacement and minimum income guaran 
tees. Wage-replacement is based on mutual, and intergenerational, soli 
darity among employees to protect their acquired standards of living. 
Wage-replacing schemes consist of social insurance covering the loss 
of earnings due to old age, unemployment, temporary sickness, or per 
manent disability. Social insurance expenditures are financed by com 
pulsory contributions, and the premiums are determined under a pay- 
as-you-go system.
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Social assistance programs safeguard the subsistence levels of all 
residents by offering flat-rate, means-tested transfers financed by gen 
eral revenue and administered by municipalities or local agencies. Stat 
utory, or collectively bargained, minimum wages are intended to 
protect the livelihood of those who are employed.
Finally, in the European welfare states people have broad access to 
health care through combinations of public, tax-funded programs, 
social insurance, and/or regulated private markets. Such arrangements 
are of prime interest for people with disabilities.
Comparison of these general features of European welfare states 
with the United States reveals four major differences. First, the United 
States has no universal safety net provision for those, working or non- 
working, below the poverty line. Second, contrary to European sys 
tems, temporary sickness is not covered by a statutory sick pay plan 
that encompasses all those in paid employment. Third, Americans are 
not universally (or federally) insured against loss of earnings due to 
unemployment. Fourth, despite the existence of two public, federal 
programs that cover health costs for target groups (Medicare and Med- 
icaid), universal coverage is not available.
Underlying Philosophies
The common features of European social security systems only 
indicate the broad principles on which they are based. However, as the 
data in the two preceding tables suggest, the countries surveyed here 
differ significantly in their treatment of people with disabilities. These 
approaches are related to varying perspectives on the disabled and 
translate into cross-national differences in disability policies and policy 
outcomes.
Considering the 1970-1990 period, Holland is an exceptional case 
by its emphasis on "freedom from want" at the expense of "freedom 
from idleness," which is the overriding principle in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. Until 1990, when the Swedish economy 
slipped into its deepest crisis since World War II, the Swedes gave pri 
ority to vocational rehabilitation and redeployment of the disabled, 
mostly through public sector work programs. Since then, job programs 
have been cut, and unemployment has soared. Nevertheless, swift reha 
bilitation is still a major goal. Sweden also stresses moderation of
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income differentials so that both benefit replacement rates and public 
sector wages are comparatively high and independent of job perfor 
mance.
Despite sharp differences in disability policy and records, Holland 
and Sweden share the economic problems attributable to a wasteful 
welfare state. Both countries are now reevaluating their social systems, 
to strike more of a balance between equity and efficiency. One of the 
focal points of this process is the incentive structure in which relevant 
parties (covered workers, employers, program administrators) operate 
(see the section entitled "The Importance of Incentive Structures").
In comparison to those in Holland and Sweden, the German system 
appears to be more manageable. Rehabilitation bevor Renten (rehabili 
tation before pensions) is the often-quoted leading principle of German 
disability policy and of social policy in general. It implies a public 
commitment to give priority to preventive and corrective policy 
responses. Strict admission procedures, mandatory rehabilitation, a 
quota for employers to provide (market) jobs for the disabled, and a 
separate disabled worker status in employment are the main instru 
ments to support vocational rehabilitation.
Finally, the United Kingdom contains its disability budget mainly 
by keeping benefit levels low. Vocational rehabilitation is supported by 
a set of instruments similar to that in Germany. However, these tools 
are less effective, as the involvement of employers in shaping and 
administering social insurance programs is weaker than on the Euro 
pean continent, where the concept of a "social partnership" between 
labor and management has strong traditional roots and pervades the 
institutional framework in which the labor market operates.
Accessibility I: Coverage2
In European welfare states, all employees are covered by social 
insurance against the risk of wage loss due to temporary sickness or 
permanent disablement. Sick pay usually covers all health contingen 
cies, whether objectively assessable or not. If the incapacity has a 
work-related cause, a separate work injury program may replace wage 
loss. European work injury plans are similar to the U.S. workers' com 
pensation program, both in design and origin. Work injury programs 
were the first form of social insurance in all early market economies.
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As a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, a large number of indi 
viduals became involved in hazardous jobs. Simultaneously, tort law 
evolved such that employers were increasingly found liable for the 
financial consequences of job-related diseases and injuries. These par 
allel trends spurred a common interest among labor and firms in cover 
age of the financial risks of work injury. As private insurance markets 
were unable to provide such coverage, this common interest created a 
broad political platform for the implementation of statutory social 
insurance plans.
In almost all welfare states, coverage of work injury and related 
risks is compulsory for private employment. One of the exceptions is 
Holland, which abolished the distinction between work-related and 
other causes of incapacity under its disability insurance scheme in 
1967. In the United States, small firms, and firms in certain states, may 
be exempted from mandated coverage. 3
Most disability transfer programs covering social risks, i.e., non- 
work-related contingencies, consist of an employment-related, social 
insurance scheme, like the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
program, and a separate arrangement for disabled persons without, or 
with limited, work experience, like Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI). In Holland and Sweden, compensation for loss of earning capac 
ity due to long-term impairments is provided by a two-tier disability 
insurance program. The first tier is universal, with eligibility being 
based on citizenship. These national disability insurance programs typ 
ically offer flat-rate benefits that are, of course, earnings-tested but are 
not tested for other household means. They target those handicapped 
congenitally, or in early childhood, and provide benefits from age 18 
onwards. In Holland, these basic benefits also cover self-employed 
people. In Germany and the United Kingdom, those with insufficient 
insurance contribution years have to rely on means-tested social assis 
tance transfers. In the United Kingdom, an additional disability pre 
mium may be allowed up to the basic rate under invalidity benefits (see 
the appendix table). In Germany, employees who become disabled 
before age 55 enjoy entitlements as if they had worked until age 55.
Eligibility for a supplement is restricted to labor force participants. 
These second-tier benefits are based on age, or employment history, 
and wage earnings. In Germany and Sweden, as is the case under the 
U.S. Social Security system, earnings-related disability insurance is
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part of the legal pension system. Coverage depends on contribution 
years. More specifically, at least three years (Sweden) or three out of 
the five years (Germany) preceding a contingency should have been 
spent in paid employment. Wage earners are obliged to participate, and 
the self-employed may participate voluntarily. Holland and the United 
Kingdom have no contribution requirements for earnings-related bene 
fits in terms of years of covered employment. However, the United 
Kingdom has a requirement of covered earnings both for statutory sick 
pay and invalidity benefits, and, in 1993, Holland introduced a system 
of age-dependent supplemental benefits, which simulate a contribution 
years requirement.
Accessibility II: Eligibility Requirements and Benefit Levels
By definition, eligibility for disability pensions is based on some 
measure of (residual) capacity or productivity. The United Kingdom 
has an all-or-nothing system: after 28 weeks, when sickness benefits 
have run out, only those fully incapacitated, i.e., more than 80 percent 
disabled, qualify for invalidity benefits. These are basically flat-rate 
benefits, which are only distantly related to previous earnings (see the 
appendix table). Supplements and allowances may be given, depending 
(inversely) on age and on household situation.
Germany has a dual system, with full benefits for those who lose 
two-thirds or more of their earning capacity with regard to any job 
available in the economy and partial benefits for those who are more 
than 50 percent disabled with regard to their usual occupation. Under 
the Handicapped Act of 1974, workers having a permanent reduction 
in their labor capacity of at least 50 percent are entitled to the status of 
"severely disabled" (Schwerbehinderte). Given this status, workers are 
entitled to extra vacation and enjoy protection against dismissal. 
Although being recognized as a severely disabled worker does not give 
access to cash benefits, it allows one to retire at age 60 with a full pen 
sion, given sufficient (15) contribution years.4
Sweden has a more lenient eligibility standard, as incapacity is mea 
sured with regard to commensurate employment instead of any gainful 
activity. Moreover, the Swedish program has four disability categories, 
depending on the size of residual capacity, with a corresponding sys 
tem of full and partial pensions.
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The Dutch disability program is unique in that it distinguishes seven 
disability categories, ranging from less-than-15 percent, 15-25 percent 
disabled, and so on, to 80-100 percent disabled. The minimum degree 
of disability yielding entitlement to benefits is 15 percent. The degree 
of disablement is assessed by consideration of the worker's residual 
earning capacity. As of 1994, capacity is defined by the earnings flow 
ing from any job commensurate with one's residual capabilities as a 
percentage of predisability usual earnings. The degree of disablement, 
then, is the complement of the residual earning capacity and defines 
the benefit level. Before 1994, only jobs that were compatible with 
one's training and work history could be taken into consideration. Not 
only has the definition of suitable work been broadened, but the medi 
cal definition of disability has been tightened: under the new ruling, the 
causal relationship between impairment and disablement has to be 
objectively assessable.
Administration
The preceding short overview of "the rules of the game" does not 
say much about how the game is played. It does not explain why differ 
ent national schemes produce the divergent results recorded by tables 1 
and 2. More specifically, the fact that Holland has such a high preva 
lence of disability transfer payment recipients has more to do with the 
way in which the rules are applied than with the rules as such.
The Dutch disability plan differs from other national programs, not 
only because it has no separate work injury scheme and has a more 
elaborate system of partial benefits, but also because its social insur 
ance programs (disability and unemployment insurance, and sickness 
benefits) are run by autonomous organizations, which lack direct gov 
ernmental (political) control. These "Industrial (Insurance) Associa 
tions" represent different (19) branches of industry. They are managed 
by representatives of employers' organizations and trade unions. Mem 
bership in one of these associations is obligatory for every employer. 
The Industrial Associations have discretion to develop autonomous 
benefit award and rehabilitation policies without having to bear the fis 
cal consequences of their policy choices, as disability program expen 
ditures are funded by a uniform contribution rate. Thus, administrative 
autonomy is not balanced by financial responsibility (see the discus 
sion under "The Importance of Incentive Structures").
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In Germany and Sweden, disability insurance is part of the national 
pension program, which is run by an independent, national board that 
is, however, closely supervised by those who are politically responsible 
for the operation of the social security system and therefore subject to 
parliamentary control. These boards monitor disability plans and safe 
guard uniformity in award policy by issuing rules and guidelines to 
local agencies. The British administration, being a civil service run by 
the Department of Social Security, is more similar to the U.S. Social 
Security Administration. The difference between these countries and 
Holland, then, is that their disability systems are under some form of 
budgetary control.
In Holland, disability assessments are made by teams of insurance 
doctors and vocational experts employed by the administrative offices 
of the Industrial Associations. These teams also have to examine the 
rehabilitation potential of disability claimants and to rehabilitate those 
with sufficient residual capacities. A further potentially important dif 
ference with the other European countries, then, is that the Dutch dis 
ability assessment teams are legally obliged to examine every benefit 
claimant personally, not just administratively. This may have spurred a 
liberal, conflict-avoiding attitude, especially in a setting in which nei 
ther the gatekeepers themselves nor their managers are confronted with 
the financial consequences of award decisions.
Sweden only allows administrative checks of disability claims on 
the basis of written, medical and other, reports in order to prevent the 
program gatekeepers from being influenced by self-reports and by the 
physical presence of claimants. In Germany, too, award decisions are 
made by using medical reports and by applying uniform decision rules 
developed by specialists' panels, each covering a diagnostic group. 
Entry into the British Invalidity Benefit program rests upon the claim 
ant's doctor issuing a statement that advises the person to refrain from 
work when, in the doctor's opinion, the patient is definitely unable to 
do so because of a physical or mental disorder or when work would be 
detrimental to the patient's health. Claimants may be, and often are, 
referred to doctors of the Benefit Agency's Medical Reference Ser 
vices. Usually, one in three among those examined by reference doc 
tors is considered fit for either the predisability job or for some other 
work.
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"Hidden" Unemployment
Workers with disabilities have a higher-than-average sensitivity to 
cyclical downswings. Independent of the operation of disability pro 
grams, they are among the first to be made redundant. Both American 
and British studies show a significant relationship between labor mar 
ket conditions and disability program participation rates. 5 These stud 
ies do not explain the extent to which there may be severely disabled 
individuals hidden among workers in boom periods or (mildly dis 
abled) unemployed persons hidden among disability benefit recipients 
in slack periods.
As discussed, European workers who lose their jobs are usually cov 
ered by unemployment insurance. Entitlement to earnings-related 
unemployment insurance benefits is of limited duration and is followed 
by flat-rate, means-tested social assistance. In Holland, Germany, and 
Sweden, entitlement durations depend on age, such that workers older 
than 58 or 60 may keep unemployment insurance until they reach pen 
sionable age (65) or qualify for disability insurance benefits on non- 
medical, labor market grounds. Improper use of disability benefits as a 
more generous, and less stigmatizing, alternative to unemployment 
benefits was quite common in the 1975-1990 period (see the earlier 
section on disability records). It provided employers with a flexible 
instrument to reduce the labor force at will and kept official unemploy 
ment rates low. The approach was very popular in Sweden until 1992, 
when the law was changed and disability pensions based solely on 
unemployment could no longer be awarded.
Holland had similar experiences. Until 1987, the law explicitly rec 
ognized the difficulties impaired workers may have in finding com 
mensurate employment by prescribing that the benefit adjudicators 
should take account of poor labor market opportunities. The adminis 
trative interpretation of this so-called labor market consideration was 
so liberal as to award a full benefit to almost anyone who passed the 
low threshold of a 15 percent reduction in earnings capacity. The share 
of unemployed (or "socially disabled") among disability insurance 
beneficiaries, applying the pre-1994 eligibility standards, is estimated 
to be 40 percent (see Aarts and de long 1992, chapters 5 and 11). The 
fact that the abolition of this legal provision could not halt the growth
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in the incidence of disability transfer payment recipients (table 1) 
induced further amendments in 1992-1994.
Labor market considerations also influence disability determinations 
in Germany. In 1976, the German Federal Court ruled that if insured 
persons have limited residual capacities and the Employment Service 
or the Pension Insurance is unable to find them a commensurate job 
within one year, they can be awarded a full disability pension retroac 
tively. Because partial disability benefits are based on the availability 
of commensurate work, certified skilled workers may refuse any job 
that is not at least semiskilled in nature. A semiskilled worker must 
only accept unskilled jobs that are prominent in pay and prestige. 
Unskilled workers who are not eligible for a full disability pension 
have to resort to unemployment or to social assistance. These regula 
tions, in combination with a slack labor market, have reduced the pro 
portion of partial pensions from 30 percent in 1970 to less than 5 
percent in the early 1990s.
Cross-National Comparison of Rehabilitation Policies
Assessment of rehabilitative potential is the counterpart of disability 
assessment. To contain dependency on transfer payments, impairments 
should be cured, or their limiting consequences corrected, as soon as 
possible. The ultimate goal of a vocational rehabilitation plan is work 
resumption. This involves more than treatment, training, and the provi 
sion of corrective devices. It also involves job mediators and employ 
ers. Swift rehabilitation and redeployment depend on the willingness 
of all of these different actors to invest money, time, and/or effort to 
boost the employment possibilities of impaired workers. The job of 
some of these participants (doctors, ergonomists, job mediators) is to 
help people overcome their handicaps. For others, the impaired work 
ers and their employers, it is more or less a matter of choice and, hence, 
of incentives, as to whether they engage in rehabilitative efforts.
Policies differ with respect to public spending on rehabilitation ser 
vices and on employment programs for disabled workers (see table 2). 
Rehabilitation services may consist of (subsidies on) tangible provi 
sions (corrective devices, such as wheelchairs, workplace accommoda-
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tions, Seeing Eye dogs) or of intangible ones (training, therapy, 
counseling, job mediation). Given the broad accessibility of health care 
in European welfare states, there are no serious financial impediments 
to obtaining medical rehabilitation. Nevertheless, over the past years, 
as part of the changes in their welfare programs, Sweden and Holland 
have introduced patient fees for an increasing number of health and 
rehabilitation services.
National policies also differ in the extent to which they require reha 
bilitation efforts. Mandatory rehabilitation is a possible outcome of the 
disability determination process in both Germany and Sweden. More 
over, Germany and the United Kingdom have quotas, stipulating that 
firms should employ a certain percentage of workers who are registered 
as handicapped. Dutch and Swedish civil law similar to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act requires firms to provide commensurate work to 
employees who have become disabled in their current jobs.
Public Provision of Rehabilitation Services
In addition to cash compensation, Dutch disability insurance offers 
in-kind provisions covering job accommodation and training costs to 
promote redeployment of impaired workers. As table 2 indicates, 
spending in this area is minimal. In 1993, spending on provisions in 
kind under the Dutch disability insurance program amounted to 0.8 bil 
lion guilders. Only 20 million (2.5 percent of provisions expenditures, 
about 0.1 percent of total disability expenditures) was used for voca 
tional rehabilitation and workplace adjustment. The rest was spent on 
provisions for general daily activities (mobility, dwelling, etc.). The 
amount is extremely low simply because very few claims are filed. On 
a per-capita basis, Germany spends 42 times more than Holland does 
on vocational rehabilitation.6
Various aspects of the disability pension system reflect the German 
commitment to a corrective policy response. First, a relatively large 
amount of money is spent on vocational rehabilitation (see table 2). 
Impaired workers are referred to rehabilitation by the adjudicators of 
either the sickness insurance system, the disability pensions, or by the 
local employment agencies. Furthermore, to encourage employment of 
disabled workers, the Handicapped Act subsidizes employer expenses 
related to job accommodations.
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The Swedish Social Security Administration and its regional and 
local offices do not have their own rehabilitation personnel or facilities. 
Instead, they enlist the services of the various medical, vocational, and 
other professionals in this field. Each county has AMIs (labor market 
institutes), special centers for vocational rehabilitation and guidance. 
The centers are operated by the National Labor Market Board through 
the county labor market boards. Some of them specialize in groups 
with specific disabilities. The AMIs provide more detailed examina 
tions than are given at the employment offices, in order to determine 
the work capacity of people with disabilities and to provide general 
help in developing the capacities necessary to work. However, in most 
cases, specific occupational training for the disabled is provided under 
the same programs that train people without disabilities. The AMIs 
also serve the nondisabled; the share of those in AMI programs who 
are able-bodied has gradually increased and is now about 50 percent.
Recently, the general policy emphasis in Sweden has been put on 
early intervention for those receiving sickness benefits and on the coor 
dination of all the parties involved in rehabilitation, i.e., medical pro 
fessionals, unions, employers, vocational professionals, and 
employment service administrators, depending on what the case is 
judged to require. New legislation gives the social insurance offices the 
responsibility for initiating and coordinating rehabilitation when nec 
essary. This has enabled social insurance administrators to act more as 
private insurers with a responsibility to contain costs. The government 
has established cost-reduction goals for all the regional offices regard 
ing sickness and disability payments. In sum, the trend of recent years 
has been to make more resources available for rehabilitation, while at 
the same time goals have been set for reducing benefit payments by 
returning persons to the workplace.
The British Department of Employment, operating under the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for Employment, administers a 
number of programs aimed at rehabilitation and reentry into the labor 
market. The United Kingdom provides a status to those who qualify to 
be registered as disabled similar to the official status of Schwerbe- 
hinderte in Germany. Being on the register enables a person to claim 
various kinds of assistance aimed at getting a job.
Vocational rehabilitation is provided mainly through 26 Employ 
ment Rehabilitation Centres (ERCs). The ERC staff includes individu-
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als such as psychologists, social workers, and technical instructors, 
who provide fuller assessments of capacity as well as employment 
rehabilitation and training. Research in 1980 showed that, six months 
after completing the courses, about half the participants were 
employed and the other 50 percent were either on sickness benefits or 
unemployed. To our knowledge, more recent empirical analyses are 
not available. The present trend is towards privatizing the Employment 
Rehabilitation Centers.
Employment Policies
Provision of jobs for workers with disabilities can take several 
forms. One is job creation in the public sector, either as part of an 
employment policy targeted at a broader population, including the 
able-bodied unemployed, or via a narrow approach, by creating shel 
tered workshops as a kind of workfare for the disabled. Another way to 
promote employment is to hand out wage subsidies to private business. 
Finally, employers may be forced to make room for handicapped work 
ers by regulations, such as requirements involving special perks for 
recognized disabled workers, job protection, and employment quotas.
Sheltered Work. Holland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have 
forms of sheltered work for the disabled. Holland has a national net 
work of sheltered workshops, employing 88,000 people with disabili 
ties (1.5 percent of total employment). Sweden has 35,000 
handicapped workers (0.83 percent of total employment) in sheltered 
jobs. In both countries, the operating costs of these workshops are 
almost fully funded by government. On average, wages are higher than 
disability benefits, and part-time earnings may be combined with par 
tial benefits. Handicapped workers may choose freely whether or not 
they want to be employed in a sheltered workshop. In the United King 
dom, the range of sheltered employment opportunities goes from large 
government-supported companies to smaller sheltered workshops that 
are little more than welfare provision. They all are heavily subsidized 
by way of grants to cover trading losses and training fees. Quantita 
tively, the sheltered employment programs are of marginal signifi 
cance, as only about 20,000 severely disabled people (0.075 percent of 
total employment) are in sheltered employment. Sheltered placements 
are increasing, however.
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Wage Subsidies and Partial Benefits. Apart from being an insurance 
device to compensate the exact loss of earning capacity, partial benefits 
also work as a wage subsidy. In fact, introduction of the fine grid of 
seven disability categories under Dutch disability insurance was sup 
ported by explicitly referring to its rehabilitative aims when the pro 
gram was enacted in 1967. Partial benefits were intended to help 
disabled workers find commensurate employment. By liberal applica 
tion of labor market considerations, it became routine to award full 
benefits under the presumption of a shortage of employment opportu 
nities. This lenient approach was hoped to have been changed by the 
1987 amendments, banning labor considerations, into an administra 
tive practice of accurate assessments of residual capacities. The old 
routines proved difficult to alter, however, and the amendments did not 
produce the expected results. At the end of 1993, 77 percent of current 
disability beneficiaries still had an award based on full disability. 
Hence, a new series of cuts and changes were introduced in 1993 and 
1994.
Like Holland, Sweden and Germany have also seen a growing share 
of full disability benefits. Currently, 85 percent of Swedish and 95 per 
cent of German beneficiaries (up from a 1965 low of 67 percent) are 
labeled as fully disabled. These differences suggest that the more strin 
gent the award system, the stronger the pressure to obtain full awards. 
In Sweden, a separate wage subsidy program was introduced in 1980, 
replacing two earlier programs. The compensation rate paid to the 
employer varies depending on the disability, on the duration of 
employment (compensation is generally higher in the first years after a 
person is hired; subsidies are not available for already employed per 
sons), on the sector in which the person is employed, and on the per 
son's age (compensation is highest for disabled youth). On average, the 
compensation rate was 73 percent in July 1992 for those in their first 
year of support and 61 percent for those assisted for longer periods. 
These wage subsidies are used by about 1 percent of total employment.
Although the British system does not provide for partial disability 
benefits, people with severe disabilities are subsidized under the Brit 
ish Sheltered Placement Scheme to work in the open labor market. The 
wage subsidies are paid to the employers to compensate for the differ 
ence in productivity between a disabled and a nondisabled worker. Fur 
thermore, the Disability Working Allowance, a bonus for disability
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beneficiaries who have found a job, was introduced in 1992. The allow 
ance depends on the wage and on the disabled person's wealth. Claims 
are adjudicated on the basis of self-assessed disability. The Department 
of Social Security anticipated an annual number of 50,000 claims. 
Within six months following its introduction, around 20,000 claims 
were received; however, 90 percent were denied, mainly because 
claimants had not yet obtained a job.
Employer Mandates
Quotas. Employment quotas exist in Germany and the United King 
dom. The German Handicapped Act requires that public and private 
employers with more than 15 employees hire one severely disabled 
person for every 16 job slots or pay monthly compensation of deutsche 
mark (DM) 200 ($130) for each unfilled quota position. In 1990, 
approximately 900,000 severely disabled persons were employed, and 
120,000 were unemployed. Despite the carrot of subsidies for work 
place adjustments and the stick of monthly fines, disabled persons 
make up only 4.5 percent of the targeted workforce, well below the 6 
percent quota. Only 19 percent of the 122,807 public and private 
employers subject to the quota have managed to fill it; 44 percent of 
these enterprises employ some severely disabled persons, although the 
numbers are lower than required by the Handicapped Act. The remain 
ing 37 percent employ no disabled persons (Sadowski and Frick 
1992a). Although German authors are rather critical of the effect of the 
Handicapped Act and compliance is far from full, the employment rate 
among disabled workers in the market sector is high by international 
standards, even by comparison with Sweden.
The British Disabled Persons Act of 1944 places a statutory obliga 
tion on employers with 20 or more employees to fulfill a "quota" of at 
least 3 percent of registered disabled people in the workforce. In the 
ory, noncompliance can lead to a fine or even to imprisonment. In prac 
tice, however, the quota regulation is not enforced. Fines have been 
imposed on only a handful of occasions despite the fact that, for the 
past 20 years, the majority of employers have stayed well below their 
quota requirements. In Holland, successive governments have also 
been reluctant to regulate business in this way, preferring to rely on the 
promotion of voluntary codes of practice.
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Job Protection. Dutch legal regulations oblige employers to provide 
commensurate work to employees who have become disabled in their 
current jobs. After the onset of impairment, individuals can only be 
dismissed if continued employment in one's usual, or alternative, work 
would put a more-than-reasonable strain upon the employer. An abso 
lute dismissal ban is in force during the first two years of disability. 
After these two years, the employer is usually granted dismissal per 
mission. Similarly, German workers that are recognized as severely 
disabled have the right to demand workplace adjustments and to enjoy 
protection against dismissal.
The Importance of Incentive Structures
Overview
European welfare states are in a phase of reorientation. The negative 
efficiency impacts of the equity principles upon which these states 
were built have gradually turned into urgent social policy problems. In 
countries such as Holland and Sweden, the sentiment is that
far too many people rely on social benefits, while too few citizens 
are at work contributing to economic growth and the financing of 
social welfare expenditure. The benefit rules and the high levels of 
taxation required to finance the system affect human motivation in 
a negative direction and may increase the propensity to work 
unofficially in the "black" economy.7
Among other things, the generosity and lack of control of disability 
benefit programs are now important entries on the agenda for reform. 
As we have seen, Germany and the United Kingdom have less gener 
ous and, therefore, more manageable disability programs.
Among the four countries studied, Germany probably shows the 
best example of a balanced approach toward disability in that it is the 
least controversial. However, national policies have their own historical 
background and are set in a specific political and socioeconomic con 
text. An exact copy of the German system in another national setting 
could, therefore, yield very different results. What we can learn from 
varying experiences in different settings is something about the com-
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bined effects of, and possible relationships between, disability policies 
and their social, economic, and political environment.
Every country develops its own set of policy responses, which are 
typically mixtures of ameliorative, corrective, and preventive elements. 
More specifically, disability policies are directed at four goals, namely, 
(1) prevention of, (2) compensation for, and (3) recovery from losses in 
earning capacity due to functional limitations, and (4) reduction in the 
waste of human capital, by either retaining people with residual earn 
ing capacities within the employing firm or by gainful redeployment 
through external channels.
In practice, the second and fourth goals often are in conflict. Since 
adequate compensation may collide with the need to contain benefit 
expenditures, each national system has to find a balance by setting pri 
orities and by using a number of instruments that are more or less uni 
versal across countries, such as
• social insurance benefits;
• assessment instruments and procedures that help in targeting bene 
fits to the most needy and that facilitate timely interventions;
•rehabilitation services (training, medical services) and other in- 
kind provisions to accommodate functional limitations;
•redeployment services (job mediation), sheltered employment 
opportunities for those who are not employable in regular jobs, and 
quotas;
•legal provisions aimed at reducing the risk of work injury and 
occupational diseases;
• legal employment protection of functionally impaired people to 
counterbalance their reduced "market value"; and
• wage subsidies, partial benefits, or disability allowances to com 
pensate employees/employers for productivity losses.
Under the European systems reviewed in this paper, most of these 
policy instruments are available to the administrators of disability pro 
grams. In this respect, European policy approaches are similar. Cross 
country differences in policy outcomes, therefore, cannot be explained 
by a lack of tools. The dominant view in Europe, nowadays also shared
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by traditional supporters of the welfare state in Sweden and the Nether 
lands, is that the incentive structure implied by the design of national 
disability policies is crucially inadequate. To illustrate this argument, 
we will identify the major agents involved in shaping disability prac 
tices and the ways in which their behavior is affected by the implicit 
incentive structure.
Who Are the Agents?
The allocation of disability benefits over the population at risk takes 
place through the operation of three agents: (1) insured/covered per 
sons, mainly employees, who can claim to be unfit for work because of 
a physical or mental impairment; (2) their employers, if any, who either 
may support the claim, or, if held responsible, fight it, or may help in 
overcoming the limiting consequences of functional impairments; and 
(3) the intermediaries, i.e., private or social insurers and the curative 
sector, which have to assess the extent to which claimants are eligible 
and to which their ailments can be cured or their limitations can be 
overcome.
Each of these three agents is subject to incentives determining the 
outcome of a process that starts with the manifestation of the symp 
toms of an ailment. These incentives are primarily defined by the 
design of the plans covering disability-related needs. For instance, 
stringent, and easily and unambiguously applicable, eligibility rules for 
disability (cash) benefits restrict the discretion of both the gatekeepers 
of the disability plan and the persons covered. On the other hand, dis 
ability eligibility rules that encompass every conceivable health com 
plaint leave a great deal of latitude both to gatekeepers in their 
disability determinations and, hence, to covered persons in weighing 
the costs and benefits of program participation.
The greater the room for choice, the stronger the impact of other 
than health-related factors. Such factors may be program characteris 
tics—benefit size and duration, availability of curative, corrective, or 
rehabilitative provisions in kind, mandated redeployment—or may be 
more or less independent of the design and operation of the disability 
plan. These external influences can be found in different spheres of 
life—personal, vocational, social—of the individuals covered by the 
program. These factors, however, may also stem from a broader envi-
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ronment, such as regional labor market circumstances and the avail 
ability of alternative cash benefits. 8
The Employee/Disability Beneficiary
Economic theory posits that workers supply labor according to their 
preferences with regard to the trade-off between leisure and earnings, 
available nonwork income, and earning capacities as reflected by wage 
rates. The stronger one's taste for leisure, the lower the expected wage 
rate, and the larger the amount of nonwork income, the smaller the 
expected number of hours supplied. The expected wage rate is the 
product of the wage rate in a given job and the probability of finding 
such a job, taken over all jobs in the relevant segment of the labor mar 
ket, i.e., the wage offer distribution. Similarly, the expected number of 
hours is the product of the probability of labor force participation and 
the preferred number of hours, given participation.
Within this theoretical framework, health impairments may reduce 
labor supply for two reasons. Impairments affect the demand for lei 
sure positively and, depending on the extent of disablement, have a 
negative impact on the expected wage rate, both by reducing the earn 
ing capacity in a given job and by lowering the mean of the wage offer 
distribution. The negative effect of a lower wage on labor supplied may 
be reinforced by disability-related income transfers that replace part of 
the earnings loss. The relevant concept is the expected benefit as a 
function of award stringency and the benefit stream upon award.
In the absence of mandatory rehabilitation and regular reviews of 
disability status, eligible workers can choose between permanent with 
drawal from the labor force, by enrollment in a disability insurance 
plan, or reentry into the workforce, by, if necessary, enrollment in a 
rehabilitation program. As described in the preceding two sections, the 
Dutch disability insurance system typically offers such discretion to 
workers who are recognized as disabled. Under the German and British 
programs, benefit dependency is much less of an option. There, the sta 
tus of being severely disabled is allowed to keep people in employment 
instead of making them redundant.
Our research on the determinants of disability benefit recipiency in 
the Netherlands strongly confirms the influence of economic factors on 
the choice between benefit dependency and work resumption. We 
found that medical factors, such as the nature and extent of disable-
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ment and health history, explain only about one-third of the variation in 
the probability of entry into the disability insurance benefit system. Of 
the remaining, nonmedical factors, financial considerations, indicated 
by the present value of the benefit stream relative to the present value 
of the expected stream of earnings upon work resumption, and unem 
ployment hazards derived from labor market records have proved to be 
particularly influential (see Aarts and de long 1992, pp. 299-303).
Despite stricter systems in the United States and the United King 
dom, similar results have been found in studies of these countries (see 
Leonard 1986 and Aylward and Lonsdale 1992). These findings sug 
gest that an inherently vague concept like work disability always 
allows some room for discretion. Given the availability and generosity 
of disability benefits, eligible workers with no (further) career pros 
pects and a weak labor market position appear to prefer benefit depen 
dency rather than returning to the hazards of labor market 
participation. The results also imply that an increase in award strin 
gency and/or a reduction in benefit generosity may boost the demand 
for rehabilitative services. In Sweden, disability benefit replacement 
rates are relatively high; however, sick pay is even higher, and the 
incentive is to extend the sickness period. With no statutory limits on 
the length of sickness benefit entitlements, the sickness benefit pro 
gram has many beneficiaries who would be considered disabled under 
the Dutch ruling. Vocational rehabilitation is stimulated by entitling 
participants to 100 percent benefits. By paying market wages in shel 
tered employment, the interest in reemployment is increased in a simi 
lar way. Empirical evidence suggests that the modest size of the 
disability populations in Germany (except older workers) and the 
United Kingdom is to some extent the result of relatively low benefit 
replacement rates in these countries.
The Employer
Employers are agents who affect disability policy in two ways. First, 
they can directly influence the incidence of work injuries and occupa 
tional diseases. Second, by offering job opportunities to functionally 
impaired employees or to disabled people from outside the firm, 
employers may contribute to reducing disability benefit dependency.
Workers can be gainfully employed only as long as the value of their 
productivity covers labor costs. Thus, impaired workers with reduced
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productivity must be employed in jobs with wages that are substan 
tially below their pre-impairment level, or in jobs where profitability 
requirements are less pressing, such as public sector employment in 
general and sheltered work in particular. Private employers can make 
jobs available to the functionally impaired only if a positive difference 
between wages and the (marginal) revenue deriving from this labor is 
covered in one, or more, of the following ways: increased productivity 
through vocational rehabilitation, partial benefits or disability allow 
ances for diabled workers, or wage subsidies for employers.
A cost-benefit framework may help to unravel the determinants of 
the firm's willingness to engage in rehabilitation via accommodating 
workplaces or offering alternative employment. In the short run, given 
the enterprise's technology and the level of safety provision, the net 
cost for the employer of an employee entering a disability transfer pro 
gram primarily depends on the profitability of the job held by the 
impaired worker. Clearly, the incentive to retain an impaired employee 
will be very small if the individual's job is redundant. This is one of the 
reasons why disability transfer payments increase in times of growing 
unemployment. If the job is not redundant, enrollment into a disability 
benefit program means hiring a replacement. The cost-benefit approach 
implies that a firm's inclination to retain and rehabilitate workers who 
have become functionally impaired depends on the following:
• The value of the impaired employee's productivity. The higher the 
postadjustment productivity, the more inclined the firm will be to 
accommodate and retain the worker.
•The labor costs of continued employment of the employee. By 
allowing for subsidies covering part of these costs, the disability 
program may encourage firms to retain workers upon impairment.
•The costs of adjustments, net of subsidies, to make jobs and 
impaired workers match. Lowering these costs may reinforce a 
firm's inclination to retain impaired employees.
• The potential contribution of a replacement to the firm's proceeds. 
Other things equal, the higher the expected productivity of a 
replacement employee, the less inclined the firm will be to retain 
and accommodate the impaired worker.
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• The cost of recruiting and training a replacement. Firms will be 
more inclined to retain employees after the occurrence of func 
tional impairments if the individuals' skills are hard to find. If a 
replacement would need to go through a long period of job or firm- 
specific training to acquire the impaired employee's skills, replace 
ment may be an unattractive alternative. Equally important, finding 
a suitable replacement in a tight labor market may involve consid 
erable search costs. In this situation, external labor market condi 
tions enter the cost-benefit calculus.
• The costs of enrolling an employee into the disability insurance 
program and the internal and external financial consequences of 
program enrollment. The higher these costs, the greater the firm's 
inclination to retain functionally impaired employees. Insurance 
devices, such as coinsurance and differentiation of contribution 
rates (experience rating), raise the cost-consciousness of firms with 
respect to these external expenses.
The countries reviewed have different approaches to the firm. Until 
recently, Swedish and Dutch firms did not incur any substantial cost if 
employees entered the disability rolls. Mandatory employment quotas 
still are absent, and contribution rates are uniform, although differenti 
ation is under consideration. In both of these countries, program 
administrators have had a range of instruments at their disposal to help 
bridge the gap between impaired employees' productivity and market 
wages: fully subsidized training and rehabilitation, fully subsidized job 
accommodation provisions, and partial disability benefit entitlements. 
As mentioned, the effect has been very limited in these two nations.
Since 1987, both Sweden and the Netherlands have taken measures 
to remove adverse incentives and to introduce alternatives to benefit 
dependency. Between 1980 and 1987, benefit levels had already been 
cut. After that, the focus shifted from the employee to the employer, 
with measures affecting the cost to the firm of disability program 
enrollment and the benefit of retaining or hiring functionally impaired 
workers. In the Netherlands, a stick-and-carrot mechanism was intro 
duced that puts a fine on every disability benefit award and provides a 
bonus for every newly hired functionally impaired employee. In the 
sickness benefit program, both in Sweden and the Netherlands, the 
employer has been made accountable for providing benefits during the
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first six (Holland) or eight weeks (Sweden). Additionally, in the Neth 
erlands, legislation was put in place by which employers are obligated 
to make the accommodations necessary to employ functionally 
impaired employees. As these measures did not bring about the 
intended effects quickly enough, benefit levels were further reduced in 
1993.
It would be unfair, however, to put all the blame on the employer. A 
provision enacted in 1986 empowering impaired workers in Holland 
with a legal instrument to enforce (subsidized) workplace accommoda 
tion did not have any impact on the claims for in-kind entitlements. 
Only a few cases were brought to court. This is indicative, not only of 
the apparent preference of Dutch disability benefit claimants for leav 
ing the labor market, but also of the lax assessment procedures that 
allow claimants to act according to their preferences.
Germany and the United Kingdom have had a quota system for 
many years, although enforcement is weak, especially in Britain. Dis 
abled employment is more substantial than in Sweden or the Nether 
lands, however. In Germany, the registered disabled account for over 4 
percent of total employment. In the United Kingdom, this figure may 
be lower; but considering the huge difference in the sizes of the British 
and Dutch disabled populations relative to the labor force and the small 
differences, if any, in unemployment rates, it appears that many func 
tionally impaired British citizens, who would have been entitled to dis 
ability benefits under the Dutch system, are gainfully employed.
The Administering Organizations
The extent to which individual preferences or firm-specific consid 
erations have an impact on the number of disability beneficiaries 
depends on the behavior of the gatekeepers of disability insurance pro 
grams. Whether or not firms are successful in discharging impaired 
employees by making them apply for disability benefits depends on 
whether benefit dependency conforms with the preferences of the 
employee and the design and administration of the program. A 
leniently administered, and generous, disability insurance regime pro 
vides older workers with an early retirement option and offers firms 
ample opportunities to use disability insurance as an instrument for 
personnel management. Ideally, the adverse stimuli for employers and 
employees to "play the disability insurance system" should be counter-
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balanced by administrative regulations and routines that either reduce 
the discretionary powers of individual employers and employees or 
provide contrary incentives. To do this, administering organizations 
need adequate instrumentation, for example, standardized assessment 
and review protocols and the authority to enforce compliance with 
quotas and to prescribe and mandate rehabilitation. The administration 
also needs the motivation to apply the available instruments ade 
quately.
While private insurance carriers get their incentive from a competi 
tive market environment, public services require either bureaucratic 
control mechanisms or budget containment of some sort. In the four 
European countries, disability insurance is publicly administered, but 
there are significant differences in administrative design. In the United 
Kingdom, the government bears direct responsibility for administra 
tion. The Department of Social Security allocates the benefits, and the 
Department of Employment administers the job programs. Careful 
allocation of benefits is safeguarded by combining bureaucratic and 
budget controls. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the government, 
until 1995, had only indirect administrative responsibilities since the 
actual administration and its supervision and control were delegated to 
semipublic organizations run by employers' and union representatives 
(the so-called social partners). 9 Bureaucratic controls were weak, and 
budget containment devices were virtually absent. The German and 
Swedish administrations are somewhere in between those of the Neth 
erlands and the United Kingdom. Germany is closer to the Netherlands 
in its approach, as it allows some influence from labor and manage 
ment, be it under strict government control. In Sweden, the system is 
closer to that of the United Kingdom; Swedish benefits are adminis 
tered by government agencies, while the social partners only have a say 
in the provision of employment services. In both Germany and Swe 
den, the administrative system is closely monitored by the government.
Put in terms of a "principal agent scheme," with government as the 
principal and the administrative system as the agent, most European 
governments try to monitor the agents as closely as possible, so that 
social disability insurance is administered according to the public 
interest. In Holland, the agents, in casu, the social partners have had 
ample opportunities to serve their own interests, yielding to the prefer 
ences of their membership in times of economic recession and struc-
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tural economic changes. As a consequence, nothing was done to 
counterbalance the adverse incentives of a lenient award policy on 
individual employers and employees. The result has been the two- 
decade-long sustained process of purging the labor force of marginally 
productive workers.
Lessons from Europe
In the 1980s, the need to cut back public expenditures led to the 
reevaluation of social insurance policies all over Europe. Initially, the 
focus was on the efficacy of social security programs. Measures were 
taken, for example, to improve the possibilities for timely intervention 
in order to reduce disability insurance dependency, to disentangle the 
unemployment and disability components in disability insurance, and 
to increase job opportunities by making workplace adjustment manda 
tory and by introducing quota legislation. In more recent years, when 
earlier policy adjustments appeared to be less effective than hoped for, 
the focus gradually shifted away from technical changes towards mea 
sures intended to restructure the incentives induced by social security 
systems. Especially in Sweden and the Netherlands, these incentive 
issues have been, and still are, heavily debated.
In Germany and the United Kingdom, the incentive structure is 
much less of a problem. In both of these countries, the private sector 
employment opportunities for people with disabilities are larger than in 
Sweden or Holland. These higher participation rates probably result 
from an administrative system that operates more efficiently and effec 
tively and from benefit rates in Germany and, especially, Britain that, 
by their modesty, may spur preferences for work over transfer depen 
dency. Under these stricter systems, the social costs of disability are 
likely to be lower and, to a larger extent, borne by private enterprises 
and households.
Currently, the operations of the third agent, the Social Security 
Administration, are the major object of policy reform in Holland. In 
1993, a parliamentary commission officially concluded what an 
increasing number of observers already had suspected—that the 
administering organizations had grossly failed in achieving an efficient
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and effective allocation of social insurance resources. Now the debate 
on the social security system—on the concept of the welfare state, for 
that matter—is completely open. The proposals put forward range 
from total privatization of social insurance to full socialization under 
government control.
Similar developments can be observed in Sweden, the prototype of 
the welfare state. The general feeling is that government has reached 
the limits of what it can provide or even should want to provide. In 
contemporary societies, people are viewed as autonomous citizens, 
aware of their individual interests, and ready to act in response to these 
needs. In such an environment, where public authority is no longer 
obvious, workers, employers, and administrators have become less 
hesitant to respond to the incentives with which they are confronted.
Good social policy and practice, then, not only require able adminis 
trators, using appropriate policy tools, but an intelligent design of the 
incentive structures implied both by the programs and by their manage 
ment. This may seem obvious, but it took about three decades before 
this insight finally broke through among European supporters of the 
welfare state.
Appendix Table. Disability Policies in Four European Countries
Netherlands Germany Sweden United Kingdom
I. Temporary disability
(employees' sickness insurance)
Benefit level
Qualifying 
conditions
Maximum duration
Funding 
Contributors
Risk sharing
Administration
70% of earnings 
Inability to perform current job
52 weeks
Employer, employee 
(Risk groups within) industry
Nongovernmental industry 
agencies run by employees' and 
employers' representatives; no 
direct government supervision
80% of earnings 
Inability to perform current job
78 weeks
Employer, employee 
Region, industry, or firm
Nongovernmental agencies run 
by employees' and employers' 
representatives under direct 
government supervision
Day 2-3: 75% of earnings 
Day 4- 14: 90% 
Day 15-365: 80% 
Day 366 on 70%
Inability to perform current job 
(short term), other suitable job 
(longer term)
Unlimited
Employer, employee, 
government
National
National agency under direct 
government supervision
Flat-rate benefit. 
£45.30 per week (low earnings) 
£52.50 per week (higher 
earnings plus dependents' 
supplements)
Inability to perform current job
28 weeks
Employer, employee, 
government
National
National agency under direct 
government supervision
II. Permanent disability
Employees. Non-Work-Related Risks
Benefit level
Partial benefits
Waiting period
Maximum duration
Qualifying 
conditions
Funding: 
Contributors
Risk sharing
70% of last earnings during 6- 
72 months depending on age at 
onset if older than 33; 
thereafter, or if younger than 
33, 70% of minimum wage plus 
1.4% of (earnings - minimum 
wage) for each year older than 
15
Percentage of full pension, 
corresponding to loss of 
earning capacity (minimum 
15%)
12 months
Age 65
Incapacity for gainful activity
Employer, employee 
National
General disability 
60% (plus 1.5% times age - 55) 
of assessed earnings
Occupational disability: 
40% (plus 1% times age - 55) 
of assessed earnings
Flexible
Age 65
General, incapacity for gainful 
activity 
Occupational 50% reduction of 
capacity in usual occupation
Employer, employee, 
government
National
65% of assessed earnings
75%, 50%, or 25% of full 
pension corresponding to loss 
of earning capacity
Flexible
Age 65
Inability to work in 
commensurate employment 
(above 60 years previous 
work)
Employer, employee, 
government
National
Flat-rate benefit. 
£57 75 - 65.70 per week plus 
dependents' supplements (e g , 
£53 15' spouse + 2 children)
Disability Working Allowance3
28 weeks
Age 65
Inability to work
Employer, employee, 
government
National
(continued)
Appendix Table, (continued)
Administration
Employees. Work Inji 
Benefit level
Partial benefits
Waiting period
Maximum duration
Qualifying 
conditions
Funding 
Contributors
Risk sharing
Administration
Nongovernmental industry 
agencies run by employees' and 
employers' representatives; no 
direct government supervision
jry
No separate work injury 
scheme
Nongovernmental industry 
agencies run by employees' and 
employers' representatives, no 
direct government supervision
State agencies under direct 
government supervision
66.7% of last earnings
Percentage of full pension, 
corresponding to loss of 
earning capacity
Flexible
Age 65
Loss of earning capacity due to 
work injury or occupational 
disease of at least 20%
Employer 
Risk group
State agencies under direct 
government supervision
National agency under direct 
government supervision
70% of last earnings
Percentage of full pension, 
corresponding to loss of 
earning capacity
Flexible
Age 65
Loss of earning capacity due to 
work injury or occupational 
disease of at least 6.7%
Employer 
National
National agency under direct 
government supervision
National agency under direct 
government supervision
Flat-rate benefit up to £88.4 
per week if 100% disabled plus 
dependents' supplements
From £17 68 (14% disabled) to 
£79.56 (90% disabled); reduced 
earnings allowance up to 
£35.30
15 weeks
Unlimited
Loss of earning capacity due to 
work injury or occupational 
disease of at least 14%
Employer, employee, 
government
National
National agency under direct 
government supervision
III. Vocational rehabilitation
Training/workplace 
adjustment
Sheltered workshops
Public/private 
employment for 
disabled
Rehabilitation/ 
redeployment 
incentives for
Disabled employee 
Employers
DI administration
Institutional links 
with disability 
insurance programs
Programs available, limited 
significance
Available, substantial 
significance
Both of limited significance
Tnal work benefitsb
Lump-sum bonus, wage 
subsidies
None
Potentially strong, weak in 
practice
Programs available, very 
significant
Available, limited significance
Mainly pnvate sector, very 
significant
Tnal work benefits
"Disabled worker" protection, 
enforced quota regulation
Some
Strong
Programs available, very 
significant
Available, substantial 
significance
Mainly public sector, very 
significant
Increased benefits0 
Wage subsidies
None
Strong
Programs available, 
moderately significant
Available, limited significance
Mainly pnvate sector, 
moderately significant
Disability Working Allowance 
Not enforced quota regulation
None
Moderate
SOURCE. Based on data published in Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong (1996) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, SSA (1994).
a. Means-tested benefits payable to disabled people with a job.
b Continued benefit entitlements while at work on probation or participating in a rehabilitation program
c Rehabilitation program participants receive 90 percent of lost earnings
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NOTES
1. A practical consideration for choosing these four countries is that their disability policies 
are relatively well documented in the international literature, recently, for instance, in Bloch 1993
2. For additional details, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security 
Administration (1994)
3. See National Academy of Social Insurance (1994), p. 38
4 A similar early retirement option applies to employees who were unemployed for at least 
one year in the 18 months before age 60.
5. See, for instance, Lando et al. (1979) and Disney and Webb (1991)
6 Further legislation was enacted in 1986, through the Handicapped Workers' Employment 
Act (WAGW). The WAGW contains an additional budget to adapt job demands and working con 
ditions to the functional limitations of impaired employees Spending under WAGW is similarly 
low
7. Quoted from "Social Security in Sweden How to Reform the System," Report to the Expert 
Group on Public Finance, Ministry of Finance, Stockholm, 1994, p 7
8 For a fuller treatment of the determinants of disability benefit recipiency, see Aarts and de 
Jong (1992, chapter 3)
9 As of 1995, supervision of benefit administration is in the hands of an independent agency 
The current government proposes privatization of both the sickness benefit and the disability 
insurance schemes.
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Return-to-work Policy

Patterns of Return to Work
in a Cohort of
Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries
Martynas A. Yeas
Social Security Administration
From the beginning of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
program, it has always been a priority to encourage and help as many 
beneficiaries as possible to return to the labor force and to leave the DI 
rolls. It is common knowledge that such transitions have proven to be 
rare; empirical evidence about these events is unusual as well. This 
paper reviews the actual post-entitlement experience of a cohort of dis 
abled workers, a component of the New Beneficiary Data System 
(NBDS), in order to examine work efforts over the period from 1983 to 
1991.
The New Beneficiary Disabled-Worker Sample
The New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) was originally designed as a 
free-standing, cross-sectional survey of persons coming onto the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) rolls. It was envisioned as a sequel to 
the 1968 Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries, whose findings had 
become of doubtful relevance with the passing of time and with the 
accumulation of significant changes in the various programs. The NBS, 
therefore, drew and interviewed a nationally representative sample of 
persons who had begun receiving one of a number of specified types of 
Social Security benefits at the start of the 1980s (for further details, see 
Maxfield 1983).
The sample represented the universe of persons who started to 
receive benefits for a spell of disability (not necessarily their first) dur 
ing the "window period" of July 1980 to June 1981. Some 242,257 of 
the 281,314 who came on the rolls in those months and who were not
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known to have died in March 1982 were eligible for sampling. Cases 
were randomly drawn, stratified only by sex, subject to a geographi 
cally constrained Primary Sampling Unit design intended to econo 
mize on field work. Target numbers were 3,450 completed interviews 
with disabled-worker men and 1,550 with disabled-worker women. On 
completion of field work at the beginning of 1983, 3,593 and 1,605 
interviews had been obtained for men and women, respectively.
The NBS did not remain a static data base, however. During the fol 
lowing years, interview responses were periodically linked with SSA's 
Master Beneficiary, Summary Earnings, and Supplemental Security 
records, and to Medicare utilization records maintained by the Health 
Care Financing Administration. These made it possible to track 
changes in sample members' eligibility, covered earnings, and health 
status and essentially created a longitudinal data base. Because many 
important variables cannot be measured, or measured accurately, on 
the basis of data collected for other purposes-, it was decided to conduct 
another round of interviews with surviving sample members (and to 
collect some further information from surviving spouses). Conse 
quently, the New Beneficiary Followup (NBF) was in the field during 
the last months of 1991. Taken together, these three sets of data consti 
tute a single complex data base sometimes referred to as the NBDS, the 
"New Beneficiary Data System" (Yeas 1992).
While some amount of labor force activity, at least at some point 
after coming on the disability rolls, is not uncommon, very few benefi 
ciaries leave the rolls because their condition improves or because they 
find some way of offsetting or overcoming their limitations. The under 
lying aim of this paper is to focus on a relatively rare event, work 
among the disabled. The present study, therefore, concentrates on 
those individuals in the NBDS disabled-worker sample who survived 
to complete interviews in 1991 and thus provide a full set of longitudi 
nal data for comparative purposes.
Excluded Cases
This is by no means all of the information relevant to the experience 
of the disabled over time that can eventually be extracted from this data
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set, and, in fairness to the reader and to the large majority of the dis 
abled, some of these issues should be briefly discussed. The common 
way to leave the rolls is to die. 1 It would be possible to obtain some 
material regarding decedents, for whom NBS, administrative, and, in 
some cases, surviving spouse information is available. Decedents are 
omitted from the analysis here because the comparability problems 
that they raise are not likely to be offset by a significant increase in pro 
gram-relevant insight. Obviously, persons who die soon after coming 
on the rolls do not have much impact on program costs, and they are 
probably comparatively poor prospects for return to work while they 
are in benefit status.
These issues have been examined to some degree (McCoy, lams, 
and Armstrong 1994). Mortality is concentrated among persons in their 
first years on the program; as noted, about 15 percent of the persons 
who had come on the rolls during the 1980-1981 "window period" had 
died by the time the sample was drawn, and others died before the 
interviewing was complete. Not a great deal is known about these indi 
viduals because of the limited machine-readable administrative data 
available for them. However, it is likely, a priori, that they differ con 
siderably from other disabled workers. Some disabling health condi 
tions can reasonably be called "killer" diseases; for example, by the 
time that neoplasms or AIDS results in work disability, life expectancy 
has become very short. Few of these persons will be observed over 
time on the rolls; in terms of program financing or return to work, they 
have correspondingly little impact. Other disabling "nonkiller" dis 
eases, such as acute musculoskeletal problems, may have little effect 
on life expectancy, and it is these types of health problems that charac 
terize the population on the rolls.
McCoy, lams, and Armstrong did not have data for the short-lived 
disabled, but it is obvious that this disabled group has a very different 
mortality profile than the simple aging pattern associated with the 
retired population. Despite their considerably lower average ages, dis 
abled-worker men and women were 14 times more likely than their 
retired counterparts to die during their first six months on the rolls, 
eight times more likely to die during their second six months, and four 
times more likely in the third six months. Subsequently, the disabled 
showed a generally stable death rate. This remained higher than that of 
retired workers for some years, but the latter rose steadily (no doubt
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reflecting the results of aging as this group proceeded into their 70s), 
and, by the end of the study period, retired workers were more likely to 
die than their disabled counterparts who had survived a similar dura 
tion on the rolls.
Another group excluded by this selection criterion comprises 2,939 
disabled workers drawn from the same sample universe as the original 
NBS disability sample but interviewed only in the 1991 NBF. These 
cases were added for the specific purpose of increasing the number of 
observations of apparent return to work that could be studied (Hennes- 
sey and Muller 1994). They lack, of course, any of the data collected in 
the NBS and must be handled with care to maintain comparability. As 
the cases have recently been analyzed from a perspective similar to the 
one taken in this paper, they are not included in the numbers presented 
here; however, note is taken of results based on the work of Hennessey 
and Muller.
The Key Variables
When measuring recovery rates, it is useful to consider what the 
numerator and denominator ought to be. Rates are frequently discussed 
in terms of the percentage of the disabled who recover or otherwise 
leave the rolls, a seemingly commonsense definition, but one that can 
be rather misleading from a program perspective.
The disabled are by no means created equal. A majority are awarded 
benefits after the age of 50, and so the age distribution of current bene 
ficiaries is markedly skewed when compared with the labor force at 
large. Discussions and tabulations of the disabled tend to be dominated 
by this relatively elderly numerical majority. From a simple cross-sec 
tional perspective, this does indeed describe who is on the rolls at any 
given moment. However, from an over-time perspective, the point-in- 
time predominance of older beneficiaries severely distorts the dynam 
ics of program financing and the experience of beneficiaries while they 
are on the program rolls.
Older disabled workers are not, by statutory definition, paid disabil 
ity benefits for very long. If they survive until age 65 (and do not 
recover, as very few do), they are converted to retired-worker status.
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From then on, ability to work, if any, is irrelevant to eligibility for ben 
efits, and the "ex-disabled," like the retired, are subject to only mar 
ginal disincentives to work. Thus, mortality aside, a single worker 
disabled at 35 counts for three workers disabled at the more typical age 
of 55; a 25-year-old counts for four. This situation is rather comparable 
with patterns observed in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program: most welfare clients will not remain in the program 
very long, but a core group, which remains dependent in the long run, 
accounts for a disproportionate share of program costs. In the case of 
disability, age enables us to target such a core group, the relatively 
small percentage of disabled workers who come onto the rolls in the 
earlier part of their working years. From a policy perspective, it is 
important to give less weight to the characteristics of the older majority 
and more to the particular characteristics of the younger group.
In a way, it is fortunate that these younger disabled workers are par 
ticularly important in their impact on program costs, because they 
would appear to be more promising prospects for return to work. For 
them, the financial incentives tend to be more compelling. Workers 
near the age of retirement appear to experience considerable difficulty 
in reentering the labor force, and the payoff for doing so is fairly minor. 
In most cases, the effort will yield only a few years of earnings and is 
not likely to make a major change in retirement income. Younger work 
ers without life-threatening health problems, by contrast, face more 
sharply differentiated alternatives.
If they do not return to work, the younger disabled will spend the 
remainder of their lives, a matter of decades, receiving a fixed con 
stant-dollar benefit. The formula used to calculate this benefit is the 
same fractional-replacement-of-past-earnings formula that is used to 
calculate retirement benefits (although it is based on fewer years and is 
thus somewhat more generous for workers under 30), but the early 
years of most persons' careers are characterized by comparatively low, 
entry-level earnings. Older disabled workers, by contrast, are likely to 
have approached their peak earnings years, and thus their benefit 
amounts approximate the expected retirement benefit had they not 
become disabled. Consequently, the DI benefits of younger disabled 
workers provide a considerably lower replacement rate when measured 
as a function of what would have been earned but for the onset of dis 
ability. On the other hand, a successful return to substantial work offers
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a prospect of many years of increased income, followed by an 
increased retirement benefit.
Similar considerations of economic incentives suggest the impor 
tance of differentiating the disabled according to another demographic 
variable, marital status. Married persons are parts of economic units, 
and the disability of one member of a couple does not necessarily 
diminish the earnings capacity of the partner. Indeed, through the pres 
sure of economic need, it may often be an incentive for the partner to 
increase work effort. The incentive to return to work may be corre 
spondingly reduced among the married disabled, a factor that should 
significantly differentiate them from their single counterparts.
However, responses may also reflect a third crucial variable, sex. A 
"disability insured" worker must have sufficient work activity (techni 
cally, quarters of coverage) to demonstrate recent and substantial 
attachment to the labor force. This is mediated by the longstanding dif 
ferences between men's and women's patterns of labor force participa 
tion. The great majority of men work, such that a broad cross section of 
the male population has disability insurance. For women, the situation 
is more problematic. Labor force participation rates vary considerably 
among female subgroups and, particularly, according to the age and 
marital status variables of interest here.
Moreover, women's earnings tend to be lower than those of men, 
and this holds true for most married couples on the micro level. 
Accordingly, financial incentives to return to work are presumably 
lower on average for couples in which the wife, as compared with the 
husband, is disabled. It is not quite so clear how single persons would 
be affected, but given that the forgone wages of disabled single women 
are probably lower, their incentive may be less. Financial pressure 
aside, there are also normative differences. Working is a central com 
ponent of the conventional adult male identity, but has a much less 
central role in the lives of women. Men, accordingly, may feel a 
greater pressure to resume work ceteris paribus.
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Earlier Findings Based on the NBDS
The variables that have been highlighted can be singled out by little 
more than a commonsense understanding of the labor market. How 
ever, while this is a preliminary effort to take advantage of the full lon 
gitudinal potential of the New Beneficiary Survey data, it is grounded 
in earlier studies based on the 1982 data and on administrative records 
that suggest the correctness of this approach.
Packard (1987) found all three of the variables to have an obvious 
relationship with income. The Social Security system has convention 
ally been said to rest on the model of a "three-legged stool." This 
model (developed in 1935 to provide for retired workers, but extended 
unchanged in 1956 to disabled workers) assumes that Social Security 
benefits are not a fully adequate source of income by themselves but 
will normally be supplemented by two other sources, assets accumu 
lated over the worker's career and pensions based on long-term 
employment. Obviously, the longer the working career, the more 
appropriate this model will be, and, conversely, the shorter the working 
career, the more severe the impact on total income.
As expected, Packard's results show that, in terms of both asset and 
pension income, the oldest disabled were markedly more similar to 
retirees than were the younger disabled. Thus, 53 percent of the mar 
ried men and 17 percent of the unmarried men in Packard's oldest cate 
gory (60-64) reported pension income, as compared to only 17 and 5 
percent, respectively, for the men in his youngest group (18-44); the 
pattern for women was similar, and the increase in pension income 
with age was uniformly monotonic.
That this reflects differences in length of service, a frequent determi 
nant of both eligibility and amount of pensions, is confirmed by lams 
(1986). Examining characteristics of the longest predisability job, he 
found that in his youngest disabled-worker category (18-45), the large 
majority of both men and women (65.9 and 79.2 percent, respectively) 
had worked less than 10 years on this job, as compared to a modest 7.9 
and 22.5 percent, respectively, in his oldest category (60-64). The dis 
tinction is significant because the Employee Retirement Income Secu 
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA) had set maximum vesting requirements, 
usually 10 years of service, effective in 1976, several years before this
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group became eligible for disability. The younger disabled were also 
less likely to have been covered by a pension plan than the oldest, 55.8 
percent as compared to 35.3 percent for men and 63.6 percent as com 
pared to 50.2 percent for women. Even those younger disabled who 
were covered were less likely to have received a lump sum or a cur 
rently paid or future pension.
The pattern was much the same for assets. Among the oldest group, 
Packard found rates of receipt of asset income of 73 percent for mar 
ried men and 47 percent for single men, as compared to 47 and 21 per 
cent, respectively, for their younger counterparts. The pattern of 
differences was similar among disabled women. As might be 
expected, differences in average asset income reflect differences in 
average asset holdings (Yeas 1986). Ownership rates and median val 
ues were much lower for every type of asset than those reported by 
retired workers, and indeed, about one out of four of the disabled had 
no assets whatever. However, there were considerable variations within 
the disabled population. Older married men (the age range used here 
was 55-64) were the largest single subgroup in the disabled population. 
They were also comparatively well-off, although their median asset 
portfolios were worth only $3,600 when home equity was excluded. At 
the other extreme, younger single men (aged 18-54), the third largest 
subgroup, had negligible median assets regardless of how home equity 
was treated.
Throughout these results, the expected salience of marital status as 
well as of age is confirmed. Having a spouse who is (usually) able to 
work means that the career of the couple, the economic unit, is only 
partially impaired rather than brought to a halt. Thus, Packard found 
that 46 percent of married couples in which one spouse was disabled 
had earnings. This is considerably lower than the 96 percent observed 
for the population aged 18-64 at large, but it is far higher than the 6-7 
percent observed for single disabled men and women.
Differences shown by sex have been generally as anticipated, but 
somewhat more complex. As expected, disabled wives were more 
likely to report earnings from their husbands than disabled husbands 
were from their spouses (Packard 1987). It is perhaps a little surprising 
under these circumstances that it was the disabled husbands who 
reported slightly larger median assets. Interpreting the differences 
among the groups lumped together as "single" is complicated by the
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fact that the less elderly unmarried men and women (under age 55) 
were quite different demographically from their older counterparts 
(Yeas 1986). The single men were some 10 years younger, on average, 
than the single women, but this difference largely disappears after con 
trolling for specific marital status. Disabled-worker men were almost 
twice as likely never to have married, while the women were consider 
ably more likely to be separated and, especially, widowed. Given the 
small sample sizes, it has unfortunately not been feasible to examine 
these differences in much depth; however, the area is worth pursuing as 
other data sets become available.
The hypothesis that being married affects the economic incentive to 
return to work is also suggested by differences observed in living 
arrangements (Packard 1987). The NBS showed that the majority of 
married disabled couples lived in households containing no other per 
sons, and the majority of single disabled did not. Moreover, if other 
persons were in the households of the married disabled, they were gen 
erally children. Significant minorities of single men, and, to a lesser 
extent, women, lived with parents, siblings, or non-relatives, while vir 
tually none of the married disabled did so. This may in part reflect dif 
ferent provisions for meeting a need for care, but it is plausible that it 
also reflects a greater need among the characteristically lower-income 
disabled to share living expenses or to have them paid by others.
In addition to financial incentives, return to work is, of course, 
greatly influenced by health problems. Packard (1993) examined 
reports from the NBS interviews of the disabled sample and found the 
individuals to be in notably poor health overall, with some important 
variations. His study, unfortunately, did not take account of marital sta 
tus; age was again associated with substantial differences, while sex 
distinctions were comparatively minor. The health variables did not, 
however, vary monotonically with age. His youngest group (aged 
under 45) comprised only about a quarter of the disabled-worker sam 
ple but stood out in many respects. Fourteen percent had recovered 
from their disabilities, as compared with only 2 percent of those aged 
45 or above. Twenty-nine percent were able to work at least part-time 
or occasionally, as compared with 9 percent of the older disabled work 
ers, and 22 percent of the younger group expected their health to 
improve or thought that it might, as compared with 10 percent of the 
older group. Perhaps most significantly, 16 percent, twice the rate of
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the older group, were no longer receiving Social Security about two 
years after benefits had begun.
Muller (1992) took advantage of administrative data to examine 
work attempts after a considerably more extended period. These were 
explored in unusual depth. After any indications of work were found in 
automated files, the hard-copy claims folders were requested and 
examined in order to obtain more detailed information. Of the 1,495 
claims folders requested, 1,150 were located. After reweighting the 
transcribed information to adjust for missing data (for example, folders 
were more often unobtainable for persons who were no longer on the 
rolls), work outcomes were examined. Just over 10 percent of the indi 
viduals in the sample were found to have worked, but less than 3 per 
cent had been terminated for sustained substantial gainful activity, and, 
of these, almost a third had returned to the rolls. In the strict sense of 
returning persons with severe medical impairments to the workforce, 
then, the success rate was a meager 2 percent. It should be noted, how 
ever, that another 6 percent, who were not examined in this study, had 
been terminated due to medical recovery.
A number of factors were significantly associated with some work: 
among the variables that have been discussed, age was particularly 
salient, with almost a third of the disabled under 40 years old having 
worked, as compared with a scant 2.5 percent of those aged 60 or older. 
However, termination for substantial gainful activity was surprisingly 
difficult to predict. Of the variables examined, only race (whites were 
more likely) and the presence of mental conditions (less likely) were 
significantly related. It should be noted that this part of Muller's analy 
sis was necessarily based on very small sample sizes.
More recently, Hennessey and Muller (1994) examined the work 
efforts not only of the NBDS disabled-worker sample but also of the 
parallel "add-on" sample from the same cohort, mentioned earlier, that 
was included in the 1991 NBF interviews for this purpose. After cer 
tain cases were excluded (e.g., those interviewed by proxy and those 
who denied ever receiving benefits), their combined sample comprised 
4,405 cases. Four percent had been working at the time benefits began 
(presumably not at the level deemed to be substantial gainful activity), 
and 18 percent started work after benefits began. The majority of the 
latter cited "financial need" as their most important reason, and more 
than 80 percent gave it as a reason for working. The only other factor
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of considerable importance was "wanted to work," the primary motive 
of more than one-sixth of the sample.
An effort was made during the 1991 interviews to assess the effec 
tiveness of the current measures intended to facilitate return to work, 
but the results are not encouraging. Only about 27 percent reported 
receiving any vocational rehabilitation services; for the most part, these 
took the form of physical therapy. In about three cases out of four, 
however, physical therapy did not help in returning to work. No more 
than a fifth to a tenth knew about the program features—trial work, 
extended eligibility, and extended Medicare—which are intended as 
incentives to reenter the labor force, and almost none said that they 
were influenced by these "incentives."
Additional Findings
This analysis is based on persons in the disabled-worker sample 
interviewed in both the 1982 NBS and the 1991 NBF—3,161 cases. 
The work status of these individuals was determined on the basis of 
both covered earnings in SSA's Summary Earnings Record for the 
years 1983-1991 and of self-reports of work activity during those same 
years.
As with many other issues, the results can be seen both as good 
news and as bad news. The good news here is that a larger-than- 
expected number of disabled persons surveyed had at least some tenta 
tive connection with the labor force after benefits began. Using the 
most generous criterion, a record of nonzero earnings in any year or 
any survey report of a job during the same interval, more than one out 
of four (27.6 percent) had worked after benefits began. In the following 
discussion, this group is described as experiencing some work. Less 
encouraging is the fact that, in the majority of these cases, the contact 
does indeed appear to have been marginal. Just over two out of five of 
this group, one-ninth of the total disabled workers, had covered earn 
ings in excess of $3,600 (the annualized monthly substantial gainful 
activity threshold in force over most of the period) in more than one 
year. 2 This subset is referred to as substantial workers.
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Even this number is not inconsequential, but its policy relevance is a 
little difficult to interpret. Slightly more than two-thirds of the substan 
tial workers "had at some point been found to be medically recov 
ered,"3 and more than 90 percent of those who had ever recovered had 
also worked substantially. Taken at face value, this would seem to be 
somewhat discouraging from a policy perspective. While the disabled 
worker's condition may sometimes be improved by medical interven 
tion, the possibilities for this appear quite limited and perhaps costly. If 
only a distinct minority of health-impaired individuals return to work, 
then the potential for increasing the rate of return in this unhealthy 
population would seem to be low.
However, there is some reason to question these findings. The period 
under study, beginning in 1983, came immediately after vigorous 
efforts were undertaken to remove disabled cases from the rolls via 
continuing disability reviews (CDRs). This move sparked considerable 
criticism in many quarters, and, in response, CDRs were cut back to a 
relatively low level beginning in 1983. Moreover, even in later years, 
the pressure to allocate administrative resources in other directions has 
prevented any resumption of large-scale CDRs. It is highly likely that 
such reviews will still take place when the record shows substantial 
gainful activity. The implication is that recovery significantly affecting 
work capacity may have taken place among a certain proportion of 
marginal workers and nonworkers, but never been reflected in the 
administrative records. In other words, the pool of potential labor force 
returnees may be larger, perhaps much larger, than the record now 
shows.
In any event, without trying to control consistently for apparent 
medical recovery (which would result in precariously small cell sizes 
in some instances), the pattern of differences is somewhat as expected 
when sex and, especially, age are taken into account; however, the 
importance of marital status emerges only when the interactions of 
these variables are considered. Thus, as shown in table 1, only about 11 
percent of both married and single disabled workers are likely to have 
had substantial work, although the single group is a little more likely to 
have worked only marginally. With respect to sex, the difference is 
quite small (12 and 10 percent for men and women, respectively), but 
with respect to age, it is obvious. Thirty-two percent of the younger
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Table 1. Age and Marital Status in 1982 of Disabled-Worker 
Beneficiaries by Return-to-work Status
All disabled
Men
Women
Married
Single
Under 35
35 - 50
50 or older
Married men
Married women
Single men
Single women
Married men
Married women
Single men
Single women
Married men
Married women
Single men
Single women
Total 
(percent)
100.0
100.0
100.0
1000
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Substantial Marginal 
workers Workers 
(percent) (percent)
11.3
Sex
11.9
9.9
Marital status
11.3
11.2
Age
31.8
14.0
4.9
Under age 35
49.3
32.6
21.4
28.9
Age 35-49
13.7
12.2
14.9
15.1
Age 50 and older
5.5
4.2
4.8
4.1
16.4
16.6
15.9
15.0
18.4
27.6
17.2
13.2
21.9
18.3
30.5
34.9
16.0
13.1
19.2
21.4
14.0
13.5
12.2
11.8
Nonworkers 
(percent)
72.4
71.5
74.2
73.7
70.4
40.6
68.9
81.9
28.9
49.1
48.1
36.2
70.3
74.6
65.9
63.5
80.5
82.4
83.1
84.1
SOURCE: New Beneficiary Data System, persons newly entitled to disabled-worker benefits in 
1980-1981 who were interviewed in both 1982 and 1991
NOTE- Substantial workers had covered earnings in excess of $3,600 (the annuahzed substantial 
gainful activity threshold) in more than one year between 1983 and 1990. Nonworkers had no 
indication of work. Marginal workers fell in between these limits. Percentages may not sum pre 
cisely to 100 due to roundmg.
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disabled had worked substantially, compared to 14 percent of the mid 
dle-aged and only 5 percent of the older group.
When the three factors are taken together, a more complex pattern 
emerges. As might be expected, younger men are the most likely to 
have worked substantially, or for that matter at all. Within this group, 
the impact of marital status is quite striking: virtually half of the mar 
ried subgroup consisted of substantial workers, compared to only a lit 
tle more than a fifth of this segment's single counterparts. Conversely, 
nearly half of the single men had no indication of work, far more than 
the two out of seven married. The pattern for younger women was also 
distinctive, but quite different. The proportion of married versus single 
women with substantial work was similar, a little under a third for both 
groups, but single women were almost twice as likely to have had some 
marginal contact with the labor force (35 compared to 18 percent).
Absolute levels of work activity were lower among the middle-aged 
disabled than in the younger group. Curiously, women showed the 
same pattern of differences by marital status, while, for men, marital 
status was almost irrelevant. Contrasts by both marital status and sex 
virtually disappeared in the older group, which made up nearly three- 
fifths of the disabled and reported very modest levels of work activity, 
utterly different from those of their younger counterparts.
The health information collected in 1991 is not necessarily rigor 
ously supported by clinical or medical evidence, nor does it speak 
directly to changes as they affect the timing of return to work, but it 
does lend support to the thesis that work and health are positively 
related. As table 2 indicates, the majority (56 percent) of those who 
never worked reported their health to be "poor," compared with only a 
quarter of the substantial workers. Nearly a quarter of the latter rated 
their health as "excellent" or "very good," compared to a desultory 4 
percent of the nonworkers. Marginal workers are, appropriately, in the 
intermediate range of these percentages.
The distribution of health status is, perhaps unsurprisingly, quite 
similar to the distribution of levels of work when marital status, age, 
and sex are taken into account. It is easy to generate an unwieldy 
amount of cells with unacceptably small numbers of observations if 
too many variables are controlled for in the process of tabulation, so 
table 2 does not attempt to break the subgroups out by work status. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that the groups with the greatest propensity
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for labor force activity are also those in which health was rated the 
most positively. It is notable that, after controlling for age, the other 
two variables are associated with only minor differences. The age- 
health relationship, again, is far from monotonic: those under 35 were 
uniformly much more positive in their self-assessment, while the mid 
dle-aged and older disabled differed very little.
Table 2. Reported Health Status in 1991 by Return-to-work Status
Substantial
workers
(percent)
Total 100.0
Good-to-excellent health 49.8
Fair health 24.5
Poor health 25.7
Health limits the amount or kind of work 65.5
Marginal
workers
(percent)
100.0
26.9
36.7
36.4
90.0
Nonworkers
(percent)
100.0
15.5
28.7
55.8
93.8
SOURCE- New Beneficiary Data System, persons newly entitled to disabled-worker benefits in 
1980-1981 who were interviewed in both 1982 and 1991
Somewhat similar patterns appeared when health status was asked 
in terms of "other people your age," but recovery appears far from 
complete in this population. Even among the substantial workers, only 
17 percent thought it to be better, and more than two-fifths thought it to 
be worse. Similarly, two-thirds of the substantial workers (and nearly 
all of the nonworkers) reported some work limitation in 1991.
Although substantial workers felt that they were healthier, they were 
not a great deal happier. It is true that nearly a third of them were 
"delighted" or "pleased" with their lives in general, compared with 
only a fifth of the non workers, but they were nearly as likely to have 
negative feelings (16 percent compared to 20 percent). As far as being 
satisfied with the family standard of living, there was virtually no dif 
ference, and the substantial workers worried considerably more often 
about their financial situations. This argues that their greater work 
effort, while it may be enabled by better (perceived) health, also is 
apparently driven to some extent by a greater sense of financial need.
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Conclusion
The NBDS is a rich data base that can, given due attention, tell us 
considerably more about the dynamics of disability and work among 
the population already on the assistance rolls. This paper is, obviously, 
by no means the last word on what can be found in the NBDS. How 
ever, the limitations of the data base should also be recognized. It rep 
resents a cohort of persons who came onto the program at a particular 
point in time. These individuals experienced a number of changes in 
the economy and in the administrative climate that may be quite differ 
ent from those in the years to come. Given the volatile nature of the 
disability program growth, the characteristics of this group may differ 
to an uncertain degree from those of more recent cohorts of entrants 
who will drive the program's future.
This paper has attempted to focus on the more striking or clearly 
defined differences among subgroups that are least likely to be suscep 
tible to such changes, but generalizations should always be made with 
caution. It is for this reason that a methodologically simple tabular 
approach has been taken to these data. The temptation to resort to stan 
dard, more sophisticated multivariate techniques is natural, but proba 
bly one to be resisted until the data are better understood. Despite the 
relatively large overall size of the disabled-worker component of the 
sample, the subgroups of particular interest are often quite small, many 
observations are left- or right-censored, there is substantial multicol- 
linearity among key variables, and distributions are frequently trun 
cated and far from normal. The painstaking, almost case-by-case 
approach taken by Hennessey and Muller is probably the key to mini 
mizing these problems and to maximizing the degree of understanding 
that can be derived from the NBDS.
However, the outlines of some basic conclusions are already clear. 
The older majority of disabled workers are very different from the 
comparatively small younger group in many key respects relevant to 
return to work. The older group offers minimal prospects for return to 
work on any scale and ensures that observed recovery rates for the total 
disabled population will never be high. While incentives can be offered 
and recovery is a realistic possibility for a limited number of cases, dis 
ability policy would do well to treat older disabled workers in general
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as another class of retirees. Older workers already are awarded benefits 
on a less restrictive basis, as the disability definition is relaxed at ages 
50 and 55, so this point is tacitly accepted in current law. Perhaps it 
ought to be revised and extended further in the context of equitably 
raising the retirement age.
The small subgroup of younger disabled workers is quite different, 
although none of the research presented here can tell us exactly how 
different. It is notable that various studies of the same sample have 
found it convenient to define "younger" using age ceilings ranging 
from the mid-30s to the mid-50s according to sample size and analytic 
convenience. However, no effort has yet been made to estimate pre 
cisely which age breaks best discriminate between different patterns of 
relevant variables. Still, the age 35 cutoff employed here indicates that, 
below this age, return to work, to at least some extent, is quite common 
already. It is likely that development and refinement of a "work-prone 
profile," of which age would be a major component, could be of con 
siderable use both in identifying and notifying disability beneficiaries 
who might be helped by available services or respond to targeted 
incentives. For that matter, such a profile might also be used more pro- 
actively for identifying beneficiaries not much interested in employ 
ment who might be urged more vigorously to make work attempts.
The potential of the NBDS to support such studies has not yet been 
fully exploited. It may be, of course, that the experience of this cohort 
is a less-than-perfect guide to the new cohorts of individuals coming 
onto the benefit rolls. In this context, however, it is encouraging (if any 
silver lining can be found in the cloud of unexplained program growth) 
that increases in disability awards reflect more and more grants to com 
paratively young beneficiaries. Perhaps the improved understanding of 
return to work that we are now deriving will be all the more useful as 
we address emerging challenges in program administration and policy 
formulation.
NOTES
NOTE. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessanly reflect those 
of the Social Security Administration
1 In the case of Social Security Disability Insurance, as opposed to Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), the disabled are converted to retired-worker status at age 65 This has some minor
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effect on how they are treated by the program, but, in practice, very few individuals in conversion 
cases return to work or otherwise leave the rolls at more advanced ages.
2 The numbers reported here differ, and in general indicate more return to work, from those 
reported earlier by Muller This reflects both differences in the definition of what constitutes 
"work" and a longer time period under review, which gave the disabled additional opportunity to 
return to the labor force
3 More specifically, they had been coded "no longer disabled" in the Ledger Account File 
records that were pulled for each year in December Thus, a few cases in which an individual's 
recovery lasted less than a year may have been excluded (although such a bnef recovery would 
seem to be of little policy relevance). On the other hand, the timing of recorded work and periods 
of recorded recovery were not disentangled, and, in some instances, work may have taken place 
dunng periods of medical disability in these "recovered" cases
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The Effectiveness of Financial Work 
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and Supplemental Security Income
Lessons from Other Transfer Programs
Hilary Williamson Hoynes 
University of California, Berkeley 
Robert Moffitt 
Johns Hopkins University
The major programs for the disabled in the United States, Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), are each intended to provide financial support to individuals who 
have an impairment that prevents them from engaging fully in produc 
tive labor force activity. As originally enacted, these programs based 
eligibility not only on evidence of a disabling condition but also on low 
earnings. Over the last several years, however, it has been increasingly 
recognized that the disabled are capable of at least some productive 
labor force activity and that basing eligibility on low earnings may pro 
vide work disincentives to existing recipients or even discourage some 
of the genuinely disabled from applying for benefits in the first place. 
In both programs, this development has led to changes in the rules gov 
erning earnings receipt, which are designed to encourage work. Addi 
tional programmatic changes to increase work incentives even more 
have also been proposed.
In this paper, we assess the implications of existing research on 
work incentives in programs for the nondisabled for the likely effec 
tiveness of the current and proposed work-incentive provisions in dis 
ability programs. While there has been relatively little study of work 
effects in DI and SSI, there has been a tremendous amount of research 
on the work incentives of transfer programs for the low-income popu 
lation, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
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the Food Stamp program, and there has even been a small amount of 
research on the work-incentive effects of Medicaid. The relevance of 
this literature comes not so much from its rather large body of empiri 
cal evidence on the responsiveness of the low-income population to 
work-incentive provisions, since the responsiveness of the disabled 
may be quite different, as from the lessons that have been learned about 
the way in which work-incentive provisions operate and what their 
effects, both intended and unintended, might be. We shall argue that 
there are a number of important insights from this research literature 
that have implications for existing work-incentives and for proposed 
work-incentive reforms in DI and SSL
In the next section, we discuss the major U.S. transfer programs for 
the low-income population, what their work-incentive effects are gen 
erally presumed to be, and what the empirical evidence suggests on the 
impact of current work-incentive rules and of past and proposed 
changes in those rules. Subsequently, we provide a parallel discussion 
of DI and SSI and draw lessons for those programs from the literature 
on nondisability programs. We discuss the probable effects of both 
existing and proposed work-incentive provisions. In the final section of 
the paper, we draw policy conclusions.
Transfer Programs for the Nondisabled
In our discussion of nondisability transfer programs, we will focus 
on income-conditioned programs for the nonaged and therefore 
exclude both Social Security and unemployment insurance from our 
survey. Instead, we will concentrate on the AFDC program, the Food 
Stamp program, and Medicaid.
Description of Program Rules
The AFDC program currently provides cash benefits to families 
with dependent children, where a "dependent" child is defined as a 
child living in a family with only one parent or with an unemployed 
parent. 1 Most AFDC families are headed by women with no adult male 
present, although the AFDC Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) provi-
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sion permits some families to receive benefits where both parents are 
present. In families where income and asset conditions for eligibility 
are met, an adult's earnings, if any, are taken into account in calculat 
ing the amount of the benefit (which also varies by family size). First, 
earnings that cover work-related expenses are allowed, up to a certain 
maximum, without any reduction in benefits, as are earnings that cover 
child care expenses up to a maximum. In addition, for the first four 
months of earnings after joining the program, a deduction from income 
of one-third of earnings above work-related expenses plus $30 is 
allowed. The marginal tax rate (MTR) on earnings is thus 67 percent 
for earnings beyond deductions. The one-third disregard is eliminated 
after four months of earnings, leading to a 100 percent MTR on earn 
ings above deductions. 2 The AFDC program also imposes a maximum 
on the gross income a family can receive from all sources, earned and 
unearned; if income exceeds these amounts, eligibility ends. An 
increase in earnings that pushes family income above these maximums 
thus results in an MTR exceeding 100 percent. An MTR exceeding 100 
percent occurs when an increase of earnings of $1 leads to a decrease 
in benefits of more than $1. This can occur when eligibility ends.
The AFDC program provides extended, or "transitional," child care 
support to families who have been made ineligible for benefits because 
of increased earnings. Child care subsidies are provided for up to 12 
months following the date of exit from the rolls. These provisions can 
be thought of as lowering the effective MTR on earnings.
The Food Stamp program provides food coupons to all families with 
income and assets below defined amounts, with or without children 
and regardless of individuals' marital status. In computing benefits for 
families with earnings, a standard deduction is allowed, as well as a 
deduction of 20 percent of earnings and deductions for child care and 
shelter expenses up to certain maximums. Earnings above these 
deductible amounts reduce benefits by 30 cents per dollar, leading to a 
30 percent MTR. However, as in the AFDC program, families are made 
ineligible if income rises above certain limits. 3 This leads to an MTR of 
over 100 percent at the point at which earnings push a family above 
one of the maximums.4
The Medicaid program has historically provided subsidized or free 
medical care mainly to families receiving AFDC (or SSI) benefits. The 
types and amount of medical care for which an AFDC family is eligi-
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ble are independent of its income or benefit amount, and thus the tax 
rate on Medicaid benefits is implicitly zero as long as the family is on 
the AFDC rolls. Until recently, eligibility for Medicaid was lost in its 
entirety when a family left AFDC, generating an MTR of over 100 per 
cent on increased earnings at that point. However, Medicaid eligibility 
is currently not as closely tied to AFDC receipt as it once was. Many 
states have a Medically Needy program, for example, which provides 
Medicaid benefits to families who are below somewhat higher income 
and assets limits than those for AFDC or who experience heavy medi 
cal expenses that push their net incomes below those limits. In addi 
tion, recent federal legislation has extended Medicaid eligibility to 
some children and pregnant women in families who are not on AFDC 
but whose income is below 133 percent of the federal poverty line. 
Finally, transitional Medicaid benefits are available for up to 12 
months following exit from the rolls to families leaving the AFDC rolls 
because of increased earnings. These provisions, taken together, can 
once again be thought of as effectively lowering the MTR faced by 
individuals leaving AFDC.
Cumulative MTRs for families receiving multiple programs can be 
quite high (Keane and Moffitt 1994; Giannarelli and Steurle 1994). In 
many states, recipients who work part-time at the minimum wage rate 
have lower disposable incomes than they would have if they were not 
to work at all, implying an average tax rate of over 100 percent. Aver 
age tax rates between no work and full-time work at the minimum 
wage for program recipients are between 70 and 80 percent nationwide 
and exceed 100 percent in some states. 5 Aside from the Medicaid 
notch, which can cause high tax rates alone, separate notches are cre 
ated for AFDC and the Food Stamp program. In addition, payroll and 
income taxes generally raise the cumulative tax rate, since they are 
only partially (i.e., not fully) deductible in the programs.
Since the 1980s, most of the policy interest in these programs has 
centered on employment and training for welfare recipients instead of 
on financial inducements to work (the major current project of this type 
is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program in 
AFDC). Such programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory 
employment programs necessarily increase work effort among those 
recipients whose participation is required, while voluntary work and 
training programs provide incentives through the prospect of increased
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future earnings or employ ability. If future wages and job prospects are 
increased by participation in such a program, the effective MTR (tak 
ing into account projected earnings) is lowered even if the current, 
nominal MTR is 100 percent.
Our paper is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of financial 
incentives rather than with the efficacy of work, employment, and 
training programs. However, we will discuss the policy merits of both 
approaches in our concluding section.
Expected Effects of Work-Incentive Provisions
The conventional labor-leisure model provides the framework 
within which work incentives of welfare program tax rates are gener 
ally analyzed. This model uses the assumption of utility maximization 
to justify the commonsense presumption that individuals trade off the 
amount of take-home income they would have for different levels of 
hours of employment with the desire to work and difficulty involved in 
that employment. As an empirical matter, the model implies that the 
choice of how much to work is based partially upon how much take- 
home income is gained by working various amounts, or by how much 
is gained by working less, in the case of some transfer programs.
The model is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the budget con 
straints for welfare programs with different tax rates. In this figure, 
segment A CDE, with slope equal to the hourly wage rate, w, applies to 
individuals off welfare. Segment BC applies to welfare recipients if the 
tax rate is 100 percent. Segment BD applies to welfare recipients if the 
tax rate takes on a value t that is less than 1. The theory implies that an 
individual will work less on welfare than off welfare, whether segment 
BC or BD applies.
A major focus of attention in the research literature has concerned 
the effects of a reduction in the tax rate on work effort. Perhaps surpris 
ingly, the literature does not yield a clear verdict on whether work 
effort would go up or down as a result. The arrows in the figure illus 
trate the types of responses that might occur from a shift from segment 
BC to BD. For individuals initially on welfare and not working (i.e., 
initially at point B), the reduction in the tax rate may encourage the 
type of movement shown by arrow 1, reflecting an increase in work 
effort. At the same time, a reduction in t expands the range of incomes
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eligible for the benefits. Unfortunately, some individuals who were ini 
tially ineligible for welfare and were hence initially off the welfare 
rolls are made eligible by the reduction in t; some of these people will 
go onto welfare and reduce their work effort, as illustrated by arrow 2 
in the figure. In addition, some individuals who are ineligible for bene 
fits even at the new, lower tax rate may take advantage of the financial 
inducement to combine welfare and work by reducing their work effort 
enough to become eligible for benefits, as illustrated by arrow 3. 6
Figure 1. AFDC Budget Constraints with Different MTRs 
(£C:MTR = 100, BD: MTR = t > 0)
Take- 
home 
income
B
0 
Hours of work
The net effect of the reduction in the tax rate is thus ambiguous and 
could be positive or negative on the overall level of work effort. It is 
even theoretically possible that 100 percent tax rates result in the great 
est amount of overall work effort in the low-income, eligible popula 
tion. This would occur if any reduction in t below this level induced
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large numbers of individuals to come onto the rolls and to work less 
than they had been working off the rolls.
The possibility that large numbers of eligibles would rush onto the 
welfare rolls if the tax rate were lowered seems implausible in many 
circumstances. However, the same end result would occur even if entry 
rates onto welfare were completely unaffected by the level of the tax 
rate, but if exits from the rolls were. Assuming that individuals joined 
the rolls only because of unforeseen job losses, adverse health events, 
or other unplanned changes in household structure (e.g., divorce), the 
increased generosity of the program brought on by a low tax rate would 
decrease the likelihood that they would leave the rolls. There may be 
many welfare recipients who would, for example, ordinarily leave the 
rolls to take a full-time low-wage job if the tax rate were 100 percent, 
but who would choose to stay on the rolls and work part-time if the tax 
rate were lower. After a period of time, some recipients would end up 
working while on the rolls who would have otherwise been off the rolls 
working longer hours.7
Whether this possibility has any relevance to actual situations will 
be discussed in the context of the available empirical evidence. How 
ever, even if it is relevant to actual situations, it does not imply that 
reductions in tax rates below 100 percent are undesirable, only that 
they must be justified on some grounds other than as a means to 
increase average work effort. For example, it may be desirable per se to 
have welfare recipients work, even if this can only be achieved by 
broadening the recipient population to include individuals who would 
have otherwise been off the rolls (they are likely to be low-wage indi 
viduals as well, of course). Alternatively, it may be desirable to avoid a 
division of the low-income eligible population into those who are on 
welfare and not working and those who are off welfare and working 
long hours. A reduction in the tax rate that increases the work effort of 
the former group but reduces it for the latter group may serve to equal 
ize the distribution of earnings and income in the eligible population 
and lessen polarization. In addition, a program that offers income sup 
plements to individuals who work part-time but are still poor (assum 
ing that such work is covered by a low t) may be considered 
worthwhile simply because such persons are believed to be deserving 
of assistance, even if by doing so some recipients may reduce work 
effort from full-time to part-time. Finally, low tax rates may be a means
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to prevent underreporting of income and fraudulent work by individu 
als while receiving benefits. 8
Another possibility is that employment provides a welfare recipient 
with work experience and increased skills, thereby raising earnings 
ability (i.e., the wage rate) and encouraging exit from the rolls in the 
future. Whether the types of jobs that welfare recipients are likely to 
have while on the rolls provide a stepping-stone to permanent self-suf 
ficiency, or whether such jobs are likely to be high-turnover, dead-end 
positions that lead nowhere but back onto the rolls, is an empirical 
question. However, if progress towards permanent employment is the 
goal of the reduction in the MTR, it could be fairly asked whether job 
training programs are not a superior method of increasing skills.
Finally, the literature in this area has shown that the same work- 
incentive difficulties that arise with tax rate reductions occur when 
transitional child care and Medicaid benefits are provided (Moffitt and 
Wolfe 1990). In this situation, such benefits provide an incentive for 
individuals who leave the rolls to work less than they would have oth 
erwise during the transition period. Also, for those who are on the bor 
derline between applying or not applying for benefits in the first place, 
there is an incentive to apply because they know that transitional bene 
fits will be available should they go off the rolls. Consequently, transi 
tional child care and Medicaid benefits may have the undesirable effect 
of actually increasing the caseload and reducing average levels of work 
effort.
Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence on the effects of welfare program tax rates on 
work effort comes from three sources: (1) econometric estimates of tax 
rate effects from cross-sectional survey data, (2) estimates from con 
trolled experiments testing a negative income tax, and (3) historical 
information from actual tax rate changes in recent decades in particular 
programs such as AFDC. We will not discuss any evidence on the 
effect of transitional child care and Medicaid benefits on work effort 
and the caseload, since those provisions have not been studied. Also, 
we will not look at the earnings and caseload impacts of welfare 
employment and training programs, since our focus is on financial 
inducements to work.
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Cross-sectional econometric estimates of the effect of welfare pro 
grams on work effort generally relate differences in hours of work to 
differences in benefit levels and MTRs among welfare-eligible individ 
uals living in states with varying benefit schedules (Danziger, Have- 
man, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992). Most of these studies have 
examined the effect of welfare on the level of work effort per se and 
have found that welfare programs provide some disincentive and there 
fore that work effort would be higher in the absence of the programs. 
However, only a minority of the studies examined the issue of whether 
the net effects of a change in the MTR on work effort would be positive 
or negative; instead, most studies estimated the "marginal" effects of 
changing the MTR conditional on program participation, that is, the 
effect of a change in the MTR on hours of work for those on AFDC 
before and after the change. 9 On this issue, the research showed non 
zero, but moderately sized, responses to benefit levels and MTRs: both 
higher benefits and higher MTRs are correlated with less work effort, 
assuming AFDC participation by the individual before and after the 
change. 10 Thus, arrow 1 in figure 1 was found to be significantly posi 
tive: when faced with a lower MTR, many AFDC recipients enter the 
labor force and work.
Three studies reviewed by Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick did 
estimate net effects of changes in MTRs, however. The research (Mas 
ters and Garfinkel 1977; Levy 1979; Barr and Hall 1981) found either 
no net effect of tax rates on work or a "perverse" effect, i.e., higher tax 
rates increase work levels. The explanation given for these findings 
was that the positive effects on the work effort of initial recipients are 
canceled out by the negative effects from new entrants and from a 
decline in the exit rate. Thus, the theoretical possibility of significant 
offsetting effects to the work incentives of lower tax rates is, unfortu 
nately, supported by the evidence.
There have been only a few additional studies of the AFDC program 
since the review by Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, and these pro 
vide further evidence supporting the weak effects of changes in the 
MTR. Moffitt (1983) applied more advanced econometric methods to 
the problem but found, again, essentially no net effect on work effort 
due to changes in the tax rate. Keane and Moffitt (1994) incorporated 
the housing program into a model of AFDC and Food Stamps and 
found that changes in cumulative MTRs had very little net impact on
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work effort. Hoynes (1996), in the first work-incentive study of the 
APDC-UP program, found that reductions in the MTR on earnings had 
essentially zero net effect on the work effort of husbands and wives. 11
Only a few studies have been conducted on other programs. Fraker 
and Moffitt (1988) estimated the effects of the Food Stamp program on 
the work effort of female heads of household and found, again, that the 
net effect of MTR reductions was zero. Estimates of the effect of the 
Medicaid program on work effort have been conducted by Blank 
(1989), Moffitt and Wolfe (1992), and Winkler (1991). Two of the stud 
ies showed rather weak effects of the Medicaid program on work 
effort, while the third showed quite strong effects. However, none of 
these studies specifically examined the effect of the notch imposed by 
Medicaid. 12
The negative income tax (NIT) experiments conducted in the 1970s 
provided additional evidence on the responsiveness of welfare recipi 
ents to welfare programs (Burtless 1987; Moffitt and Kehrer 1981; SRI 
International 1983). In these experiments, a sample of the low-income 
population in several cities was selected, and its members were ran 
domly assigned either to an experimental group, which received a wel 
fare program (NIT) with varying benefit levels and MTRs, or to a 
control group, which was eligible only for the existing welfare system. 
Estimates were obtained by comparing work effort levels of the control 
group to those of the different experimental groups. The results of the 
experiments showed that an NIT with higher benefit levels than those 
in the existing AFDC system would reduce the work effort of female 
heads of household, and that an NIT of any type would lower the work 
effort of men and women for whom no existing program was available. 
The experiments also provided estimates of the responsiveness of wel 
fare recipients to changes in benefit levels and MTRs, assuming indi 
viduals to be on AFDC before and after the change. The estimates were 
found to be nonzero, but slightly lower in magnitude than those derived 
from cross-sectional survey data. 13 Unfortunately, the experiments pro 
vided little evidence on the net effect of changes in welfare program 
tax rates. In part, this is because the experiments were not designed for 
such estimates: the studies excluded families with income very much 
above the break-even level and hence could not capture the effects of 
tax rate changes that might arise from that group. 14
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Finally, some studies have been conducted on the effects of two his 
torical changes in the AFDC tax rate: its reduction from 100 percent to 
67 percent in 1969, as a result of the 1967 Social Security Amend 
ments, and its increase from 67 percent to 100 percent in 1981, due to 
the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). Early studies 
of the 1967 Social Security Amendments examined the changes in 
employment and earnings among recipients remaining on the AFDC 
rolls; once again, the studies excluded responses from entry and exit 
and did not estimate net effects (Appel 1972; Bell and Bushe 1975; 
Smith 1974). The research suggested that work effort rose among 
women initially on the AFDC rolls. However, aggregate data on the 
AFDC participation rates and work effort levels of female heads of 
household in the United States in the early 1970s, just following the 
reduction in the tax rate, showed increases in participation rates and 
decreases in work effort (Moffitt 1992). Thus, net effects appeared to 
be zero, and, consequently, there was no evidence of increased work 
following the legislation.
The 1981 OBRA legislation has been evaluated more formally. The 
best study, conducted by the Research Triangle Institute (1981), exam 
ined the exit rates and work effort levels of women initially on the 
AFDC rolls at the time of the legislation, some of whom were made 
ineligible by the increase in the MTR. The results of the evaluation 
indicated that the increase in the tax rate to 100 percent had no discern 
ible work-discouraging effects on those who were initially on the rolls 
and working, in the sense that there was no evidence of their having 
reduced work effort to zero to retain eligibility for benefits. The study 
did find that the exit rate from AFDC increased, which is consistent 
with the expected effects discussed previously. Unfortunately, the 
study failed to gather information on the work effort levels of those 
who left the rolls following the change or on the work effort levels of 
those who failed to apply for benefits following the tax rate increase. 
Hence, the total (i.e., net) effect of the change could not be ascertained. 
However, once again, subsequent time series evidence on the work 
effort levels of female heads of household showed very little impact of 
the legislation (Moffitt 1986).
In summary, the empirical evidence from the welfare program litera 
ture reveals a consistent pattern of inelastic (i.e., weak) responsiveness 
of work effort to changes in MTRs. Despite MTRs of or in excess of
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100 percent, there is very little indication that reductions in those 
MTRs would induce any statistically detectable increase in overall 
hours of work or in employment among the low-income population. 
This realization by analysts and policy makers explains, in part, why 
efforts in the 1980s to change work patterns among AFDC recipients 
shifted so strongly toward employment and training programs and 
away from the use of financial incentives.
Transfer Programs for the Disabled
The primary cash transfer systems for the disabled consist of the 
Social Security DI and SSI programs. 15 DI is a major part of the Old- 
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. It was 
added to the program in 1957 and is designed to provide partial earn 
ings replacement to all workers under age 65 who sustain severe, long- 
term (typically career-ending) disabilities. All workers covered under 
Social Security (about 95 percent of the U.S. workforce) are also cov 
ered for DI benefits, and financing for the program comes out of 
employer- and employee-paid Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(PICA) taxes. In 1993, the DI program provided benefits for about 5 
million disabled, nonaged individuals, for a total cost of $34.5 billion 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994).
The SSI program provides benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled. 
The goal of SSI is to provide an income floor, and receipt is not tied to 
previous work experience. The program, enacted in 1972 and imple 
mented in 1974, is funded from general revenues, and benefits are stan 
dardized across the states. However, most states supplement the federal 
SSI benefits through their own SSI programs. On average, 4 million 
disabled workers and their dependents received monthly federal SSI 
benefits in 1993, for a total annual cost of about $35 billion. The dis 
abled represent about 75 percent of the total SSI caseload. DI recipi 
ents with low benefits can use SSI to supplement their income; about 
16 percent of DI recipients also receive SSI (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), Social Security Administration 
(SSA) 1994).
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Description of Program Rules
Both programs define disability as "the inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of medically determinable physi 
cal or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than twelve months" (HHS, SSA 1992). Therefore, the medi 
cal definition of disability is not sufficient for benefit receipt. Instead, 
initial and continuing eligibility for both programs is tied to the ability 
to work. Substantial gainful activity (SGA) is defined as a threshold 
level of earnings, which is currently set at $500 per month. 16
Social Security Disability Income Program (DI)
Eligibility for DI requires meeting the definition of disability (as 
previously stated), having sufficient work history in Social Security 
covered jobs, 17 and not working, or working and earning less than the 
SGA threshold. When determining if earnings exceed SGA (both for 
initial as well as continuing eligibility), deductions are allowed for 
impairment-related work expenses (IRWE). The DI benefit is equal to 
100 percent of the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA), which is 
a function of the individual's earnings history in Social Security cov 
ered employment. 18 This benefit can be significant and is typically 
equal to the full value of the worker's potential Social Security retire 
ment benefit. In 1993, DI benefits for disabled workers averaged $642 
per month. The PIA calculation is based on a progressive structure 
under which high-wage workers obtain lower earnings replacement 
rates than lower-wage workers. The replacement rate in 1994 ranged 
from 78 percent for workers with low average monthly earnings ($500) 
to 29 percent among workers with high monthly earnings ($4,500) 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). 19
To analyze the work-incentive provisions of DI, we must examine 
the five possible phases of the program that working recipients can 
experience. First, there is a five-month waiting period after disability 
begins before benefits can be received (although there is no waiting 
period if the individual returns to the rolls within five years of leaving). 
Second, a trial work period (TWP) allows for nine months of employ 
ment over a 60-month period. If the individual earns over $200 in a 
month, it is counted as a trial month. Third, individuals who accumu-
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late nine months of work have their cases reviewed; if the work in 
which they have been engaged is "SGA" (generally meaning that it 
reflects an ability to earn more than the SGA monthly threshold), bene 
fits are extended for three more months (the grace period) and then 
stop. During the TWP, benefits are provided in full regardless of the 
level of earned or unearned income and are intended to let recipients 
test their ability to work, without danger of losing benefits. Fourth, 
recipients who have reached this point enter the extended period of eli 
gibility (EPE), which lasts 36 months. After the three-month grace 
period during the EPE, benefits are provided in full if earnings (net of 
allowed deductions) are less than SGA, but benefits are reduced to zero 
if earnings are over SGA. After the EPE is exhausted, individuals are 
dropped from the rolls if they have achieved SGA (or they must file a 
new application if they are still disabled). 20
The marginal tax rates (MTRs) on earnings in the DI program are 
generally much lower than those found in programs for the nondis- 
abled. During the TWP, for example, the MTR is zero. Further, the 
MTR is also zero during the EPE if earnings are below SGA. However, 
by eliminating benefits for workers over SGA, an MTR of more than 
100 percent is created on earnings that push the individual just over 
SGA. This creates a "notch" that resembles the MTR of over 100 per 
cent created by the loss of Medicaid benefits in the nondisabled pro 
grams discussed previously. Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) find that, 
overall, DI recipients considering entering the labor force on a part- 
time basis face average tax rates in the range of 60 to 91 percent, 
depending on their earnings capacity. Those considering entry at full- 
time levels face average tax rates of about 40 percent.
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI)
While DI is an earnings replacement program, SSI is a means-tested 
transfer program that is not tied to previous work experience. The eligi 
bility and benefit formulas are consequently similar to those in the 
means-tested programs for the nondisabled. In order to be eligible for 
SSI, the individual must meet the definition of disability, have income 
and assets below the eligibility requirements, and not work, or work 
and earn less than the SGA threshold. The income test, asset test, and 
benefit level vary by living arrangement. The asset limit is $2,000 for 
single persons and $3,000 for couples, excluding home and automo-
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bile, while the income test requires that countable income, which 
includes both earned and unearned income, not exceed $446 for single 
persons and $669 for couples in 1994. The main deductions used in 
calculating countable income include the full deduction of IRWE, $20 
of monthly income, $65 of earned income, and one-half of the remain 
ing earnings. This creates an MTR of 50 percent for earnings above 
deductions. Benefits are equal to the program guarantee ($446 for sin 
gle persons and $669 for couples) less countable income. 21 These bene 
fit levels are adjusted annually for changes in the cost of living. All SSI 
recipients are also eligible for health benefits through the Medicaid 
program.
Work effort is observed to be quite low in both the DI and SSI pro 
grams. In a study of a sample of new entrants to DI in the early 1980s, 
only 10 percent of all participants had any work experience over a 10- 
year period following initial benefit receipt (Muller 1992). Three per 
cent left the rolls because of increased earnings, and 5 percent 
attempted trial work, but this did not result in SGA termination. Those 
who worked were more likely to be younger, white, female, single, 
with higher education levels, lower DI benefits, and less severe disabil 
ities. SSI workers have represented about 6 percent of the total SSI 
caseload since the mid-1980s (HHS, SSA 1993).
Expected Effects of Work Incentive Provisions
The DI and SSI programs are designed to replace (or supplement) 
earnings for workers who are unable to engage in "substantial gainful 
activity." There is, of course, a potential moral hazard problem associ 
ated with these programs inasmuch as disability is not a purely medical 
condition but may respond to economic and other factors. High bene 
fits or lenient application procedures may lure those in poor health, but 
with employment possibilities, out of the labor market. Furthermore, a 
high MTR may lead to low work effort among the recipient population.
To begin, consider how the existence of the DI program affects work 
effort among the disabled. First, eligibility requires that recipients earn 
less than SGA during the application and waiting periods. This will act 
to lower employment effort. The time spent out of the labor force while 
establishing eligibility may be quite costly, especially since many 
recipients are initially denied and since acceptance may follow only
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after a lengthy appeals process. Bound (1991) estimates that DI recipi 
ents are jobless for an average of 8.5 months before receiving benefits.
Figure 2. DI Budget Constraint during TWP
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Second, the level of work effort is affected by the TWP. Figure 2 
shows the one-period budget constraint that operates for the TWP as 
well as for the grace period. Without DI, the relevant budget segment is 
ADF. During the TWP, benefits are received in full regardless of earn 
ings (MTR equals zero), thus shifting out the budget constraint by the 
amount of the benefit and resulting in the DI budget segment of ABCE. 
In this case, the DI program operates through a pure income effect, 
causing work effort to fall, for example. High benefits may induce 
some workers to accept DI and to reduce labor supply, possibly even 
leaving the labor force altogether.
Third, a different effect of the DI program on work effort is created 
during the EPE. The income opportunities during the EPE are shown
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by budget segment ABCD in figure 3. If earnings are less than SGA, 
benefits are provided in full. Above HBE, the break-even level of hours, 
the benefit is cut off completely, and the MTR is over 100 percent. In 
this case, the worker would have to increase hours of work to Hj to 
make up for lost DI income. The EPE, like the TWP, provides a nega 
tive income effect that reduces work, as illustrated by arrow 1. In addi 
tion, the notch provides a strong incentive to work at levels below 
SGA. In this situation, shown by arrow 2, some individuals who might 
otherwise have had high employment effort are induced by the DI ben 
efits to work less in order to remain below SGA. Overall, providing 
benefits to the disabled through the DI program will reduce labor sup 
ply among the disabled.
Figure 3. DI Budget Constraint during EPE
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These effects are not necessarily of greatest policy interest, because 
they concern the impact of the DI program relative to having no pro 
gram at all. Of more note are the expected effects of the DI provisions 
that are intended to provide work incentives, mainly the TWP and the 
EPE, relative to a DI program without such provisions. To examine the 
outcomes of these incentives, or of any proposed modifications in 
existing incentives, we need to consider not only differences in work 
effort among current recipients but any changes in entry and exit rates 
that (also) contribute to changes in the overall level of work effort 
among the disabled.
First, consider the effects of adding a TWP to a "strict SGA" pro 
gram in which benefits are unaffected if work is below SGA but are 
eliminated entirely for work above SGA.22 The impact of the TWP on 
the budget constraint is illustrated in figure 2. Without any DI program 
at all, the budget constraint is ADF, while the budget constraint is 
ABCDE under the strict SGA DI program. The addition of the TWP 
prolongs benefits regardless of earnings, extending the DI budget con 
straint to ABCE. As intended, this change provides an incentive for 
those recipients who were initially at or a bit below SGA to work more 
than SGA, as shown by arrow 1. However, by making the program 
more generous for those who can and wish to work above SGA, exit 
rates from the program will fall in the longer term: some recipients 
who would have left in order to work above SGA will stay on the pro 
gram.23 Thus, while work effort among current participants may 
increase in the short run, it may fall in the long run. Those who would 
have exited the program will ultimately work less than they would have 
otherwise, as illustrated by arrow 2 (income effects induce a reduction 
in hours of work). In addition, benefits can now be received above 
SGA, which was not possible before, and this may affect entry rates, 
by creating incentives for eligible nonparticipants to apply for benefits, 
should they think that work above SGA is likely if they go onto DI. 
This would also increase the caseload and result in reduced work 
effort. Overall, the introduction of the TWP has ambiguous net effects 
on the employment effort of DI recipients and the eligible population, 
for the increased work among initial recipients may be outweighed by 
the likely future reductions in work among those who delay exit and 
those who enter.
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The effects of the EPE, which was introduced in 1980, are, at least 
at first inspection, more clear-cut: the benefit schedule reverts to its 
strict SGA form of loss of benefits for work above SGA (aside from the 
retention of Medicare benefits, whose effects are similar to the TWP 
and are provided above SGA). Once a worker is in the EPE, the incen 
tives to work above and below SGA are the same in each month as they 
were in the strict SGA program. However, the main impact of the EPE 
is in its provision of insurance for 36 months against a drop in earn 
ings. In the strict SGA program, a recipient might have hesitated to 
work above SGA because of the danger of not being able to sustain 
such high earnings and having to reapply for benefits. Avoiding this 
concern is part of the intention of the EPE program and presumably 
increases work effort during the EPE period.
Even with the EPE there is the possibility of increased entry. The 
greater generosity created by the EPE may make the DI program more 
attractive to eligibles who are on the margin of applying for benefits 
and may tip them in the direction of applying. Actually applying will 
depend on the extent of information about the DI program, whether eli 
gibles have reasonably good expectations of attempting to work when 
on the program, and on the costs associated with application. If any 
entry occurs, this will raise the DI caseload and reduce work effort, 
since those who enter will work less, on average, while on the DI pro 
gram than they would have if they had stayed off DI. Thus, in princi 
ple, the direction of the net effect of the EPE is ambiguous and can 
only be determined by empirical research. 24
This discussion shows that there is a basic similarity between the 
TWP and EPE work provisions of the DI program, on the one hand, 
and the MTR reductions in nondisability programs, which are also 
aimed at increasing work effort, on the other. Both have ambiguous net 
impacts on the recipient and eligible populations: while they have pos 
itive employment incentives for some, they also reduce exit rates and 
possibly increase entry rates, both of which lower long-run work effort 
(and raise the caseload). Each type of financial incentive operates by 
making the program more generous, and therefore more attractive, to 
working individuals as compared to their prospective situations off the 
program.25
The work incentives of SSI differ considerably from those of DI, 
while they are similar to those in the AFDC or Food Stamp programs.
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The work incentives of SSI can be analyzed by referring to the welfare 
budget constraint for the nondisabled in figure 1, substituting the SSI 
implicit tax rate on earnings of 50 percent for t (t = 0.5 in figure 1). The 
50 percent MTR implies that if earnings are increased by $1, total 
income increases by only 50 cents. Benefits are phased out as earnings 
increase and reach zero at the break-even level (point D). As before, 
the static labor supply model implies unambiguously that the existence 
of SSI will reduce work effort among the disabled relative to having no 
program at all. There is an income effect associated with the guarantee 
(as with the DI program), but the 50 percent MTR induces a substitu 
tion effect that is not present in the DI program. The income and sub 
stitution effects work in the same direction, and hours of work must 
fall. If the MTR is reduced, the net impact on work effort is ambiguous 
in direction, however. As discussed for nondisability programs, such a 
reduction lowers work effort because of a delay in exit and an increase 
in entry.26
Empirical Results
The scope of the empirical literature on work incentives of disability 
income programs is somewhat limited compared to the literature for 
the nondisabled. The main body of empirical studies examines the 
effect of the level of DI benefits on program participation (or caseload 
size).^Participation in DI is typically estimated as a function of the 
potential DI benefit, which is imputed for those not on the program, 
individual attributes such as age and education, and locational charac 
teristics.28 The principal parameter of interest, the elasticity of DI par 
ticipation (or nonparticipation in the labor market), with respect to the 
DI benefit, varies widely in the literature. The results based on samples 
of older men (aged 45-62) provide elasticities ranging from 0.06-1.80. 
The highest elasticities in the literature are found by Parsons and range 
from 0.63 (Parsons 1980a) to 1.80 (Parsons 1980b). Slade (1984) esti 
mates an elasticity of 0.81. The magnitude of these elasticities is suffi 
cient to explain all of the observed decline in labor force participation 
rates by older men in the 1970s. Haveman and Wolfe (1984a) claim 
that Parsons' estimates are flawed and instead estimate an elasticity 
between 0.06 and 0.21 (Haveman and Wolfe 1984b; Haveman, de 
long, and Wolfe 1991). The other main estimates fall in the range of
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0.10 to 0.20 (Halpern and Hausman 1986; Leonard 1979). Older work 
ers, those in poor health and with greater disabilities, and individuals 
with lower earnings have been found to be more responsive to changes 
in benefits (Haveman and Wolfe 1984b; Slade 1984). de long, Have- 
man, and Wolfe (1988) find evidence that women are more sensitive to 
benefits, with estimated elasticities of 0.97 for female heads of house 
hold and 0.23 for married women. 29
Variation in the leniency of determining eligibility has been used to 
examine the sensitivity of DI participation to the uncertainty of bene 
fits. Parsons (199la) and Gruber and Kubik (1994) use over-time and 
across-state variation in DI denial rates to estimate how DI applications 
and nonparticipation in the labor market are affected by such uncer 
tainty. Parsons finds the elasticity of applications with respect to the 
denial rate to be -0.18. Gruber and Kubik find the elasticity of nonpar 
ticipation with respect to the denial rate to be 0.27.
While much of the empirical work in this literature is of great inter 
est, the results fall significantly short of what is needed to estimate the 
effect of the TWP, the EPE, or other work-incentive provisions. In the 
absence of direct evaluations of the TWP, for example, inferences 
about its effects can be made only by estimating the number of individ 
uals who would prefer to work above SGA but still receive benefits; 
wage elasticities as well as income elasticities are needed for this pre 
diction. The marked absence of attempts at estimated wage elasticities 
is, in fact, the literature's major defect for assessing the effectiveness of 
work-incentive provisions. 30 Furthermore, in these studies, participa 
tion in DI is considered equivalent to nonparticipation in the labor mar 
ket, which rules out examining the sort of responses shown by the 
arrows in figures 2 and 3.
As noted, the empirical evidence for nondisability programs should 
generate skepticism that there are any significant positive net effects of 
financial inducements for recipients to work while on the rolls. While 
the TWP and EPE are quite different in form from a simple MTR, the 
same types of effects are involved; therefore, the results from the non- 
disability programs should generate concern about the effectiveness of 
the TWP and EPE. In an assessment of whether the nondisability 
results are applicable to DI programs, one issue that would presumably 
be very important is whether the responsiveness of the disabled to 
changes in benefits and tax rates (i.e., their income and substitution
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elasticities) are similar to those of female heads of household and other 
low-income groups that commonly receive nondisability benefits. 
Whether the responsiveness is higher or lower seems unclear from the 
literature. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the populations 
and programs are distinctive in many ways, which may contribute to 
different responsiveness levels. 31
Expected Effects of Reforms to DI Work Incentives
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reflects a 
desire to encourage labor force participation among the disabled. As is 
often noted, the existence of the DI program runs counter to this goal, 
by encouraging reductions in work effort among the disabled. Com 
pared to a program with a strict SGA limitation, however, the TWP and 
EPE features of DI do produce work incentives for current recipients, 
even though the direction of these features' overall impact is ambigu 
ous. Several changes to the work incentives of the DI program are 
under consideration, including increasing the SGA, extending the 
length of the TWP, and imposing a 50 percent MTR on earnings after 
the end of the TWP.32
Raising the SGA increases the DI caseload but has ambiguous 
impacts on work effort among the disabled. 33 The change affects 
employment effort, program exit, and program entry in two ways. 
First, the costs of application are reduced because higher work effort 
can be sustained without exceeding SGA (as required for initial appli 
cation). Second, as shown in figure 4, increasing the SGA shifts up the 
notch in the budget constraint during the EPE. Increasing the SGA 
level from SGA0 to SGAj shifts out the DI budget constraint from 
ABCD to ABCEF. This will lead to increases in hours of work among 
some current recipients, as shown by arrow 1 in the figure. However, 
by allowing for higher levels of work with full benefits, the more gen 
erous program lowers the exit rate from the rolls for some recipients, 
who ultimately work less than they would have otherwise. In addition, 
the change attracts new applicants, who, if accepted into the program, 
will take advantage of the SGA to work while on the rolls; however, 
they will work fewer hours than they would have had they been off the 
rolls, as shown by arrows 2 and 3. Some of these new entrants are eligi 
ble under the expanded program (arrow 2), and others may take ad van-
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tage of the increased benefits and reduce their work effort to become 
eligible (arrow 3). This leads to a rise in the caseload, through 
increases in the entry rate as well as decreases in the exit rate.
Figure 4. Effect of Increasing SGA on EPE Budget Constraint
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Similarly, adding a partial benefit or MTR on earnings during the 
EPE will tend to increase work levels among current DI recipients, but 
the impact on overall work effort among all disabled persons is indeter 
minate in direction (the caseload will unambiguously rise). Figure 5 
shows the budget constraint for the EPE before and after the introduc 
tion of the partial offset, where the MTR is imposed only on earnings 
over the SGA. Under current law and with this expansion, the slope of 
the budget constraint below the SGA (ABC) is w, reflecting an MTR of 
zero. With the expansion, above the SGA there is an MTR of 50 per 
cent, which operates until benefits are reduced to zero. As before, 
arrow 1 shows the likely movement in work levels among current 
recipients. This increase in work effort is the intended effect of the 
expansion. However, a positive income effect and negative substitution
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effect suggest that work levels will fall for others, as shown by arrows 
2 and 3, both from reduced exit and increased entry. The potential 
growth in the caseload is quite large under this expansion. Using the 
average benefit in 1993 of $642, the break-even earnings level 
increases from SGA to about $1,800 per month or about $22,000 per 
year. 34
Figure 5. Partial Benefit Offset (50 percent) over SGA
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Extending the length of the TWP also has ambiguous effects on 
work incentives. By allowing recipients to work for more months 
before being taxed (e.g., before entering the EPE), the effective MTR 
in the program decreases. This will probably increase work levels and 
the length of time on the program for current participants. In addition, 
it may reduce exit rates for current participants and attract new partici 
pants, with both of these groups working fewer hours during the addi 
tional 12 months than they would have otherwise. This would augment 
the caseload as well.
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The empirical literature, as described, provides limited insight into 
the likely results of these proposed reforms to DI work incentives. In 
general, the impact on overall work effort depends critically on the rel 
ative sizes of the income and substitution effects for current recipients 
and potential entrants. Existing research provides very little reliable 
information on these parameters. The total effect also depends on the 
size of the increase in break-even income and on the density of the eli 
gible population in these areas of the earnings distribution, that is, on 
the relative numbers of disabled individuals who can and prefer to 
work just above the SGA.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
As the issue of increasing work incentives in the DI and SSI pro 
grams becomes of greater policy interest, the lessons from similar pro 
visions in plans for the nondisabled should be studied. Our review of 
the nondisability program literature demonstrates that simple financial 
inducements or changes in benefit formulas are unlikely to be as effec 
tive as they first appear. The empirical research on such reforms in non- 
disability programs is quite uniform in its failure to find strong 
responses to financial incentives and decreased MTRs. A set of possi 
ble explanations includes new entry into the programs as well as 
decreased exit. Our review of the empirical research on DI and SSI 
does not allow us to reach any conclusions about whether the magni 
tude of the responses in DI programs is likely to be greater than that in 
nondisability programs. However, the different types of responses to 
financial considerations, both the intended increases in work effort and 
the unintended reductions, should be present in DI and SSI, at least to 
some degree. This leads us to urge caution in using financial induce 
ments as a means of work-incentive reform in those programs without 
further, concrete evidence of their effectiveness.
Policy for AFDC recipients has evolved away from financial incen 
tives in recent years and has shifted toward the use of education and 
training programs to directly encourage, and sometimes require, work. 
This transition began in the 1970s and occurred in part because of the 
perceived failure of financial inducements, such as provided by the
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1967 Social Security Amendments, to increase AFDC recipient 
employment levels and to reduce caseloads. In addition, the move 
reflected a society-wide change in attitudes toward work by women 
with children, as it became increasingly the norm for such women to be 
employed rather than to stay at home. A similar change in attitudes 
toward the disabled appears to have occurred, with many arguing that 
all recipients should work to the degree they can. However, the use of 
financial inducements is still more favorably viewed in policy discus 
sions of SSI and DI than of AFDC and other welfare programs. As we 
have stressed, this perspective is not necessarily justified by the evi 
dence.
Finally, a recent policy direction taken for AFDC and related pro 
grams is to provide financial incentives to leave the welfare rolls via 
earnings and wage supplements for private sector work. The most 
prominent of these programs is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
which provides supplements to low-income families and which has 
been greatly increased in generosity. The attractiveness of the EITC is 
that it has the potential to increase work and earnings and to reduce the 
welfare caseload at the same time. The philosophy behind the EITC 
and similar private sector wage subsidy programs is diametrically 
opposite to that behind the use of financial inducements to work more 
while on welfare; the latter has the potentially deleterious conse 
quences of increasing the caseload and reducing some individuals' 
work effort, which we have discussed at length. These undesirable 
results would not occur if financial incentives were offered only for 
off-welfare (or both on- and off-welfare) work. Policy discussions of 
disability assistance might fruitfully turn to wage subsidies, perhaps by 
investigating special private sector earnings subsidies for the disabled 
or modifications in the EITC to make more disabled individuals eligi 
ble for its benefits.
NOTES
NOTE The authors would like to thank Gary Painter for excellent research assistance and 
John Bound, Richard Burkhauser, David Stapleton, and Finis Welch for comments
1. The rules descnbed in this section can be found in the 1994 "Green Book" (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1994).
2. The $30 flat deduction is eliminated after 12 months of earnings Both the twelve months of 
a $30 deduction and the four months of the one-third deduction can be reestablished after one 
year, provided that the recipient has gone off AFDC and not returned in the intenm We should
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also note that some states use a payment method called "fill-the-gap," which permits a total disre 
gard of earnings up to a certain maximum, after which the tax rates noted in the text are applied.
3 Unlike the AFDC program, the FSP has two maximums, one on gross income and one on 
net income (i e., income after deductions). A family loses eligibility if either maximum is 
exceeded.
4 We should note that the AFDC benefit is included in countable income for those FSP recip 
ients who are also on AFDC This inclusion tends to lower the cumulative MTR for those who are 
on both programs, since an increase in earnings generally reduces the AFDC benefit, which, there 
fore, increases the FSP benefit. In simple cases, the cancellation is complete: a $1 increase in 
earnings lowers the AFDC benefit by $1, so countable income in the FSP is unchanged, and hence 
the FSP benefit is unchanged.
5 We have not discussed the MTR arising from participation in public and subsidized housing 
programs because there has been too little research on their effects Keane and Moffitt (1994) pro 
vide estimates of these MTRs.
6 Another possible response can occur if there are initially individuals along segment AC who 
are eligible for benefits but do not receive them, either because of a stigma associated with AFDC 
receipt or because the "hassle" and other costs of applying for and receiving assistance outweigh 
the benefits of the potential payment. A reduction in t, which increases potential payments, may 
induce some of these individuals to go onto welfare after all, with an associated reduction in work 
effort
It should be noted that the welfare program caseload unambiguously rises Providing work 
incentives by lowering the tax rate increases the caseload
7 In this discussion, we have to a degree shifted to a model of exit and entry, unlike the static 
model of our diagrams. In truth, even in the presence of "fixed" budget constraints, there are con 
tinual flows onto and off the rolls, in response both to unforeseen and uncontrollable events (lay 
offs, health events, etc ) and to conscious decision and purposeful behavior (e g , leaving the rolls 
to take a job offer) Purposeful behavior that takes relative income and work incentives into 
account will result in a long-run equilibrium similar to that portrayed in the static model, as a 
larger proportion of the population ends up with higher income.
8 Although very little is known of underreporting among AFDC recipients, many suspect it to 
be common, based on anecdotal evidence. One study of 50 AFDC families in Chicago found that 
all 50 were receiving some form of unreported income (Edin 1991). The general presumption in 
the literature is that the frequency and magnitude of income underreporting are positively associ 
ated with the level of the tax rate.
9. Technically, these studies estimated the substitution and income elasticities assuming that 
the budget constraint segment upon which individuals were located did not change.
10 That is, income elasticities are estimated to be negative, and substitution elasticities are 
positive
11 Another approach taken to estimating the net impacts of tax rates has been to simulate 
those effects from a microsimulation model, applying estimated elasticities from the econometric 
literature to representative household data bases (Moffitt 1992; Fortin, Truchon, and Beausejour 
1993). These studies confirm that lowering tax rates in welfare programs may reduce work effort, 
depending upon the size of the estimated responses but also upon the relative numbers of eligible 
individuals in different portions of the income distribution.
12 A recent study by Yelowitz (1995) did examine the impact of the Medicaid notch, however, 
and found that it had negative effects on the probability of working.
13. See Moffitt and Kehrer (1981) for details.
14 The experiments further excluded eligible nonrecipients, whose responses would also 
affect the net result in real-world welfare programs.
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15 Other public programs that provide cash benefits for the disabled include several veterans' 
compensation programs, workers' compensation, and (optional) state-provided temporary disabil 
ity benefits The discussion in this paper will be limited to the DI and SSI programs
16. The SGA is not indexed for price changes and has been increased nine times in the pro 
gram's 35 years. The SGA started in 1957 at $100 and was set at $300 from 1980 to 1990 before 
the latest increase to $500.
17 To qualify for DI, applicants must have worked 20 of the last 40 quarters preceding the 
quarter of application, although the rules differ somewhat for younger workers. The work history 
required for DI is virtually the same as that required for Social Security retirement benefits
18 The benefit can be as large as 150 percent of PIA for disabled workers with families.
19 The earnings figures refer to the worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) in 
Social Security employment. The DI benefit, equal to the worker's PIA, is a function of the AIME 
Benefits are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. The PIA and AIME are calculated in 
roughly the same way as they are for Social Security retirement benefits
20 If a person has never achieved SGA, the EPE is extended indefinitely. However, benefits 
will be discontinued the first time that SGA is achieved.
Medicare benefits are available after 24 months of DI benefit receipt. Once the individual 
enters the EPE, Medicare benefits are obtainable for the next 39 months. Thus, Medicare is pro 
vided for three months past the end of EPE. Once a worker reaches age 65, the DI case is automat 
ically transferred to the Social Security retirement system
21 All figures refer to 1994 levels.
22 The original DI program did not have the TWP or EPE features. The TWP was introduced 
in 1960 and the EPE in 1980.
23. Once again, such exit rates can only be understood if it is realized that a dynamic model 
involving normal flows onto and off the rolls underlies the static diagrams we have drawn. Normal 
exits from the rolls occur, for example, due to job opportunities, even though the budget constraint 
does not change in the ordinary sense of the word Whether an individual takes advantage of such 
opportunities will no doubt be based in part on the relative income gain or loss associated with 
leaving versus staying on the rolls. These are the same considerations that underlie the arrows in 
our static diagrams, although in a dynamic context.
24 The EPE may also reduce exit rates from DI when averaged over the 36-month period. For 
example, recipients may try out a job with possibly short duration, knowing that they will proba 
bly return within a few months to collect benefits While this encourages employment among 
those who would not have worked at all, it discourages work effort by those who would have oth 
erwise chosen to go off the rolls altogether at a job with greater prospects of stability and longev 
ity.
25. Some important dynamic considerations of the DI program have been left out of this dis 
cussion. For example, even though benefits are not reduced during the TWP, potential benefit cut 
offs begin after nine months of work if the recipient enters EPE Consequently, taking advantage 
of the TWP will increase income at the time but decrease prospective income, effectively raising 
the MTR and reducing work effort Similarly, individuals who consistently work above SGA dur 
ing the EPE will eventually be dropped from the system altogether after 36 months, thus losing 
Medicare benefits as well as the insurance of DI benefits if wages fall below SGA. This also oper 
ates to increase the effective MTR Lastly, Medicare benefits will be lost three months after the 
end of the EPE when leaving the DI rolls. There is anecdotal evidence that losing health benefits 
may be a larger work disincentive for the disabled than the prospect of losing cash benefits 
(National Academy of Social Insurance 1994).
26 This discussion shows that the main difference between SSI and DI is in the treatment of 
earnings In SSI, SGA is only used when determining initial eligibility, and benefits are reduced
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with increases in earned income The notch in the DI budget constraint during the EPE does not 
exist in SSL However, this difference is only a result of recent legislative changes in the SSI pro 
gram Provisions referred to as 1619(a) and 1619(b) started in 1980 and were made permanent in 
1986 These provisions dramatically changed the earnings opportunities for disabled workers. 
Previously, SSI recipients had a trial work period, and Medicaid and cash benefits were lost when 
a worker had countable earnings that exceeded SGA. In that case, there was an MTR of 50 percent 
below SGA, at which point the remaining benefits (and Medicaid coverage) were lost in entirety 
Provision 1619(a) allows SSI (and Medicaid) benefits to be continued even at earnings exceeding 
SGA (until sufficiently high earnings move a person off the rolls completely). To ease the transi 
tion back to work, provision 1619(b) extends Medicaid coverage when workers' earnings render 
them ineligible for SSI benefits
27. This literature is critically reviewed in Leonard (1986) and in the exchanges between Par 
sons (1984) and Haveman and Wolfe (1984a) and Parsons (1991b) and Bound (1991)
The empirical studies of the work disincentive effects of the SSI and workers' compensation 
program are much less developed McGarry (1993) considers the impact of potential benefits on 
the take-up of SSI benefits among the low-income elderly
28. The majority of the literature defines the dependent variable to be labor force participation 
or nonparticipation (de long, Haveman, and Wolfe 1988, Gruber and Kubik 1994, Haveman and 
Wolfe 1984b, Parsons 1980a, 1980b; Slade 1984) Leonard (1979) specifies the dependent van- 
able as DI participant or nonparticipant Operationally, there is little difference between these 
approaches. Halpern and Hausman (1986) consider three states DI recipient, Dl-rejected appli 
cant, and nonapphcant Haveman, Wolfe, and Warhck (1988) consider the DI recipient, Social 
Security early retirement, and labor force participant choices
29 The elasticities cited are from the econometric studies that utilized cross-sectional data 
The time series studies are summarized by Leonard (1986)
30. Some of the studies (e.g., Parsons 1980a and 1980b) do include wages, but only their pre- 
disabihty level, and only in the form of a replacement rate, which results in neither an income nor 
a wage elasticity There are many difficulties in estimating the work-incentive effects of the DI 
program that are not encountered in the literature for the nondisabled Such problems include the 
endogenous nature of DI benefits, due to the relationship with previous work experiences, the 
uncertainty of DI receipt, and the difficulty in imputing DI benefits for nonrecipients These issues 
and their relevance for the empirical literature are discussed in Leonard (1986), Haveman and 
Wolfe (1984a), Bound (1991), and Hoynes and Moffitt (1996)
31. It is clear that DI recipients confront different obstacles to labor market success than do 
female heads of household Disabled individuals may face difficulties in labor supply (due to the 
physical or emotional conditions impacting the ability to work) and labor demand (due to the 
availability of jobs for persons with disabilities) Furthermore, contrasted with AFDC, receipt of 
DI benefits is uncertain and subject to long waiting periods because of difficulties in evaluating 
the medical definition of disability Lastly, the availability of public health insurance may be quite 
important for disabled workers, especially due to preexisting condition clauses in private insur 
ance
32 Specifically, the National Academy of Social Insurance report (1994) outlines five possible 
reforms: indexing the SGA amount to keep pace with wage growth, raising the SGA to the level 
for the blind ($930 in 1993) and indexing to keep pace with wage growth, providing a partial off 
set (MTR) of 50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above the monthly SGA; pro 
viding a partial offset (MTR) of 50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above $85 a 
month, and extending the TWP by 12 months With the partial offset, the work-incentive effects of 
the DI program are made more similar to those in the SSI program
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33 Increasing the SGA would also expand eligibility for SSI. The impacts are likely to be 
larger for the DI program since the SGA only affects initial (but not continuing) eligibility for the 
SSI program
34 This is calculated by setting benefits [B-0.5*(w//-500)] equal to zero, where w is the 
hourly wage and H is hours worked, and solving for the earnings level where benefits are just 
exhausted
Imposing a 50 percent MTR on earnings over an $85 exclusion during the EPE would result in 
closer parity between the SSI and DI work incentives. This change differs from those considered 
in the text: since the $85 exclusion is below the SGA level of $500, benefits would be lower than 
they are under current law for some ranges of earnings By increasing the tax rate (from 0 to 50 
percent), we may see a reduction in work effort for current recipients However, eliminating the 
notch (and its high MTR) and extending benefits past the SGA may result in an increase in work 
levels among some recipients. For this program change, the caseload as well as the net work 
effects are ambiguous. The direction of the change in entry and exit rates is not predictable since 
for some ranges for hours worked the program has been expanded while, for others, the program 
is less generous.
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Lessons from the Vocational 
Rehabilitation/Social Security 
Administration Experience
Edward Berkowitz
George Washington University
David Dean
University of Richmond
In the long history of efforts to link the vocational rehabilitation 
(VR) program and the income maintenance programs for persons with 
disabilities run by the Social Security Administration (SSA), three dis 
tinct eras emerge. Even before the passage of Social Security Disabil 
ity Insurance (DI) in 1956, there were discussions of how to use 
rehabilitation as an alternative to income maintenance benefits. The 
period between 1957 and 1981 featured the rise and fall of the Benefi 
ciary Rehabilitation Program (BRP). Since 1982, Congress has legis 
lated a new system for rehabilitating DI beneficiaries that includes 
stricter reimbursement mechanisms.
The inability to rehabilitate persons after they have been declared 
eligible for DI retirement pensions, a common feature of all three of 
the eras, marks a major failure of modern disability policy. The barriers 
between vocational rehabilitation, which attempts to facilitate the labor 
force participation of people with disabilities, and DI, which grants 
tickets out of the labor force, remain high. The only way to lower the 
barriers is to change the entire disability system.
As an exercise in analytical description, this paper examines the his 
tory of VR-DI linkage efforts. The first section recounts the early plans 
to rehabilitate disability beneficiaries. The second section chronicles 
the arrival of the BRP program, describes its operation, and cites some 
of the reasons for its demise. The results of the revised "retrospective" 
payment schema are examined in the third section.
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The Linkage in the Planning Stage, 1935-1956
The idea of building a link between disability insurance and voca 
tional rehabilitation preceded the formal establishment of DI in 1956. 
Indeed, during the period between 1935 and 1956, SSA planners 
experimented with different ways to match applicants for disability 
benefits with rehabilitation services. Their counterparts in the Office of 
Vocational Rehabilitation developed techniques for rehabilitating peo 
ple on the public assistance caseload. In this same period, advocates of 
both programs engaged in complex political negotiations that left a 
permanent mark on the nation's response to disability.
Social Security administrators included provisions for rehabilitation 
services in their earliest blueprints for a disability insurance program. 
Late in 1938, for example, I.S. Falk, the director of research and statis 
tics for the Social Security Board, noted that a program of social insur 
ance against disability should include occupational retraining for 
persons with chronic impairments and cited vocational rehabilitation 
as an example of a program that provided such services (Falk 1938, pp. 
9-10).
Vocational rehabilitation had existed since 1920 as a modestly 
funded federal grant-in-aid program that, in a typical year during the 
1930s, placed fewer than 40,000 people with disabilities in the labor 
market. The program, run differently in each of the states, relied 
heavily on the counseling of people with disabilities. In addition, the 
program had the authority to purchase a wide array of services, such as 
training courses, that might help persons overcome their handicaps and 
enter the labor market (MacDonald 1944).
The Social Security Board planners proceeded to fit rehabilitation 
into their designs. When individuals' disability claims were being vali 
dated, their suitability for rehabilitation could also be tested. The initial 
estimates called for 10,000 referrals in 1940 and 25,000 referrals in 
1945, indicating the modest expectations that officials had of the voca 
tional rehabilitation program (Falk 1938, pp. 19, 29). In 1940, how 
ever, the Board expanded the estimates and refined the rehabilitation 
part of the program. Draft legislation for permanent disability insur 
ance included a $400,000 appropriation for the Board to administer a 
program of "medical, surgical, rehabilitation, and other services to dis-
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ability beneficiaries"; in the future, the appropriation was not to exceed 
2 percent of estimated expenditures for disability insurance. "Rehabili 
tation," Board officials claimed in one internal planning document, "is 
in the interest not only of the worker but also of the insurance system" 
(Social Security Board 1940).
The 1940s proved to be inauspicious for the passage of a disability 
insurance program, and, for the moment, the idea of a VR-DI linkage 
faded. During this decade, Congress repeatedly rejected proposals to 
expand Social Security by initiating health and disability insurance. 
Congress paid far more attention to old age assistance than to old age 
insurance, and the number of people on welfare exceeded the number 
of people on Social Security (Achenbaum 1986). The vocational reha 
bilitation program also seemed to be at a low ebb. The pioneering gen 
eration that had launched the program in the 1920s was retiring, and, in 
its place, came a series of uninspired administrators who failed to make 
a strong case for the plan in Congress. Although the program benefited 
from the strong wartime economy, in which it was easy to achieve 
mass rehabilitations simply by assembling a group of people with dis 
abilities and matching them with employers eager for workers, voca 
tional rehabilitation faltered after the war. In 1944, the program 
rehabilitated 44,000 people, and in 1946, only 36,106 (E. Berkowitz 
1988, pp. 17-18).
With the revival of both programs in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the idea of a linkage between the two once again gained currency. In 
May of 1948, an advisory council submitted a report to Congress that, 
for the first time, endorsed the establishment of a disability insurance 
program. After President Truman's surprising victory in the 1948 elec 
tions, Congress gave serious consideration to creating such a program. 
In so doing, Congress confronted the question of the relationship 
between DI and VR. In planning documents, SSA officials noted that 
encouraging rehabilitation was "almost as important as the payment of 
cash benefits."
To provide such encouragement, draft legislation in 1949 included a 
provision that authorized the Federal Security Administrator (the fore 
runner of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser 
vices to use money from the disability insurance trust fund to furnish 
rehabilitation services. If individuals should refuse rehabilitation ser 
vices, they would lose their cash benefits. According to the SSA's
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plans, the two agencies would share medical information and expertise. 
Improvements would accrue to both programs. By rehabilitating bene 
ficiaries, the Social Security program would save money; by receiving 
increased federal funds from the disability insurance trust fund, VR 
would be able to take on the tough cases that met the demanding Social 
Security standards for permanent and total disability (U.S. Congress 
1949).
Although the House of Representatives passed a disability insurance 
program in 1949, the measure ran into serious opposition in the Senate 
and died in 1950. Even before the House passed the measure, however, 
it deleted the section that allowed the Federal Security Administrator to 
purchase rehabilitation services for the severely disabled. Wilbur 
Cohen, at the time the Social Security program's chief congressional 
liaison, later noted that Representative Robert Doughton, the chairman 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, could not reconcile a pro 
gram designed to aid permanently disabled people with a rehabilitation 
program. Congressman Doughton told Cohen that his agency would 
have to choose between one or the other. Arthur Altmeyer, Cohen's 
boss, chose permanent disability insurance over rehabilitation (E. 
Berkowitz, forthcoming). Members of the Senate made the opposite 
choice. Rehabilitation, according to the Senate Committee on Finance, 
held "at least equal significance as providing income for disabled peo 
ple" (U.S. Congress 1974, p. 109).
While Congress did not pass permanent disability insurance in 
1950, it did create a compromise measure in the form of a new public 
assistance category for the permanently and totally disabled. This cate 
gory eventually became the most important component of Supplemen 
tal Security Income (SSI). Mary Switzer, a seasoned bureaucrat 
appointed to head the vocational rehabilitation program in 1950, chose 
to make the rehabilitation of public assistance recipients, particularly 
those on Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), a prior 
ity of her agency. She wanted to revive the program, and she seized on 
the nation's concern over growing welfare costs. Using rhetoric that 
had guided the program almost from its beginnings, Switzer noted the 
need to substitute the positive ideal of rehabilitation for the negative 
type of social welfare represented by public assistance. She reminded 
rehabilitation workers that the Bureau of Public Assistance recom 
mended that states use a team approach to disability determination and
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suggested that a vocational rehabilitation caseworker be placed on the 
team. In this way, the two programs could share clients. To facilitate 
this sort of dynamic interaction, Congress had left room in the new 
public assistance category to admit clients who were not quite perma 
nently disabled and who could benefit from rehabilitation (Dabelstein 
1951).
With Mary Switzer's active intervention, the rehabilitation program 
responded to this opportunity. Between October 1950 and December 
1952, the number of APTD recipients grew from 58,000 to 222,000. In 
this same period, the percentage of those on public assistance (prima 
rily APTD) at the time of acceptance for VR service provision among 
those rehabilitated increased from about 9.8 to 12.5. The increase 
meant that in 1952, the vocational rehabilitation program successfully 
rehabilitated 7,800 individuals who had previously been on public 
assistance (U.S. Congress 1952). This provided the nation's first bit of 
hard evidence that a link could be forged between rehabilitation and 
income maintenance programs for people with disabilities.
It was a natural extension to forge a linkage between VR and Old- 
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneficiaries who became dis 
abled. On October 23, 1953, Secretary Oveta Culp Hobby of the newly 
created Department of Health, Education, and Welfare suggested to the 
president that the "OASI system be permitted to underwrite the cost of 
providing rehabilitation services, through the Vocational Rehabilitation 
agencies of the States, to insured persons who become disabled." She 
argued that this provision would cost only a modest amount "but no 
accountant can estimate the physical rewards, the sense of indepen 
dence, pride and usefulness and the relief from family strains, which 
accrue to one of the disabled when he returns to his old job" (Hobby 
1953). Despite this eloquent plea, probably drafted by Mary Switzer, 
the Eisenhower administration decided against the use of trust funds 
for rehabilitation.
Congress finally passed disability insurance in 1956. Despite deter 
mined SSA opposition, Mary Switzer continued to insist that there be a 
link between vocational rehabilitation and disability insurance. She 
never realized her vision. The rehabilitation agencies, in the absence of 
increased funds for this purpose, lacked the time to see all or even most 
of the applicants for disability insurance. Between 1957 and 1960, all 
of these applicants were 50 years or older and nearly all had dropped
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out of the labor force. Such people made very poor candidates for reha 
bilitation. The state VR agencies, concerned that their program statis 
tics demonstrate a high success rate, sought a means of screening out 
disability insurance applicants. In concert with the SSA, they worked 
out a procedure in which they would not interview people who were 
over the age of 55, bedridden, institutionalized, mentally ill with nega 
tive prognosis, or who had impairments that were worsening (E. 
Berkowitz 1987, p. 161).
Arrival of the Beneficiary Rehabilitation Program
Not surprisingly, few disability applicants, perhaps one thousand out 
of 1.5 million, were rehabilitated between 1956 and 1959. These early 
years set the pattern for the program, even after the elimination of the 
age 50 restriction in 1960. In fiscal year 1963, the vocational rehabili 
tation program interviewed 456,000 DI applicants for possible rehabil 
itation. Only 48,800 were accepted. That same year, the vocational 
rehabilitation agencies terminated 10,200 cases referred from the 
Social Security program, of which they managed to rehabilitate suc 
cessfully only 5,600 (E. Berkowitz 1987, pp. 161-162).
Between 1955 and 1965, more than 2 million severely disabled per 
sons received DI benefits, and only about 19,000 were rehabilitated by 
the state vocational rehabilitation agencies. Less than 2 percent of the 
successful rehabilitations in the federal-state program were beneficia 
ries of the DI program at the time of acceptance for VR services (M. 
Berkowitz et al. 1982, p. 4). In other words, the rehabilitation program 
did less well with the DI program than it had done with APTD referrals 
a few years earlier.
The failure to establish an effective link could, at least in theory, be 
attributed to a lack of a specific appropriation for this purpose. 
Although the SSA recommended that trust fund money be used for 
rehabilitation, Mary Switzer resisted the suggestion. She wanted 
increased funds for her program that she could control. She realized 
that, if the SSA used trust fund money to finance rehabilitation, it 
would insist on close supervision of the process and might ultimately
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absorb her agency. In 1965, the SSA managed to overcome her objec 
tions, and Congress approved the BRP.
This breakthrough occurred in 1965 due to a change in the definition 
of disability in the Social Security program. After 1965, a disability no 
longer needed to be of "long-continued and indefinite duration" to 
qualify an applicant for benefits; the disability could instead be 
expected to end in death or to last for 12 months. This change some 
what softened the definition and allowed for a greater possibility that a 
disability applicant might be accepted for benefits but within a few 
months become a candidate for rehabilitation.
Beyond this obvious motivation, the BRP stemmed from optimism 
that an investment of trust fund monies in the rehabilitation process 
would result in savings for the program. Social Security was extremely 
popular, as the passage of Medicare in the same legislation as the BRP 
indicated. Indeed, despite the momentous changes in the disability pro 
gram in 1965, disability was an incidental concern in the legislation; 
Congress devoted nearly all of its attention to Medicare. Vocational 
rehabilitation also retained its popularity from the previous decade, as 
demonstrated by the fact that in the early 1960s the program obtained 
increased responsibilities to serve new populations, such as the men 
tally retarded. Further, Mary Switzer, as part of a major departmental 
reorganization in 1963, acquired new prestige within the federal 
bureaucracy. She worried less that Social Security would somehow 
absorb her agency.
She need not have worried; the terms of the BRP were in fact quite 
generous. For one thing, the BRP provided money to VR on more 
favorable terms than those on the contributions the program usually 
received from the federal government. Most of the federal funds that 
the VR program obtained required at least some state matching. For 
every $10 the federal government contributed, the states contributed 
about $4. Money from the BRP, in contrast, came entirely from the fed 
eral government, with no need for any sort of state matching. Further, 
the money was paid prospectively by means of a formula that matched 
allocations to the states with the percentage of the total DI caseload liv 
ing in that state. The overall allocation was set at 1 percent of total dis 
ability insurance payments.
Understanding what happened to the BRP requires some general 
background. Table 1 provides an overview of the growth of the DI pro-
Table 1. DI Cash Benefits Paid, Total Beneficiaries, New Awards, and Terminations from DI Rolls, 
by Reason, 1969-1992
Fiscal 
year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
DI cash 
benefits 
($millions)
2,542
3,067
3,758
4,473
5,718
6,903
8,414
9,966
11,463
12,513
13,708
15,437
17,199
17,338
17,530
Total 
beneficiaries 
on DI rolls at 
start of year 
(000)
1,295.3
1,394.3
1,492.9
1,647.7
1,832.9
2,0166
2,236.9
2,488 8
26702
2,837 4
2,879 8
2,870 6
2,858.7
2,776 5
2,603 6
Total 
number of 
new awards 
during year 
(000)
NA
3504
4159
4554
4916
5360
5920
5515
568.9
4644
416.7
3966
3453
2985
311.5
New awards 
as a percent 
of total 
beneficiaries
NA
25.1
27.9
276
268
266
26.5
22.2
21.3
16.4
14.5
13.8
121
10.8
120
Number of 
terminations 
during year 
(000)
251.3
2604
2665
2617
3048
321.0
329.5
3515
3589
4136
4225
408.1
NA
NA
4536
Number of 
terminations 
due to 
death of 
beneficiary 
(000)
1088
1058
1099
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1403
1449
1419
1432
NA
NA
134.3
Number of
terminations 
for 
retirement 
of 
beneficiary 
(000)
93.5
102.9
1070
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1519
1927
205.3
199.7
NA
NA
193.7
Number of 
terminations Terminations Number of 
for other as a percent beneficiaries 
reasons3 of total terminated 
(000) beneficiaries from DI rolls
490
517
496
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
667
760
753
652
NA
NA
125.6
19.4
18.7
179
159
166
159
147
14.1
13.4
14.6
14.7
14.2
NA
NA
174
2,799
3,978
2,325
2,468
2,597
2,721
3,595
4,822
4,760
6,363
7,841
NA
NA
NA
NA
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
17,900
18.836
19,847
20,512
21,692
22,873
24,803
27,662
31,091
2,569 0
2,596 5
2,656.6
2,728 5
2,785 9
2,830 3
2,895 4
2,011.3
3,1949
357 1
377.4
4169
4158
409.5
425.6
4680
536.4
6366
139
145
15.7
152
147
150
162
17.8
199
3719
3400
NA
3315
346.3
3602
3278
3203
3459
133.9
1367
NA
1354
1513
1559
1380
1444
154.4
1858
186.2
NA
1854
181.5
193.5
1796
174.6
1803
523
17.0
NA
107
13.5
108
102
1.3
112
145
13.1
NA
121
124
12.7
113
106
10.8
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
SOURCE: McManus (1981), table 1, p 20; Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1993, table 6 F2, p. 279, and table 4 A 4, p. 164. 
NOTE NA indicates that data are not available.
a. These data do not include disabled beneficiaries whose monthly benefits have been suspended because of their ability to engage in SGA These persons 
continue to be eligible for Medicare for a three-year penod.
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grams and of DI terminations. One notes the steady growth in cash 
benefit payments (in nominal dollars) throughout the period. The num 
ber of persons on the DI rolls also rose from the inception of the BRP 
program reporting in 1969 through 1979. There was a decline through 
1984 and a subsequent rise through 1992. Two "flow" factors have con 
tributed to the recent growth in beneficiaries. One reflects an explosion 
(more than a 50% percent increase from 1988 through 1992) in new 
awards. The other centers on the fact that the number of terminations 
from the rolls has leveled off. As a percentage of total beneficiaries, the 
termination rate stands at an all-time low of about 11 percent.
From the beginning, the BRP contained a number of perverse incen 
tives. The greater the DI caseload, the more money was spent on the 
BRP program. The object of the BRP was at least in part to restrain the 
growth of the disability rolls, yet its fiscal health depended on the 
growth of those rolls. The better job that the BRP did, the less need 
there would be for its services and the less money that would be spent 
on it.
Not only did the BRP program grow as a result of the rise in the DI 
rolls, it increased through pressures generated by the political process. 
Like any federal grant program, the BRP became subject to appeals for 
its incremental expansion. In this manner, the proportion of DI pay 
ments devoted to the BRP increased to 1.25 percent in 1973 and to 1.50 
percent in 1974. Combined with the explosive growth in the DI case 
load and in program expenditures, the BRP grew into a significant sub 
sidy to the VR program. In 1972, for example, the allotment was $30.5 
million, and it rose to $102.6 million four years later. By 1976, BRP 
money accounted for 9.2 percent of VR expenditures (M. Berkowitz et 
al. 1982, p. 10).
Beyond these features that related to the financing formula, the BRP 
contained a vital flaw that inhibited its value as a link between the dis 
ability determination and vocational rehabilitation processes: the BRP 
program benefited only those who were already on the rolls. Recall 
that service provision for VR clients who were merely applicants for 
DI had to be partially funded, at least initially, from state coffers. VR 
services for DI beneficiaries were 100 percent federally financed. 
Because of this difference in the state matching requirements, it cost 
the program more to serve DI applicants before they entered the rolls 
than it did afterwards. Once on the rolls, however, a person made a
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very poor candidate for rehabilitation. It was an axiom of rehabilitation 
theory that the sooner the program intervened, the better would be the 
outcome. By using the BRP to serve only those on the rolls, policy 
makers lost the most significant part of the huge VR recruiting scheme 
envisioned in 1954.
The failure of the BRP to stem the rise in the DI rolls did not deter 
its expansion. Congress moved under the comfortable cover of prece 
dent to extend the BRP to SSI recipients, after the SSI program began 
in 1974. This move made sense since SSI and DI used the same dis 
ability definition and determination process.
It was much harder to rationalize the expenditure of funds for dis 
ability applicants rather than for disability beneficiaries. The BRP was 
created to save trust fund money, not to reform the nation's approach to 
disability. Congress therefore insisted that BRP money be spent only 
on clients of the Social Security disability programs. Other expansions 
of the rehabilitation process would have to be handled through the 
vocational rehabilitation program itself.
For these and other reasons, the BRP did not transform the relation 
ship between VR and DI. The numbers for 1978, are only a little more 
encouraging than in 1963. In fiscal year 1978, the state vocational 
rehabilitation agencies served 154,541 Social Security and federal wel 
fare beneficiaries. They rehabilitated 12,268 people at an average cost 
of $7,904 (see table 2). However, someone who was rehabilitated did 
not necessarily leave the rolls. States counted someone as rehabilitated 
who worked in suitable employment, paid or unpaid, for 60 days. 
Unpaid work would not count as "substantial gainful activity" under 
the rules developed by the Social Security programs and would not 
cause someone to leave either the SSI or DI rolls. If a person worked 
for 60 days at a well-paying job and then left the labor force, the indi 
vidual would also not have to leave the DI rolls. Hence, although more 
than 12 thousand people were rehabilitated in 1978, only 6,346 people 
were removed from the rolls, despite the fact that SSA reimbursements 
were nearly $97 million.
Such performance casts doubt on the entire exercise, and in time a 
pervasive critique of the BRP developed. The intellectual sources of 
this critique were varied. First, economists began to devote serious 
attention to the effect of disability benefits on labor force participation 
rates. This research and the very real fact of DI's growth caused policy-
Table 2. BRP Experience, 1967-1981: Expenditures by SSA, Rehabiliitations, Terminations, and 
Costs per Rehabilitation
Fiscal 
year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
SSA trust funds 
expended
$9,846,158
15,440,712
17,557,281
20,983,873
24,375,764
30,390,442
42,934,953
56,461,818
81,022,057
96,190,226
89,243,374
96,963,162
102,070,666
NA
85,771,908
Number of DI 
recipients 
rehabilitated 
under the BRP
1,815
5,934
8,036
9,307
9,799
9,983
11,580
13,358
12,585
12,826
11,760
12,268
13,302
NA
13,197
Number of 
beneficiaries in 
the BRP
NA
26,455
32,911
35,275
40,711
45,111
52,011
60,651
69,653
78,063
80,037
94,979
94,936
NA
NA
Number 
terminated from 
DI rolls
170
1,068
2,799
3,978
2,325
2,468
2,597
2,721
3,595
4,822
4,760
6,363
7,841
NA
NA
Percent 
terminated
9.4
18.0
34.8
42.7
23.7
24.7
22.4
20.4
28.6
37.6
40.5
51.9
58.9
NA
NA
Average cost per 
rehabilitation
$5,425
2,602
2,185
2,255
2,488
3,044
3,708
4,227
6,438
7,500
7,589
7,904
7,673
NA
6,499
SOURCE McManus(1981)
NOTE: NA indicates that data are not available.
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 235
makers to explore means of limiting disability expenditures. Second, a 
series of cost-benefit studies, launched by independent investigators in 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and in universities, brought into 
question the efficacy of the BRP. This development occurred simulta 
neously with a critical reevaluation of the VR program itself. The reap 
praisal took the form of cost-benefit studies and of criticisms that the 
program did not serve the population of severely disabled individuals 
who, arguably, needed its services the most.
On May 13, 1976, the GAO released a study of the BRP that found a 
benefit-cost ratio of only 1.15. By way of contrast, an earlier analysis 
done by SSA's Office of the Actuary showed a benefit-cost ratio of 
2.50. A subsequent report by SSA calculated a range of $1.39 to $2.49 
returned for each dollar invested in the BRP (M. Berkowitz et al. 1982, 
p. 17).
The 1976 GAO study examined 350 DI beneficiaries who had been 
reported as rehabilitated through public sector VR and whose DI bene 
fits were subsequently terminated. The research found that most of the 
terminations, perhaps five out of eight, were not due to VR services. In 
slightly more than half (51 percent) of the cases, the individual's DI ben 
efits were stopped because of medical recovery, not VR's intervention. 
Indeed, SSA officials maintained that these individuals did not meet the 
BRP selection criteria and should not have been accepted as BRP can 
didates in the first place. Another 11 percent of the people in the GAO 
sample returned to work through their own efforts and had received no 
VR services. In fact, several of these cases had been discontinued from 
the DI rolls prior to acceptance for services by a state VR agency.
The GAO study also focused on the discrepancy between the rela 
tively large number of rehabilitations claimed by the state VR agencies 
and the relatively small number of DI beneficiaries who left the rolls. 
Beginning in 1967, the number of successful rehabilitations in the BRP 
grew steadily. Table 2 shows that rehabilitations increased more than 
sixfold between 1967 and 1973, to reach 11,580. Yet, over the same 
period, the number of beneficiaries removed from the rolls stabilized at 
roughly 2,500 in 1973, after peaking at 3,978 in 1970.
The GAO attributed this divergence to the misinterpretation of BRP 
program eligibility criteria by state VR agencies. Instead of striving for 
benefit terminations, the state agencies were using the less restrictive 
"rehabilitation" mandate of the basic VR program. Some 40 percent of
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a sample of 400 randomly selected DI beneficiaries classified as reha 
bilitated were placed in noncompetitive employment such as home- 
maker, sheltered work, or unpaid family member. Another one of six 
cases in this sample had worked at competitive employment for 60 
days (i.e., with successful rehabilitation as a Status 26 closure) but had 
not been terminated from the DI rolls because the individual was not 
able to continue working.
Ironically, as the GAO and Rutgers studies were released, there was 
a dramatic increase in the number and percentage of BRP candidates 
terminated from the DI rolls. The fourth through sixth data columns of 
table 2 demonstrate this trend. From a low of 2,325 cases in 1971, DI 
terminations through the BRP more than doubled (to 4,822) by 1976. 
By the end of the decade, terminations had more than tripled (to 7,841) 
the 1971 figure. The number of persons rehabilitated under the BRP 
increased by a much smaller percentage, from 9,799 to only 13,302 
over the same period. Thus, in the first half of the decade, one out of 
four or five rehabilitants was terminated from the DI rolls, but by the 
end of the decade the ratio exceeded one-half.
Despite this irony, the general impact of the GAO and other studies 
was to dispute the effectiveness of the BRP. The tradition in the VR 
program had been to portray returns on investments on the order of 10 
to 1. Mary Switzer had long argued that for every dollar of tax money 
spent on vocational rehabilitation, the program returned 10 dollars in 
tax payments by the rehabilitants. The analysis of the BRP showed 
nothing like that. In a climate in which disability insurance was viewed 
as an uncontrollable entitlement program, the BRP came to be seen as 
a source of expenditures, rather than of revenues.
In the critical atmosphere of the late 1970s, pressures grew to 
reform the BRP program. Staff members on the Social Security Sub 
committee of the House Committee on Ways and Means sought to 
make the BRP an accountable program of unambiguous benefit to the 
DI trust fund instead of a general subsidy to the VR program. To 
accomplish this result, they proposed to substitute retrospective for 
prospective payment and to reimburse the states only for successfully 
removing someone from the DI rolls. After lengthy consideration, 
Congress took this step in 1981, the same year in which the Reagan 
administration launched an ambitious campaign to remove from the 
rolls those people thought to have medically recovered. Under the new
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arrangements, VR agencies received subsidies only for people who, as 
a result of VR services, engaged in substantial gainful activity for nine 
continuous months. Unlike the rest of the Social Security program, DI 
was regarded by the Reagan administration as a source of current sav 
ings. Cutting the costs of the BRP would add to those savings.
The Post-BRP Experience of Retrospective Service Payments
The new program differed radically from the old. In 1981, as table 2 
reveals, SSA reimbursements to VR totaled about $86 million. In the 
next year, the reimbursements fell to about $3 million. In effect, the 
reform of the BRP wiped out the SSA subsidy to vocational rehabilita 
tion. Over the course of the decade, as the states adjusted to the situa 
tion, the BRP enjoyed a recovery, although the subsidy never returned 
to the level of the 1970s. In part, the tremendous resurgence of the DI 
and SSI rolls in the late 1980s accounted for this trend as did the fact 
that the states learned how to submit claims to SSA so that more of 
them would be accepted.
The experience of the post-BRP era is presented in table 3. In the 
first part of the 1980s, state VR agencies attempted to adapt to the new 
retrospective payment regime stipulated by SSA (GAO 1987, p. 14). 
Still, in 1985, VR agencies submitted fewer than 5,000 claims for reim 
bursement by SSA for rehabilitation services for DI beneficiaries. SSA 
allowed a little more than half of these claims (2,645/4,912, or 55.2 
percent) for a total reimbursement of slightly less than $10 million. 
During the 1990s, the annual number of claims submitted by state VR 
agencies has increased to more than 10,000. The approval rates in the 
1990s have ranged from 57.3 percent to 71.7 percent. That means that 
SSA has allowed an average of some 6,450 claims on an annualized 
basis, at an average cost of roughly $10,000 per approved claim.
A comparison of tables 2 and 3 reveals three unequivocal impacts of 
the BRP reforms. First, SSA's aggregate reimbursement has fallen con 
siderably to state VR agencies for DI beneficiaries receiving rehabilita 
tion services. The nominal expenditures in the 1990s represent less than 
two-thirds of the amounts in the latter part of the 1970s. In real terms 
(1987 dollars), the 1992 total outlay was only one-third of the 1979 
level.
Table 3. Post-BRP Experience: Expenditures by SSA, VR Claims, Allowances, and Average Costs per Allowance
Fiscal 
year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
SSA trust funds VR claims received 
expended by SSA
$ 216,000
4,094,000
9,850,000
20,195,374
28,087,992
36,456,373
48,740,569
60,245,993
66,593,433
63,692,775
64,467,533
3,626
7,739
4,912
6,649
8,092
11,032
11,267
10,222
12,300
10,567
10,744
VR claims 
processed
1,813
4,990
5,019
6,482
7,414
9,361
9,762
12,539
11,004
11,510
10,818
Number of VR 
claims allowed
110
2,202
2,645
3,693
4,469
5,092
5,828
7,330
6,032
6,269
6,155
Percent of 
processed VR 
claims allowed
3.0
28.5
53.8
55.5
55.2
46.2
51.7
71.7
49.0
59.3
57.3
Average cost per 
allowed VR claim
$1,964
1,859
3,724
5,469
6,285
7,160
8,363
8,219
9,382
10,160
10,474
SOURCE "SSA Reimbursement Program. Making Rehabilitation and Employment Services Available to Disability Beneficiaries," Social Secunty 
Administration, 1994
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 239
Second, this reduction does not necessarily imply fewer VR services 
per eligible DI beneficiary. Rather, SSA has reduced the number of 
rehabilitations that it reimburses. The number of claims allowed annu 
ally in 1991 through 1993 was less than half the number that SSA 
reimbursed through the BRP in the latter part of the 1970s.
Third, the number of rehabilitations submitted for reimbursement by 
state VR agencies in the retrospective payment era has dropped from 
the totals in the BRP period. Clearly, the reform of the prospective pay 
ment scheme has caused state VR agencies to be more circumspect in 
choosing claims for reimbursement. Specifically, the number of claims 
submitted in the period from 1988 through 1993 averaged some 11,000 
cases annually. For the comparable six-year period of 1974 through 
1979, the average annual number of rehabilitations exceeded 12,500 
cases. Over the two periods, a one-eighth reduction in the number of 
claims submitted for reimbursement has occurred.
What do these trends imply for the state VR agencies? Somewhat 
fewer claims submitted and dramatically fewer claims allowed for 
reimbursement suggest that the state agency must fund the denied 
claims from the basic VR program. As table 3 shows, SSA annually 
denies some 4,000-6,000 claims for reimbursement. In fiscal year 
1993, SSA denied most of the cases (2,546 of 4,567 or 55.7 percent of 
all denials) because the rehabilitant had not demonstrated the sustained 
capacity to work or had accumulated earnings below the level defined 
as substantial gainful activity (National VR Denial Report 1993). 
These denials highlight the distinction between a VR successful reha 
bilitation and an SSA reimbursement.
Because it so much harder to rehabilitate DI cases, VR counselors 
tend to shy away from them. The SSA population is older and more 
severely disabled than the rest of the VR caseload (GAO 1987). 
Because not all DI beneficiaries get rehabilitated and even fewer meet 
the SSA's stringent requirements for reimbursement, DI beneficiaries 
compete with other rehabilitation clients in the basic state VR pro 
grams. In such a competition, DI beneficiaries most often lose.
Unfortunately, little data exist to permit a comparison of the post- 
1981 reforms with the BRP era of 1967-1981. Here one must delve 
into the problems of data reporting. SSA measured success in the BRP 
by the number of terminations from the DI rolls, but these data have 
not been published for the 1981-1991 period. The number of allow 
ances by SSA for reimbursement is not an adequate proxy.
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A second shortcoming in reporting also makes comparisons diffi 
cult. The average service cost figure reported in table 2 is provided on a 
per-rehabilitant basis. In table 3, the cost figure is on a per-allowed- 
claim basis. Ideally, the cost reporting should be across comparable 
cohorts. Without tabulating such figures on an individual claimant 
basis, cross-period cost comparisons lack validity.
One last data issue complicates comparison across the two periods. 
Changes in the standard Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) 
closure report form in 1985 (from the RSA300 to the RSA911) have 
eliminated most of the extensive information about a client's DI status 
while in the VR system. For example, on the R300 report, VR clients 
were asked about their DI status (beneficiary, denied, pending, not an 
applicant, unknown) at both application and closure from the program. 
The RSA911 form only requires that a client report whether he or she 
was receiving DI (a yes/no binary) upon termination from the program.
Conclusion
The bulk of the empirical evidence reinforces the maxim that, once 
on the rolls, people tend to stay on them. The GAO has stated flatly that 
"Rehabilitation contributes little to terminations" (GAO 1994, p. 19). 
The link between VR and DI continues to resemble a long funnel into 
which the Disability Determination Services pour cases, to have only a 
few trickle out the other end. The disparities between the ends of the 
funnel are staggering. The Disability Determination Services made 
over a million favorable decisions in fiscal year 1993 and recorded 
6,154 successful rehabilitations. The revamped BRP undoubtedly 
saved the SSA money, an estimated $321.9 million in fiscal year 1993, 
but this was nearly irrelevant to either the DI or SSI programs ("Devel 
oping a World-Class Employment Strategy" 1994, charts 10 and 11).
This raises the more fundamental question of where the relationship 
between rehabilitation and Social Security went wrong. To be sure, it 
did not help that bureaucratic rivalry inhibited cooperation in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but the problems were more fundamental. Social Security 
advocates pressed for a disability program that they regarded as an 
extension of the old-age retirement system; disability to them was a
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cause for early retirement. Vocational rehabilitation advocates cam 
paigned for an extension of the basic counseling and service program; 
disability to them was a source of adjustment in one's labor force status 
that, with the right sort of intervention, could be remedied. To a large 
extent, the two programs worked with completely different target pop 
ulations. Efforts to force the DI and, later, the SSI population onto the 
VR program largely failed.
Furthermore, most of the history recorded here occurred without 
recourse to serious analysis. Congress simply mandated a relationship 
between vocational rehabilitation and the disability programs without 
investigating the feasibility of maintaining such a bond. The efforts at 
analysis of the BRP had ambiguous findings and hence were not of 
much use to policy makers. Over time, however, the cost-benefit analy 
ses of both the BRP and vocational rehabilitation did add to the policy 
environment and provided at least one reason for altering the BRP.
There is also a greater irony. While the conventional wisdom now 
holds that linkages between VR and DI are destined to end in failure, 
many claim to favor labor force participation over retirement benefits 
as a response to disability. Fiscal conservatives, who currently occupy 
a wide range of the political spectrum, are joined by members of the 
disability rights movement in this sentiment. If we wish to achieve 
their objective, the only avenue appears to be fundamental reform of 
the system, with the attendant high political costs and possibilities for 
unintended, damaging effects. To put it plainly, the present system of 
providing DI benefits does not allow beneficiaries to return to work, 
even though policy makers continue to advocate return to work as a 
policy goal. At the same time politicians do not appear to have the 
stomach for changing the system. Almost invariably, reform centers on 
tightening eligibility rules, not on rehabilitating people with disabili 
ties.
Although the potential remains to make the disability determination 
process a recruiting station for rehabilitation, the promise of such an 
approach has never been realized. Despite an initial success with wel 
fare beneficiaries in the early 1950s, the link between rehabilitation 
and income maintenance has never been forged. Historical circum 
stance and political maneuvering account for the current situation as 
much as anything else.
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The Problem
The human and social costs of disability are well known, and 
increases in the number of beneficiaries and in expenditures are both 
causes of concern. The real economic cost of disability, namely, the 
lost production from individuals not at work, has been growing rapidly 
in recent years. Nominal, or budget, outlays have also been increasing 
as private and public payments for disability benefits have soared in the 
last 20 years. Using a nonrandom sample, a recent study estimated that 
employers were paying 8 percent of payroll for disability-related 
expenses, including both direct and indirect costs of disability (Che- 
lius, Galvin, and Owens 1992).
At the same time, a very specific issue has arisen in the Social Secu 
rity Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
programs. The return-to-work rate has declined precipitously since the 
1970s. According to the Disability Policy Panel of the National Acad 
emy of Social Insurance:
The proportion of beneficiaries who leave the disabled-worker 
benefit rolls because of recovery has never been large. During the 
1970s, it generally ranged between 1.5 and 2.5 percent of the ben 
efit rolls. Terminations due to recovery peaked in the early 1980s, 
when SSA pursued an aggressive policy of reviewing the rolls and 
terminating benefits. In the 1990s, terminations for recovery are at
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an all time low, in 1991-1993 they are below 0.5 percent (National 
Academy of Social Insurance 1994, p. 82).
We take this "recovery" or return-to-work issue as the impetus for 
our paper. 1 Are private sector actors more successful in returning per 
sons with disabilities to work? How do they do it? Are there lessons 
that can be learned about return to work from the private sector that 
could be transferred to public sector programs? What problems would 
have to be overcome to translate private solutions to the public sector?
Equity and efficiency considerations are key in evaluating policy. 
Economic efficiency requires that we obtain the maximum amount of 
goods, services, and leisure time from the human and other resources 
in society. Thus, any human resource that is unemployed or underem 
ployed reduces the total production available for all to consume and 
thereby decreases the economic well-being of all citizens. Economic 
equity is harder to define, but ultimately it deals with the distribution of 
those goods, services, and leisure time that a society can produce. 
Some use a standard of equity that specifies "to each according to his 
or her contributions"; others prefer "to each according to his or her 
needs." In either event, the issue is who gets to consume what share of 
total production (Okun 1975).
There is also another sense of equity, and that is the equity of partic 
ipation. For the last three decades or more, we as a society, have been 
concerned about the full and equal participation of racial minorities, 
females, older Americans, and persons with disabilities in the eco 
nomic life of the country. We have enacted statutes attempting to pro- 
mote the opportunity for such participation by outlawing 
discrimination against these groups. In some cases, we have even 
required "affirmative action" to try and involve disadvantaged groups, 
especially where their participation has been prevented or hindered by 
past discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) seeks to remove barriers to employment for persons with func 
tional limitations by requiring employers to reasonably accommodate 
these individuals' disabilities. The clear goal of ADA is to facilitate the 
greater participation of persons with disabilities in the world of work 
by removing the environmental and societal barriers to participation 
and integration.
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However, if individuals are being encouraged to "maximize" their 
lability rather than their ability in order to receive cash or in-kind 
benefits, we will have a loss of both efficiency and equity. We will lose 
efficiency in the sense that society will produce less than it could if all 
resources were fully employed. We will lose equity if some individuals 
are not participating, thereby not contributing their share to producing 
the goods, services, and leisure time that we are all consuming. In this 
sense, equity and efficiency both mandate the optimum participation of 
persons with disabilities in economic life.
Refraining the Return-to-work Issue
Traditional Approach
Before the disability management movement, attention to return-to- 
work or stay-at-work goals for people with functional impairments was 
rare in the private as well as in the public sector. A medical model of 
treatment and recovery was dominant, with the emphasis on benefit 
administration, not return to work. That is, the process moved in a lin 
ear sequence from diagnosis of impairment to independent provision 
of medical treatment, passive recovery at home, and claim monitoring 
at eligibility points by the carrier. Only when it became clear that the 
injured employee was failing to return to work was recourse to the 
vocational rehabilitation system considered.
Over the past decade, there has been growing disenchantment with 
the medical or clinical model of disability and with the outcomes of the 
traditional approach to vocational rehabilitation. Meanwhile, an eco 
logical model of disability has gained acceptance. That is, a given indi- 
vidual with an impairment functions in interaction with an 
environment that has certain attitudinal, physical, economic, and policy 
characteristics, which, in large part, determine whether the conse 
quences of an impairment will result in a work disability. Increasingly, 
disability has become recognized as an interactive phenomenon, not 
simply deriving from the medical or even the functional aspects of the 
impairing condition (Berkowitz 1985).
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From a public policy perspective, this changing viewpoint has led to 
additions to the state-federal program of vocational rehabilitation, with 
the inclusion of such approaches as independent living services and 
supported employment. We have also seen the de-emphasis of the clin 
ical model of vocational rehabilitation services in the 1992 amend 
ments to the Rehabilitation Act (which governs the federal-state 
vocational rehabilitation system), particularly in regard to determina 
tion of eligibility. More fundamentally, the ecological or sociopolitical 
view of disability fueled the development and adoption of the ADA, 
explicitly changing the focus to the capabilities of persons with disabil 
ities and requiring the larger environment to provide reasonable 
accommodation to allow for the participation of this "minority" group 
of citizens.
Further, subsequent evaluations of the modest employment out 
comes achieved by the state-federal system (General Accounting 
Office [GAO] 1993) have recently motivated the Council of State 
Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation (CSAVR 1993) to launch 
an initiative that calls for significant linkage with the employer com 
munity, including disability management efforts, and emphasizes 
employment as the desirable outcome. In summary, the service model 
that ignores the labor market until the end of a lengthy process has 
been identified by virtually all constituents as a flawed approach to 
employment for people with disabilities (CSAVR 1993; Stubbins 1982; 
Vandergoot 1994; GAO 1993).
The Disability Management Approach
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a confluence of economic 
and policy factors led to heightened awareness of disability costs in the 
business community. Reduced profitability in the face of rapidly esca 
lating health care and disability benefit costs led to an examination of 
workers' compensation and other disability programs as significant 
management concerns. No longer could these issues be ignored as sim 
ply a cost of doing business.
Simultaneously, many leading companies, as part of their human 
resource commitment, became actively involved in national and inter 
national efforts to promote the employment and full participation of 
people with disabilities. The Independent Living movement led to
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increased leadership and expectations of the disability community in 
policy efforts. The field of vocational rehabilitation discovered 
employers as necessary partners to achieving further goals. From many 
directions, the economic and social forces converged to set the stage 
for the emergence of the disability management model. This history 
has been adequately summarized by other authors (e.g., Galvin 1986; 
Tate, Habeck, and Galvin 1986; Akabas, Gates, and Galvin 1992; 
Habeck et al. 1994).
In their comprehensive book on the subject, Akabas, Gates, and 
Galvin (1992) define disability management as
a workplace prevention and remediation strategy that seeks to pre 
vent disability from occurring or, lacking that, to intervene early 
following the onset of disability, using coordinated, cost-con 
scious, quality rehabilitation service that reflects an organizational 
commitment to continued employment of those experiencing 
functional work limitations. The remediation goal of disability 
management is successful job maintenance, or optimum timing for 
return-to-work... (p.2, emphasis added).
Disability management, effectively implemented, is intended to 
achieve a win-win situation that addresses the reciprocal economic and 
humanistic needs of the true stakeholders in disability management, 
namely, employers and employees. Common interests that can be 
achieved through an effective program include reducing the risks of 
injury and illness, retaining productivity, effectively using human 
resources and health care services, improving financial security, avoid 
ing adversarial relationships, and achieving the requirements of dis 
ability legislation.
The interest of the business community in disability management 
has been astounding. Since early reports of significant cost savings 
began to circulate a decade ago, there has been an explosion of pro 
grams. Employers by the thousands have embraced disability manage 
ment techniques as a way to combat the upward spiraling of disability 
costs and, often, to demonstrate commitment to the well-being of their 
employees. Disability management conferences abound, and virtually 
every insurance carrier has developed a disability management product 
in response to this interest. In 1993, a survey of 1,050 companies 
revealed that more than 84 percent were actively attempting to control
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their workers' compensation costs through various disability manage 
ment techniques (Towers Perrin 1993).
During the last few years, a growing number of organizational case 
studies and empirical efforts have documented the dramatic cost reduc 
tions achieved in these initiatives. Every company is unique in the spe 
cific constellation of job risks, human resources, and business factors 
that must be taken into account in tailoring a disability management 
program to meet its needs. Nevertheless, the literature indicates several 
traits that successful disability management programs share. The 
essential components, adapted from reviews by Schwartz et al. (1989) 
and Habeck (1991), are as follows:
1. Company wide commitment to reduce disability costs and pro 
vide needed assistance to encourage return to work
2. Analysis and modification of related benefits and policies to 
support disability management objectives
3. Comprehensive assessment of corporate needs, experiences, 
and responses to injury and illness incidents
4. Organization of the disability management initiative across lev 
els and locations, with clearly assigned responsibilities and 
accountability among all necessary people and operating units
5. Creation of an integrated, usable, and effective information sys 
tem to document, analyze, manage, and evaluate relevant data 
about incidence, employees, costs, services, and impact
6. Educational efforts directed toward managers, supervisors, and 
line workers to create understanding and involvement in disabil 
ity management efforts
7. Active use of safety and prevention strategies to avoid disability 
occurrence
8. Early intervention and ongoing monitoring for health risks and 
disability cases
9. Contact with the injured/ill employee and the treating physician 
within 24 hours of impairment onset
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10. Facilitating early return to work of disabled workers through an 
organized process that provides modifications in assignments, 
hours, and/or duties
11. Systematic procedures for effective use of health care and reha 
bilitation services
12. Writing an individual plan of service and return to work by the 
responsible case manager with the participation of the 
employee
13. Using professional expertise to design accommodations that 
permit workers with disabilities to perform work in a satisfac 
tory manner
14. Collaboration with public and private agencies to provide nec 
essary mental health and rehabilitation services
15. Use of incentives in benefit design, cost accounting, and perfor 
mance evaluation to encourage participation of employees, 
supervisors, and managers
One can presume that, if there is this much interest by the private sec 
tor in a specific set of techniques, there must be a substantial payoff.
Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Disability Management
Although very limited research evidence is available to document 
and quantify the impacts of these practices, there are a few studies that 
provide clear support for the significant effect of the organization's 
behavior on the disability experience of the company and its employ 
ees. For example, Rousmaniere (1989) and his colleagues found the 
most important cause of variation in disability impact among 24 hospi 
tals in New England to be the hospital's internal system of risk man 
agement and post-injury response. Rousmaniere (1990) has further 
asserted that how a company responds to and manages injuries deter 
mines roughly 50 percent of the costs. Similarly, according to the 
National Rehabilitation Planners organization (1993), companies can 
reasonably expect to reduce workers' compensation costs by 25 to 30 
percent after the first year of implementing a disability management
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program, with nearly twice those savings realizable when long-term, 
inactive cases are more effectively resolved.
Lewin and Schecter surveyed 77 companies in 1989 and found that 
human resource policies were significantly related to disability inci 
dence. Use of employee involvement programs, conflict resolution pro 
cedures, workforce stabilization measures, and disability management 
policies were each inversely associated with levels of lost work days 
due to occupational and nonoccupational illnesses and injuries (Lewin 
and Schecter 1991).
Two recent studies of disability prevention and management in 
Michigan demonstrate the impact of employer practices on the fre 
quency of disability. The first study, based on a nonrandom survey of 
124 firms, explored the hypothesis that a significant portion of the vari 
ability between workers' compensation experience in different compa 
nies was due to internal actions that were within the employer's control 
(Habeck et al. 1991). The following findings and conclusions were 
reached:
1. Great variability, at least tenfold differences, could be found 
between the workers' compensation claim rates of the firms with 
the highest and lowest claims within each of 29 industries stud 
ied.
2. Only part (25 percent) of this variability in claim rate could be 
explained by industry, size, and location of the firms.
3. Firms with high claims incidence had twice as many injuries but 
had four times as many workers' compensation claims, support 
ing conjecture that there are two distinct processes involved in 
disability management. The first portion involves strategies that 
prevent potentially disabling incidents from occurring, and the 
second involves managing the incident after it occurs, with each 
process contributing substantially to eventual outcomes.
4. Organizational characteristics, such as unionization and tenure of 
the workforce, are also related to the claim rate.
5. Favorable claims experience (i.e., a low claim rate) is signifi 
cantly related to the managerial philosophy and the particular 
policies and practices adopted by the firm, including an open
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managerial style, a positive human resource orientation, more 
rigorous pursuit of safety and preventive interventions, and spe 
cific procedures to manage disabilities. In regard to the latter, 
firms that had lower claims rates reported significantly more fre 
quent use of employee assistance resources, light duty and modi 
fied work to help restricted individuals resume employment, and 
procedures to promote supervisors' efforts to assist in the return 
to work of injured employees in their departments.
The second study was conducted to quantify the impacts of specific 
workplace policies and practices on the incidence and outcomes of 
work-related disability within firms (Hunt et al. 1993). The impacts of 
disability prevention and management behaviors were estimated in a 
multivariate analysis that controlled for a wide range of organizational 
factors, using a random, cross-sectional survey of 220 firms in seven 
industries. The results demonstrate that companies engaging more fre 
quently in behaviors defined as "Safety Diligence" and "Proactive 
Return-to-Work" experienced significantly fewer cases with lost work 
days, fewer total lost workdays, and less frequent workers' compensa 
tion claims; in sum, they experienced less work-related disability.
Specifically, firms that reported 10 percent more frequent achieve 
ment of Safety Diligence (disability prevention) experienced 17 per 
cent fewer lost workdays per 100 employees. Safety Diligence is 
interpreted as the rigorous behaviors of companies that act on their 
stated safety goals and put their safety measures into continuous prac 
tice. These behaviors have been accepted by managers, supervisors, 
and employees as an integral part of their regular functions.
Firms that reported 10 percent more frequent achievement of Proac 
tive Return-to-work (disability management) experienced approxi 
mately 7 percent fewer lost workdays per 100 workers. Proactive 
Return-to-work is interpreted as supportive, company-based interven 
tions for personally assisting those involved in an injury or disability, 
from the beginning of the incident to its positive resolution. The 
actions and responsibilities of individuals within the company and 
external providers are spelled out and related to the ultimate goal of 
resumption of employment.
Further, these results appear to be enabled and perhaps multiplied by 
the managerial commitment and corporate culture of the organization.
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One observation is that firms that demonstrate their concern and com 
mitment for injured workers receive, in turn, greater trust and coopera 
tion from their employees. This is also manifest in the finding that 
"Disability Case Monitoring," defined as a reactive approach to cost 
containment and claims control, actually was associated with a greater 
incidence of lost workday cases (Hunt et al. 1993).
In addition to the survey, on-site plant visits were made to a subsam- 
ple of 32 firms in order to verify the quantitative findings and to gain 
operational understanding of the company behaviors that contributed 
to low disability rates. The initiatives of successful firms are summa 
rized as follows:
1. Extensive use of data to measure performance and identify prob 
lems
2. Analysis of problems to identify the root causes of injury and 
work disability and to target interventions accordingly
3. Receipt or development of the active support of top management 
for the goals, policies, and procedures undertaken
4. Education of labor to understand the relevance of safety and dis 
ability performance to the well-being of the company and to 
themselves
5. Immediate response to identified problems, which convinces 
labor and supervisors of the genuineness of management's con 
cern and determination
6. Realization that their actions and performance in safety are 
related to their disability performance and to workers' compen 
sation costs
7. Movement upstream in prevention through ergonomic initiatives 
in design
8. Development of effective working relationships with designated, 
knowledgeable, and responsive health care providers
9. Maintenance of an active role in case management, even when 
professional services are used, in order to keep the company in 
control of the process
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10. Implementation of the return-to-work process in a systematic 
way throughout the organization, yet tailoring the process to 
meet the needs of the individual situation and maintaining a tran 
sitional perspective in accommodations made
These findings support a causal connection between the disability pre 
vention and management policies and practices of a firm and disability 
performance results. The strategies of prevention and management 
have both been shown to be effective in reducing workplace disability 
in those firms that have implemented them rigorously. As expected, 
prevention strategies have a higher payoff, but management techniques 
have also been effective at reducing the total incidence and severity of 
work-related disability.
Case management is one of the techniques included under the 
broader disability management umbrella. One example of its applica 
tion to Social Security claimants will be reported. An experimental 
design was used to test an independent case manager model with per 
sons who had applied for Social Security disability benefits (Hester et 
al. 1990). Over 3,850 applicants were referred to the project. After rig 
orous screening for probable success, a final selection of 753 persons 
(20 percent) was made of those felt to be eligible for return to work.
These individuals were assigned to one of three groups. The first 
was an early referral group, comprised of individuals who were offered 
case management services to promote return to work within two weeks 
of their application for benefits. The second was a late referral group, 
in which participants were offered the same case management but not 
until after they had been approved for benefits. The third group was a 
control. Case management services included physician contact; an 
assessment of vocational skills, with a work evaluation if indicated; job 
development with former employers, if possible; referral to state voca 
tional rehabilitation agencies for skill training; and direct placement 
services. Among the relevant findings were the following:
•only 6 percent in the late referral group accepted services, as 
opposed to 22 percent in the early referral group;
• 46 percent of those who accepted services were employed at the 
end of the project, as opposed to 13 percent of those in the control 
group; and
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• 21 percent in the early referral group returned to work, as opposed 
to 3 percent in the late referral group.
These observations indicate that a case management approach using 
early intervention (even though six months or more after onset of dis 
ability) may be particularly useful before disability benefits are 
awarded for encouraging return to work for those still in the applicant 
stage. While these empirical research findings are very limited, they do 
strongly suggest that disability prevention and management techniques 
work for reducing the incidence and consequences of work-related 
injuries in the private sector. Some of the techniques may even work 
with DI claimants.
Private Sector Examples
In an attempt to determine how particular elements are implemented 
in private sector disability management programs, and how they might 
impact Social Security Administration (SSA) program concerns, we 
conducted a set of nine case studies. They were meant to represent a 
broad range of private sector experience, but not necessarily "best 
practice," since much more systematic survey work would be required 
to determine just what best practice really is. We talked with some self- 
insured employers from widely divergent sectors of the economy, 
insurance carriers with very different books of business, and varied 
types of service providers. Due to the limitations of space, just three of 
these examples are presented here: one self-insured employer, one 
insurance carrier, and one service provider. 2 A summary of the lessons 
learned is provided at the end of the section.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Owens-Corning Fiberglas is a global manufacturer of fiberglass 
products. The firm has 50 U.S. plants with about 12,000 employees.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
Owens-Corning characterizes its approach as an "aggressive stance" 
toward disability management and return to work. Owens-Corning has
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taken corporate responsibility for all of its claims, including work- 
related and nonwork-related disabilities. The company has brought the 
process in-house and no longer relies solely on third parties. This 
approach was adopted in response to significant rises in costs in all dis 
ability areas and to anticipated changes due to national health care 
reform. The goal is to reduce disability costs as a means of increasing 
company profit, but to do so in a way that is consistent with corporate 
principles of (1) customer satisfaction, (2) individual dignity, and (3) 
shareholder value.
Specific Interventions
The major features in the administration of the Owens-Corning 
approach include the following:
1. A site disability case manager is used to coordinate all activities 
and provide case management services;
2. Case management begins on day one of the occurrence;
3. Benefit checks are cut in-house to assure prompt payment;
4. Performance standards have been tightened for third-party 
administrators of the company's plans;
5. The company has changed vendors for its long-term disability 
insurance to one that has a progressive disability management 
philosophy and shares the firm's vision;
6. Corporate oversight is used to address responsibility for overall 
disability outcomes;
7. Human resource managers and supervisors at all plants were 
brought in for education regarding program goals and operation; 
and
8. Provisions for disability management and return to work have 
been incorporated into contract negotiations with the company's 
represented groups.
Expected Outcomes
Owens-Corning stipulated the outcomes that should be accom 
plished by the end of the first three years of the program, which was
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implemented in 1992. These outcomes included a 10 percent reduction 
in total disability costs, including indemnity benefits and medical 
costs; a 10 percent reduction in lost workdays; and a 10 percent 
increase in the use of modified, restricted workdays. In less than two 
years, each of these three goals had already been achieved. In 1992, the 
firm's disability cost total was estimated at $25 million; the current 
goal is to reduce these costs to $15 million by 1998 (a 40 percent 
reduction).
Relationship to the Social Security System
Owens-Corning sees Social Security as an added benefit. Owens- 
Corning recognizes that it cannot provide for all needs and that Social 
Security represents an important resource to the corporation. The firm 
provides assistance to its employees in applying for DI, including pro 
vision of information for the applicant to carry to the SSA if needed.
UNUM Insurance Company
UNUM Corporation is a specialty insurance holding company 
whose affiliates include UNUM Insurance Company of America, a 
leading provider of disability insurance and of employee benefits, 
long-term care, and retirement products.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
Disability management and return to work at UNUM are best pic 
tured as a continuum. The preferred disability management activity at 
the beginning of the continuum is disability prevention and stay at 
work. To that end, UNUM works with high-risk employers at an orga 
nizational level to identify trends in claim causes that suggest preven 
tion activity, such as job restructuring, ergonomic engineering, or 
training in how to work more safely. 3 The Long-term disability (LTD) 
product offers an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for help with 
personal issues that can contribute to disability.
Further along the continuum, if a person does have an impairment 
and a functional limitation that prevents work, early intervention is 
important. Under short-term disability (STD) policies, that can happen 
much sooner than in LTD where there is a 90-to-180 day waiting 
period. Where UNUM provides both STD and LTD, an STD objective
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is early intervention and management to prevent or minimize an LTD 
claim. UNUM also provides stay at work services for employees. Stay 
at work services include functional assessment of the person and the 
job, along with identifying and paying for job modifications within 
certain limits.
Specific Interventions
From the insurance carrier perspective, a plan design that sets wait 
ing periods and replacement rates that provide significant incentives to 
return to work is an important management tool. Collection of com 
plete impairment and work information is also key to making a fair 
decision regarding the person's functional ability in relationship to 
clearly stated job demands. These facts determine if the definition of 
disability is operable and if the individual is entitled to benefits.
For STD, the major tool is duration management according to 
guidelines that indicate how long individuals may not be able to per 
form the functions of their jobs or occupations, considering their age 
and impairment-related functional restrictions and limitations. Using 
these guidelines, expectations of recovery and return to work are set 
when the claim is approved, causing people to think of return to work 
from the beginning. For LTD, a case plan is set and return-to-work 
expectations are conveyed, but with less formal duration guides. For 
both STD and LTD, if expected recovery does not occur, claims man 
agers work with treating physicians to review the medical aspects of 
claims and the individual's job functions, in order to facilitate return to 
transitional or modified employment.
Specific management protocols are developed for the more prob 
lematic impairment categories such as psychiatric, cardiac, maternity 
(STD primarily), and chronic back pain cases with no objective medi 
cal findings. These protocols involve specific physician questionnaires 
and physical/functional evaluation. Regular follow-up is used to track 
progress and to communicate with employee, employer, and the treat 
ing physician in pursuit of the case plan.
UNUM has developed a copyrighted return-to-work prediction 
scale, which claims specialists use as a guide for identifying rehabilita 
tion candidates with return-to-work potential. For persons who have 
both STD and LTD eligibility, rehabilitation potential is assessed dur 
ing the STD claims management for those likely to go on to long-term
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disability. In some circumstances, case managers will use outside ven 
dors for rehabilitation services, where there is likelihood that such ser 
vices can return the claimant to work. A cost-benefit formula is applied 
based on the cost of the services, the cost of providing present and 
future benefits, and employer and employee motivation. For long-term 
disability, about 18-20 percent of new claimants are reviewed and 
accepted for rehabilitation.
Expected Outcomes
Success is measured by company profits as well as by customer 
(both employer and employee) satisfaction. Outcomes for long-term 
disability claimants are tracked based on the relationship between the 
cost of the intervention that UNUM will cover and the projected sav 
ings in future benefits that would have been paid if the person had con 
tinued on claim status (the industry calls this reserve release). By this 
calculation, there has been a return in the range of $5.00 to $7.00 for 
every $1.00 expended over the last three years. Outcomes are also mea 
sured in terms of client satisfaction and recoveries, and, of course, in 
increased sales and renewals of insurance policies.
Relationship to the Social Security System
There is a formal Social Security referral program in the LTD claim 
process. Social Security is a consideration in setting up a case plan for 
a claimant. However, return to work is the first goal, and Social Secu 
rity referrals are made based on the severity and duration of the impair 
ment and when other efforts to achieve return to work are not 
successful. UNUM's benefits are in addition to those of Social Security 
and the LTD insurance price reflects this potential offset.
United Health Care
United Health Care (UHC) is one of the largest health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) in the country, with over 2.7 million enrollees. 
UHC has purchased a workers' compensation preferred provider net 
work (FOCUS) to augment integrated disability management services, 
starting with the medical event. The organization's disability manage 
ment services are discussed from the perspective of a vendor that mar-
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kets integrated disability management to insurance companies and 
large employers.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
UHC provides a "managed care" approach, assisting clients in inte 
grating their occupational and nonoccupational medical and disability 
management programs. From the onset of a claim, employees and their 
families have a specific primary care nurse as their contact for health 
care education, utilization review, and disability management services. 
This nurse communicates with the attending physician, the employer, 
and the claims payor(s) to negotiate an effective treatment plan that 
includes early return to appropriate transitional/modified work as parl 
of the recovery process.
Specific Interventions
Depending on clients' utilization of services, key features could 
include the following:
• centralized disability application processing for STD/LTD claims;
•early intervention by a primary care nurse (or masters-prepared 
social worker), who contacts the employee, employer, and provider 
within two business days of notification;
• health care utilization management, including preferred providers 
and second opinion/independent medical examination services;
• telephonic return-to-work coordination with the employer, utiliz 
ing on-site resources as needed for job accommodation, ergonomic 
evaluation, etc.;
•comprehensive measurement and reporting to evaluate trends, 
demonstrate impact, and continuously improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the program;
•employer program development support to clarify internal roles 
and responsibilities, identify transitional work opportunities, and 
influence attitudes and cultural expectations within the organiza 
tion;
• rehabilitation vendor selection and management;
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• specialized injury prevention programs for cumulative repetitive 
trauma and back conditions;
• maternity education and high-risk pregnancy programs;
•chronic disease management programs based on client-specific 
trends.
Expected Outcomes
Outcome indicators include the average length of disability, total 
wage replacement benefits paid, and total medical costs by diagnosis/ 
procedure and by work location. In a voluntary referral program, a 
recent employer client report indicated that 67 percent of referred 
claims experienced an average 31 percent reduction in the total number 
of weeks of disability, as compared to the attending provider's initial 
plan. However, only a small percentage of the client's total claims were 
managed. In a mandatory referral program, 41 percent of claims were 
positively impacted with a 15 percent average reduction in the total 
weeks of disability. The program objective is a minimum five-to-one 
return on investment. While these results probably represent outstand 
ing examples, it seems clear that disability outcomes are amenable to 
influence.
Summary
Each of these examples illustrates different aspects of the disability 
management continuum. Owens-Corning takes a stance typical of pro 
gressive self-insured employers that are trying to manage their disabil 
ity costs aggressively. The company uses a case manager model with 
obvious corporate commitment to communicate among the players, 
solve problems, and coordinate services for a positive outcome. 
UNUM emphasizes prevention, early intervention, and incentives in 
addition to case management services for difficult categories of disabil 
ity. The insurer also makes an explicit judgment about the costs and 
benefits of intervening in specific cases in particular ways. United 
Health Care uses a traditional managed care model with a strong 
return-to-work focus. All seem to promise substantial returns in the 
form of lower costs of disability, either through reduced duration, 
lower incidence, and/or savings from better process management.
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Clearly, not all of the disability management tools developed in the 
private sector are completely relevant for the DI or SSI programs. For 
example, while prevention of disability is critically important in the 
private sector, it is hard to imagine how SSA could directly affect the 
incidence of disabling conditions. Early intervention has been shown 
to be crucial in private sector experience, and many believe the first 24 
hours is critical to the eventual outcome. However, with a five-month 
waiting period, it is difficult to see how SSA could achieve early inter 
vention in this same sense. Another consideration is that there is no pri 
vate parallel to SSA concerns about children with disabilities.
In addition, in a very real sense, SSA must deal with the failures of 
private sector disability management treatments, i.e., the cases of those 
people who still have not returned to work despite private efforts. So 
the scope for action at SSA may be very different than in the private 
sector. One obvious observation is that the lessons from the private side 
of the economy are likely to be more relevant for the population with 
recent work experience. Nevertheless, there are some well-established 
disability management principles that might transfer to public pro 
grams, such as rationalization of incentives, a proactive return-to-work 
philosophy, and case management techniques.
Policy Implications
We will begin with a description of the SSA disability determination 
and return-to-work procedures of the past. 4 Then, we will recount the 
lessons from private sector disability management efforts and examine 
their applicability to Social Security programs.
Critique ofDI Process
For adults, the current approach to determining eligibility for DI 
benefits basically works to convince individuals that they belong to one 
of two categories. Either they have relatively few limitations and can 
manage on their own, or they have limitations so severe that they can 
never again be productive members of society on a competitive basis. 
Further, the system provides little support or encouragement for either
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group to obtain employment. Only a select few in the second group are 
referred to the state/federal system of vocational rehabilitation, and this 
occurs only after considerable time has elapsed since their previous 
labor market experience. These individuals are then supposed to make 
an immediate reversal in their self-concepts. Suddenly, they have 
become potential workers, without the benefit of any intervention, 
other than the passage of time, to bring about this considerable change.
This approach to disability is counter to conventional wisdom and 
available research, which suggests that a focus on ability and early 
intervention is required to prevent persons from losing touch with their 
identification as workers. It is not surprising that only a small percent 
age of those referred to vocational rehabilitation are rehabilitated. The 
public resources available through the Social Security system are sim 
ply not designed to help adults with disabilities achieve employment. 
In fact, the system may actually encourage disability through factors 
such as excessive delays in processing claims, over-reliance on medical 
evidence in determining disability, and insufficient or nonexistent dis 
ability management tools.
First, the time that elapses between the onset of disability and the 
determination of eligibility for benefits can be months, if not years. 
Some of this cannot be avoided if there must be a statutory waiting 
period of five months, but SSA reports that the subsequent delays in 
processing are prodigious. According to an internal study by the SSA 
Office of Workforce Analysis, an initial determination of beneficiary 
status from SSA may take up to 155 days from first contact with the 
agency, with from 16 to 26 employees involved, but requires only 
about 13 hours of actual "task time." If the decision is negative and the 
individual appeals, a further 400 days may pass before a final decision 
is received by the claimant, of which only 32 hours is actual task time 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, SSA, 1994, pp. 8-9). 
During all this time, the individual claimant is concentrating on his/her 
disability, rather than on the ability that could be used in an employ 
ment situation.5 This approach discourages motivation to return to 
work and minimizes personal investment in productivity-restoring 
activities.
Second, the primary data used to assess eligibility for benefits are 
medical in nature, hence input from physicians often is the deciding 
factor. Although medical information is certainly critical to the deci-
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sion process, almost exclusive reliance on it obscures the reality that 
disability results from a complex array of factors. The preeminence of 
medical diagnostic criteria perpetuates a model that focuses on disabil 
ity rather than ability. It also deflects attention from the variety of inter 
ventions or environmental changes known to be able to remove or 
ameliorate many of the functional limitations producing disability, as 
called for in more contemporary public and private policy.
Third, there is no real case management built into the system. There 
seems to be an assumption that the only factor to consider is the 
impairment that led to eligibility in the first place. If medically verifi 
able improvement occurs, then there is the chance for a later review of 
a person's condition. However, the review is only for the purposes of 
establishing the severity and duration of the disability and whether 
these remain substantial enough to warrant continued benefits. Again, 
the pressure is to demonstrate disability and limitations, not ability and 
potential participation. Nevertheless, the examples cited earlier in this 
paper suggest significant results are available from case management 
techniques alone.6
Although the employment incentive provisions in the 1980 disabil 
ity policy reforms can support return-to-work activities, practically 
speaking, these are really only useful when people are ready, on their 
own, to make a work attempt. 7 There is no systematic case manage 
ment system to guide a person through effective utilization of these 
incentives, or in obtaining appropriate health care services, or in pursu 
ing education that could qualify an individual for alternative jobs more 
suitable to existing limitations. There is no system to assist treating 
physicians in understanding the functional requirements of specific 
jobs for which the individual might be qualified. Finally, no one works 
with employers to develop appropriate accommodations that can open 
job opportunities by minimizing the impact of limitations, even though 
the employer has this obligation under the ADA. Persons receiving dis 
ability benefits are virtually left to their own devices, and to the 
resources of family members, to overcome the variety of limiting fea 
tures that contribute to their disability.
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Lessons Learned
Some of the problems that have been described are familiar to pri 
vate employers and insurers. However, in recent years the private sec 
tor has improved its experience with disabled workers through 
prevention, early intervention, disability case management, and proac 
tive return-to-work policies of accommodation and rehabilitation. The 
disability management movement in the private sector has been driven 
by the stimulus of unacceptably high workers' compensation and other 
disability costs and has produced a practical, sequential, problem-solv 
ing approach. The public programs can and must follow this same path, 
with the advantage of the past decade of private sector experience to 
draw from in redesigning a comprehensive disability policy. Let us 
review what we have learned from the private sector evidence pre 
sented earlier, recognizing that these lessons are most applicable to 
those disabled individuals who have recently been in the labor force.
Return-to-work Focus
The first lesson is that return to work should be the ultimate goal. 8 
While it is clear that not all persons with disabilities can be expected to 
work, failing to adequately assist individuals with functional impair 
ments to develop the opportunity to be employed, to participate, and to 
contribute is inequitable and inefficient. We must realize that disability 
is a continuum, and a benefit structure that maintains a bifurcated view 
of the world (either disabled or not) is no longer relevant. Our evidence 
shows that return to work is not a disconnected function that occurs at 
some specific point in the treatment process. Rather, it is a commitment 
that evolves out of early intervention and case management activities 
with the individual, the physician, the employer, and others. The 
return-to-work "treatment" does not follow medical treatment and 
maximum medical improvement, as has frequently been the case with 
the tertiary vocational rehabilitation model. It should be part of a com 
prehensive disability management process from day one.
From the company examples reviewed earlier, it is obvious that one 
key to disability management success is the immediate creation, or 
maintenance, of the expectation that the individual has the potential to 
work and will return to work. This requires personal contact and sup 
port, which must be maintained on a regular basis, either in person or
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by telephone. As indicated by the SSA Disability Process Reengineer- 
ing Team, current SSA procedures are far from this ideal (SSA, Plans 
for a New Disability Claim Process, 1994). The proposals of the SSA 
Reengineering Team for a more efficient and inclusive process are cer 
tainly a step in the right direction, but much more could and should be 
done. SSA needs to design ways to partner with private sector employ 
ers, insurance carriers, medical practitioners, and other service provid 
ers to ensure that the return-to-work goal is addressed from the 
beginning of an emerging disability.
Positive Incentives
It may be contentious to talk about financial incentives, but a system 
that encourages people with functional limitations to think of them 
selves as disabled is immoral. A system that effectively limits earnings 
to $500 per month and then threatens to take away all supports if earn 
ings exceed that level does not fit with an ecological model of disabil 
ity. Disability is a continuum, and our support systems should mirror 
that reality. Partial benefits and carefully crafted implicit tax rates are 
needed to maintain incentives for all persons with disabilities to work 
as much as they can.
There are also perverse incentives for other actors in the system— 
employers, insurers, and service providers. Our case studies show that 
many private sector disability claims end with a "pass-off to Social 
Security. There is no motivation for the employer or insurer to stay 
involved beyond that point. Further, there is no real incentive to try to 
prevent this outcome, since it can be regarded as a "success" from the 
narrow point of view. Perhaps it is time to consider experience rating of 
the Social Security taxes that employers pay, in order to encourage pre 
vention of disabilities. SSA needs to consider establishing policies that 
encourage private sector players to serve the public interest.
We need to be sure that all incentives reinforce the social policy 
objective of maximizing the contribution of each individual, of achiev 
ing optimum equity and efficiency, in bringing persons with disabilities 
into the labor force to the extent feasible. Return to work is not appro 
priate for everyone, but we need to make sure that we adequately sup 
port those for whom this is a realistic goal.
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Early Intervention
Early intervention is another lesson from the private sector that can 
not be overemphasized. Private sector insurance carriers and third- 
party administrators have discovered that this is not a question of 
months, but of days. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the ear 
lier the intervention begins the better for the ultimate goal of recovery 
or maintenance of employment. Even after six months, however, there 
is evidence that additional delays are harmful, particularly as compared 
to a system that focuses on return to work and maintains positive 
incentives to promote this goal.
SSA must find a way to reach forward (even into the five-month 
waiting period) to address the needs of individuals with functional 
impairments as soon as possible. Thought might be given to some 
innovative sort of technical assistance, consultative service, and finan 
cial incentives that could assist employers and treatment providers in 
preventing disability and in meeting employers' accommodation obli 
gations under the ADA. An appropriate partnership with SSA could be 
made attractive to all interested parties, bearing in mind that persons 
with disabilities must be the major beneficiaries.
Case Management
The evidence is clear from the private sector that case management 
services save money for both insurance carriers and self-insured 
employers and reduce unnecessary disability outcomes. The marketing 
effort that is currently going into third-party case management services 
indicates that many private sector players understand this relationship. 
The hypothesis that the effect extends to public programs is being for 
mally tested in the ongoing Project Network experiments for SSA cli 
ents (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). Without prejudging the results 
of the research, it should not come as a surprise that investing time and 
energy in managing any process will lead to better outcomes. Evidence 
available from the private sector suggests that efficiency savings of 
from 10 to 20 percent are readily achievable through case management 
techniques alone. When combined with the return-to-work orientation 
and early intervention perspectives that we have suggested, consider 
ably larger gains should be available.
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Final Reflections
Disability management offers a critically important mechanism for 
stemming the tide of individuals who leave employment unnecessarily 
and enter disability systems, while simultaneously addressing the eco 
nomic survival needs of American business and the security of the jobs 
it provides. In a comprehensive view of national disability policy, dis 
ability prevention and management should be seen as the keys to pro 
moting the maximum contribution of all disabled individuals and to 
reducing the public burden of preventable disability.
About 10 years ago, private sector employers began to realize that 
nobody was going to solve the problem for them and that they had to 
do it themselves. It is amazing what has been accomplished in the 
intervening decade at "best practice" companies. Reductions of 50 per 
cent, or more, in work-related disability incidence are possible where 
the company is willing to make the commitment to an integrated dis 
ability prevention and management strategy. Many of these cases have 
now been documented in the literature.
It is certain that public sector programs will show more limited 
gains, because the severity of disabilities encountered is greater, 
because the claimant's connection to the world of work is more tenu 
ous, and because entitlement to public sector benefits is a matter of 
right (Galvin, Dean, and Kirchner 1991). However, it is our obligation 
to make sure that every individual has been given the opportunity and 
the needed support to participate. The private sector has pointed the 
way in developing specific disability prevention and management pro 
grams; it is up to all of us to make sure that the public sector does not 
ignore the lessons that are there to be learned.
NOTES
1. We specifically include stay-at-work efforts under this topic as well.
2. The full content of the interviews is available upon request from the W E Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research The subjects include Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Rohr, Digital Corpo 
ration, Union Pacific Railroad, UNUM Insurance, Wausau Insurance, United Health Care, Univer 
sity of Cincinnati Medical Center, and S Yangouyian & Associates
3 While UNUM is not a workers' compensation earner, short-term and long-term disability 
benefits are paid during workers' compensation waiting periods and above maximum workers' 
compensation benefit levels
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4 However, see the Plan for a New Disability Claim Process (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, SSA 1994) Clearly, SSA has become aware of these shortcomings
5 See Bound (1989) for evidence that under 50 percent of rejected male applicants actually 
return to work We are not suggesting that these people are not disabled, but simply that the longer 
the eligibility determination process requires, the higher the proportion of individuals that will be 
disabled, other things equal.
6. These gains are being examined experimentally in Project Network See Rupp, Bell, and 
McManus (1994) for details of the design
7 See Rethinking Disability Policy (National Academy of Social Insurance 1994), chapter 5, 
for a brief history of DI and SSI policy.
8. Of course, this could be restated as secunng and retaining gainful employment for those 
who have never held a job
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Quantitative Outcomes of the 
Transitional Employment Training 
Demonstration
Summary of Net Impacts
Aaron J. Prero
Social Security Administration
In the period from 1985 through 1987, the Transitional Employment 
Training Demonstration offered job placement and special training to 
375 recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) with mental 
retardation. The demonstration was organized and largely funded by 
the Social Security Administration (SSA). A six-year retrospective 
view of the demonstration, presented here, reveals a mix of results 
regarding the effectiveness of SSA's providing these services. On aver 
age, the trainees' employment rate and earnings increased because of 
their participation. SSI payments declined only slightly, however, not 
nearly enough for SSA to recoup the costs.
The demonstration outcomes, therefore, do not yield simple policy 
implications in favor of SSA's support of transitional employment. 
Rather, the value of a transitional employment program will depend on 
the nature of the population being served, the features of the plan, and 
the weight policy makers attach to its various objectives. For example, 
a program targeted to groups for which the benefits are expected to be 
large can be more effective than a program offered, as in this demon 
stration, to a less select group. A program that substitutes for other 
expensive, government-funded services (like sheltered work) would 
incur lower net costs. A program cosponsored by several agencies, 
whose missions include increasing participants' income and employ 
ment, will more likely be economical than one whose goal is simply to 
save money for the SSI program.
This paper summarizes the findings of a comprehensive evaluation 
of the demonstration (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988, Decker 
and Thornton 1994) and extends that research by examining some sub-
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group impacts in greater detail. A more extensive discussion of the 
implementation of the demonstration, nonquantitative findings, and 
transitional employment, in general, can be found in Prero and Thorn- 
ton (1991).
Description of the Demonstration
The objective of the demonstration was to determine the results of 
SSA's offering transitional employment training to a specific popula 
tion, as described in the next section. The effect of main interest was 
savings to the SSI program. That is, could SSA justify paying the cost 
of services on the expectation that the costs would be exceeded by the 
resulting reductions in SSI payments?
Population and Experimental Design
The participants in the demonstration were 745 SSI recipients aged 
18 to approximately 40 with mental retardation. Job placement and 
training were provided by eight nonprofit agencies in various localities 
around the country, whose operations under the demonstration were 
funded mostly by grants from SSA. (These organizations are referred 
to here as the sites.)
SSA has a particular interest in the habilitation of persons with men 
tal retardation, since retardation is a leading cause of disability among 
SSI recipients. SSI statistics suggest that roughly 1.2 million children 
and adults under age 65 receive SSI payments on the basis of a primary 
diagnosis of mental retardation, some 29 percent of all SSI recipients 
under 65.' Based on the average monthly SSI disability payment of 
$402.47 in December 1994, payments to recipients with mental retar 
dation approximate $5.8 billion per year. In addition to these individu 
als, an unknown number of recipients whose primary diagnosis is some 
other condition are also mentally retarded.
Eighty-five percent of the people in the demonstration were drawn 
from a pool of some 12,000 SSI recipients whom SSA invited by letter 
to inquire about participation. The invitees were persons for whom 
mental retardation was listed as the primary or secondary diagnosis on
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their SSI records and who lived in the localities of the sites. To partici 
pate, the recipient had to volunteer and had to be accepted by the local 
site. The remaining 15 percent were SSI recipients who were recruited 
by the sites, generally through referrals from vocational and social ser 
vice agencies. The referred participants also had mental retardation.
The demonstration was designed as a formal experiment, in order to 
assure the rigor of the analysis of outcomes. Half of the participants, 
designated as the treatment group, were offered the demonstration's 
services, and half, the control group, were not. Individuals were 
assigned by random number to one of the groups after they agreed to 
participate, were accepted by the site, and had completed the partici 
pant questionnaire. (All participants and/or their guardians understood 
at the time of enrollment that the probability of being assigned to the 
control group was 50 percent.)
Members of the control group were free to obtain vocational and 
additional services from sources other than the demonstration. Thus, 
the test was not of the effect of the demonstration's services as com 
pared with no vocational services, but the effect of the demonstration's 
services compared with the services that were then otherwise available 
or that have since become available.
Some of the post-demonstration changes experienced by the treat 
ment group in employment, earnings, SSI, and other measures would 
have been realized even without demonstration services and should not 
be attributed to the demonstration. The extent to which change would 
have taken place regardless is measured by the experiences of the con 
trol group. Indeed, the average control group member, who earned 
$615 during the year following enrollment in the demonstration, 
earned about twice that in each of the third through sixth years (Decker 
and Thornton 1994, p. 23).
Random assignment assured that the treatment and control groups 
were alike at the time of enrollment with respect to characteristics that 
were or were not measured or may not even be measurable. Compari 
son of known characteristics of the participants confirms that the two 
groups, in fact, resembled each other closely (Thornton, Dunstan, and 
Schore 1988, pp. 58-60, or Prero and Thornton 1991, pp. 12-13). The 
two groups were alike in terms of their distributions by age, race, gen 
der, IQ scores, sources of income, receipt of benefits from assistance
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programs besides SSI, types of work experience, and other personal 
characteristics.
Characteristics of the Sample
The results of the demonstration can be generalized to a population 
described by the selection criteria of the sample: SSI recipients 18 to 
40 years old with mental retardation who would volunteer for and be 
accepted by this sort of program. The results cannot be generalized to a 
population that consists of volunteers and nonvolunteers.
Table 1 compares characteristics of the sample with those of the 
11,430 persons who were invited by letter to participate and did not 
volunteer or were not accepted. These invitees comprise the large 
majority of SSI recipients in the sites' local areas who had a primary or 
secondary diagnosis of mental retardation and were in the 18-to-40 age 
range. (We might have preferred to compare the participants with 
recipients nationally of the same diagnosis and age, but we cannot 
readily identify all recipients by diagnosis.)
On average, the participants were somewhat younger than the invi 
tees. The proportions of males and blacks among the participants were 
somewhat higher than among the invitees. Mean earnings in the year 
prior to the demonstration were low for both groups but were twice as 
high for the participants as for the invitees.
Services and Providers
Key services of the transitional employment model for training are
• training by a job coach on a real job, that is, on a paid job consist 
ing of tasks that another worker would otherwise perform for the 
employer and in which the worker has an opportunity to interact 
with nondisabled coworkers or the public;
• placement in a potentially permanent real job, either the job on 
which the training was received or, after the training, in a similar 
position.
If the permanent placement is in a job that was not the training posi 
tion, additional instruction by the coach is available as needed. Subse-
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 277
Table 1. Characteristics of Participants and Nonparticipant Invitees, 
Transitional Employment Training Demonstration
Characteristics
Number
Age (percentages)
Under 22
22-30
3 1 or older
Mean age (in years)
Gender (percentages)
Male
Female
Race (percentages)
White and other
Black
Income
Mean annual SSI payment
Mean annual earnings
Mean years of SSI receipt
Concurrently receiving SSI 
and social security benefits 
(percentage)
Participants
745
22.3
55.6
22.2
26.5
59.2
40.8
69.7
30.3
$3,638
$450
6.5
31.0
Nonparticipant 
invitees
11,430
20.5
40.0
39.5
27.9
54.6
45.4
73.4
26.6
$3,390
$225
7.0
32.5
SOURCE Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 54 and 81-83), based on SSA administrative data of 
the SSI program and the Demonstration Intake Data Collection forms. 
NOTE: Items may not total precisely 100 due to roundmg
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quent to training, job-retention support is provided when necessary to 
resolve occasional difficulties that may arise on the job.
A job coach is a specialist in training persons with disabilities and is 
usually employed by a service agency rather than by the trainee's 
employer. The scope of training by the coach includes appropriate 
behavior on the job, relationships to supervisors, communication, 
transportation to the job, and other nonwork, as well as work, skills.
Training and intensive support are transitional in the sense that they 
are expected to be of limited duration, generally between 6 and 18 
months. Transitional employment is intended as a bridge to working 
independently of vocational services except for occasional job-reten 
tion help. When the need for intensive support services is expected to 
be ongoing, the service model is usually referred to as supported 
employment. In the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, 
job coaching and other intensive services were provided for a maxi 
mum of a year.
The demonstration sites provided the services. Of the eight sites, 
three were universities or university affiliated. They were:
• Children's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts
• University of Washington, Seattle, Washington serving Portland, 
Oregon in cooperation with Portland Community College
• University of Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, Wisconsin, serving a 
rural area in west central Wisconsin
Three of the sites were units of the Association for Retarded Citi 
zens (ARC) or Goodwill Industries:
•Association for Retarded Citizens, Monmouth Unit, Monmouth 
County, New Jersey
• Exceptional Children's Foundation, Los Angeles, California (a unit 
of ARC)
• Goodwill Industries, Milwaukee Area, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
Two were independent rehabilitation agencies:
• AHEDD, Inc., Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, serving Harrisburg, Lan 
caster, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and York, Pennsylvania, and 
Dover, Delaware
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• Center for Rehabilitation and Training of the Disabled, Chicago 
(also known as the CENTER)
Besides offering training and employment services, the sites provided 
or arranged for case management and other indirectly related services. 
SSA granted waivers to the trainees that protected their SSI status 
while in training. Subsequent amendments to the SSI statute now pro 
vide similar protection to all SSI recipients. The waivers did not 
change the way income reduces SSI payments to recipients and did not 
protect social security insurance benefits.
Data Collection
The main source of data on outcomes is the SSI administrative com 
puter files. SSA verifies and records the monthly earnings and other 
income of SSI recipients to determine the amount of the monthly pay 
ment. Historic records of earnings and income are retained by com 
puter, in order to refigure the payment amount retroactively for any 
month for which SSA receives new information relevant to the pay 
ment.
The record generally remains available even for SSI recipients 
whose earnings rise to a level at which no cash payment is made. Such 
recipients usually remain on the SSI rolls, and continue to report their 
incomes, for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. By the end of the sixth 
year following enrollment, 87 of the 745 participants had left the SSI 
rolls entirely. Their earnings and income data are, therefore, missing 
for one or more years (but their SSI payments are known to be zero).
Attrition was approximately the same from the treatment and con 
trol groups, at 11.7 percent of the former and 11.6 percent of the latter. 
The single most common reason for losing SSI eligibility was new 
entitlement to social security benefits. Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 
12-14 and 25-28) analyze the possibility of a differential impact of 
attrition on the treatment and control groups' average outcomes and 
show that it is unlikely that there is any substantial bias.
Data on personal characteristics of the participants come from three 
major sources: a uniform intake questionnaire that was administered 
by the sites to all participants (and/or their care givers) before random 
ization, IQ scores obtained from SSA medical documentation of dis-
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ability or released by the participants from other sources, and the 
computerized SSI records.
Data on hours of direct staff services provided to a subsample of cli 
ents were kept by all sites in a uniform manner. These data, collected in 
the demonstration's client service record, and records of program 
expenditures are the basis of the cost estimates.
Outcomes of the Demonstration
Measures of the Difference Made by the Demonstration
The net impact of the services on the treatment group is the differ 
ence between the outcomes the treatment group experienced and the 
outcomes that would have been realized without the demonstration ser 
vices, as measured by the experience of the control group. Most of the 
net impacts as reported here are adjusted using regression techniques 
to account for preexisting differences in characteristics between the 
treatment and control group members and for attrition of participants 
from the data file. However, as described, the preexisting treatment- 
control differences are quite small, and, therefore, so are the conse 
quent econometric adjustments.
The control group's outcomes, as tabulated in this section, serve as 
the reference points for the net impacts. That is, an impact expressed in 
dollars plus the mean for the corresponding control group equals the 
outcome for the treatment group (with small econometric adjustments). 
For each impact, the table also lists the ratio of the impact to the con 
trol group outcome, expressed as the percentage change that is attrib 
uted to the training.
The impacts are labeled "estimated" because they estimate the con 
sequences of transitional employment training for an entire population, 
based on the experience of the demonstration's 745-member sample. 
(The population consists of all recipients of the same age and diagnosis 
who would volunteer for this type of training.)
Participants enrolled between May 1985 and June 1986. Each treat 
ment group member was eligible for demonstration-funded services 
for one year from the date of enrollment. Outcomes are reported for
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that year and for the five subsequent years, beginning each year at the 
month of the participant's enrollment, rather than at the same time for 
all participants. All dollar measures are adjusted for inflation to 1986 
dollars. This facilitates comparison with the costs of the demonstration 
services, which were incurred from mid-1985 to mid-1987.
Summary of Outcomes
The impacts are presented as averages of all 375 members of the 
treatment group, despite the fact that 121 members of the group, 32 
percent, were never placed in a training or permanent job. Some of 
those 121 refused the placements they were offered, some dropped out 
of the program, and some were not offered placement because the sites 
found it too difficult to serve them. (This is not a surprising result, 
since SSA encouraged the sites to accept participants with less than the 
usual level of screening for suitability.) It is necessary to include all 
members of the treatment group in the mean outcomes to preserve 
comparability with the control group. Also, the costs of the demonstra 
tion are averaged over all members of the treatment group.
Of the remaining 254 treatment group members, 127 were holding 
permanent jobs when their participation was completed. This is 34 per 
cent of the treatment group. Another 57 trainees (15 percent of the 
group) were placed in one or more permanent jobs but failed to retain 
those jobs. An additional 70 trainees (19 percent) were placed in train 
ing jobs but could not be subsequently placed in potentially permanent 
jobs (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988, p. 107).
Demonstration services cost about $7,650 per treatment group 
member, of which somewhat more than $2,000 is attributable to the 
resources used to start up and terminate the demonstration (Thornton, 
Dunstan, and Schore 1988, pp. 117-130). The service provided in the 
demonstration would thus cost an average of about $5,600 (1986 dol 
lars) in a program operating in a steady state over the long run. This 
amount includes expenditures for job coaching, job development, cli 
ent recruitment, and other activities performed directly for clients, as 
well as program administration and an allocated portion of agency 
overhead. Average cost at the individual demonstration sites is shown 
in table 2.
Table 2. Estimates of Costs, by Site, Transitional Employment Training Demonstration
ARC The Children's Exceptional Univ. of 
AHEDD Monmouth CENTER Hospital Children's Goodwill WashTPCC3
Total operational expenditure15
Average operational 
expenditure per client
Estimated average operational 
expenditure for an ongoing 
program per client0
Estimated average direct labor 
cost per client
Ratio of total labor cost to 
direct labor cost
Ratio of total cost to total 
labor cost for 1986
Number of treatment group 
members
$308,647
$3,810
$,2,800
$266
57
18
81
$381,483
$9,782
$5,500
$1,038
3.7
15
39
$379,556
$14,058
$7,200
$631
7.0
16
27
$161,731
$5,577
$4,700
$1,630
18
1.6
29
$630,812 $328,112
$8,192 $9,114
$7,300 $6,200
$2,101 $698
20 60
1.7 1.5
77 36
$454,456
$10,099
$8,100
$1,742
2.4
20
45
Univ. of 
Wisconsin
$221,153
$5,394
$4,400
$1,061
19
22
41
tooo to
Total
$2,865,950
$7,643
$5,600
$1,159
37
18
375
SOURCE Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore (1988, p 120) based on the Client Service Record and site financial records
a. Costs to Portland Community College. Because the University of Washington primarily provided technical assistance to start this project, the univer 
sity's costs have been excluded from the operational cost The University of Washington costs totaled approximately $160,000 
b These costs exclude payments for clients' wage subsidies and project costs incurred prior to the start of enrollment.
c These costs are estimated as the product of average direct labor cost per client, the ratio of total labor cost to direct labor cost, and the ratio of total cost 
to total labor cost
d. These estimates include the wages and fringe benefits of staff time devoted directly to serving specific clients The estimates are denved from Client 
Service Record data and project expenditures during 1986.
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During the six-year observation period, the average trainee earned a 
total of $4,282 more due to the training. Earnings were approximately 
$10,256, which is 72 percent more than control group mean earnings 
(table 3). Some or all of a participant's earnings during the first year 
may be thought of as being derived directly from participation in the 
demonstration. Earnings excluding that year are a measure of post- 
demonstration outcomes. The net impact on earnings for the total of 
years two through six is an increase of $3,736, which is 69 percent over 
the control group mean of $5,391 (Decker and Thornton 1994, p. 23).
Table 3. Estimated Impacts of the Demonstration on Postenrollment 
Earnings
Estimated impact 
Year after (standard error in 
enrollment parentheses)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total, years 1 to 6
Total, years 2 to 6
$ 678* 
(96)
835* 
(137)
737* 
(160)
574* 
(172)
869* 
(184)
637* 
(182)
4,282* 
(761)
3,736* 
(714)
Control group Estimated 
mean percentage impact
$ 615
921
1,167
1,336
1,206
1,131
5,974
5,391
110
91
63
43
72
56
72
69
SOURCE. Decker and Thornton (1994 p 23), based on SSA administrative data of the SSI pro 
gram and the Demonstration Intake Data Collection forms.
NOTE Estimates are based on multiple regression models that control for individual preenroll- 
ment characteristics and site The sample includes between 650 and 745 individuals assigned to 
either the treatment group or the control group The exact size of the sample depends primarily on 
attrition from the SSI program. Statistical tests indicate that attrition does not bias the estimated 
impacts. Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars. 
*Sigmficantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level of significance using a one-tail test.
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The effect on SSI payments is small by any standard. The estimated 
six-year impact is a decrease of $870 per participant (table 4). For the 
second through sixth years, the estimated impact is a $731 decrease. 
This is a reduction of 5 percent from the means of $18,956 and 
$15,325 that the control group received over the six- and five-year peri 
ods, respectively (Decker and Thornton 1994, p. 31). It amounts to 
about $12 per month.
Table 4. Estimated Impacts of the Demonstration on Postenrollment 
SSI Receipt
Estimated impact 
Year after (standard error in 
enrollment parentheses)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total, years 1 to 6
Total, years 2 to 6
$-138*
(65)
-104 
(87)
-156 
(97)
-121 
(102)
-183
(112)
-167 
(113)
-870* 
(471)
-731* 
(439)
Control group Estimated 
mean percentage impact
$ 3,630
3,443
3,264
3,037
2,876
2,705
18,956
15,325
-4
-3
-5
-4
-6
-6
-5
-5
SOURCE: Decker and Thornton (1994 p 31), based on SSA administrative data of the SSI pro 
gram and the Demonstration Intake Data Collection forms.
NOTE' Estimates are based on multiple regression models that control for individual preenroll- 
ment characteristics and site The sample consists of 745 individuals assigned to either the treat 
ment group or the control group Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars. 
* Significantly less than zero at the 5 percent level of significance using a one-tail test
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A mean reduction in SSI of $870 can be consistent with mean addi 
tional earnings of $4,282, depending on the operation of the SSI exclu 
sions. That is, income of recipients reduces their SSI payments dollar 
for dollar, but certain amounts of income are excluded from being 
counted against the SSI payment. If an SSI recipient has no income 
other than earnings, $85 of monthly earnings plus half the remaining 
earnings are excluded.
According to the preceding figures, a mean of only $870 was 
counted against SSI, of the mean $4,282 that was earned. The remain 
ing $3,412 of the earnings impact must have been excluded. On a 
monthly basis, these amounts correspond to $59 ($4,282/72 months) in 
mean additional earnings of which $47 ($3,412/72 months) was 
excluded, for six years. At least some treatment group members had 
income besides the income that the demonstration generated; their $85 
exclusion may not have been available to apply to the additional dem 
onstration-based earnings. Thus, the extent to which the additional 
earnings could be excluded depends on the distribution of earnings 
among participants, not just on the means.
One reason for the exclusion of so large a proportion of earnings 
was that the participants' jobs were often part-time. Workers' total 
earnings are typically low when they work part-time, and the initial 
exclusion of $85 comprises a larger fraction of lower than of higher 
earnings. The 127 members of the treatment group who were in perma 
nent jobs when they exited the demonstration (see preceding discus 
sion) worked an average of 27 hours per week in those jobs.
The Younger Participants
Just over half of the participants were of age 25 or less. The out 
comes in this age range are informative with regard to transition from 
school to work, since students with disabilities can be entitled to public 
education until they are 22 years old. The SSI and earnings outcomes 
for this group (not regression adjusted) are presented in table 5.
Mean total SSI payments for the six years following enrollment in 
the demonstration fell by $1,376, from $20,402 for the controls to 
$19,026 for the treatment group. For the second through sixth years, 
the difference is $1,105, representing about the same proportionate 
relationship between treatment and control, -7 percent, as for the first 
through sixth years.
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Table 5. Estimated Impacts of the Demonstration on Postenrollment and 
SSI Receipt, for Persons Aged 25 and Younger
Estimated impact 
(standard error in Control group 
Variable parentheses) mean
SSI receipt 
Total, years
Total, years
Earnings 
Total, years
Total, years
Ito6
2 to 6
Ito6
2 to 6
$-1,376 
(1,073)
-1,105 
(925)
3,383* 
(987)
2,836* 
(920)
$20,402
16,441
6,266
5,776
Estimated 
percentage 
impact
-7
-7
54
49
SOURCE: SSA administrative data of the SSI program
NOTE Estimates are based on observed means, not on multiple regression models. The sample 
for the SSI estimates consists of 383 individuals assigned to either the treatment group or the con 
trol group. The sample for the earnings estimates is the same, except for the exclusion of 20 mem 
bers of the treatment group and 23 members of the control group for whom earnings data are 
missing in one or more years Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars. 
*Sigmficantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level of significance using a one-tail test
These differences are larger, both absolutely and by percentage, than 
those reported for the entire age range (table 4). However, based on a 
sample of the 383 participants aged 18 to 25 rather than on 745 partici 
pants of all ages, the differences for the younger group are not statisti 
cally significant. 2
The differences in earnings are larger than the SSI differences and 
are statistically significant. The six-year and five-year differences are, 
respectively, $3,383 and $2,836. That is, the treatment group did 54 
percent and 49 percent better in the respective time intervals. (Twenty 
members of the treatment group and 23 members of the control group 
are omitted from the earnings comparisons because their earnings data 
are missing in at least one year. The issue of attrition from the sample 
has been discussed.)
Although not shown in table 5, it is noteworthy that the control 
group's mean earnings rose from $490 in the year following enroll 
ment to $791 and $1,136 in the next two years, before reaching a pla 
teau. Mean earnings of the treatment group rose from $1,038 in the
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first year to $1,519 in the second year, fluctuating mildly after that to a 
mean of $1,773 in year six. Thus, the sharper rise in control group 
earnings accounts for the reduced difference between treatment and 
control groups, from 54 to 49 percent, when the first year's earnings 
are disregarded.
Costs and Benefits
Based on the preceding information, the costs of the demonstration 
far exceeded the reductions in SSI payments that SSA realized. This 
conclusion addresses the main question that the demonstration was 
intended to answer, but it is not a benefit-cost judgment in the standard 
sense. A full treatment of benefits must consider those to the federal 
government as a whole, to other levels of government, and to private 
organizations and individuals. 3 A full treatment of costs must consider 
that, during training and subsequent employment, other services the 
client would have received may not be necessary.
Economic benefits that have not been considered here include, for 
example, the additional goods and services produced as a result of the 
employment of program participants. The counterpart of this produc 
tion is the workers' earnings and the income and payroll taxes paid by 
workers and employers. A comprehensive benefit-cost analysis would 
also account for personal and social benefits to the participants result 
ing from their greater role in the social mainstream.
Examples of services that might be rendered unnecessary by transi 
tional employment include sheltered work and other day activities. The 
costs of these services, which can amount to several thousand dollars 
per year, would have been borne by the federal or local governments or 
others. The observed cost of transitional employment should be 
adjusted to reflect the savings for these services (or the savings should 
be treated as another benefit). A transitional employment program that 
might be proposed for funding by a government agency with a broader 
mission than SSA's, or jointly by SSA and other agencies, would be 
more appropriately evaluated by a comprehensive benefit-cost analy 
sis.
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Qualifications of the Analysis
The conclusions of this report regarding the costs and benefits to 
SSA are subject to several qualifications. First, members of the control 
group may have received employment services from sources other than 
the demonstration. That is, the demonstration tested the effect of SSA's 
adding its services to existing opportunities. The test was not of the dif 
ference between service or no service.
The second qualification is that the conclusions of this experiment 
should be corroborated by additional research. Methods of providing 
transitional employment training can differ grossly or subtly among 
providers. An approach that focuses more on the effectiveness of spe 
cific training practices than did this demonstration could lead to other 
cost and benefit outcomes. Even in the present demonstration, in which 
the sites' services were organized according to certain unifying specifi 
cations (Prero and Thornton 1991, pp. 8-11), the variation among sites' 
styles of operation and outcomes was sufficient to warrant analysis of 
cross-site differences. (Decker and Thornton's analysis of the site earn 
ings impacts "show a considerable level of variation across sites," 
although the samples were not large enough to support a statistically 
significant difference in these impacts across the eight sites [1994, pp. 
65-77].)
Third, the costs per participant can vary greatly, depending on the 
treatment mode and operating efficiency. Within this demonstration, 
the estimated cost per participant for replication on an ongoing basis is 
$2,800 at the lowest cost site and over $8,000 at the highest cost site 
(table 2). Administrative costs and organizational overhead, which are 
included, also varied widely.
Fourth, the rules of the demonstration severely limited the extent to 
which sites could screen applicants for the program. More comprehen 
sive screening could have led to more effective service. The main rea 
son for the policy was to limit the personal involvement of members of 
the control group. In this way, the intake process would be as neutral as 
practical with regard to the control group's desire to seek training and 
employment. Limited contact prior to randomization also reduced the 
possible disappointment to participants who were subsequently 
assigned to control status. Abbreviated screening incidentally pro-
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moted the demonstration's goal of testing transitional employment on a 
wide variety of participants.
Screening and Targeting
One way to increase the ratio of benefits to costs in a project of this 
nature is to target services to groups for whom net impacts are 
expected to be high. Then, depending on the criteria for targeting, 
screening methods may have to be developed to assure that the group 
that was targeted is the one that is served.
Targeting does not necessarily mean "creaming," or serving the cli 
ents with the mildest disabilities. Although those who are least dis 
abled might be expected to accomplish the most after training, they are 
also the ones who would accomplish the most without training. Thus, 
the net impact of the training might not be large.
Analysis of subgroups of the demonstration sample suggests, but 
does not lead conclusively to, some possible targeting criteria. For 
example, table 6 shows that, classifying age in three subgroups, the 
greatest impact was experienced by participants 22-to-29 years old and 
that this impact is statistically significant. The differences in impacts 
among the age subgroups, however, are not statistically significant. 
Participants with IQ scores greater than 554 show the highest impacts 
among the subgroups based on IQ score.
Another subgrouping that shows differing impacts is based on a sub 
jective rating of the participant's high, medium, or low probability of 
success, as judged by the interviewer during the intake process. Again, 
the impact of the high-probability subgroup is not dissimilar enough 
from that of the combined medium- and low-probability subgroup for 
the difference to be statistically significant. The observed impacts, nev 
ertheless, suggest that program staff have some ability to forecast out 
comes even beyond the predictions based on client characteristics 
incorporated in the regression model (Decker and Thornton 1994, pp. 
47-48). One interpretation of staff workers' insight is that they con 
sciously or unconsciously consider client characteristics that were not 
measured and may be difficult to measure. These factors might include 
motivation and family support, both of which are anecdotally thought 
to be important.
Table 6. Estimated Impacts of the Demonstration on Cumulative Postenrollment Earnings and SSI Receipt, 
Years One to Six
to
VO
o
Characteristics
Age
Under 22
22-30
3 1 or older
IQ score
Greater than 70
55 to 70
40 to 54
Less than 40
Intake worker's opinion of
probability of success on a
competitive job
High
Medium or low
Estimated 
impact on Control group 
earnings mean earnings
$2,548
5,474**
3,637*
9,697**a
5,011**a
2,254a
2,611 a
5,491**
3,744**
$6,818
6,478
4,795
4,482
5,826
7,194
4,245
8,018
5,175
Estimated 
percentage Estimated 
earnings impact impact on SSI
37
85
76
216
86
31
62
69
72
$435
-1,639*
-353
-3,154*
-677
-770
953
-1,026
-756
Control group 
mean SSI
$21,027
19,313
16,252
18,175
18,562
19,711
17,416
15,607
20,573
Estimated 
percentage 
SSI impact
2
-9
-2
-17
-4
-4
6
-7
-4
SOURCE Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 40-41 and 44-45), based on SSA administrative data of the SSI program and the Demonstration Intake Data 
Collection forms.
NOTE Estimated are based on multiple regression models that control for individual preenrollment characteristics and site The sample includes between 
650 and 745 individuals assigned to either the treatment group or the control group. The exact size of the sample depends pnmanly on attrition from the 
SSI program Statistical tests indicate that attntion does not bias the estimated impacts Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars.
* Significantly at the 5 percent level, earnings are greater than zero by a one-tail test and SSI is greater or less than zero by a two-tail test.
**Sigmficantly at the 1 percent level, earnings are greater than zero by a one-tail test and SSI is greater or less than zero by a two-tail test, 
a The hypothesis that the impacts for all subgroups in the category are equal can be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance.
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It should be noted that, in the analysis of subgroups, the regression 
model holds all other characteristics constant when analyzing the 
impact with respect to a particular characteristic. Also, the present sub 
group analysis is limited to benefits. Costs cannot be compared with 
benefits within subgroups because the costs are not known at that level 
of detail.
Moving beyond the overall mean impacts, analysis of the distribu 
tion of earnings provides another perspective on the potential for tar 
geting. A distribution of earnings can be constructed by summing the 
earnings of each participant over the six postenrollment years. The 
sums of earnings of the treatment group are ordered from lowest to 
highest, as are the sums of earnings of the control group. (Earnings of 
39 members of the treatment group and 37 members of the control 
group are omitted from the distributions because data are missing in at 
least one year.)
We then compare, for example, the highest third of the treatment 
group's distribution with the highest third of the control distribution. 
This comparison does not assume that the selected portion of the con 
trol group is the counterpart of the selected portion of the treatment 
group. Rather, the highest third of the control group yields an upper 
bound for the sums of earnings of any third of the control group, no 
matter how selected.
Mean earnings of the highest third of the treatment group are 
$23,645 over the six-year period, as compared with $14,479 in mean 
earnings for the highest third of the control group (table 7). Since the 
control group mean is an upper bound, this implies that the net impact 
for these members of the treatment group is at least the difference of 
$9,166. (Statistical significance has not been calculated.)
Excluding earnings in the year of demonstration services, mean 
earnings of the highest third of the treatment group are $21,596 over 
years two through six. Mean earnings for the highest third of the con 
trol group are $13,243 for the second through sixth years, yielding an 
impact of at least $8,353.
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Table 7. Mean Earnings of the Highest One-Third and Two-Thirds of the 
Distribution of Total Earnings and Minimum Net Impacts for 
All Participants in the Transitional Employment Training 
Demonstration and for Participants 25 and Under
Fraction of 
earnings 
distribution
Highest 1/3
Highest 2/3
Highest 1/3
Highest 2/3
Highest 1/3
Highest 2/3
Highest 1/3
Highest 2/3
Mean 
treatment Mean control Minimum 
group earnings group earnings net impact
All ages , years 1 to 6
$23,645 $14,479 $9,166
15,103 9,071 6,032
All ages, years 2 to 6
$21,596 $13,243 $8,353
13,583 8,224 5,358
Ages 25 and under, years 1 to 6
$21,418 $14,431 $6,987
14,078 9,323 4,756
Ages 25 and under, years 2 to 6
$19,657 $13,436 $6,221
12,680 8,609 4,071
Percentage 
minimum 
impact
63
66
63
65
48
51
46
47
SOURCE' SSA administrative data of the SSI program and the Demonstration Intake Data Col 
lection forms
NOTE. Estimates are based on observed means, not on multiple regression models. Participants 
for whom earnings data are missing in one or more years are omitted from the sample. The high 
est one-third of the sample for all ages consists of 223 individuals, and the highest two-thirds con 
sists of 446 individuals, assigned to either the treatment group or the control group For 
participants 25 and under, the highest one-third consists of 114 individuals, and the highest two- 
thirds consists of 227 individuals Percentage minimum impact is the minimum net impact as a 
percentage of the mean control group earnings. Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars
Similar calculations for the highest two-thirds of each group's distri 
bution yield a treatment mean of $15,103, a control mean of $9,071, 
and a difference of $6,032 for the six-year observation period. Over 
years two through six, the treatment mean is $13,583, the control mean 
is $8,224, and the difference is $5,358.
Among participants in the 25 years and younger segment, one-third 
of the sample consists of 59 treatment group members and 55 control 
group members, after excluding cases with missing earnings data. The
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mean earnings of the highest-earning one-third, totaled over six years, 
are calculated to be $21,418 and $14,431, respectively, or a minimum 
difference of $6,987. Over the second through sixth years, mean total 
earnings are $19,657 for the treatment group and $13,436 for the con 
trols, a minimum difference of $6,221. This suggests some potential 
for targeting in the years of transition to adulthood, as well.
These analyses of the distributions of earnings give us no hint of the 
targeting or screening criteria that might be necessary to obtain desired 
results in a population. However, we can infer that, if research on the 
characteristics of clients produces appropriate criteria, transitional 
employment could be found to be cost-effective for a portion of the 
population, even on the basis of a narrow set of benefits.
Effective Practices
Another way to increase the ratio of benefits to costs is to modify 
the provision of services so that benefits are increased. For example, 
placement in part-time rather than in full-time jobs was cited as a rea 
son why the decline in SSI benefits is so much less than the rise in 
earnings. A focus on full-time placement might be more cost-effective. 
On the other hand, development of part-time jobs is easier and, thus, 
probably less expensive. Also, an emphasis on full-time jobs might 
draw a different mix of clients into the program, which could alter the 
impacts.
Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 65-76) infer certain suggestions for 
effective practices based in part on apparent differences in impacts 
across sites. The sites with the largest impacts were more flexible in 
offering a wide array of job placements, so that the circumstances and 
interests of clients could be better matched to jobs. The more success 
ful sites were also willing to work with clients for longer periods of 
time and did not require that clients be employed in jobs reserved for 
training before being placed in a potentially permanent job.
Prero and Thornton (1991, pp. 17-22) base additional suggestions 
on their observation of the demonstration. One is that training organi 
zations should recognize that convenient transportation is important to 
success in every phase of training and employment. However, since 
these suggestions are not based on the experimental design of the dem 
onstration, they generally fall outside the scope of the present paper.
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In summary, the outcomes do not support the hypothesis that sav 
ings in SSI payments cover the cost for SSA to offer transitional 
employment services as provided in this demonstration. However, it 
appears that outcomes can be enhanced by more narrow targeting and 
by services that are better designed in light of ongoing research.
Further, cost effectiveness might be achieved in a program that had a 
broader set of economic objectives and, therefore, accounted for more 
kinds of benefits. Such gains would include the productivity of other 
wise unemployed workers and reduced costs for other social services. 
The calculation of benefits would also value the greater community 
regard and self-respect that individuals would have from participating 
in the producing mainstream of society.
NOTES
NOTE: This paper represents the opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the Social 
Secunty Administration Thanks are due Craig Thornton and his associates at Mathematica Policy 
Research, Inc., and to Kalman Rupp, Lewis Frain, and Salvatore Galhcchio for their assistance
1 Kochhar estimates that 28 7 percent of SSI recipients under age 65 have a primary diagno 
sis of mental retardation, based on 1988 data (1991, table 12). A total of 4,176,729 persons under 
age 65 received SSI payments in December 1994.
2 Not being statistically significant means that, even in a situation where training would have 
no effect whatsoever on the mean SSI of a population, there would be a reasonable probability of 
observing a decline of $1,376 in the mean SSI payment of a sample of that population. A small 
decline is attributable to a sample's not being representative of the population from which it was 
selected. The smaller the sample, the greater the nsk that it is not representative.
3 For a discussion of comprehensive benefit-cost analyses of rehabilitation programs, see 
Burkhauser and Haveman (1982, pp 68 ff)
4 This observation relative to IQ level does not correspond to a finding in another transitional 
employment demonstration that some impacts were greater on the employment of persons with 
moderate as opposed to mild retardation See Kerachsky et al (1985, p 82 and elsewhere)
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Policies for People with Disabilities 
in U.S. Employment 
and Training Programs
Burt S. Barnow
Johns Hopkins University
This paper discusses the federal government's employment and 
training policies and programs for individuals with disabilities. For 
each program considered, a brief description is provided, followed by a 
discussion of any policies and provisions especially applicable for per 
sons with disabilities, a summary of available evidence on services 
provided to this population, and an assessment of potential program 
matic and policy improvements that could be made.
There are several important issues that, for various reasons, are not 
covered in the paper. First, programs whose main purpose is to deal 
with discrimination in the labor market are not included. Thus, govern 
ment antidiscrimination programs administered by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of 
Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) are 
not discussed. With the important exceptions of vocational rehabilita 
tion and vocational education, which are joint federal-state undertak 
ings, the paper excludes programs administered by the states or by 
other federal agencies. 1
Another important limitation is that the paper does not address the 
issue of whether the level of services to people with disabilities is ade 
quate or even if people with disabilities are served in proportion to 
their share of the eligible population. Although it would be desirable to 
include such information, there has been a variety of definitions used 
over time and by various sources at a given time. Additionally, some 
sources use self-identification, while others rely on observations by the 
individuals compiling the information or on administrative data. 
Indeed, it is the lack of coordination in defining the population in need 
and in establishing roles for various programs that makes it difficult to
297
298 Policies for People with Disabilities in U.S. Employment and Training Programs
determine how well the nation is doing in serving people with disabili 
ties who need training.
Vocational Rehabilitation
The vocational rehabilitation program, authorized under Title I of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, provides grants to states to provide 
comprehensive vocational rehabilitation that meets the "needs of indi 
viduals with handicaps so that such individuals may prepare for and 
engage in gainful employment to the extent of their capabilities." Dis 
abled individuals must satisfy a number of requirements to be eligible 
to participate in the program. Participants must have a physical or men 
tal disability that can be medically described, they must have a sub 
stantial handicap to employment, and they must be capable of 
achieving employ ability (i.e., they have rehabilitation potential). All 
vocational rehabilitation activities are conducted at the state level, but 
they are reviewed and monitored by the Rehabilitation Services 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Education. Currently, there 
are over 80 "state" agencies administering vocational rehabilitation in 
the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and other gov 
ernment units (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993, U.S. Department 
of Education 1992). About half the states have two agencies, one for 
the blind and one for people with other disabilities. In the remaining 
states, a single agency is responsible for all vocational rehabilitation 
services. In fiscal year 1992, total federal funding available for state 
grants was approximately $1.78 billion. These funds are allocated on a 
formula basis (depending on state population, per capita income, etc.), 
and there is a state matching fund requirement (80 percent federal and 
20 percent state except for construction of facilities).
Approximately 1 million individuals are served by state vocational 
rehabilitation agencies annually, and approximately 200,000 are "suc 
cessfully rehabilitated."2 The number of cases rehabilitated dropped 
slightly below 200,000 in 1992 (to 191,000 cases) for the first time in 
25 years. Data on the characteristics of clients who were rehabilitated 
in fiscal year 1991 (the most recent year for which these data are avail 
able) are shown in table I. 3 About half of all clients were between the
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Table 1. Characteristics of Persons Rehabilitated in Vocational 
Rehabilitation, Fiscal Year 1991)
Characteristics
Total
Age at referral
Number reporting
Under 18
18-24
25-44
45-64
65 and over
Sex
Number reporting
Male
Female
Race
Number reporting
White
Black
American Indian/ Alaskan Natives
Asian and Pacific Islander
Hispanic origin
Number reporting
Hispanic origin
Not of Hispanic origin
Education
Number reporting
No grades completed
1-7 grades completed
Total
Number
202,831
202,170
15,214
44,137
100.982
34,612
7,225
202,640
112,452
90,188
2.2,580
162,602
35,973
1,313
2,692
202,591
17,057
185,534
201,507
897
7,926
rehabilitations
Percent
100.0
100.0
7.5
21.8
49.9
17.1
3.6
100.0
55.5
44.5
100.0
80.3
17.8
0.6
1.3
100.0
8.4
91.6
100.0
0.4
3.9
(continued)
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Table 1. (continued)
Characteristics
8-11 grades completed
12 grades completed
13 grades and over completed
Special education
Marital status
Number reporting
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Severity of disability
Number reporting
Severely disabled
Nonseverely disabled
Veteran status
Number reporting
Veteran
Nonveteran
Weekly earnings at application
Number reporting
No earnings
Less than $100
$1004199
$200 and over
Total
Number
45,067
78,225
37,528
31,870
201,923
56,018
7,848
28,955
11,506
97,596
202,831
139,794
63,037
202,623
9,445
193,178
201,887
158,059
14,866
14,136
14,826
rehabilitations
Percent
22.4
38.8
18.6
15.8
100.0
27.7
3.9
14.3
5.7
48.3
100.0
68.9
31.1
100.0
4.7
95.3
100.0
78.3
7.4
7.0
7.3
SOURCE U S. Department of Education (1992). 
NOTE: Items may not total precisely 100 due to rounding.
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ages of 25 and 44. Participants were more likely to be never-married, 
male, and white. In addition, the average participant was more likely to 
be severely disabled and to be a nonveteran. A recent analysis of the 
vocational rehabilitation program (U.S. General Accounting Office 
1993) found that the demographic characteristics of accepted appli 
cants are very similar to those of individuals not accepted. The study 
found applicants and participants more likely to be men and under the 
age of 45 than the eligible population as a whole.
A significant majority, about 78 percent, of rehabilitated clients had 
no earnings at application to the program. The program is supposed to 
focus on individuals with severe disabilities, and 65 percent of the indi 
viduals accepted were classified as severely disabled, as compared to 
35 percent of those not accepted. The most common disabling condi 
tions among those accepted were mental and emotional (43 percent) 
and orthopedic (24 percent).4
Table 2 shows data on the various services received during the 
course of their rehabilitation by clients whose cases were closed in 
1988. Although the majority of participants served received diagnosis 
and evaluation (87 percent) and counseling and guidance (73 percent), 
slightly less than half (47 percent) received training of any sort. Train 
ing is broadly defined in this program and includes education; program 
participants are classified as receiving training if they are given aca 
demic, business, vocational, or personal and vocational adjustment 
training from any source as arranged for by the state agency. Some par 
ticipants received more than one type of training. Services provided in 
1988 did not vary by severity of the disability. The average cost of ser 
vices in 1988 per participant was $1,573 (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1993). In 1991, the average cost per client rehabilitated was 
$2,518 (U.S. Department of Education 1992).
There have been few evaluations of the impact of vocational rehabil 
itation on earnings and employment because it is difficult to identify an 
appropriate group of untreated individuals to use as a comparison 
group. One study (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993) found that 
rehabilitants with physical disabilities, emotional disabilities, and men 
tal retardation were likely to earn $2,000, $1,600, and $1,000 more, 
respectively, than would dropouts from the program. In interpreting 
this result, it is important to keep in mind that the definition of rehabil 
itation includes placement in a job, so the comparison being made is
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not between those who receive services and those who do not receive 
such services. Another recent study, which was limited to Virginia, 
included all closed cases in the treatment group and used dropouts as 
the comparison group (Dean and Dolan 1991). This research found sta 
tistically significant one-year impacts for men ($910) and women 
($1,632) with physical disabilities. For mental and emotionally dis 
abled participants, the impacts were also positive but smaller in magni 
tude and statistically significant only for women with mental 
disabilities. 5
Table 2. Percentage of 1988 Vocational Rehabilitation Clients Who 
Received Various Types of Services
Severely disabled 
Category of service All VR clients clients
Diagnosis and evalution
Counseling and guidance
Restoration
Transportation
Placement
Referral
Income maintenance
Adjustment training
Business or vocational training
Miscellaneous training
College or university training
On-the-job training
Other services
87
73
33
27
22
21
20
19
12
12
11
8
22
88
75
35
28
23
22
20
23
12
14
10
9
23
SOURCE U.S. General Accounting Office (1993) 
NOTE: These figures are based on cases closed in 1988
As the General Accounting Office has pointed out, the vocational 
rehabilitation program clearly deserves more study. Better data are 
needed to determine who receives services and what the impacts of the 
program are on employment and earnings. Recent efforts to develop 
and analyze longitudinal data have improved matters somewhat, but 
good evaluations of the program are still few in number.
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The Job Training Partnership Act Title II Programs
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) authorizes the nation's 
major employment and training programs for individuals with specific 
labor market needs. JTPA was passed in 1982 to replace the Compre 
hensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), and the programs 
began operation in 1983. The specific programs established by JTPA 
are authorized in Titles II, III, and IV of the Act. Major provisions 
include training services for economically disadvantaged adults (Title 
II-A) and youth (Title II-C), the summer youth employment and train 
ing program (Title II-B), employment and training services for dislo 
cated workers (Title III), employment and training programs for Native 
Americans and migrant and seasonal farm workers (Title IV-A), the 
Job Corps (Title IV-B), and veterans' employment and training pro 
grams (Title IV-C). Each of the JTPA programs has specific eligibility 
requirements, although an individual may qualify for more than one 
program. The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assis 
tance Act (EDWAA) of 1988 modified the JTPA Title III program sub 
stantially, and major amendments to JTPA were enacted in December 
1992.6
The JTPA Title II program for economically disadvantaged adults 
and youth is operated through a partnership of federal, state, and local 
government with the private sector. The program is financed by the 
federal government, with funds distributed by formula to over 600 state 
and local governmental units, called service delivery areas (SDAs). 
Each SDA must form a private industry council (PIC) comprised of 
representatives of the private sector and of other governmental and 
nonprofit organizations. PICs may choose to run the program or to 
serve more as a board of directors, providing guidance. Private sector 
members of the PIC must constitute a majority of the membership. 
Major activities for participants enrolled in JTPA include the follow 
ing:
• Basic skills and remedial education. These programs provide par 
ticipants with classroom instruction in reading, arithmetic, and 
other academic skills. The programs are often intended to lead to a 
general equivalency diploma (GED) or high school diploma.
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• On-the-job training (OJT). Work opportunities with individual 
employers are offered in OJT programs. The employer typically 
receives a reimbursement of 50 percent of wages paid to the partic 
ipant for up to six months to cover the cost of formal and informal 
training.
• Work experience. Work experience programs provide paid employ 
ment for participants with government or nonprofit agencies and 
organizations. Participants are generally paid the minimum wage. 
The intent of the program is for the individuals to gain experience 
that will help them qualify for an unsubsidized job.
• Job search assistance. Participants are helped to improve their job 
search methods and skills.
The amount of work experience that can be provided is limited by pro 
visions governing the use of funds, and the 1992 amendments to JTPA 
restricted the use of job search assistance provided without training 
and placed constraints on the use of OJT, particularly for youth. In pro 
gram year 1993, the most common activities for adults were classroom 
training (46 percent), job search assistance (19 percent), and on-the-job 
training (18 percent), as reported by Stanley (1995). In 1993, the aver 
age length of stay for adults was about four months, and the average 
cost per terminated participant was about $3,300.
JTPA programs have several features that encourage the state and 
local governmental units that receive funding to serve people with dis 
abilities, but the programs are generally targeted to needy groups, and 
people with disabilities must often compete with other disadvantaged 
individuals for scarce program resources. The original legislation 
defines a handicapped individual as "any individual who has a physical 
or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a 
substantial handicap to employment." The December 1992 amend 
ments replaced the term "handicapped individual" with the term "indi 
vidual with a disability" but otherwise left the definition unchanged. 
Beginning in program year 1992 (the 12-month period beginning July 
1, 1992), however, programs were required to report individuals with a 
disability using the following definition based on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).
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Any individual who has a physical (motion, vision, hearing) or 
mental (learning or developmental) impairment which substan 
tially limits one or more of such person's life activities and has a 
record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an 
impairment. Record the code as follows:
1 - Yes, individual has such an impairment that does result in a 
substantial barrier to employment;
2 -Yes, individual has such an impairment that does not result in a 
substantial barrier to employment;
3 - No, individual has no disability (U.S. Department of Labor 
1994).
The reporting instructions state that a response of 1 to the revised defi 
nition is the same as the definition used in prior years, although these 
do not appear to be equivalent. While the revised version is to be used 
for reporting characteristics, this definition differs from the statutory 
definition, which is to be used for determining eligibility.
The JTPA Title II programs have enrolled a significant number of 
people with disabilities. Comparisons over time are difficult because of 
the change in the definition for reporting purposes as of program year 
1992. Between program years 1989 and 1991, the total number of indi 
viduals terminated from Title II-A programs dropped substantially, 
from 613,200 to 481,600, and although the proportion of these individ 
uals with disabilities increased from 12.9 percent to 14.2 percent, their 
absolute numbers declined from 79,000 in program year 1989 to 
68,200 in program year 1991 (U.S. Department of Labor 1992 and 
1993a). Data for program year 1993 indicate that 10.6 percent of adults 
terminated and 19.8 percent of the youth terminated had disabilities.
Table 3 shows the characteristics and outcomes for individuals ter 
minated from Title II-A programs. The information is for program year 
1991, the latest for which data are currently available. There are some 
notable differences between the characteristics of disabled and nondis- 
abled persons, but the outcomes are only slightly worse for those with 
disabilities. Relative to nondisabled Title II-A participants, those with 
disabilities were more likely to be men (58 percent compared to 42 
percent), white non-Hispanic (70 percent compared to 47 percent), 
young (42 percent under age 19 compared to 26 percent), not on Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or other welfare (9 percent
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on AFDC compared to 30 percent), and a high school student (41 per 
cent compared to 18 percent). Individuals with disabilities were just as 
likely to be economically disadvantaged as those without disabilities 
(92 percent compared to 93 percent).
Table 3. Comparison of Characteristics of Participants Terminated with 
and without Disabilities in JTPA Title II Programs during 
Program Year 1991 (July 1991-June 1992)
Selected characteristics 
and outcomes
Sex
Male
Female
Minority status
White excluding Hispanic
Black excluding Hispanic
Hispanic
Other
Age at enrollment
Younger than 19
19-21
22-54
55 and older
Economically disadvantaged
Receiving AFDC
Receiving any public assistance
Unemployment compensation 
claimant
Education status
School dropout
Student (high school or less)
High school graduate
People with 
disabilities 
(percent)
58
42
70
20
7
3
42
12
43
4
92
9
30
4
17
41
42
People without 
disabilities 
(percent)
42
58
47
36
13
4
26
16
54
5
93
30
53
7
30
18
53
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Table 3. (continued)
Selected characteristics 
and outcomes
Program activity
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Job search assistance
Work experience
Other services
Median length of stay (days)
Average entered employment rate 
by type of service received
Overall
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Job search assistance
Work experience
Other services
Average hourly wage at termination 
by type of service received
Overall
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Job search assistance
Work experience
Other services
People with 
disabilities 
(percent)
39
9
15
7
29
150.4
49
36
78
72
43
46
$5.44
$5.98
$5.32
$5.52
$4.96
$4.99
People without 
disabilities 
(percent)
45
15
15
6
19
136.5
50
43
73
65
41
41
$5.82
$6.08
$5.76
$5.78
$5.07
$5.55
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1993a)
Participants with disabilities received a slightly different mix of ser 
vices than did other participants. The proportions acquiring classroom 
training and on-the-job training were lower (39 percent compared to 45 
percent and 9 percent compared to 15 percent, respectively), and more
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participants with disabilities received "other services" (29 percent 
compared to 19 percent). Participants with disabilities remained in the 
program about two weeks longer than other participants (150.4 days 
compared to 136.5 days). In terms of outcomes, the proportions enter 
ing employment at termination were virtually identical (49 percent for 
participants with disabilities compared to 50 percent for those without 
disabilities), and the hourly wage rate for those obtaining employment 
was somewhat lower for participants with disabilities ($5.44 per hour 
compared to $5.82).
Thus, in spite of the potential problems with the performance stan 
dards system (described below), JTPA Title II programs have been able 
to attract a reasonable number of participants with disabilities, and the 
outcomes have been close to those achieved for participants without 
disabilities. This relative success does not mean that improvements 
could not be made. It is possible that the favorable results ensue from 
creaming among the population with disabilities. Thus, additional 
incentives in the performance standards system may still be warranted, 
and SDAs should consider negotiating with the governor to obtain 
lower standards if enrolling severely disabled individuals is being con 
sidered.
The Department of Labor recently funded a controlled experiment 
to determine the effectiveness of JTPA Title II-A programs (Orr et al. 
1994). The evaluation took place in 16 sites throughout the country, 
and the treatment and control groups were followed for 30 months 
after random assignment. In-school youth were excluded from the 
experiment. Major findings, as reported by Orr et al. (1994) and Stan 
ley (1995) are as follows:
• For youth, the evaluation found no significant impact on earnings 
during the 30 months after random assignment. Estimates of the 
impact on earnings were positive but not statistically significant 
for young women and were negative and not significant for young 
men.
• The program increased earnings for both adult men and adult 
women participants. During the second post-program year, both 
men and women experienced gains of about $900 in 1993 dollars 
over the control groups. These gains represented a 15 percent dif 
ferential for women and a 10 percent differential for men.
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• The earnings gap between the experimental and control groups 
widened over the post-program period, especially for men. Subse 
quent analyses may lead to larger impacts of the program.
• The impacts were generally greatest for participants assigned to 
receive OJT and/or job search assistance, and the impact for voca 
tional classroom training was always positive (but not always sta 
tistically significant for subgroups).
At this time, the future of JTPA is very uncertain. A number of propos 
als have been made to modify the nation's employment and training 
system. Options being considered include abolishing the programs 
entirely and providing the eligible population with vouchers, and pro 
viding employment and training block grants to states.
There are several special features of JTPA that either encourage 
local SDAs to enroll people with disabilities or make it easier for peo 
ple with disabilities to meet the entry requirements. While these fea 
tures are likely to have increased enrollment of people with disabilities 
in the programs, it is impossible to gauge how large the impact has 
been.
Special Definition of Family for People with Disabilities
The Title II JTPA programs have strict targeting requirements. At 
least 90 percent of the participants must be economically disadvan- 
taged, and a maximum of 10 percent may have some other barrier to 
employment. 7 Individuals with disabilities are permitted to have only 
their personal income considered in determining eligibility rather than 
having the entire family's income counted. This provision permits an 
individual with disabilities to qualify even if his or her parents or 
spouse earns enough to exceed the income limits. Estimates are not 
available on the number of additional individuals with disabilities who 
are eligible because of this provision.
Requirement for Enrollment of the Hard to Serve
The December 1992 amendments to JTPA added requirements that 
at least 65 percent of both Title II-A adult and Title II-C youth partici 
pants fall into a category of "hard to serve." In addition, the Secretary 
of Labor is required to establish performance standards and a reward
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structure for SDAs that exceed the 65 percent requirement. Section 203 
defines the term hard to serve for adults to include the following cate 
gories:
• individuals who are basic skills deficient,
• individuals who are school dropouts,
• recipients of cash welfare programs, including AFDC), Supple 
mental Security Income (SSI), and general assistance,
• offenders,
• individuals with disabilities,
• homeless individuals, and
• individuals in another category approved by the governor but not 
to include "poor work history" or "unemployed."
For youth, the disabilities category is expanded to include learning dis 
abilities, and the welfare recipient category is omitted; categories 
added are pregnant or parenting individuals, runaways, and persons 
with educational attainment at least one grade level below what is 
appropriate.
Although the hard-to-serve requirements could, in theory, increase 
enrollments of individuals with disabilities, it is unlikely that these pro 
visions will have much impact. The Department of Labor has chosen to 
implement the performance standards by making achievement of the 
required enrollment of hard-to-serve individuals a "gate" that must be 
passed to receive any other incentive funds; however,-no incentive 
funds are received simply for meeting or exceeding the hard-to-serve 
participation requirements. A series of group discussions was held at 
three regional conferences in the spring of 1994 for an evaluation of 
the impact of the 1992 amendments. At the meetings, representatives 
of most SDAs indicated that they were already fulfilling the hard-to- 
serve requirements, and so they would not have to change their enroll 
ment behavior as a result of the amendments. Representatives of some 
SDAs stated that they have selected food stamp recipients as their addi 
tional target group, and because the eligibility requirements are rela 
tively broad for the food stamp program, such SDAs would have little 
trouble satisfying the 65 percent requirement. Thus, the hard-to-serve 
stipulations are likely to have little, if any, impact on enrollment of
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people with disabilities (or of other hard-to-serve groups, for that mat 
ter): most SDAs already meet the requirement and the additional cate 
gory provides SDAs with sufficient flexibility to satisfy the rules 
without serving other groups.
Performance Standards Adjustments
The JTPA Title II programs include a performance management sys 
tem in which SDAs are held accountable for meeting goals. The basic 
parameters of the system are established at the national level, but gov 
ernors have a significant amount of latitude to change the level of 
expected performance to meet their own criteria, to add additional 
evaluation measures, and to decide how the various standards will be 
aggregated to assess total outcomes. SDAs that exceed expected results 
receive additional funding; SDAs that fall short receive technical assis 
tance, and, if performance remains poor for two consecutive years, 
they are reorganized.
There are currently four core performance standards for adults 
served under Title II-A of JTPA and two standards for youth served 
under Title II-C:
• the adult follow-up employment rate, defined as the total number 
of adult terminees who were employed at least 20 hours per week 
during the 13th week after termination, divided by the total num 
ber of adult terminees;
• adult follow-up weekly earnings, defined as total weekly earnings 
for all adults who were employed for at least 20 hours per week 
during the 13th week after termination, divided by the total num 
ber of adults employed at follow-up;
• the welfare adult follow-up employment rate, defined for adult 
welfare recipients in the same manner as for all adults;
• welfare follow-up weekly earnings defined for adult welfare recip 
ients in the same manner as for all adults;
• the youth entered employment rate, defined as the total number of 
youth who, at termination entered employment with at least 20 
hours per week, divided by the total number of youth who termi 
nated (other than potential dropouts who remained in school); and
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• the youth employability enhancement rate, denned as the total 
number of youth terminating from the program who obtained one 
of the employability enhancements at termination, divided by the 
total number of youth who terminated. 8
Satisfactory performance on each of the measures is adjusted to take 
account of the characteristics of participants served and local economic 
conditions. The adjustments are determined through regression analy 
sis based on data submitted by SDAs in previous years. Linear regres 
sion models are used to determine which participant and local 
economic variables have a statistically significant impact on the perfor 
mance measures.9 Variables with insignificant coefficients or coeffi 
cients with what appears to be the "wrong" sign are omitted from the 
adjustment equation. Note, for example, that percentage Hispanic does 
not appear as an adjustment for the adult follow-up employment rate, 
so SDAs receive no adjustment in expected performance for serving 
more Hispanics. The constants in the equations are set so that approxi 
mately 75 percent of all SDAs will exceed the standards, but governors 
may vary the constant to take account of conditions in their states.
Adjustment models for program year 1994 (July 1, 1994 through 
June 30, 1995) have recently been released. Table 4 shows the adjust 
ments in program year 1994 for the percentage of participants with dis 
abilities and for three other characteristics that apply to the six core 
performance measures. The two measures with adjustments of zero 
(the two welfare measures) make no modification in expected perfor 
mance for serving individuals with disabilities, i.e., SDAs are expected 
to achieve as well on these measures for people with disabilities as they 
do for other participants. To interpret the adjustments, consider the fol 
lowing example for the adult follow-up employment rate. The percent 
age of participants with a disability coefficient of -.090 means that, if 
the share of participants who have a disability is increased by one per 
centage point (such as from 10 percent to 11 percent), then the accept 
able level of performance on the measure is decreased by.09 
percentage points. The adjustments in the standards for the adult fol 
low-up employment rate and adult follow-up weekly earnings are 
greater for serving people with disabilities than are the adjustments for 
dropouts, blacks, and females; however, the adjustments for welfare 
adults with disabilities on follow-up employment and earnings are zero
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and are, therefore, smaller than the adjustments for the other three cat 
egories.
Table 4. Performance Standards Adjustments in Program Year 1994
(July 1994-June 1995) for Title II-A Core Standards for Persons 
with Disabilities and Selected Other Groups
Population characteristics
Performance measure Disability Dropout Black Female
(percent)
Adult follow-up employment rate
Adult follow-up weekly earnings
Adult welfare follow-up 
employment rate
Adult welfare follow-up weekly 
earnings
Youth entered employment rate
Youth employability 
enhancement rate
-.090
-.558
0
0
-.047
-.047
-.084
-.276
-.062
-.274
-162
0
-.086
-.325
-.048
-.340
-.090
-.059
-.056
-.443
-.144
-.642
-.061
0
SOURCE: Social Policy Research Associates (1994)
Although the adjustment procedures provide some stimuli to serve 
people with disabilities, the incentives do not appear especially strong 
and suffer from several shortcomings. To see the size of the incentives, 
consider an SDA that initially has all factors in the adjustment model at 
the national average and has the option of doubling the percentage of 
people with disabilities it serves, from 10.6 percent to 21.2 percent. For 
an SDA with average values of all factors in the adjustment model, the 
standard for the follow-up employment rate would be 59.0 percent 
(based on the Department of Labor worksheet). If the SDA doubled its 
proportion of people with disabilities to 21.2 percent, the follow-up 
employment rate standard would drop by .95 percentage points (10.6 x 
.09 = .95) to 58.05 percent. Thus, although an SDA receives a reduc 
tion in its level of required performance for serving additional people 
with disabilities, the magnitude of the incentive is probably too small 
to have much impact. The result is also quite small when the same 
exercise is performed for follow-up weekly earnings: the standard for
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follow-up weekly earnings for an SDA with average factor values 
would drop from $245 to $236 if the proportion of participants with 
disabilities doubled from 10.6 percent to 21.2 percent. In the case of 
adult welfare recipients, an increase in the proportion of participants 
with disabilities would have no impact on minimum acceptable perfor 
mance.
Another shortcoming of the adjustment procedure is that it treats all 
disabilities alike. An SDA receives the same adjustment for serving a 
person with a minor or a major disability. SDAs who wish to maximize 
measured performance avoid serving people with major disabilities 
and concentrate on people with minor disabilities. 10 Under the current 
performance management structure, it is impossible to overcome this 
problem because there are too few participants with disabilities to be 
disaggregated into finer categories for the regression analysis used to 
determine the adjustments.
Note that even if the adjustment procedure worked as intended, it 
would provide no incentive to serve people with disabilities. As 
explained in the latest technical assistance guide (Social Policy 
Research Associates 1994, p. III-l), "Performance standards are 
adjusted to 'level the playing field' by making the standards neutral 
with respect to who is served and to local economic conditions." Thus 
the current system is not intended to provide net incentives to serve 
people with disabilities; if the Department of Labor wished to provide 
such motivation, the adjustments would have to do more than level the 
playing field.
Another problem with the current approach to adjusting perfor 
mance is that, because the percentage of participants with disabilities is 
relatively small, the regression coefficients are probably unstable, par 
ticularly for the adult welfare group, which is likely to include very few 
people. The small proportion of welfare recipients with disabilities 
probably results in a failure to find an appropriate adjustment for adults 
on welfare. Unfortunately, under the current approach, SDAs receive 
no modification in their expected performance for adults on welfare for 
serving recipients with disabilities. Although the program year 1994 
adjustment models for youth included a factor for the proportion of 
participants with disabilities, the 1993 models included no such adjust 
ment. It is unlikely that the reason for the change in the status of the 
variable is in any way related to changes in the efficacy of the programs
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for people with disabilities; instead the change probably stems from 
the instability of the regression coefficients estimated.
Finally, by estimating the adjustment models on participant data 
rather than on the unserved eligible population, the current approach 
may create several problems. First, if the SDAs do tend to cream 
among the disabled, the adjustments produced by the regressions will 
apply to the "more advantaged" population already served and may not 
provide enough incentive for those with more severe disabilities to be 
served. In addition, by estimating the relationships on the basis of par 
ticipant data, the coefficients derived combine training impacts with 
labor market differences that would have resulted in the absence of the 
program. 11
In sum, the performance management system in JTPA has mixed 
effects in its incentives to serve people with disabilities. If there were 
no performance management system, SDA administrators would not 
consider creaming as a means of assuring that they have high measured 
performance. The performance management system includes adjust 
ments for serving groups with various outcomes, but the adjustments 
for serving people with disabilities do not take account of the degree of 
disability; the effects are sometimes impossible to measure, resulting 
in no adjustment; and the adjustments are based on the population cur 
rently served rather than on the population interested in participating. 
Although the current regression-based system has an objectivity that 
has helped make it credible with the SDA administrators, it may not 
provide them with strong enough incentives to enroll people with dis 
abilities in adequate numbers. The Department of Labor should seri 
ously consider the possibility of modifying the adjustments to achieve 
greater enrollment of groups of interest. 12 Although regression model 
ing provides a useful starting point for adjustments and was very help 
ful in getting SDAs to accept the performance management system, the 
Department of Labor should now determine whether the current proce 
dures do an adequate job of promoting its policies. In situations where 
the regression model for the current year produces coefficients that are 
judged inappropriate for inclusion, the Department of Labor could use 
estimates from previous years, pool data from several years, or use 
results obtained from another group. This would avoid having no 
adjustment for adult welfare follow-up employment and earnings in 
program year 1994. In addition, the Department of Labor should
316 Policies for People with Disabilities in U.S. Employment and Training Programs
reconsider whether it wants simply to "level the playing field" or to 
provide actual incentives to serve people with disabilities and other 
groups with high needs.
Vocational Education
Vocational education programs provide students at the secondary 
and postsecondary levels with training that will enable them to pursue 
employment in a broad range of occupations. Federal support for voca 
tional education is authorized under the Perkins Act, which defines 
vocational education as follows:
Vocational education means organized educational programs 
which are directly related to the preparation of individuals for paid 
or unpaid employment, in such fields as agriculture, business 
occupations, home economics, health occupations, marketing and 
distributive occupations, technical and emerging occupations, 
modern industrial and agricultural arts, and trades and industrial 
occupations, or for additional preparation for a career in those 
fields, and in other occupations requiring other than a baccalaure 
ate or advanced degree (P.L. 98-527).
There is little, if any, distinction between vocational education and 
training provided under JTPA and other programs, so it is appropriate 
to treat vocational education as a training program for this study.
Vocational education is primarily funded by the states rather than by 
the federal government, but federal support is currently $1.178 billion 
annually (Apling and Irwin 1994). 13 Most of that money is distributed 
to states by a formula based on population and per-capita income. 
States are required to distribute 75 percent of their federal funds to 
local areas using a formula based on proxy measures of poverty. States 
have discretion to allocate the funds between the secondary and post- 
secondary levels. Most states spend a majority of the funds on second 
ary education; in fiscal year 1993, with 44 states reporting, 62.2 
percent of federal funds were used at the secondary level, with the per 
centage varying from 8.6 percent up to 91.9 percent (U.S. Department 
of Education 1994). In the discussion that follows, attention is 
restricted to postsecondary vocational education. 14
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 317
About two-thirds (65.7 percent) of individuals enrolled in postsec- 
ondary vocational programs in the 1989-1990 school year were in pub 
lic community colleges, and 22.5 percent were in proprietary schools 
(Tuma 1993). The remaining students were enrolled in public voca 
tional-technical schools (3.7 percent), private junior colleges (2.9 per 
cent), public four-year colleges (3.2 percent), and private four-year 
colleges (1.9 percent).
Analysis of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey 
(NPSAS) indicates that many people with disabilities participate in 
postsecondary vocational education. Of the 5.76 million students 
enrolled in vocational programs in the 1989-1990 school year, about 
12.7 percent, or 732,000, had a physical or learning disability. 15 The 
proportion of students with disabilities was greater in vocational cur 
ricula than in academic two-year programs (11.9 percent) and four- 
year degree programs (7.6 percent).
The literature concerning the impact of postsecondary vocational 
education on earnings is somewhat inconsistent. One review of the lit 
erature concludes that each additional year of education beyond high 
school, academic or vocational, increases earnings by 5 to 10 percent 
even if a degree or other credential is not obtained (Stanley 1995). 
Another survey of the literature is much more cautious and concludes 
that analysis of the returns to higher education is hampered by a lack of 
recent, high-quality data and by methodological problems (U.S. 
Department of Education 1994).
Several approaches have been included in the Perkins legislation to 
encourage states and local school districts to adequately enroll and 
serve individuals with disabilities. Prior to 1990, 10 percent of the fed 
eral funds were earmarked for services to participants with disabilities. 
The 1990 legislation eliminated the set-aside but gave states and local 
districts increased responsibilities such as
• obtaining input from state personnel responsible for programs for 
students with disabilities,
• adjusting performance standards and measures "to encourage ser 
vice to targeted groups or special populations,"
• assuring that the state will monitor the degree to which the needs 
of special students are met, and
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• assuring that the state will guarantee equal access to quality voca 
tional education programs for special population students and 
establish procedures for community input at the state and local 
levels (U.S. Department of Education 1994).
The National Assessment of Vocational Education conducted a survey 
to determine if the elimination of the set-aside resulted in reduced ser 
vices for disabled students and concluded that "elimination of the set- 
aside funds did not lead to a reduction in services [to students with dis 
abilities] among postsecondary institutions" (U.S. Department of Edu 
cation 1994). The use of adjustments to performance standards to 
reflect the proportion of students with disabilities was completed or in 
process in 45 percent of the states by the 1992-1993 school year (U.S. 
Department of Education 1994). It is likely that states are moving 
slowly in this area because they are reluctant to express a willingness 
to accept lower performance for special populations than for the regu 
lar population.
Postsecondary vocational education is a major source of training for 
people with disabilities. The recent National Assessment of Vocational 
Education has indicated that alternatives to set-asides can result in 
maintaining the enrollment level of individuals with disabilities. An 
important issue for further exploration is what is and should be the 
respective roles of vocational rehabilitation and vocational education. 
Is there a need for separate programs, and if so, what should the 
responsibilities of each program be? In addition, estimates should be 
made of the impact of vocational education on the employment and 
earnings of the population with disabilities.
The Employment Service
The U.S. Employment Service (or job service, as it is sometimes 
known) is a federal-state partnership providing labor exchange and 
related services and activities to U.S. workers and firms. The employ 
ment service is one of the nation's oldest employment and training pro 
grams, dating back to the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. The program is 
funded through the federal unemployment insurance tax on employers, 
with the money channeled back to state employment service agencies.
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In this section, the provision of basic labor exchange activities for per 
sons with disabilities is discussed, along with the targeted jobs tax 
credit (TJTC), which was administered by the employment service. 
The treatment of disabilities in the testing program is also briefly 
reviewed.
Although the employment service is intended to assist to all seg 
ments of the labor force, special provisions apply to individuals with 
disabilities. 16 When the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 amended 
the Wagner-Peyser Act, people with disabilities were the only popula 
tion group for whom states were required to include provisions in their 
annual plans. Section 8(d) of the Wagner-Peyser Act indicates the fol 
lowing:
Such (annual state) plans shall include provision for the promo 
tion and development of employment opportunities for handi 
capped persons and for job counseling and placement of such 
persons, and for the designation of at least one person in each 
State or Federal Employment office, whose duties shall include 
the effectuation of such purposes.
Each October, the Employment Service observes National Disabil 
ity Employment Awareness Month. During October, special promo 
tional kits prepared by the President's Committee on Employment of 
People with Disabilities are distributed to state employment service 
agencies. The kits are intended to assist the state agencies in observing 
the program and in advancing opportunities for people with disabili 
ties.
The most recent data on characteristics of applicants and the ser 
vices provided to them are for program year 1992 (July 1992 through 
June 1993), and highlights are presented in table 5. People with dis 
abilities made up a very small proportion of all applicants: only 
529,000 out of 21.346 million applicants, or 2.5 percent, as of program 
year 1992. This is somewhat less than one would expect based on their 
share of the labor force. 17 Relative to all applicants, those with disabili 
ties were more likely to have been males (72.4 percent compared to 
58.3 percent), over age 44 (31.1 percent compared to 19.1 percent), 
and economically disadvantaged (25.7 percent compared to 15.8 per 
cent). Surprisingly, the percentage on welfare was about the same for
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the two groups (5.9 percent for applicants with disabilities and 5.6 per 
cent for those without disabilities).
Table 5. Characteristics and Activities of Employment Service 
Applicants, Program Year 1992 (July 1992-June 1993)
Characteristics and activities All applicants
People with 
disabilities
Total active applicants
Male
Female
Age
Under 22
22-44
45-54
55 and over
Economically disadvantaaged
Welfare recipient
Services received
Assessment
Testing
Job search activities
Referral to employment
Placement
21,346,000
(Percent)
58.3
41.7
15.5
65.3
12.0
7.1
15.8
5.6
8.8
2.4
15.2
37.3
12.6
529,000
72.4
27.6
7.8
61.2
19.8
11.3
25.7
5.9
17.2
3.6
23.8
42.5
14.4
SOURCE. Data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, United States Employment Service, 
October 1994.
Employment service applicants with disabilities were more likely to 
have received services and obtained a job than other applicants. 
Assessment was provided to 17.2 percent of applicants with disabilities 
but to only 8.8 percent of all applicants. A slightly higher percentage of 
applicants with disabilities were tested (3.6 percent of applicants with 
disabilities and 2.4 percent of all applicants), but this result must be 
interpreted with caution as testing is inappropriate for some people
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with disabilities. Individuals with disabilities were also more likely to 
have had job search activities (23.8 percent compared to 15.2 percent 
for all applicants) and to have been referred for a job (42.5 percent 
compared to 37.3 percent). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
applicants with disabilities were slightly more likely to have been 
placed in a job (14.4 percent compared to 12.6 percent). Thus, individ 
uals with disabilities have done quite well relative to people with no 
disabilities in terms of the labor services provided to them and the 
results achieved. The only area that may be of concern is that the pro 
portion of people with disabilities using the employment service has 
been lower than one would anticipate.
TJTC was enacted in 1978 to provide incentives for firms to hire 
workers with selected characteristics. The program has been controver 
sial throughout its life, and it has been scheduled for termination 
numerous times. The program expired December 31, 1994, but some 
parties have expressed interest in reviving the program. Many of the 
provisions that have generated disputes about TJTC were either cor 
rected or did not apply to workers with disabilities. In previous years, 
for example, firms were able to receive retroactive certifications for 
hiring members of the target groups, and young workers with no spe 
cial barriers to employment were eligible if they were in a cooperative 
education program.
Evaluations of the program indicate that it may have had a small 
positive effect on employment of economically disadvantaged youth, 
but the results are not robust, and research on the impact of the pro 
gram on people with disabilities has not been conducted. 18 In addition, 
one study found that advising employers of one's eligibility through 
participation in a welfare program actually hurt job prospects; because 
disabilities are more difficult to conceal, it is unlikely that this effect 
would pertain to people with disabilities (Burtless 1985).
Eligible individuals could obtain vouchers from the employment 
service indicating that they qualified for the credit. An employer was 
required to request certification when or before the employee began 
work. If the job applicant had a voucher, the employer had five days to 
request certification. For individuals without vouchers, the employer 
was required to certify to the employment service that a good faith 
effort was made to determine eligibility.
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The tax credit for most groups was 40 percent of the first $6,000 in 
qualified wages, with a maximum credit of $2,400. Employers claim 
ing the credit reduced their tax deduction for wages by the amount of 
the credit. The Committee on Ways and Means (U.S. Congress 1994, p. 
709) notes that the effective subsidy was about 18 percent for a full- 
time employee hired at the minimum wage by an employer in the 35 
percent tax bracket.
In its final form, TJTC applied to nine groups:
• people with disabilities who have been referred to an employer 
from the vocational rehabilitation program of either a state or the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs;
• recipients of federal SSI, the welfare program for poor individuals 
and couples who are aged, blind, or disabled;
• youth aged 16 to 19 who are from economically disadvantaged 
families and who participate in a qualified cooperative education 
program;
• economically disadvantaged Vietnam-era veterans;
• recipients of state or local general assistance payments for at least 
30 days;
• youth aged 18 to 22 from economically disadvantaged families;
• economically disadvantaged ex-convicts who are hired no later 
than five years after the earlier of release from prison or the date 
of conviction;
• recipients of AFDC who have received assistance for at least 90 
days prior to being hired; and
• economically disadvantaged youth aged 16-17 when hired for a 
summer job, if they have not previously worked for the same 
employer.
Although people with disabilities could have been in any of the nine 
categories, they were most likely to be in the first two. In program year 
1991, 500,000 certifications were issued (Landini 1995). The most 
recent year for which the distribution of certifications by eligibility cat 
egory is available is calendar year 1989. In that year, 9.0 percent of the 
certifications were for vocational rehabilitation referrals and 1.6 per-
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cent were for supplemental security income recipients. If those propor 
tions remained the same, slightly over 50,000 certifications were issued 
per year for people with disabilities. (Of all certifications, economi 
cally disadvantaged youth 18 to 22 years old and AFDC recipients 
were the two largest groups, constituting about three-quarters of the 
total.) Although TJTC may have certified a significant number of indi 
viduals with disabilities, the lack of any evidence showing that the pro 
gram increased employment or earnings for those certified makes it 
likely that the program's expiration has not produced much harm for 
the U.S. population with disabilities.
As part of its procedure of matching job applicants and employers, 
the Employment Service has long used aptitude tests, particularly the 
General Aptitude Test Battery (GATE). In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
testing program became increasingly controversial, primarily for rea 
sons unrelated to disabilities. Issues of importance included the ques 
tion of whether test scores could be generalized and applied to most or 
all occupations (validity generalization or VG) and how differences in 
mean scores across demographic groups should be handled in scoring 
the GATE and reporting results to employers (group norming). In addi 
tion, the test was nearly 45 years old, and there was concern about how 
well it was holding up in predicting job success.
To deal with these and other concerns, including the applicability of 
tests such as the GATE for people with disabilities, the Department of 
Labor provided funds to the National Research Council to investigate 
matters related to fairness in employment testing. Although most of the 
resulting report deals with other topics, the National Research Council 
Committee has several recommendations regarding employment test 
ing for people with disabilities:
• For applicants with handicapping conditions, we recommend the 
continued use of job counselors to make referrals.
• Measures should be taken to ensure that no job order is filled auto 
matically and solely through the VG-GATB system. Job counse 
lors who serve handicapped applicants, disabled veterans, or other 
populations with special needs must have regular access to the 
daily flow of job orders.
• To ensure that handicapped applicants who can compete with 
tested applicants are given that opportunity, the GATE should be
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used when feasible to assess the abilities of handicapped appli 
cants. But the test should be used to supplement decision making, 
not to take the place of counseling services.
• Because special expertise in assessing the capabilities of people 
with handicaps is necessary and available, we recommend that the 
Department of Labor encourage closer coordination between state 
rehabilitation agencies and State Employment Service Agencies. 
States should consider placing their rehabilitation counselors in 
local employment service offices that serve a sizable population of 
handicapped people (Hartigan and Wigdor 1989).
As a result of the National Research Council study, the employment 
service has undertaken a major psychometric research agenda to adapt 
its testing procedures to meet the needs of employers and applicants 
without discriminating against particular groups. Results of these stud 
ies are now becoming available. The interim policy is to recognize that 
tests can be useful, but no referral can rest solely on test scores. As 
noted, testing currently involves only a small proportion of applicants, 
but the percentage is slightly higher for those with disabilities.
Employment of Workers with Disabilities 
under Special Certificates
Since 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (Section 14[c]) has per 
mitted employers meeting certain requirements and obtaining special 
certificates to pay workers with disabilities less than the minimum 
wage. 19 The term "worker with a disability" is defined for this law as 
"an individual whose earning or productive capacity is impaired by a 
physical or mental disability, including those related to age or injury, 
for the work to be performed." Employers who wish to make use of 
this provision must obtain a certificate from the Wage and Hour Divi 
sion of the Department of Labor's Employment Standards Administra 
tion.
The covered employee is to be paid a "commensurate wage," which 
is defined as the prevailing wage for the work adjusted for the produc 
tivity of the person with the disability relative to the typical worker in
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the area. Thus, if the prevailing wage for a given job is $5.00 per hour 
and a disabled worker is 80 percent as productive as a typical worker, 
the disabled individual could be paid .80 x $5.00 = $4.00 per hour, 
which is less than the regular minimum wage, provided that the 
employer obtains the certificate.
An employer who wishes to operate such a program must calculate 
both the prevailing wage rate and the relative productivity of the work 
ers. Because worker productivity varies, employers are responsible for 
measuring the productivity of each person employed under the pro 
gram to assure that the individual is not paid less than the commensu 
rate wage. Workers must be reviewed at least once every six months to 
reassess their commensurate wage. Because of the computations that 
must be conducted and employer fear of violating discrimination law, 
particularly the ADA, most affected individuals are employed by shel 
tered workshops that exclusively hire workers with disabilities, and 
few such workers are hired by regular firms. A Department of Labor 
official has estimated that approximately 7,000 employers have certifi 
cates and that about 200,000 workers are employed under the program. 
It is believed that the majority of those working under the program 
have mental retardation as their disability. In carrying out investiga 
tions, the Wage and Hour Division has found that employers some 
times underestimate the productivity of their workers with disabilities.
Although the special certificate program affects a large number of 
people with disabilities, the Department of Labor has not evaluated the 
program in over 20 years, due to a shortage of resources. The net 
impact of the program on job creation and whether the program could 
or should be expanded are of particular interest. Especially worth 
exploring is the potential for expanding the use of the program by reg 
ular employers.
Conclusions
A number of federal employment and training programs are avail 
able for people with disabilities. In reviewing the variety of programs 
that serve this population, is that there does not appear to be a compre 
hensive plan for assessing these individuals' employment and training
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needs or for developing a comprehensive service strategy. Many of the 
programs use different definitions of disabilities, and programs often 
appear disconnected from others in the same cabinet department and 
linked even less with programs and agencies in other departments. A 
comprehensive review of all the major employment and training pro 
grams for people with disabilities is overdue. Among the questions that 
need to be answered are the following:
• What are the unique responsibilities of each program in serving 
individuals with disabilities?
• When (if ever) is it appropriate to serve individuals with disabili 
ties in special programs such as vocational rehabilitation, and 
when is it better to serve them in general programs such as voca 
tional education and JTPA?
• How can the coordination of programs be encouraged, so that 
duplication of effort is avoided and so that people with disabilities 
are served most effectively?
• What are appropriate levels of service to individuals with disabili 
ties in each of the programs? What is the appropriate level of ser 
vice overall?
• If some programs are not serving appropriate numbers of people 
with disabilities, what incentives or requirements should there be 
for them to meet these goals?
It is apparent that all of the major employment and training pro 
grams have an interest in serving individuals with disabilities. Unfortu 
nately, the lack of a single lead agency has led to decentralized, 
uncoordinated efforts with inconsistent and incomplete data, and one 
cannot judge whether the resources provided are adequate or if the mix 
of programs and services is appropriate.
NOTES
1 The paper also does not cover the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) program To the 
extent that the DOT (or its successor) indicates essential functions of occupations, the DOT may 
be important in interpreting provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act The DOT is in the 
midst of a major revision, and Department of Labor staff have indicated that they are aware of the 
issues, but the DOT revision project is at too early a stage for any findings to have been reported.
2 Closures from the active caseload are classified as rehabilitated if the individuals have (1) 
been declared eligible for services, (2) received appropriate diagnostic and related services, (3)
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had a program for vocational rehabilitation services formulated, (4) completed the program, (5) 
been provided counseling, and (6) been determined to be suitably employed for a minimum of 60 
days.
3 Note that since these data only apply to cases that were closed with rehabilitation during fis 
cal year 1991, they may not exactly reflect the total population of individuals being served by the 
program.
4. Figures in this paragraph are for individuals accepted into the program in 1988 (U.S. Gen 
eral Accounting Office 1993) Data on cases rehabilitated in 1991 (U S. Department of Education 
1992) provide similar but not identical findings
5. Dean and Dolan note that the use of dropouts as a comparison group is not ideal, but they 
argue that dropouts are the best available group for the analysis
6 The Title III program for dislocated workers serves very few people with disabilities and is 
not discussed further in this paper. In program year 1990, for example, only 2 to 3 percent of indi 
viduals terminated, depending on the source, were reported as having disabilities.
7 Economically disadvantaged is defined in Section 4 of JTPA as an individual who is a mem 
ber of a family that receives cash welfare payments under a federal, state, or local welfare pro 
gram, is a member of a family receiving total family income for the six months prior to 
application that is less than either the poverty level or 70 percent of the lower living standard 
income level, is receiving or is eligible to receive food stamps, qualifies as a homeless individual 
under the McKmney Act, or is a foster child on whose behalf state or local payments are made
8. Youth employabihty enhancements include attaining two or more PIC-recognized youth 
employment competencies, completing a major level of education following participation of at 
least 90 days or 200 hours in the program, and entering and remaining at least 90 days or 200 
hours in non-Title II training or receiving a certificate of occupational skill attainment
9 Governors are not required to use the Department of Labor's adjustment models, but virtu 
ally all states now do In the early years of the program, many states used the Secretary's stan 
dards without adjusting for participant characteristics and local economic conditions
10 This "creaming" problem is not unique to people with disabilities, and, as noted, Congress 
amended JTPA in 1992 to require SDAs to assure that at least 65 percent of participants fall into a 
category of "hard to serve "
11 See Barnow 1994. Barnow demonstrates that, if the goal of the performance management 
system is to maximize total impact on the performance measures, then the current system leads to 
disincentives to serve members of groups for whom the program is most effective
12 This point applies to any hard-to-serve group. See Barnow and Constantme (1980)
13 It is widely believed that federal monies account for 8 to 10 percent of funding for voca 
tional education, but accurate estimates are unavailable
14. The Perkins Act also supports several "special" and "national" programs. In fiscal year 
1995, funded programs include vocational education provided by community-based organiza 
tions, tech-prep education, consumer and homemaking education, and tnbally controlled postsec- 
ondary vocational institutions (Apling and Irwm 1994).
15. Figures in this section were estimated by the author based on data from NPSAS (Tuma 
1993)
16 The Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) is administered through the Office oi 
the Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training DVOP funds about 1,880 special 
ists who provide outreach, job development, and placement services to veterans with disabilities 
About three-quarters of the DVOP staff are located in local employment service offices.
17 One must be cautious in making comparisons because of variation in the definitions used 
but people with disabilities compose about 4 2 percent of the labor force. In 1993, there were 5 4 
million people with disabilities out of a total of 128 million people in the adult labor force
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Because the unemployment rate for individuals with disabilities is about twice as high as for those 
without work disabilities, one would expect the former to show greater use of the employment 
service See LaPlante, et al. 1996).
18. For a brief review of some of the literature on TJTC, see Ehrenberg and Smith (1994)
19. This section is based on a telephone interview with Mr. Howard B. Ostmann of the 
Employment Standards Administration and on Title 29, Part 25, of the Code of Federal Regula 
tions.
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Improving the Return to Work of Social 
Security Disability Beneficiaries
Monroe Berkowitz 
Rutgers University
This paper explores alternatives to the present system of rehabilitat 
ing or returning to work persons who are applicants for or beneficiaries 
of the disability programs of the Social Security Administration (SSA). 
The proposals are presented in two parts. Part I pertains to beneficiaries 
and is based on the benefit system as it currently exists. Part II pro 
poses changes in how the SSA determines eligibility for benefits.
The following assumptions and beliefs underlie the recommenda 
tions:
1. The current Return to Work (RTW) system in social security is 
functioning poorly, as evidenced by the low number of persons 
who leave the rolls for reasons other than death or transfer to the 
retirement system.
2. The SSA's role in the RTW process should be minimized in favor 
of allowing market forces to operate.
3. Private sector providers should be encouraged to enter the mar 
ket and to bear the associated risks, and they should be rewarded 
based on performance rather than on the costs of services pro 
vided.
The Existing Return-to-work Program
Under the current arrangements, SSA is supposed to advise appli 
cants about rehabilitation possibilities. Using SSA guidelines that may 
be adapted to state conditions, the state Disability Determination Ser 
vice (DDS) refers beneficiaries to the state vocational rehabilitation
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(VR) agency. The exact substance of this referral is not at all clear. The 
applicant may be informed of the existence of the VR program or may 
be given literature about it. 1 Apparently, in most SSA field offices, 
there is no concerted effort to inform applicants about what the pro 
gram might do for them or about the relationship between these ser 
vices and eligibility for the SSA benefits program. 2
The individual interested in rehabilitation must submit a formal 
application to the state VR agency with evidence of his/her physical or 
mental condition. The VR counselor will interview the applicant, per 
haps order further psychological or physical examinations, and decide 
whether the person should be accepted for services. If accepted, the cli 
ent works out an individual written rehabilitation plan (IWRP) with the 
counselor that sets forth the intended services and the objective of the 
program. 3
Under the usual VR rules, a client is considered rehabilitated if 
placed in a job or homemaker status for a period of two months. In 
order for the VR agency to be reimbursed by SSA for the costs of the 
services, it must meet a sterner test of rehabilitation. The beneficiary 
must be back at work earning more than the "substantial gainful activ 
ity" (SGA) level (currently $500 per month) for a period of at least 
nine months. If return to work for that period comes about, the VR 
agency is reimbursed for all reasonable expenses it incurred, subject to 
a maximum payment equivalent to the estimated savings to the SSA 
trust fund.
Using the traditional VR test, 40,155 beneficiaries were rehabili 
tated during fiscal year 1991, in the sense that they returned to work 
and remained at work for at least 60 days. 4 The average cost for their 
rehabilitation was about $3,600, more than $1,000 greater than the 
average cost for the nonbeneficiaries who were rehabilitated. The cost 
data are from the VR program and essentially represent purchased ser 
vices. VR overhead and staff salaries, including the cost of the VR 
counselors, are not included in the averages. 5
If the test is the one that SSA imposes before reimbursements are 
made, the number of rehabilitants decreases to a little more than 6,000 
per year. In fiscal year 1993, nearly 300,000 persons were referred to 
VR, and 6,154 were rehabilitated in the sense of having earned SGA or 
more for nine months. The rehabilitation total is a relatively small 
number, some one-half of 1 percent of the persons on the rolls.
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The appropriate comparison, however, is not with the number of 
persons on the rolls at a given time. It would be more meaningful to 
take a cohort of persons on the rolls and to follow this group through 
time to determine the number of individuals that return to work. Pre 
liminary data from the New Beneficiary Survey show that most per 
sons who leave the SSA rolls do so because they attain the age of 65 
and transfer to the old age program or because they die. Some small 
number of persons return to work. We have no information about the 
number who return to work after receiving RTW services and the num 
ber that return without them. It seems safe to say that 3 percent, not all 
of whom have received any RTW services return to work, which is 
hardly a large number (Hennessey and Dykacz 1992 and 1993). The 
objective of a RTW program should be to improve that percentage.
Overall, nearly $64.5 million was paid to VR in reimbursements in 
fiscal year 1993. However, it appears that the program was cost benefi 
cial from the point of view of the trust fund. The projected savings for 
fiscal year 1993 of $321.9 million was five times the amounts reim 
bursed.
Up until now, SSA's arrangements to reimburse providers have been 
with the joint federal-state VR program exclusively. In March 1994, 
SSA revised its regulations so as to allow the private sector to compete 
for the business. If the VR agency does not take on the case after a 
period of four months, the new policy will allow referral to alternative 
providers, including those from the private sector. This program is not 
yet in effect and awaits the issuance of detailed rules and regulations 
by SSA.
Allowing Market Forces to Operate
The limited effectiveness of the public VR system in taking persons 
off the rolls is not surprising. The VR programs have found other clien 
tele, as Congress has asked them to concentrate on the disadvantaged, 
the mentally ill, persons with mental retardation, and persons with 
severe disabilities (Jenkins, Patterson and Szymanski 1992). Persons 
receiving benefits may be considered as difficult to rehabilitate since 
return to work means the loss of benefits. The issue of the disincentives
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facing beneficiaries has to be faced squarely since it plays such an 
important role in return-to-work efforts.
We can consider a person who has recently been granted benefits. 
Obviously, that individual chose to apply for benefits and, with the 
award in hand, is now in an "equilibrium" position with no great incen 
tive to change by starting an RTW program. Yet, the whole rationale 
for the RTW programs is that, somehow, the person will be better off 
by using RTW services, getting a job, and giving up the benefits. There 
may be a bit of a contradiction in this situation: having "chosen" to be 
on the benefit rolls, how could a person be better off by using RTW 
services and eventually leaving the rolls?
Before dealing with that issue, it is important to recognize that the 
interests of the benefits-paying agency and the interests of the individ 
ual beneficiary may be different. SSA is providing benefits, and it 
would be worthwhile for the agency to spend an amount on RTW ser 
vices equal to what would be saved if the person left the rolls. The test 
for determining the amount is different, but would not the beneficiary 
be well advised to invest in RTW services so long as the cost is less 
than the net gain the person would enjoy by returning to work?
There are, however, two obvious sets of problems facing both the 
individual and the agency. One involves information. There simply is a 
great deal of uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitation 
technology, the future labor market, and the success of RTW services 
in getting a person back to work at a wage that will be attractive to the 
individual and that will allow the agency to sever benefits. Obviously, 
since there are uncertainties, there are risks. Investments must be made 
today, but the return will not be forthcoming until some time in the 
future when and if the person returns to work. There is no guarantee of 
success, and the expenditures might be ineffective in putting the indi 
vidual back to work.
The other problem has to do with the financing of RTW services. 
Even if the beneficiary is convinced that the timing is right and that a 
particular set of services that can be purchased from a provider is just 
the ticket to get back to work, the person may lack the necessary 
financing. The proposals in part II suggest some ways to deal with the 
capital markets problem. SSA would not have the same financial diffi 
culties as the beneficiary since trust funds may be tapped to support 
these services. Although SSA has the advantage in the financing, the
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agency probably faces more severe informational hurdles than does the 
individual. SSA has the problems of selecting beneficiaries for whom 
RTW services may be effective and of deciding the type of services, 
the provider, the timing of the services, and a host of other issues. The 
individual beneficiaries may be in a far better position than SSA to 
assess personal motivation and the type of services and providers with 
which they will be comfortable.
However, the individual beneficiary's evaluation of future prospects 
may be distorted. Beneficiaries may overestimate the value of leisure 
or they may underestimate the labor market value of their residual 
functioning capacities. A more realistic notion of the jobs for which 
they might be eligible, after a period of counseling, guidance, and per 
haps even retraining, might emerge from a joint decision of the benefi 
ciary and a provider of RTW services. The recommendations in this 
paper are based on the assumption that competition among providers in 
offering plans, together with the freedom that the beneficiary has in 
choosing a plan will result in an optimal solution to the information 
problem.
The alternative, of course, would be for SSA to pick out the candi 
dates for RTW services or to offer these services to all. Offering and 
paying for rehabilitation services on an universal basis can be an 
expensive course of action, as demonstrated by the experience in work 
ers' compensation. The large increase in the number of private sector 
rehabilitation providers came about after California amended its work 
ers' compensation law to cover what might be termed mandatory reha 
bilitation. Although nothing in the law compelled employees to accept 
rehabilitation, employers and insurers were required to offer such ser 
vices upon application of employees. Rehabilitation services were 
accompanied by a continuation of benefits, and the appropriateness of 
rehabilitation became an issue in the legal struggles over the rights to 
compensation benefits. Originally forecast to range from 3 to 5 percent 
of benefit costs, the program outlays reached as high as 15 percent 
(Monroe Berkowitz 1990; California Workers' Compensation Institute 
1983). Variations of the mandatory rehabilitation provisions were 
enacted by several other states, including Colorado, Washington, Flor 
ida, and Maine. When the costs of the programs began to soar, each of 
these states abandoned the notion of compulsory rehabilitation.
336 Improving the Return to Work of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries
The problems with compulsory rehabilitation were not difficult to 
identify. Rehabilitation services became a matter of right and were 
viewed as an attractive additional form of aid and a way to prolong 
periods of compensation benefits. Providers were paid for services ren 
dered, be they evaluation services, counseling, training, or other types. 
Payment to the providers was not linked to results in the sense of return 
to work.
SSA's situation differs from that in workers' compensation, how 
ever. In the SSA programs, benefits are not a given for a finite period, 
and hence there would be less of a temptation for individuals to accept 
vocational rehabilitation just to prolong the period of benefits. On the 
other hand, the problems are similar, in that there are no obvious ways 
for the administrators to select persons for rehabilitation services. To 
make such services available to all brings with it expenses that may be 
out of proportion with the eventual benefits to the system.
Although states have abandoned mandatory rehabilitation or even 
mandatory evaluation for rehabilitation in workers' compensation, one 
legacy of that experience has been a thriving business of private sector 
rehabilitation providers. These individuals and firms are retained by 
employers and insurers to give services on demand. Since the employ 
ers are footing the bill, obviously these providers are called upon only 
when the employer or insurer makes a decision that the marginal dollar 
spent on services will yield a savings of that amount. It is doubtful that 
a public program such as SSA would be allowed to exercise these types 
of benefit-cost judgments in individual cases. Equity considerations 
would probably require uniform treatment of broad classes of benefi 
ciaries. The following scheme proposed for beneficiaries of the system 
takes advantage of the growing number of private sector rehabilitation 
providers and minimizes the discretion exercised by SSA in the selec 
tion of clients to be offered services.
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Part I: An Incentive-Based Reimbursement Scheme for SSA 
Disability Insurance Beneficiaries
The recommendations center around an incentive-based reimburse 
ment scheme that assumes no change in the current test for benefits eli 
gibility. It has two central features:
1. Payments to providers are conditioned on outcomes, with no nec 
essary relationship to the costs of services.
2. All risks are borne by providers.
The scheme can be outlined briefly. SSA certifies a broad range of pro 
viders from the public and private sectors. VR becomes one of the 
players but would compete with providers from the private sector and 
possibly other providers from the public sector, including employment 
services. The watchword here is diversity, and hopefully providers 
would cover a wide scope of philosophies and methodologies.
1. SSA would screen new beneficiaries and eliminate those persons 
with no reasonable chance of returning to work—the terminally 
ill or those with only a few remaining years of eligibility on the 
disability insurance (DI) rolls, and also those persons who are 
expected to recover and to leave the rolls without any RTW ser 
vices. All other beneficiaries would receive what can be termed a 
"ticket" or, to employ a term advocated by Steve Lavery from 
New Zealand, a "job card"6 that can be used to receive services at 
any of the providers.
2. The ticket would have no predetermined value. Once deposited 
by the beneficiary at a provider, the ticket would become a con 
tract between SSA and the provider to pay the latter a portion of 
the savings to the trust fund during the period of time that the 
beneficiary is off the rolls and at work.
3. The provider would not receive any compensation for services 
provided until the beneficiary completed the nine-month trial 
work period and was back at work for a period of time earning 
more than SGA. At that point, the provider would be paid a pre 
determined percentage of the amount that would have been paid
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in benefits had the beneficiary remained on the rolls.
4. Providers would be paid each year that the beneficiary remained 
off the rolls for all or a portion of the year, according to the 
amount of savings to the trust fund.
Rationale for a New Scheme
The basic justification for a new scheme is that the current system is 
"broke and needs fixing." In a world where private sector providers are 
playing an increasing role in other benefit programs, it seems unwise 
either to exclude them or to have them play a secondary role in this 
market. There does not appear to be any reason for allowing the private 
sector in only after the public sector rejects or ignores the case. 7
Beyond that, however, are the matters of monitoring and of provider 
incentives. Under the current system, providers bear the risk and are 
compensated only after the person leaves the rolls, and then solely for 
actual expenses incurred. Once the system begins to apply to private 
sector providers, SSA will have the unenviable task of auditing records 
and deciding issues of legitimacy of costs. Can fee schedules and utili 
zation protocols be far behind? All this may not be too much of a prob 
lem in the VR program since the expenses of the agency are met from 
general appropriations, and, in a sense, the SSA reimbursements are 
found money for the VR agency.
Under the proposed scheme, there will be no auditing or monitoring 
problems since payment is according to results and not according to 
the cost of services provided. This should be a plus for the proposed 
system since, as is abundantly clear from the reengineering studies, 
SSA has difficulties in accomplishing its main tasks in the DI program 
without the challenge of monitoring a rehabilitation program (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], SSA, September 
1994a and November 1994b).
The prime virtue of the proposed system is that it seeks to replicate 
as many of the features of the private market as is possible. The tickets 
are held by the beneficiaries, who have the option of depositing them 
with a wide variety of providers. The providers are assumed to range 
along a spectrum, from job developers to those oriented more to the 
professional goals of rehabilitation counselors.
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This scheme would appear to have many of the advantages of priva 
tization that Weaver (1991, 1994) has stressed. Beneficiaries would 
have a choice among many competing providers, with different ideas 
about how to restore the person to a job. Providers would have few of 
the present constraints on the freedom of the VR program to devise 
return-to-work plans. The VR program understandably is obliged to 
follow the current priorities established by Congress and to follow pre 
scribed procedures and processes. Adherence to the correct process 
may take precedence over outcomes.
Under the proposed scheme, the beneficiary is given a great deal of 
discretion. There is no obligation to deposit the ticket with any pro 
vider. The individual may choose to hold onto the ticket, preferring 
benefits to undergoing any regimen of rehabilitation. No mandatory 
compliance is contemplated. If, however, providers know that a partic 
ular person has a ticket, they will do all they can to persuade or cajole 
the person to deposit the ticket with them, and such competition for the 
custom of the beneficiary is all to the good.
The opposite situation may also prevail: no provider may agree to 
accept the ticket of a particular beneficiary. There may not be any pro 
vider who believes that the risk is worthwhile, that the person can be 
made job ready within the constraints of the reimbursement formula. 
Again, this would be an acceptable outcome. It would be a market 
judgment that the case cannot be handled at a profit to the provider.
Some Problem Areas
Who Should Be Issued Tickets?
One solution is simply to issue tickets to all beneficiaries. Persons 
who are terminally ill would not be in a position to deposit the tickets, 
and they probably would not be accepted once their condition was 
known. Older persons within a few years of age 65 might also have lit 
tle motivation to deposit the tickets, and providers would be reluctant 
to accept them in light of the limited number of years remaining in 
which payments could be collected. The problem may solve itself, and 
there may be no good reason for SSA to try to sort out these groups. 
However, it would always be possible for SSA to write the rules so as 
to deny tickets to those over a particular age or with diagnoses where
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death is expected within a short period of time. An alternative would be 
to issue tickets to persons in this group only on request.
A thornier problem is posed by those individuals who are expected 
to recover and leave the rolls without any services. Allowing these per 
sons to have tickets will lead to accusations of "creaming" on the part 
of providers: the latter would only have to secure the tickets and retain 
them until the person went to work—and then claim the rewards. On 
the other hand, this is a difficult group to identify with any degree of 
certainty. Rather than expending the time and energy on identification, 
the strategy would be to issue tickets and to let the providers gain the 
benefits that might counterbalance some of the extraordinary costs 
involved in the more difficult cases. In all instances, the most that SSA 
would be paying would be a portion of the amounts spent had the per 
son remained on the rolls.
In spite of the argument that no monetary losses accrue to SSA, per 
ceptions are important in these matters. Therefore, SSA should try to 
identify a group that is likely to exit the rolls without services. Elimi 
nating that contingent would allow the providers to prioritize services 
to those who have tickets and would keep them from "creaming" in the 
primal sense of giving assistance to persons who otherwise would have 
reached the same result.
What Happens if There Is a Change of Providers?
Two situations might be distinguished. One is where the beneficiary 
is dissatisfied with the provider, and the other is where the provider is 
unhappy with the beneficiary. The latter situation would seem to pose 
few problems. The provider can simply return the ticket to the benefi 
ciary, or, if possible, sell it to another provider. There should be no 
objection to a market developing in these tickets.
The more difficult situation is where the beneficiary refuses to have 
anything more to do with the provider. In that case, the provider might 
still be able to sell the ticket to another provider. The ticket would be 
worth little to the former if the beneficiary has announced that no 
return to work is feasible until the original provider is off the case. An 
alternative to writing detailed rules and regulations and deciding subse 
quent disputes, would be to leave such matters to the negotiations 
between all of the parties, including more than one provider.
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Inevitably some conflicts will arise, and it would seem to be reason 
able to write legislation authorizing another mechanism to resolve such 
matters. One possibility would be final and binding arbitration with 
provisions for an expedited hearing.
What Is the Size of the Market?
An estimated 200,000 persons per year would realistically be in the 
market for RTW services. This number is based on the fact that 
629,700 awards were made in 1993 (HHS, SSA 1994a, table 6.C1). If 
we eliminate all those over 50 years of age (316,669 persons) and those 
who are terminally ill (93,953 persons), we have 219,078 individuals 
remaining. Possibly 12 percent of the last number might be expected to 
recover and exit the rolls without assistance, which would leave 
192,789 or roughly 200,000 persons to be issued tickets. Obviously, 
the number would be three times as great if everyone coming on the 
rolls were issued the tickets, but it is likely that there would be some 
reluctance on the part of SSA to issue tickets to those persons who 
were expected to leave the rolls without services. In addition, the older 
and sicker group would not be very attractive to providers.
How Will Providers Be Reimbursed?
The essence of the proposal is that providers are to be paid based on 
results as they become known. It is contemplated that the providers 
would expend the funds for services or find some other agency or body 
to finance them. The providers would not be reimbursed until such time 
as the person left the rolls, after which the provider would be paid a 
percentage of the benefit amount for the period the person was off the 
rolls. Such a calculation would be done yearly, and the provider com 
pensated accordingly. Thus, the provider would have the incentive not 
only to return the person to work but to keep the person at work. 8
A question can be raised as to whether the provider should be paid 
in the event the beneficiary medically recovers but does not return to 
work. In my view, payment should be conditioned not only on removal 
from the rolls, but on return to work. The provider can be seen as an 
advocate for the beneficiary, and it would seem problematic to have 
providers striving to prove to SSA that a medical recovery has 
occurred, without having the burden of placing and keeping the person
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in a job that paid more than the SGA level. Thus, the proposed scheme 
would reimburse the provider only in the event of a return to work.
Table 1 illustrates how this reimbursement might work. The monthly 
benefit shown is the average amount awarded to a person of that age 
with a single dependent. The provider is assumed to be paid 30 percent 
of the annual savings. This is an arbitrary percentage that could vary 
and eventually would have to be set in negotiations between SSA and 
the providers.
Table 1. Incentive-Based Payments to Providers
Age
25
35
45
50
Annual 
benefit3
$7,317
$9,853
$11,711
$11,936
30 percent 
payable to 
provider 
annually
$2,195.10
$2,955.90
$3,513.30
$3,580.80
Potential 
number of 
years on DI 
rollsb
39
29
19
14
Present value of 
payments to 
providers0
$32,814.71
$40,173.63
$39,201.14
$33,282.92
SOURCE HHS, SSA (1993a) and author's calculations
a Annual benefit amount is based on the average benefit to a person of the age indicated, as shown 
in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (HHS, SSA 1993a, p 178), 
plus one-half of that amount for one dependent
b. The recipient may be on the DI rolls until age 65 One year is subtracted to account for the nine- 
month trial work period plus three months
c Present value of payments to providers was calculated assuming a 6 percent discount rate and 
annual compounding.
The reimbursement to the providers would be on a year-to-year 
basis. However, it is useful to calculate the present value of these pay 
ments so that providers can have some criterion for deciding how much 
should be spent in an individual case. 9 In making these present value 
calculations, the assumption is that the person remains on the rolls 
until age 65, unless death occurs previously. The calculations, in addi 
tion to taking mortality into account, make an adjustment for inflation 
and the fact that, under the most optimistic of assumptions, it would 
take at least a year before the person would leave the rolls. That 
amount of time is due to the nine-month trial work period plus the
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three-month period before a person is taken off the rolls. The present 
value figure is a maximum amount that could be paid under the 30 per 
cent sharing assumption. It is difficult to estimate the cost to the pro 
viders of the services necessary to remove the person from the rolls. 
Under the VR program, the average cost per case has been running 
about $10,000. A return of three to four times that amount is probably 
not excessive, considering that the payment is available only for suc 
cesses. The provider would be paid nothing if the person never left the 
rolls. 10
Part II: An Incentive-Based Proposal for SSA Disability Insurance 
Applicants and Beneficiaries
There are obvious advantages in providing RTW services before the 
benefits eligibility decision is made. One advantage is timing (Gardner 
1988). The sooner the person is reached, the better the chances that ser 
vices will be effective. The question is whether the whole spirit and 
ethos of the decision-making process in SSA might be changed so that 
rehabilitation or return to work takes precedence over benefits.
The SSA DI program bears the stamp of its origins. Unlike the situ 
ation in some countries, DI did not begin as an offshoot of the health 
program but as an addition to the retirement program. The concern was 
for persons whose income had stopped due to a disability. They were 
forced to "retire" due to a medical condition, and the feeling was that 
they should have somewhat the same benefits as people who retired 
due to old age.
The emphasis of SSA has been on the increasingly difficult task of 
determining who is and who is not eligible for benefits, in spite of the 
location of the determination process in the state agencies linked to the 
VR program, and in spite of the cooperative efforts through the years 
of the Beneficiary Rehabilitation Program (Monroe Berkowitz et al. 
1982) and the current VR program. Rehabilitation has not come before 
benefits. It has been the other way around.
A policy such as the German one of placing "rehabilitation before 
pensions" (Aarts and de long, this volume) is not easy to bring about. 
New Zealand, for example, has changed the name of its basic accident
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statute from the Accident Compensation Act to the Accident Rehabili 
tation and Compensation Insurance Act, but there is no real evidence 
that the new name has been accompanied by different priorities. 
Changing from an agency whose primary task is to determine which 
applicants should be paid cash disability benefits to one whose first 
interest is the return to work of applicants is not only difficult but prob 
ably requires modifications in support systems and other legislation.
One possible approach would be to charge the Disability Determina 
tion Services (DDS) with the responsibility of making a rehabilitation 
decision before making the basic one dealing with eligibility for bene 
fits. The initial decision would be whether the applicant should or 
should not receive a "ticket," "job card," or simply a "voucher" for 
rehabilitation services. After that choice is made, the DDS would pro 
ceed to considering the matter of eligibility for benefits. Some applica 
tions would be allowed and others denied, without regard to whether 
the individuals were issued vouchers.
The test for the voucher could be essentially that now specified for 
acceptance into the general state-federal VR program. First, it must be 
established that the person has a physical or mental condition that con 
stitutes a substantial handicap to employment for this individual; sec 
ond, there must be a reasonable expectation that vocational 
rehabilitation services will benefit the individual's employ ability.
Just as the DDS may now call on testimony from medical experts in 
deciding whether to allow benefits, it may also call upon expert evalua- 
tors for advice regarding the benefits of vocational rehabilitation ser 
vices for the individual's employment chances. 11 There are many 
different ways that the DDS might classify an individual's vocational 
rehabilitation potential. The simplest approach would probably be to 
place all applicants into three categories.
The first category would be those persons who are deemed not to 
have a physical or mental condition that would interfere with their 
employment. These people would be expected to return to the labor 
market without any VR services. Although the determination of vouch 
ers and the determination of benefits would be done separately, pre 
sumably all of the persons in this category would end up in the group 
denied benefits.
The persons in the second category would be those who meet the 
eligibility requirements and who would be issued vouchers. SSA bene-
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fits would later be allowed for some of these individuals and would be 
denied for others.
In the third category would be those persons with a sufficiently dis 
abling physical or mental condition but who are so severely impaired 
that the judgment is made that they would not benefit from receiving 
VR services. The presumption is that most of these individuals would 
be allowed disability insurance payments, but some may not be able to 
meet the rigorous disability tests in the DI law.
In a second stage, the DDS would move to consider the applications 
on their merits. Persons in the first category presumably end up without 
vouchers and without benefits. It is anticipated that benefits would be 
allowed to persons in the third category who were denied vouchers 
based on the severity of their conditions and the poor outlook for 
employment. It is people in the middle category who pose the interest 
ing issues. Some of these individuals might be denied outright, due to 
not meeting the existing SSA eligibility tests; however, they would still 
have their vouchers. This presents two problems. One is that, if we still 
wish to keep an incentive-based system for providers, we no longer 
have any obvious yardsticks with which to measure the compensation 
due providers who successfully find jobs for people in this group. The 
second problem is that there is no obvious source of financing for the 
RTW expenses. It is doubtful that there is any rationale for tapping 
trust funds on behalf of persons who have been denied benefits.
Financing Vouchers from a Loan Fund
One possible solution to the financing problem is to have Congress 
establish a loan fund from general revenues. The risks would be limited 
by the finite amount of the fund, which would be replenished by the 
repayment of the loans. Loans would be available at minimal rates of 
interest, and the obligation to repay would begin only when and if the 
person returned to gainful employment. Obviously, "failures" would 
result in a rapid depletion of the fund.
The fund could be used for two purposes. One would be to provide, 
where necessary, a modest living allowance for the person who might 
be without necessary support, having been denied SSA benefits. The 
other would be to reimburse the provider of RTW services. In order to 
adhere to the incentive- or performance-based philosophy, the provider
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would not be paid unless and until the person returned to work and 
remained at work for a period of time. A minimum period of six 
months would be advisable.
Another issue has to do with the value of the voucher. Obviously, the 
higher the value, the more attractive it will be to providers, who are 
being asked to bear the risks of the RTW program. On the other hand, 
the value of the voucher will have to depend on the size of the fund. 
Since this proposal is not for an open-ended entitlement system, the 
fund will have a finite amount of money available to finance RTW pro 
grams. The generosity of the voucher might well fluctuate in accor 
dance with fund balances.
There appears to be no ideal way to set the value of the voucher, but 
solutions might come from some experimentation over time. One 
approach would be to determine if the fund administrator, the DDS, or 
another appropriate body could make distinctions among applicants, 
based on the probability of their returning to work or on the forecast of 
the necessary services that would enable them to get back to work. 
Another experiment would focus less on the diagnosis of the individual 
and more on simulations, which would take into account fund balances 
and the attractiveness to providers of vouchers with values differing for 
persons in different disability categories.
Time-Limited Benefits
The other contingent of those persons issued vouchers would be 
individuals who qualified for benefits under the present definitions of 
disability. This group could be treated in the same way as proposed 
earlier for beneficiaries who would be issued tickets. However, in order 
to emphasize the philosophy of rehabilitation first and benefits second, 
the concept of time-limited benefits should be introduced. In a sense, 
any case that is recorded for a continuing disability review (CDR) is 
time limited. However, due to the press of other business, CDRs have 
not been conducted on a regular basis. A time-limited benefit would be 
different: recipients would be alerted to the fact that they are expected 
to return to the labor market and that their benefits are given to them 
for a finite period of time.
At the outset, a period of two years should be sufficiently long to 
determine whether RTW services were effective in getting the person
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back to work. After the two-year period, benefits would automatically 
cease. If the person were not at work, a new application could be filed, 
with the understanding that, in addition to the usual tests of disability, 
SSA would take into account the record of cooperation of the applicant 
with the RTW services. In all other respects, the incentive-based 
scheme for beneficiaries that has been proposed would apply.
An Incentive-Based Proposal for Supplemental Security Income
It might be misleading to label this an RTW process since some of 
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) clients may not have had any 
work experience. However, the problems are essentially the same, and 
an incentive-based proposal, as in part I would seem to be as applicable 
to SSI as to DI.
Certainly, there are also differences that need to be considered. First, 
in the case of DI, the test is the inability to work, whereas, in SSI, there 
is not only this criterion, but a test based on assets and income. Second, 
the conditions for entering the SSI rolls are not the same as the condi 
tions for exiting from the rolls. Although there is talk about additional 
employment incentive provisions for DI, in the form of allowing the 
recipient to retain a portion of benefits while working, these rules are 
not yet in effect. Such incentives, plus a host of others, are in place for 
SSI recipients (HHS, SSA 1992, Red Book on Work Incentives). These 
provisions pose no real problems, although their existence does dimin 
ish the savings to government when a recipient goes to work. Of 
course, SSI is financed on a different basis than is DI. There is no trust 
fund for SSI, and payments are from general revenues.
In principle, the issues and procedures applicable to DI can be trans 
ferred to SSI. As in the case of DI, decisions would have to be made as 
to whether tickets would be issued to all SSI recipients at the time they 
are put on the benefit rolls, or whether tickets ought to be withheld 
from those too disabled, too old, and those expected to recover without 
the need for services.
It would be necessary to estimate the savings to the taxpayer if the 
person who has qualified for SSI is removed from the rolls. Such a cal 
culation is currently made in order to evaluate the maximum amounts
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that could be paid to VR in the case of rehabilitation of an SSI benefi 
ciary. These estimates would be used, and a percentage of the savings 
would determine the value of the ticket.
Successful providers might have to be paid a different percentage of 
savings than would be true in the case of DI beneficiaries. Thirty per 
cent may not be sufficient in the situation where the recipient is 
allowed to retain one dollar of benefits for every two dollars of earn 
ings. The exact percentage should be set after a more thorough exami 
nation of the projected savings.
Conclusions
The current system designed to return disabled beneficiaries to work 
desperately needs to be changed. SSA is assumed to have its hands full 
trying to make the disability determination process work in an equita 
ble and efficient manner and to have neither the expertise nor the 
financing to engage in the day-to-day management of the rehabilitation 
of its beneficiaries. At the same time, the return to work of persons on 
the rolls is assumed to be a responsibility of SSA.
Another important assumption is that no one formula, modality, or 
type of rehabilitation service is obviously superior to another when it 
comes to returning beneficiaries to work. Problems of what service to 
be used, when it should be used, and who should provide the service 
are best left to the market, where the individual preferences of benefi 
ciaries can be matched with the different approaches of providers.
This paper advances several proposals for reform of the RTW sys 
tem. In part I, the proposal pertains only to beneficiaries and requires 
no change in the present definitions of disability. The beneficiary 
would be provided with a ticket that could be used to obtain services 
from a wide variety of providers. Coming up with a set of services and 
the conditions for the administration of these services would be left to 
the interaction of the beneficiaries and the providers. In the absence of 
a market, the proposed system would have some of the advantages of a 
market.
Payments to providers would be based on results. If the beneficiary 
does not return to work, no payments would be due. The risk would be
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borne entirely by the provider, whose incentive to get into this business 
would be based on the generosity of the amounts received if the benefi 
ciary resumes employment. The experience of the DI program is that 
persons move off and on the rolls. The system of compensation pro 
posed here, where providers are paid on a yearly basis only so long as 
the person is off the rolls, guarantees that the providers will have con 
tinued interest in monitoring the employment of persons returned to 
work.
SSA has nothing to lose from this system, in the sense that the 
agency can never pay providers more than a fraction of the savings 
accruing to the trust fund, and this would occur only after evidence is 
received that the savings have been realized. In this sense, the new sys 
tem should not cost the agency any additional money. However, it is 
necessary to take into account any induced demand for benefits 
brought about by the increased payments to providers. The benefits 
package may now be more attractive to some persons who now would 
file for benefits. These costs are difficult to estimate but it is wise to 
assume that some additional costs would occur because of the induced 
demand.
For the system to work, providers have to be attracted to it and be 
willing to finance back-to-work programs on this contingency basis. 
Congress has to be convinced that providers should be paid amounts 
that have no necessary relationship to the cost of services provided.
Part II proposals are based on changes in the way that SSA adminis 
ters the disability programs. Although the difficulties in bringing about 
fundamental change are not underestimated, the success of the part II 
proposals depends on SSA placing rehabilitation first and benefit 
awards second. Persons should be evaluated initially for suitability for 
RTW services, and those found suitable should be issued vouchers that 
are essentially claims on a loan fund. For those persons who are denied 
benefits, the value of the voucher would be determined by experiments. 
It is proposed that the funds be used for income support as well as for 
RTW services.
The incentive-based aspects of the RTW proposals for beneficiaries 
are maintained in part II, albeit in a modified form. For persons with 
vouchers who are allowed benefits, the proposed system should oper 
ate in much the same manner as in part I for beneficiaries, except that 
the benefits should be awarded on a two-year, time-limited basis.
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The SSI program poses its own problems, stemming from the lack 
of an identifiable trust fund and the SSI incentive provisions that allow 
persons who are working to retain a portion of their earnings. The 
incentive-based scheme for beneficiaries (part I) should be applied to 
the SSI program, with appropriate modifications in the reimbursement 
formula for providers.
Change never comes easily to an established governmental program, 
nor should it. Each innovation ought to bear the burden of proving that 
it will bring benefits commensurate with its costs. Yet the RTW record 
cries out for reform. In keeping with the philosophy of the 1990s, this 
change ought to be one that does not create new open-ended entitle 
ment programs or call upon the bureaucracy to accomplish tasks for 
which it is ill suited. In each of the schemes proposed in this paper, risk 
is transferred to the providers, payments are made only when results 
are evident, and a positive marginal benefit-cost ratio is guaranteed.
NOTES
1. The state Disability Determination Service (DDS) sends a list of beneficiaries and denied 
applicants who are considered to have rehabilitation potential to the state VR agencies These 
agencies may or may not contact the individual, who may or may not apply for services (Reno and 
staff 1994)
2 If asked by the applicant, personnel at the SSA district offices are instructed to tell claim 
ants about the VR program and to give them a brochure with the address and phone number of the 
local VR agency. A brochure giving an overview of state VR services was last printed by SSA in 
1981 and has been out of print for many years (Reno and staff 1994)
3. A more complete explanation of how the process works in the joint federal-state vocational 
rehabilitation program can be found m Mandeville and Brabham 1992 The VR program is based 
on legislation that began in the 1920s. A summary look at the chronology of this legislation can be 
found in Jenkins, Patterson, and Szymanski 1992, table 1 2 For a broader historical examination 
of the VR program, see Edward Berkowitz 1987.
4. Our discussion is narrowly focused on VR activity A study by Hennessey and Dykacz 
(1993) of a 1972 cohort of beneficiaries projected that 11 percent of the individuals would have 
either a medical or a work recovery, 36 percent would die, and 53 percent would have their bene 
fits converted to retired-worker status at age 65 Of course, all beneficiaries will die eventually, 
the reference here is to the first event of interest after entitlement
5. These data are from unpublished tabulations from the Rehabilitation Services Administra 
tion, May 1994, and are cited in Reno and staff 1994
6. Lavery 1994. The advantage of the job card is that it can be encoded with information that 
might be used to differentiate potential rehabilitants, or, as Lavery would refer to such persons, 
"customers," in terms of the reimbursement formulas or other characteristics.
7 The preferential status granted the VR program is embodied in the law. However, section 
222(d)(2) of the Social Security Act allows the Commissioner of Social Security to contract with 
other public or private agencies where a state is unwilling to participate or where it does not have
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a suitable plan. By reason of these provisions, SSA will be contracting with private providers 
where the state VR chooses not to serve the person if and when detailed regulations are issued
8 Keeping persons at work or off the rolls is a problem. In their examination of a 1972 cohort 
of beneficiaries, Hennessey and Dykacz (1993, p. 59) show that about 43 percent of those benefi 
ciaries who recovered ended their post-recovery period by becoming reentitled to disabled worker 
benefits.
9 Present value calculations are obviously sensitive to assumptions about trends in benefit 
amounts, termination rates, rates of discount, and a number of other factors For purposes of com 
pensating VR where reimbursement cannot exceed savings to the trust fund, the SSA actuaries 
compute these present values. The following table presents the application of their formula to per 
sons with the assumed benefits as shown. These sums are a good bit lower than the present-value 
sums in table 1. Unlike the VR arrangements, the reimbursements under the proposed scheme 
would be on a year-to-year basis Since it is contemplated that these reimbursements would 
always be merely a fraction of the yearly savings and would be paid only after these savings 
accrue, there would be no possibility of a payment to the providers greater than the savings to the 
trust fund.
SSA Computation of Present Value of Program Savings from Successful Rehabilitation 
Age Monthly benefit8 Computation of savings0
25 $407 $47,11802 
35 $547 $66,61027 
45 $651 $68,985378
________50_______________$663_____________$61,887.88_____ 
a Monthly benefit amount is based on the average benefit to a person of the age without dependents as mandated 
in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (HHS, SSA 1993a, p 178) 
b The formula for total savings to the SSA is as follows "A-Factor" +[(PIA-WC+SSI)* "B-Factor"], where the 
"A-Factor" represents savings resulting from administrative costs, and the "B-Factor" represents savings resulting 
from the expected eventual termination of benefit payments PIA = Title II Primary Insurance Amount, WC = 
Workers' Compensation payment, and SSI = Supplemental Security Income payments Tables of A and B factors 
are based on the alternative IIB set of disability, economic, and health utilization assumptions found in the 1988 
SSA Trustees' Reports
10 In a meeting of private providers held on June 26, 1994, the basic outlines of the proposal 
were covered. Some providers expressed doubts that the program would be a viable one and were 
concerned about having to finance the services over what might be long periods of time before 
any returns would be received. Other providers thought the program offered opportunities and felt 
that it could be financed by recourse to bank loans or to the equities market. Before such a pro 
gram is put into effect, it would be desirable to review concrete business plans from some of the 
providers who feel that the proposal would be attractive to them.
11 Evaluation for vocational rehabilitation feasibility is a difficult matter If the DOS offices 
use a cadre of evaluators to decide who is and who is not a suitable candidate, it would be desir 
able to separate this function from the provision of RTW services in order to avoid any conflict of 
interests.
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The Role of Health Care and 
In-Kind Benefits in Promoting 
Work

People with Disabilities
Access to Health Care and Related Benefits
Robert B. Friedland
Alison Evans
National Academy on Aging
Having health care coverage, whether through private insurance or 
through public programs, is a major determinant in obtaining health 
care. Whether one has access to specific services often will depend on 
the source of one's coverage—generally an employer or a public pro 
gram, such as Medicare or Medicaid. For people with existing medical, 
physical, or cognitive conditions who need ongoing, specialized, or 
medically related services, obtaining coverage is uncertain. They are 
less likely to be able to obtain private insurance and may not meet the 
specific rules for public programs. Even when obtained, the scope and 
depth of that coverage are likely to be restricted, with respect to a par 
ticular individual's health care needs.
The linkages between employment-based coverage and public pro 
grams often create negative incentives. Some people may be trapped in 
a job for fear of losing health care insurance. Others face real and per 
ceived disincentives for leaving public programs and seeking employ 
ment, since having a job may mean losing needed coverage. This 
disincentive arises because the employer might not offer any health 
insurance or because the coverage is different. For example, private 
insurance is less likely to provide for chronic, long-term, or health- 
related needs.
Health care reform proposals, such as those debated by President 
Clinton and Congress in 1994, would have eliminated many, but not 
all, impediments in the labor market related to health coverage. For 
most people with disabilities, these changes would have meant consid 
erable improvement. In the absence of comprehensive health care 
reform, the efforts of public and private payers to contain their health 
care expenditures will dominate the situation. Private insurers will con-
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tinue to avoid those at higher risk of using services and will seek ways 
to reduce coverage.
This paper undertakes two tasks. First, it provides an overview of 
the health care needs of people with disabilities and outlines sources of 
and gaps in their health care coverage. Second, it addresses the chal 
lenges from resorting to incremental steps rather than comprehensive 
reform to close these gaps.
The Connection between Disability and Health Care
On average, people with disabilities tend to use more health care 
services than people without disabilities, but many of the health care 
needs of persons with disabilities are shared with the general popula 
tion. Individuals with disabilities are not necessarily in poor health. An 
analysis of data from the National Health Interview Survey found that 
nearly half of all persons with a limitation in activity due to a chronic 
condition reported that they were in fair or poor health (Ries 1991, 
p.2). Nonetheless, even when in good to excellent health, people with 
disabilities reported more than twice as many physician contacts and 
more than five times as many hospital days as others in good health. 
The small portion (6.1 percent) of the population that reported limita 
tions in activity and fair or poor health accounted for nearly 20 percent 
of all physician contacts and 41 percent of all hospital days in the 
United States.
Physical Impairments
Approximately 40.2 million individuals had a condition (not includ 
ing mental or emotional disorders) that caused a physical limitation, a 
limitation in activities of daily living (ADLs), or a limitation in instru 
mental activities of daily living (lADLs), based on data from the 1991- 
92 Survey of Income and Program Participation (U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 1993, p. 16). l Less than half of all disabilities identified in 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), however, were 
classified as severe.2
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Generally, people with chronic conditions require physician and 
hospital care, as would others, but they also may need very specialized 
attention from providers or multidisciplinary teams. Health care utili 
zation varies considerably, depending on the type and severity of the 
disabling condition. Persons with multiple conditions (e.g., mental ill 
ness and chronic physical health conditions) must have providers who 
understand these interactions. Some people may have a greater need 
for prescription drugs, long-term occupational, physical, or speech 
therapy, or home care services. Others may require assistance with 
activities of daily living (e.g., personal care such as bathing or eating), 
adaptive equipment, interpreter services, transportation, adapted cloth 
ing, or even institutional care. Additional needs may include help with 
instrumental activities of daily living (e.g., shopping or managing 
money) or employment. Families and caregivers may also need support 
groups, stress management, training and counseling, time off, or help 
in coordinating and managing services.
People with severe chronic illnesses or disabling conditions also are 
at risk for secondary health problems like pressure sores or nutritional 
problems (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] 
1991, p. 39). Limited physical activity or immobility can increase the 
risk of circulatory, respiratory, and musculoskeletal problems. In order 
to reduce the chance of secondary problems, people with disabilities 
may need special equipment, rehabilitation or habilitation (i.e., mainte 
nance) therapies, including audiology, occupational therapy, physical 
therapy, psychosocial services, respiratory therapy, speech-language 
pathology services, cognitive, vision, and behavioral therapies, or ther 
apeutic recreation (National Council on Disability 1994, p. 27). Thus, 
for persons with disabilities, prevention takes on a broader meaning.
Among people with disabilities, some may be economically disad- 
vantaged, elderly, homeless, or severely mentally ill, and, therefore, 
may need other types of services. For example, they might need case 
management, care coordination, assistance with obtaining housing or 
disability benefits, supervision of daily activities, community living 
supports, transportation, or psychosocial rehabilitation (Schlesinger 
and Mechanic 1993, p. 125). Others may need oversight because their 
disability makes them vulnerable to neglect or abuse.
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Mental Impairments
The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that there are 
between 4 and 5 million adults with "serious mental illness" (not 
including substance abuse disorders or mental retardation) who are 
either living in institutions or in the community (Barker, et al. 1992, p. 
1). Based on the 1989 National Health Interview Survey, approxi 
mately 1.4 million adults between the ages of 18 and 69 were unable to 
work or were limited in their work because of mental illness. Over 82 
percent of these individuals had had this work limitation for a year or 
longer. Furthermore, approximately 48 percent of adults with severe 
mental illness indicated that they were in fair or poor health, compared 
to 12 percent for the adult household population overall.
Persons with severe mental illness have many health and health- 
related needs. The nature of this condition is such that it requires peri 
odic, intensive use of services and varying levels of ongoing support. 
Persons with severe mental illness may require hospitalization, outpa 
tient care, institutional care, prescription drugs, crisis intervention, care 
in group homes, or home-based services. At various times, they may 
also need assistance with daily activities, such as personal hygiene, 
self-care, learning, social transactions, and relationships. In fact, 36 
percent of adults aged 18 to 69 with severe mental illness reported not 
having a work limitation. However, 58 percent of these adults had 
other limitations such as coping with day-to-day stress (53 percent); 
social functioning, i.e., forming and keeping friendships (27 percent); 
concentrating long enough to complete tasks (21 percent); or instru 
mental activities of daily living, i.e., managing money, household 
chores, shopping, or getting around outside the home (5 percent). In 
addition, family members may need assistance to enhance their coping 
skills.
Persons with less severe mental illness or those suffering significant 
upsets in their everyday lives may need assistance from a range of 
mental health providers, such as family or marriage counselors, social 
workers, psychologists, or primary care physicians. Concern about the 
potential overuse of such services when people have third party cover 
age is part of the reason that provision for mental illness is so limited in 
many proposals. It has been difficult to design broad coverage targeted 
to just the most severely mentally ill.
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Two groups are not included in the preceding national data: persons 
with substance abuse disorders and persons with mental retardation. 
The 1991-92 SIPP indicated that 300,000 people, aged 15 and older, 
had an alcohol or drug problem disorder that caused a physical, ADL, 
or IADL limitation (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993, p. 71). In 
addition to the needs that have been listed, individuals with these prob 
lems may require care in residential treatment or detoxification centers. 
Of the approximately 500,000 working-age people with mental retar 
dation, 75 percent had a work limitation, 53 percent were unable to 
work, and 37 percent needed assistance with ADLs or lADLs (National 
Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research [NIDRR] 1991, p. 
27).* Depending on the cause of the mental retardation, for example, 
fetal alcohol syndrome, traumatic brain injury, or Down's syndrome, 
individuals may require a wide range of medical services or assistance 
with basic life activities (HHS 1991, p. 455). Other related needs might 
include prevocational training or supported employment.
Children and Disability
Children need comprehensive primary and preventive health care. 
All children must have their physical and mental development moni 
tored, be immunized, and receive dental and vision care. As children 
reach adolescence, they increasingly need psychosocial support, men 
tal health services, education, family planning, and health guidance. 
Thus, a large proportion of care for children is provided on an outpa 
tient basis.
Developmental, learning, and emotional problems are among the 
most common chronic conditions for both children and adolescents, 
yet children are less likely to be chronically ill or disabled than adults. 
Approximately 5 percent of children under age 15 experience a limita 
tion in activity caused by chronic conditions, as compared to 9 percent 
for people aged 15-44 and 22 percent for those aged 45-64 (National 
Center for Health Statistics [NCHS] 1992). Other studies indicate that, 
while approximately 5 percent of children have special needs, about 1 
to 2 percent have severe impairments (Taylor, Epstein, and Crocker 
1990, p. 28). Still, the array of conditions among this relatively small 
number of children is vast. In contrast, adults generally have a more 
limited and predictable range of disorders (Durch 1994, p. 5). Thus,
362 People with Disabilities
children with these rare conditions require specialized care that may be 
difficult to access. In addition, any chronic condition in children has 
broader implications for overall development and schooling. Children 
who are chronically ill, independent of how severe, are at risk for 
behavioral or psychiatric problems and, therefore, may need special 
pediatric counseling and support services (Perrin, Guyer, and 
Lawrence 1992, p. 71). Special services may be necessary to compen 
sate for frequent absences from school. Moreover, family members, 
foster care parents, and siblings may need special training, guidance, 
and time off.
Coverage Today
Today's health care system has many gaps. Some people do not have 
coverage. Among those who do, coverage is not uniform. Private insur 
ance and Medicare tend to have restricted scope and depth of protec 
tion, whereas Medicaid and veterans' coverage is broader but is fraught 
with other limitations.
Of the approximately 8 million adults aged 18 to 64 who were 
unable to work because of a disability in 1989, 17.3 percent had neither 
private nor public coverage, 34.3 percent had private insurance, 34.3 
percent had public coverage, and 13.2 percent had both private and 
public coverage (NIDRR 1993, p.18). 3 Individuals without work limi 
tations had much higher rates of private health insurance coverage (78 
percent), lower rates of public coverage (4 percent), and somewhat 
lower uninsured rates. National data also show clearly that not having 
health coverage means not getting timely or continuous care. Disabled 
or not, people who do not have health coverage have fewer physician 
contacts and hospitalizations than people who do (NIDRR 1993, p. 
37).
Gaps in health care coverage lead to perverse work incentives. 
Because private insurance is largely linked to employment, this protec 
tion can be jeopardized with each job change. 4 Public coverage is usu 
ally linked to receipt of public cash benefits. Some cash benefit 
programs are not available to those who are able to work or to those 
who have too much income, thus creating disincentives for beneficia-
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ries to resume employment. As a result, the need for health coverage, 
or coverage of a certain type, may influence decisions concerning 
whether or not to work and where to work.
Private Health Care Coverage
Private insurance varies considerably, depending on the employer, 
the location, and the plan chosen. Persons with limitations, whether in 
work or in basic life activities, are less likely than persons without lim 
itations to have private coverage. The extent of this coverage varies 
with the ability to work as well as with the need for assistance (see 
table 1). In 1989, of individuals unable to work, 48 percent had private 
coverage through a former employer or a spouse's employer or had 
purchased it individually. However, among those unable to work and 
needing assistance with basic life activities (activities of daily living or 
instrumental activities of daily living), a smaller proportion relied 
solely on private coverage because this group had high rates of public 
coverage also.
Employer-provided coverage is the most common form of private 
insurance for disabled and nondisabled people. However, it is not 
evenly accessible across industries or size of firm (Employee Benefit 
Research Institute [EBRI] 1994, p. 10). Differences also exist across 
educational levels. Thirty-one percent of high school graduates have 
direct employer coverage, as compared to 39 percent of people with a 
college level education or more. Overall, disabled workers who have 
low labor market skills are disadvantaged in terms of employment 
opportunities (National Academy of Social Insurance 1994, p. 10) and 
in gaining access to private health coverage.
Even when private health insurance is available, several features 
make it difficult for persons with disabilities. Often the definition of 
covered services is too narrow, providing too little protection outside of 
acute episodes of hospital and physician care. Additionally, there may 
be restrictions on a given service (i.e., the amount, duration, or scope), 
limits on total coverage or "lifetime caps," and high out-of-pocket costs 
(e.g., copayments or deductibles). As a consequence, families that 
include a member with chronic care needs are exposed to tremendous 
costs.
Table 1. Type of Health Coverage among Adults Aged 18-64, by Disability, 1989
Source of health insurance coverage (percentage)
Type of disability
(work activity and self-care)
Unable to work
and
Needs assistance, ADL
Needs assistance, IADL
Does not need assistance
Limited in amount or kind of work
and
Needs assistance, ADL
Needs assistance, IADL
Does not need assistance
Limited in nonwork activity only
and
Needs assistance, ADL
Needs assistance, IADL
Does not need assistance
Private
47.5
44.8
44.6
48.6
71.2
57.3
65.5
72.2
75.5
45.1
60.8
76.3
Private 
only
34.3
18.4
28.8
37.8
66.3
40.3a
57.8
67.0
71.5
36.6a
52.2
726
Medicare
23.9
38.7
30.7
20.2
2.8
15.8a
10.1
2.3a
3.2
18.2a
10.7a
2.7
Medicare 
only
7.3
10.3
9.0
6.4
0.8
b
4.6a
0.6
1.2
9.7a
7.2a
0.9
Medicaid
26.8
38.1
34.3
23.2
6.7
28.3a
17.3
5.9
6.6
30. l a
24.1
5.7
Medicaid 
only
17.3
20.4
20.6
16.0
4.8
21.8a
11.3
4.3
5.1
25.1 a
17.9
4.3
Military
6.2
5.8
5.5
6.4
5.0
4.5a
3.6a
5.1
3.8
5.4a
2.1 a
3.8
Not 
insured
17.3
12.4
13.3
19.1
19.8
10.6
15.4
20.2
15.8
9.5a
11. l a
16.0
No work limitation
and
Needs assistance, ADL
Needs assistance, IADL
Does not need assistance
79.3
b
24.5a
79.3
77.7
b
24.5a
77.7
0.4
b
31.9a
0.4
0.1
b
10.6a
0.1
2.8
b
39.8a
2.8
2.5
b
18.5a
2.5
2.1
b
b
2.1
16.6
b
25. 2a
16.6
SOURCE: 1989 National Health Interview Survey data published in NIDRR 1993
NOTE The percentages reflect the proportion of individuals in each disability category who have vanous types of insurance coverage. For example, 48.6
percent of individuals who are unable to work and do not need assistance have private coverage
1 Low statistical reliability
b. Standard error indeterminate, estimate=0.
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Large versus Small Groups
Competition in the employer market has moved private insurance 
from pooling risk across groups to managing the risk exposure for spe 
cific, smaller groups. Not all employer groups can get health insurance, 
even if they want it, and not all insurance policies are the same. Most 
private insurance covers small groups. The same coverage is more 
expensive for small than for large groups, primarily because of rela 
tively higher administrative costs, additional risk premiums, and the 
cost of medical underwriting. In the small group health insurance mar 
ket, insurers compete based on their ability to sell to low-risk groups 
and to avoid relatively high-risk groups. In smaller groups, employers 
are encouraged to switch policies as a means of saving money. 5 During 
such changes, employees lose coverage for "preexisting" conditions. 
Consequently, people with disabilities are more likely to be denied full 
insurance, especially if they are covered through a relatively small 
firm.
In larger groups (firms with more than 200 employees), the possibil 
ity is greater that employers will self-fund the cost of workers' health 
care. In other words, these employers take on the risk directly and 
avoid state taxes on health insurance premiums. Even if the large group 
is not self-funded, the cost of its health insurance is basically the 
expected cost of that group. Large firms usually pay less than small 
firms for the same amount of coverage. Large firms traditionally offer 
more choices of health plans, have more comprehensive benefits, and 
generally pay a larger portion of the cost of family coverage.
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Health Care
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to employer- 
provided health insurance, whether it is self-funded or purchased from 
an insurance company (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis 
sion [EEOC] 1993, p.l). Under the ADA, employees with disabilities 
must be accorded equal access to whatever health insurance the 
employer provides to employees without disabilities. Furthermore, 
specific insurance terms or conditions, covered treatments, or proce 
dures may not single out a particular disability or group of disabilities.
However, not all health-related distinctions of such plans would vio 
late the ADA; thus, the impact of the ADA on employer-provided
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health coverage is limited. The EEOC gives examples of permissible 
distinctions: benefits provided for the treatment of physical conditions 
may be different from those provided for the treatment of mental or 
nervous conditions. Although this approach has a differential impact 
for people with mental illness, the plan conditions must apply equally 
to people with and without disabilities. Employers may have preexist 
ing condition clauses or dollar caps, or they may place limits for all 
enrollees, such as on the number of covered blood transfusions or x- 
rays, without violating the ADA. Plans may not, however, exclude cov 
erage of specific conditions, like deafness, schizophrenia, or kidney 
diseases.
Private Long-Term Care Coverage
Today, virtually no one has private insurance for long-term care ser 
vices. Although most health insurance plans now provide for nursing 
home and home health care, this coverage is usually defined as an 
alternative to hospital care or for post-acute recuperation. It is not 
available for chronic, long-term situations. Separate private long-term 
care insurance is available, but relatively few people—at most 5 per 
cent of the elderly and a negligible percentage of the nonelderly—have 
purchased it (Wiener, Illston, and Hanley 1994). Private long-term care 
insurance is primarily sold to seniors and is not marketed to people 
with disabilities or to children. Most of this insurance does not cover 
specific services. Instead, it pays a fixed dollar amount if the benefi 
ciary qualifies for services. However, the cash amount may not be suf 
ficient to cover the cost of care. Private insurers claim that sales are low 
because of uncertainty surrounding taxation; unlike health insurance, 
long-term care is not explicitly addressed in the tax code. Thus, it is not 
clear, for example, whether premiums can be paid on a pretax basis 
through employer flexible benefit plans. 6
Medicaid
Medicaid is a federal- and state-funded program, which provides 
coverage for medical care and related services for some, but not all, 
low-income persons. Covered groups, defined by federal requirements 
with a great deal of state discretion, include pregnant women, children, 
and elderly or disabled people with very low incomes and few assets.
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Some people are eligible for Medicaid because they receive cash assis 
tance; this would be the case for either low income, single-parent fami 
lies receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or for 
low-income aged, blind, or disabled individuals receiving Supplemen 
tal Security Income (SSI). 7 At age 18, adolescents with physical dis 
abilities can apply for SSI (and, therefore, become eligible for 
Medicaid), even if they are living at home. 8 In addition, noncash assis 
tance groups, such as all young children with family income below the 
federal poverty level, also qualify.9
States can provide Medicaid coverage to individuals receiving state 
supplement payments (SSP), or they can include people with larger 
incomes whose medical expenses relative to income are extremely 
high ("medically needy"). 10 In 1991, 34 states extended Medicaid to 
SSP recipients, and 36 states had medically needy programs for the 
disabled. Through medically needy programs, states cover many eld 
erly and disabled people requiring nursing facility or home care. A 
state may offer a more limited package of services to its medically 
needy population than to its categorically needy population (Congres 
sional Research Service [CRS] 1993, p. 249)."
Eligibility for Medicaid is narrow, but the array of covered services 
in many states is broad. Unlike private medical insurance or Medicare, 
Medicaid covers preventive care, case management, extensive rehabili 
tation and day treatment, home health services, medical devices, per 
sonal care services, care in nursing homes, and transportation. 
However, many states have relatively low provider reimbursement and 
have restrictive licensing policies, thus limiting beneficiaries' access to 
services.
In addition to care in a nursing facility, states may, under a waiver 
program, provide home- and community-based services for persons 
who would otherwise require institutional care. In contrast to the home 
care benefit, which involves skilled medical attention, waiver services 
can include a wide variety of nonmedical, social, and supportive ser 
vices. These waivers are frequently used to serve populations such as 
the frail elderly—but also people with mental retardation, developmen 
tal disabilities, chronic mental illness, or AIDS (CRS 1993, p. 384).
Special work incentive rules are built into the SSI and Medicaid pro 
grams for blind and disabled individuals who already are receiving SSI 
benefits and return to work. Under Section 1619 (a), SSI recipients
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may continue to have Medicaid benefits, although their cash benefits 
are gradually reduced as their earnings increase. Once the individuals' 
earnings rise to the point where they lose SSI cash benefits altogether, 
they may continue Medicaid coverage, as long as the disabling condi 
tion does not improve. 12
People who lose their jobs and, therefore, their health coverage may 
find that they are eligible to have Medicaid pay their former employer's 
premium to continue coverage. The individual must have income 
below 100 percent of the poverty level and assets below 200 percent of 
the SSI limit and may not otherwise be eligible for Medicaid. In such 
cases, the state may opt to pay the premium for continuation coverage. 
This provision has several restrictions: federally mandated continua 
tion applies only to employers with 20 or more employees, is time-lim 
ited, and does not apply to employers that did not offer coverage 
originally. Finally, coverage is that defined by the private plan, which is 
unlikely to cover many health-related services needed by persons with 
disabilities.
Current Medicaid policy addresses some of the employment disin 
centives for individuals leaving SSI rolls and returning to work. It does 
not, however, address the motivation to go on Medicaid in the first 
place. This incentive arises because employer-based coverage is 
unavailable or inadequate and because Medicaid's income test effec 
tively requires that one stop working to become eligible.
Medicaid and Mental Illness
According to the 1989 National Health Interview Survey, 43.5 per 
cent of adults aged 18 and over with serious mental illness received 
SSI (Barker et al. 1992, p. 7). As a result, in most states these individu 
als would be eligible for Medicaid. Medicaid financing for mental 
health historically has been skewed toward institutional care. However, 
at state option, outpatient services may be included, such as clinics, 
hospital outpatient departments, partial hospitalization, psychiatric day 
care, and care from psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, or psy 
chiatric nurses. Furthermore, states may provide targeted case manage 
ment, prescription drugs, psychosocial rehabilitation services, and 
"clinic" services, such as day treatment, family therapy, medication 
management, psychological testing, and group therapy. The extent of 
coverage varies considerably by state.
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Under Medicaid, states may offer coverage in institutions for mental 
diseases (IMDs) for persons aged 65 and over and in inpatient psychi 
atric hospitals for children under age 21. Individuals between the ages 
of 21 and 65 may receive services for mental illness in hospitals or in 
nursing facilities, as long as these facilities are neither IMDs nor psy 
chiatric hospitals. Because individuals between the ages of 21 and 65 
are not eligible for institutional care under Medicaid, they are pre 
cluded from receiving home- and community-based services under a 
waiver.
Medicaid and Children
The Medicaid program treats coverage for children differently from 
coverage for adults. The distinctions arise from the Early and Periodic 
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program for children, 
which was enacted in 1967 as part of the Medicaid initiative to identify 
and treat children's health problems early. Under the EPSDT program, 
children may receive services that other groups do not. These services 
include physical examinations, immunizations, laboratory tests, health 
education, vision, dental, and hearing care. The greatest change in 
EPSDT came in 1989 when the law required that any physical or men 
tal illness identified during the screens must be referred for treatment; 
furthermore, the treatment must be covered by Medicaid, even if it is 
not normally covered under the state's Medicaid list of benefits. Subse 
quent referrals to health, developmental, or educational professionals 
must also be reimbursed.
The 1989 change effectively eliminated restrictions on amount, 
duration, or scope of covered services (as long as the services are med 
ically necessary) and required every state to offer all mandatory and 
optional Medicaid benefits to children. These expansions particularly 
opened up many new services for mentally ill and developmentally dis 
abled children. Furthermore, numerous states have been able to shift 
financing of some public and school health services to Medicaid. Thus, 
many services in school-based early intervention programs can be 
reimbursed through Medicaid funds.
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Medicare
Medicare primarily serves individuals who were in social security- 
covered employment but are now either disabled or age 65 or older. 13 
Ninety-six percent of the population over age 65 is covered by Medi 
care (EBRI 1994, p. 5). Medicare is also available for nonelderly peo 
ple who have been on the Disability Insurance (DI) benefit rolls of the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) for two years. 14 Overall, 24 per 
cent of working-age individuals who are unable to work and 3 percent 
of those who are limited in the amount and kind of work they can do 
are covered through Medicare (see table 1).
In most cases, Medicare coverage is not as broad as that of Medic- 
aid. Medicare has two components: Part A, which covers primarily 
hospitalization, inpatient care, and home health, and Part B, which pri 
marily covers outpatient and physician services. Medicare does not 
cover most prescription drugs taken at home. However, Medicare does 
cover home health services for people requiring skilled nursing and 
provides for broader mental health services than do most private plans. 
Generally, Medicare beneficiaries do not pay a premium for Part A, but 
they do pay a premium for Part B.
Medicare also has work incentive provisions. In the case of a dis 
abled beneficiary who has returned to work and is engaging in substan 
tial gainful employment (beyond a nine-month trial work period), 
Medicare will continue to provide coverage for three years even after 
Disability Insurance cash benefits have been discontinued. After three 
years of coverage, the disabled individual may elect to purchase Medi 
care Part A and Part B protection. The individual must pay a premium 
rate equal to the average monthly cost for beneficiaries aged 65 and 
over. 15 In January 1994, 78,000 beneficiaries were eligible for the buy- 
in benefit because they were working and their paid Medicare coverage 
had lapsed; only 450 chose this buy-in option (Department of Health 
and Human Services 1994). For Medicare beneficiaries with income 
below 200 percent of the federal poverty line, state Medicm'd programs 
must pay the Part A premium.
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Veterans Affairs
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical care system is the 
largest in the United States. It encompasses over 150 veteran medical 
centers and offers a full range of services. However, eligibility rules are 
complex, and resources are not sufficient to care for all eligible veter 
ans. Wide disparities often result in the levels of care at different cen 
ters received by veterans with similar conditions or incomes.
The VA has programs such as hospitalization, blind rehabilitation, 
care for spinal cord injuries, rehabilitation, prescription services, pros 
thetic appliances, alcohol and drug dependence rehabilitation, domicil 
iary care, nursing home care, community residential care programs, 
hospice units, adult day care centers, hospital-based home care pro 
grams, and community outreach clinics. It also has a large outpatient 
care component that spans examinations, treatment, home health ser 
vices, podiatric, optometric, dental, and surgical services for eligible 
veterans. The Veterans Health Administration is noted for its work in 
geriatrics, spinal cord injury, and substance abuse. In addition, in 1993 
the VA cared for approximately 6 percent of the nation's AIDS cases 
and provided one-third of the nation's care for the chronically mentally 
ill (Paralyzed Veterans Association [PVA] 1994).
Eligibility rules for veterans' health benefits are confusing. Eligibil 
ity requirements for inpatient and outpatient care are different, 
although, in general, priority is given first to those who need treatment 
for service-connected disabilities and to those who have disabilities 
that are 50 percent or more service-connected and who require care for 
any condition. Some categories are "mandatory" and must be provided 
services, while others only are served if resources or space are avail 
able. Veterans whose incomes are above a specific threshold who do 
not have service-related needs may be excluded from care. In 1991, 
three million veterans used VA services, i.e., 12.5 percent of the total 
veteran population (DVA 1992, p. 66). Ninety-eight percent of these 
patients had service-connected disabilities or were indigent, and did 
not have service-connected disabilities. In fact, 25 percent of veteran 
patients have no other health insurance (DVA 1991, p. 5).
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Health Care Reform Proposals
In 1994, Congress debated a number of proposals to reform the 
financing of health care. Many plans would have substantially reduced 
the number of people without health insurance or with substantial gaps 
in health insurance. Access to health care would have been dramati 
cally easier for individuals with chronic care needs, even under those 
proposals that fell short of universal coverage. As a result, work disin 
centives and fragmentation of health services would have been sub 
stantially alleviated for people with disabilities.
In the absence of major reform, discussions are likely to revolve 
around incremental changes in existing programs, modifications to the 
tax code, or small-scale block grants to states. In today's environment, 
proposals to expand coverage marginally under existing public pro 
grams are likely to compete with new demands to reduce the size of the 
federal government. In addition, closing coverage gaps in a piecemeal 
fashion for persons with disabilities could perpetuate work disincen 
tives, lead to significant inequities across populations, produce further 
unraveling of private insurance, or involve substantial public costs.
The array of potential incremental reforms is practically infinite. 
First, as a society, we should decide how much we are willing to spend, 
through public and private funds, to improve access to health care. 
Then we must sort out philosophical differences regarding program 
structure and priority populations. In this section, possible options for 
incremental reform and their impact for disabled persons are enumer 
ated, in very general terms. Acute care coverage is addressed, includ 
ing insurance market reforms and changes to Medicaid, Medicare, and 
veterans coverage. Issues relating to long-term care are also discussed, 
including insurance reforms, tax code changes, and new block grant 
programs.
Access to Acute Care
Acute care coverage could be expanded through private insurance, 
Medicaid, or Medicare. It is difficult to design a change that only 
affects those who currently have no public or private coverage. 
Because private health insurance is voluntary and because different 
sources of coverage overlap, any incremental modification is likely to
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have a number of unintended consequences. For example, changes that 
make private insurance easier to obtain are likely to make it more 
expensive and, ultimately, will lead to fewer covered individuals. Mod 
est expansions in Medicaid could unintentionally encourage employers 
to drop coverage and could lead to more employees becoming eligible 
for Medicaid.
Expanding Access to Private Insurance
Improving access to private insurance means addressing affordabil- 
ity and availability. Individual or small group coverage is frequently 
not available for people with chronic health conditions; even where it is 
obtainable, health insurance is often not affordable for moderate-to- 
low income persons. The insurance reflects the expenses of health care. 
Therefore, unless these expenses are significantly altered, increasing 
the voluntary purchase of health insurance requires that the cost be 
subsidized. Subsidies can be general or targeted through tax deduc 
tions, tax credits, vouchers, or premium discounts. It is very difficult to 
direct subsidies to only those who, without such assistance, would not 
have health insurance. As a proxy, most proposals restrict subsidies for 
private insurance to low income populations.
In 1989, for example, the Pepper Commission examined, but 
rejected, a proposal that would have enrolled everyone with family 
income below the poverty level into Medicaid, modified the insurance 
market towards community rating, and provided a sliding-scale sub 
sidy for the voluntary purchase of private coverage (starting at 99 per 
cent of the cost for families with incomes just above the poverty level 
and declining to zero for those with family incomes above 200 percent 
of the poverty level). In 1990, such a proposal would have cost approx 
imately $32 billion in new public expenditures and would have reduced 
the number of uninsured with incomes below 200 percent of the pov 
erty level by nearly 74 percent, assuming 14.4 million individuals 
enrolled in Medicaid and/or private insurance. Other recent proposals 
would give individuals the option to enroll in the Federal Employee 
Health Benefit Program or in Medicare, while providing subsidies 
toward the purchase of that coverage.
Subsidizing the cost of health insurance is not efficient. People who 
already have coverage and those willing to buy coverage without a sub 
sidy end up receiving one. Some people eligible for a subsidy will
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receive coverage from more than one source. Moreover, because of the 
elasticity of demand among those without coverage, it takes a sizable 
subsidy to encourage the voluntary purchase of health insurance. In the 
Pepper Commission example, a subsidy of 50 percent of the cost of 
health insurance (on average) was assumed to motivate only half of the 
eligible families to buy insurance (Pepper Commission 1990, appen 
dixes B and D). Assuming that 7.7 million individuals were to enroll, 
just subsidizing private insurance, could cost $8 billion. A less gener 
ous subsidy would lower this figure, but would be less effective at 
expanding coverage and more likely to apply only to those who would 
have obtained coverage in the absence of the subsidy.
Subsidizing voluntary coverage also does not resolve today's work 
disincentive issues. Only proposals mandating that everyone obtain 
coverage present the opportunity to "delink" employment and health 
coverage, thereby lessening the motivation to obtain public health care 
protection by leaving work. However, if private benefits are very lim 
ited as compared to public ones, the incentive, particularly for chroni 
cally ill populations, would continue.
Reforming Insurance Market Rules
Some policymakers favor changing insurance market rules as a 
means of expanding coverage without increasing public expenditures. 
Most of their proposals address the sale of insurance, and some plans 
deal with the determination of premiums. Health insurance premiums 
are based on the cost of health care and are affected by the rules associ 
ated with the sale of insurance. As long as insurers can deny coverage 
to those most likely to use health services, the price of insurance will 
reflect the average cost among those with insurance plus a portion of 
the cost for the uninsured. Therefore, if people can no longer be denied 
or excluded from coverage, the overall price of insurance for individu 
als and small groups is likely to increase.
If new rules address only the sale of insurance, and not the rates, 
then insurers can selectively price their coverage in order to encourage 
or discourage specific groups. If premiums are regulated to remain 
within certain limits, prices for the relatively young and healthy are 
more likely to increase. Coverage for the sick may expand, but some 
young and healthy people may drop their coverage due to higher pre 
miums.
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New rules regarding the pricing and selling practices of insurers 
would require a considerable amount of regulation in a voluntary sys 
tem. Most state insurance departments are not well prepared to under 
take this task. The incentive for insurers to avoid high-risk individuals 
is so strong that merely banning certain practices is unlikely to prevent 
insurers from seeking other ways, for example, through location, pro 
vider choice, or marketing efforts, to avoid high-risk populations. Indi 
viduals also have strong reasons to minimize their risk in a voluntary 
system. Without some limits on eligibility, individuals can wait to buy 
policies until the moment they need health care, thereby undermining 
the ability of the private market to sell insurance that pools the cost of 
health care risks. Consequently, insurance market reforms alone—in 
the absence of mandatory health care coverage—will not necessarily 
expand access to insurance and could decrease coverage.
Mandating Private Benefits
In addition to regulating the sale and pricing of health insurance, 
one could mandate coverage of certain benefits. Mandating broader 
coverage would lead to higher premiums. For example, most private 
plans have various restrictions on inpatient and outpatient mental 
health care in order to limit costs. If the number of days of inpatient 
psychiatric care were required to be 365, instead of the more typical 30 
days, then premiums would increase by 2.6 percent, on average (Con 
gressional Research Service 1988). If reimbursement of outpatient 
mental health care were raised from the more typical 50 percent of pro 
vider charges to 80 percent of charges, premiums would increase by 
0.7 percent, on average. Overall, covering mental health care in a man 
ner similar to other health care services would raise private premiums 
by about 3.1 percent.
Changing Medicaid
Beginning in the late 1980s, there was a series of expansions to 
Medicaid eligibility and covered services. Benefits added during the 
1980s, for example, included home and community-based waivers, 
case management, and supported employment. In addition, modifica 
tions were made to eligibility, income, or asset criteria. New eligibility 
rules for pregnant women and children, based on family income rather
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than on receipt of cash benefits, heralded a change in the fundamental 
principles of the program.
A similar expansion might be considered to provide for the disabled 
of working age and with family incomes of less than the poverty 
threshold. Thus, coverage could be extended to 2.8 million people, but 
with nearly $9 billion in new public costs. 16 Of course, more restrictive 
eligibility criteria or more limited benefits could lower the cost of this 
proposal.
Some suggestions are to eliminate the Medicaid program and to 
enroll beneficiaries in private plans for acute care coverage. This would 
remove the Medicaid stigma and improve access to private providers. 
However, many individuals would lose benefits now available under 
Medicaid but not typically allowed under private plans. Even if Medic- 
aid long-term care coverage does not change, access to many extended 
services (rehabilitation, assistive devices, social, and supportive ser 
vices) would be lost in the shift to private plans. While access to such 
"wrap-around" services could be maintained explicitly through a sepa 
rate program, in all likelihood such fragmented financing would result 
in less coordinated care.
Other proposals involve expanding current Medicaid work incentive 
provisions, by raising the earnings threshold at which Medicaid is dis 
continued. While these changes would increase the motivation to leave 
the cash benefit rolls, one must first become eligible for cash benefits, 
by stopping work, for example, in order to get health and health-related 
coverage. This increases the pull to obtain cash benefits in the first 
place. Ultimately, such changes also raise the policy question of why 
individuals in similar situations, i.e., disabled but working, are treated 
differently: those who once received cash benefits have health and 
health-related coverage, but those who never received cash benefits do 
not.
Changing Medicare
One possible change to the Medicare program would involve elimi 
nating the existing 24-month waiting period for individuals who are 
receiving DI cash benefits. This would add nearly 628,000 DI benefi 
ciaries to Medicare at an estimated cost of $2.6 billion. Eliminating the 
waiting period would provide relief for those individuals who have left 
their jobs without retaining health coverage because their employer did
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not offer it, because they could not afford the continuation premium, or 
because the continuation period expired. However, this approach also 
increases the incentive for disabled individuals to obtain cash benefits 
in order to get health coverage. Thus, a coverage gap would be filled, 
but the link between cash benefits and health care would be strength 
ened. This incentive is weaker if the services the individuals need most 
are extended or long-term care benefits, which are generally not pro 
vided by Medicare.
Access to Health-Related and Long-Term Care Services
Expanding coverage for health-related or long-term care services 
also can be accomplished by adding new programs or by modifying 
private insurance, public programs, or the tax code.
New Home- and Community-Based Care Programs
Several proposals have attempted to improve access to home- and 
community-based, long-term care services by creating a new, federally 
funded program. In most cases, the programs are capped at a specific 
federal dollar amount and require state contributions. They typically 
are designed to give states and individuals a great deal of flexibility, 
and, ultimately, would replace current Medicaid waiver programs.
The president's proposal, for example, included a significant new 
public program to cover home- and community-based care for individ 
uals with disabilities. Other bills had similar provisions. The presi 
dent's program would have been state-administered using federal funds 
and required state contributions. States were allocated a fixed budget, 
with total budgeted federal spending starting at $4.5 billion in 1996 
and increasing to $38.3 billion by 2003. Ultimately, such a program 
could cover approximately 3 million severely disabled individuals, of 
whom about 710,000 would be of working age.
Eligibility for the program was based on the need for assistance with 
three or more ADLs, on severe cognitive or mental impairment, and on 
special criteria for young children. Under the plan, states had a great 
deal of flexibility in designing service systems. States had to provide 
needs assessments and individual care plans. However, not all services 
identified in the individual care plan had to be offered by the state; in 
fact, only personal assistance services were required. All other services
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were at the discretion of the state (for example, case management, 
home modifications, homemaker and chore assistance, respite services, 
assistive devices, vocational rehabilitation, supported employment, or 
mental health) as were limits on amount, duration, and scope of any 
services offered. Care was offered in the home, in community residen 
tial settings, or outside the home. The plan did not provide complete 
coverage for these services to eligible persons. All services were sub 
ject to coinsurance (ranging from less than 10 percent to 25 percent of 
costs) depending on income, and there was no out-of-pocket limit on 
an individual's contribution.
How does this proposal compare to Medicaid today? From the per 
spective of the individual, eligibility and cost-sharing requirements are 
different. (Eligibility requirements have more restrictive disability cri 
teria but no means testing.) From the perspective of the state, there is 
more flexibility under the proposal to design services. While Medicaid 
is an individual entitlement, the proposed program would be an entitle 
ment to states with an overall cap. States could phase out the Medicaid 
services and instead provide services under the new home- and com 
munity-based care program at a higher federal matching rate and with 
greater flexibility. Because state allocations under the new program 
would have been based in part on current Medicaid expenditures, ineq 
uities across states would have continued.
Changing Medicaid
In 1990, the Medicaid program spent nearly $28 billion (or 37 per 
cent of total costs) covering institutional and community-based long- 
term care for 2.4 million elderly and nonelderly disabled beneficiaries 
(CRS 1993, pp.141, 146). This coverage included nursing home care, 
institutional services for the mentally retarded, care in institutions for 
mental diseases, home health services, and personal assistance. Short 
of creating an entirely new program, Medicaid rules could be modified 
by expanding eligibility through lower income and asset thresholds or 
through changes to spousal impoverishment rules. For example, one 
could mandate Medicaid coverage for personal care assistance in all 
states. If the income eligibility criterion were raised to 200 percent of 
the poverty level for this service and the asset test were removed, this 
expansion would cover approximately 10 million individuals with 
severe limitations (i.e., requiring assistance with three or more ADLs)
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at a cost of approximately $13 billion. Small, incremental changes may 
bring relief to narrow segments of the population, but are unlikely to 
change problems with fragmented delivery across medical care, social 
services, long-term care, and vocational rehabilitation. Furthermore, 
only changes in federal mandates would narrow large disparities 
between states regarding spending levels, reimbursement, and covered 
services.
Changing Coverage for Veterans
Although many groups, such as the Commission on the Future 
Structure of Veterans Health Care, have advocated a change in VA eli 
gibility and delivery of services, such initiatives were put on hold dur 
ing the debate on health care reform. Proposals that provided universal 
coverage attempted to retain access to special VA benefits for some 
groups. Other proposals that mandated all individuals to obtain cover 
age included all VA eligibles as an already covered group that met the 
requirements of the mandate. Most plans, however, did not address the 
issue of veterans who are eligible for services (theoretically, all veter 
ans) but who cannot obtain them due to limited resources in their area.
Encouraging Private Long-Term Care Coverage
Some recent proposals have focused on encouraging today's nascent 
market for private long-term care insurance. The insurance industry 
has argued that the tax code should be clarified to permit deduction of 
insurance premiums for long-term care, just as for acute health care. 17 
Such a change would affect approximately 17 million individuals and 
would cost about $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion per year in lost revenues. 
Others have argued for a tax credit in order to signal the importance of 
long-term care insurance or to stimulate its purchase. This approach 
would affect fewer individuals, approximately 3 million, and could 
cost $0.5 billion to $0.8 billion, depending on the size of the credit. In 
addition, some have recommended national standards and consumer 
protection for long-term care policies. In a number of proposals, long- 
term care policies must meet these standards in order to qualify for pre 
ferred tax treatment. In others, policies that failed to meet standards 
would be prohibited or would face penalties.
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Using the Tax Code
Deductions and credits have long been used to either encourage or 
discourage private actions or to modify inequalities that arise from 
existing definitions of costs and income. Deductions, generally, are 
best used to refine the definition of taxable income. They tend to favor 
taxpayers with higher incomes, who have greater tax rates. Tax credits 
tend to be more effective at encouraging a particular type of purchase. 
Most existing credits are not refundable, which means that the credit is 
limited by the amount of taxes owed. In contrast, a refundable tax 
credit benefits families regardless of their income, tax rate, or total tax 
liability. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is an example of a 
refundable tax credit.
Tax code modifications can be used to subsidize the cost of insur 
ance premiums, either for health or long-term care. Alternatively, they 
can subsidize the cost of specific types of equipment or care, such as 
services currently not recognized in the medical care deduction. The 
tax code, however, is not a very effective tool for targeting financial 
assistance to those with few resources or with specific types or levels 
of disability. New tax forms would have to include measures of assets 
and types of disability to determine eligibility.
Several proposals in 1994 provided for tax code changes specifically 
to assist people with disabilities in the work force. One provision 
extended the existing medical expense deduction to include long-term 
care services for persons requiring assistance with two or more activi 
ties of daily living or with severe cognitive impairment. 18 Such a provi 
sion could help the estimated 2.9 million persons needing assistance 
with ADLs or lADLs (based on the 1989 National Health Interview 
Survey), but only if they itemize their tax deductions.
The president's plan included a proposal under which disabled, 
employed individuals could receive a tax credit up to $15,000 per year 
for 50 percent of the cost of personal assistance services. 19 The credit 
would give individuals the flexibility to choose services and providers, 
without constraints that might arise in other programs because of utili 
zation review or low provider reimbursement rates. However, the credit 
was limited to $15,000 per year and applied only to the cost of personal 
care services for employed individuals with physical and cognitive 
impairments, not mental illness. In 1989, approximately 60,000 indi-
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viduals needed assistance with ADLs and either worked or were lim 
ited in the amount or type of work they could perform. The tax credit 
would benefit such people regardless of earnings. Such a proposal also 
would help those currently unable to work because of the cost of per 
sonal assistance. In 1989, 2.3 million working-age individuals were 
unable to work and needed help with ADLs or I ADLs; it is not clear 
how many of these people would have been employed if part of the 
cost of personal assistance had been subsidized. Somewhat more than 
30 percent of these individuals currently are covered by Medicaid, the 
only existing program that might provide for such long-term care ser 
vices. The potential employment effect of personal assistance subsidies 
for these individuals as well as for those currently without Medicaid is 
not clear. For many considering returning to work, the potential loss of 
acute care coverage is still a barrier.
Other Initiatives and State-Sponsored Changes
Several other steps could change the financing and delivery of health 
care. In the absence of federal health care reform, there has been an 
increased movement toward enrollment in managed-care plans. Man 
aged care presents a number of open questions for populations with 
chronic conditions. In a fee-for-service plan, individuals can choose 
their providers and, to a large extent, their services. In managed-care 
systems, individuals often are limited to a panel of providers. The pro 
viders receive a set amount per enrollee. By controlling total payments, 
health plans may encourage providers to utilize health care resources 
more selectively and efficiently and may promote innovations in com 
munity-based delivery models. Safeguards may be necessary to ensure 
that needed services are not withheld. Furthermore, a smaller man 
aged-care plan may not be able to support a wide range of specialty 
physicians, gatekeepers skilled in chronic care management, techni 
cians, equipment, and testing for people with diverse chronic and dis 
abling conditions. There is considerable concern about the ability of 
primary care gatekeepers to manage complex cases appropriately and 
to refer patients to the specialists and other types of services needed.
States also have been active in changing health care systems, prima 
rily by modifying Medicaid rules. Recently, six states were awarded 
large-scale Medicaid waivers (so-called "1115 waivers") to change eli-
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gibility, benefits, and service delivery. Proposals by nine other states 
were pending as of September 1994 (Kaiser Commission on the Future 
of Medicaid 1994, p. 2). In most cases, the waivers mandate Medicaid 
coverage through managed-care plans. They also extend coverage to 
low-income populations who currently are not eligible for Medicaid, 
but cover them for fewer services than Medicaid beneficiaries have 
covered. Thus, the implied state preference is to cover more people for 
a smaller number of services. The impact on persons with disabilities, 
who frequently require a broad range of services, is not yet clear. Some 
waivers exclude the disabled, blind and aged from the waiver, others 
create special managed-care programs for the disabled or for popula 
tions with specific conditions, such as mental illness, substance abuse, 
or mental retardation.
Conclusion
The current health care system, a web of private and public cover 
age, leaves large gaps for people with disabilities. The most obvious 
breach is that 17 percent of those unable to work because of a disability 
and 12 percent of those needing assistance with activities of daily liv 
ing have no coverage at all. Many others have coverage that excludes 
chronic, long-term, or health-related needs. These gaps create perverse 
incentives in employment patterns, particularly for people with chronic 
conditions who require a lot of care or nonacute care. Some individuals 
may be trapped in a job because of its health benefits, and others may 
not want to leave public programs. Employment does not convey cov 
erage automatically; thus, leaving the cash benefit rolls carries the risk 
of losing one's only opportunity for health care coverage. Furthermore, 
employment-based insurance frequently does not cover services 
needed by the disabled.
The opportunity to bring about fundamental change in access to 
acute care coverage "came and went" for now. Remaining options span 
a number of smaller, marginal revisions to either the public or private 
systems. These, however, must stand up to a budget-hostile environ 
ment. Furthermore, these incremental steps could exacerbate work dis 
incentives, perpetuate inequities across different groups, or accelerate
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the decline of private insurance. Recent efforts to overhaul state sys 
tems seem to center on spreading a thin public dollar even more thinly 
across more eligible people—with an as yet undetermined impact on 
individuals with disabilities. Ultimately, however, only if private and 
public coverage were seamless, covering most services that chronically 
ill populations need, would the barriers and employment disincentives 
completely be removed.
NOTES
NOTE: The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors They do not represent the 
official position of the National Academy of Social Insurance, the National Academy on Aging or 
the organizations that have provided funding for this project This paper was supported by grants 
from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
*Data from the National Health Interview Survey, 1983-1986 (four-year average) Data are 
based on household surveys of the civilian, nonmstitutionahzed population.
1 In the SIPP, activities of daily living are defined as getting around inside the home, getting 
in or out of bed, taking a bath or shower, dressing, eating, or using the toilet Instrumental activi 
ties of daily living include going outside the home, for example, shopping, keeping track of 
money and bills, preparing meals, doing light housework, or using the telephone
2. Similarly, data from the National Health Interview Survey show that, although half of work 
ing-age persons have a chronic condition, only 15 percent have a limitation in activity and 10 per 
cent are limited in work (National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research 1991, p 
20)
3. Another 0 9 percent had coverage from undefined plans Data from the 1989 National 
Health Interview Survey
4. Firms with 20 or more employees must extend coverage to former employees for a fixed 
time period but may charge them the full premium plus 2 percent.
5. Insurers tempt the owners to drop their current policy by offering a lower price, but this 
price excludes the coverage of any "preexisting" medical conditions As time elapses and these 
exclusions are no longer in place, the insurance price increases
6. In the past, the tax code also was unclear about whether benefits would be treated as taxable 
income. Since 1989, it has been clarified that the earnings on long-term care insurance reserves 
can be treated in the same manner as earnings on life insurance reserves, i.e., these earnings are 
exempt from taxation for insurers and pohcyholders.
7. Twelve states, the so-called 209(b) states, use more restrictive eligibility standards than SSI 
policies, either regarding the definition of disability or regarding income and resource limits or 
definitions. States electing the 209(b) option must allow applicants to "spend down," i e., to 
deduct medical expenses from income in determining eligibility.
8. In such cases, parental income and resources are not counted, although the SSI benefit 
amount is reduced by one-third.
9 Effective Apnl 1990, states have been required to cover all pregnant women and children 
under age 6 whose income is below 133 percent of the federal poverty level. In addition, Medicaid 
must expand coverage each year to children under age 19, so that, by October 2001, all children 
living below 100 percent of the federal poverty level will be covered.
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10. In practice, to become medically needy, one must first deplete one's assets to the eligibility 
standard (i.e., $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples) and then continue to incur high med 
ical expenses relative to one's income.
11. Because the eligibility standard for medically needy applicants must be the same across all 
applicants (families, children, elderly, and disabled) and because it may not exceed 133 percent of 
the AFDC payment, very often the medically needy income standard is lower than the SSI benefit 
standard (CRS 1993, p. 211).
12. The individual's earnings must be less than the combined equivalent of SSI, SSP, Medic- 
aid, and publicly funded personal attendant care benefits
13 Medicare also covers individuals with end-stage renal disease, regardless of whether or not 
they work.
14. Disabled beneficiaries include disabled workers under age 65, widows aged 50 to 64, and 
children aged 18 and over who were disabled before age 22
15. In 1993, this voluntary premium was $245 per month for Medicare Part A. The premium 
rate for Part B was $36.60 per month If the individual returns to the disability rolls within five 
years (seven years for widows and adult children), there is no two-year waiting period to be re-eli 
gible for Medicare without paying a premium.
16. This estimate is based on the average cost of coverage for those now eligible because of a 
disability. In this sense, the cost per potential beneficiary is probably overstated. However, this 
estimate does not include the potential of more people claiming to be disabled than currently mea 
sured by random sample surveys. This estimate assumes that both the uninsured and those now 
covered by private insurance would seek Medicaid coverage.
17. The Internal Revenue Service has argued that legislation, not clarification, would be 
required
18. Deductible expenses include the provision of assistance with "activities of daily living" 
(eating, dressing, bathing, toileting, transferring in and out of bed) or protection from threats to 
health and safety due to severe cognitive impairment. Services may not be provided by a relative 
and must be part of a plan of care prescribed by a licensed professional. All deductible medical 
expenses would be subject to the existing 7 5 percent floor
19. The 50 percent is reduced by 10 percentage points for each $5,000 in adjusted gross 
income over $45,000. Services are defined broadly and include personal assistance to carry out 
"activities of daily living" (eating, dressing, bathing, toileting, transferring in and out of bed) in or 
outside of the home; homemaker/chore services (e.g., meal preparation or shopping); assistance 
with life skills (e.g., money management) for people with cognitive impairments; assistive tech 
nology services; or modifications to the home. To be eligible, individuals must prove that they 
have a "medically determmable physical impairment," which has lasted or is expected to last at 
least 12 months Furthermore, they must be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity with 
out personal assistance services
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Health Care, Personal Assistance and 
Assistive Technology
Are In-Kind Benefits Key to Independence 
or Dependence for People with Disabilities?
Andrew I. Batavia
McDermott, Will and Emery
and
Georgetown University
School of Medicine
In-Kind Benefits
In addition to cash benefits, the Social Security system in our coun 
try provides a variety of benefits in kind to eligible individuals with 
disabilities. Eligibility for the in-kind benefits, such as health insur 
ance, is typically contingent upon eligibility for cash benefits under the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) programs, which, in turn, depends upon inability to work 
due to a medical impairment. This paper considers whether the sys 
tem's in-kind benefits, and the way in which they are designed and 
made available, optimally assist disability beneficiaries to achieve the 
goals that our nation sets for these programs, and whether there is a 
better way to fulfill these goals.
The Goal of Independence
There is now a consensus that the goal of U.S. disability policy is to 
enhance the capacity of people with disabilities to live independently 
in their communities. This has been the key objective of the indepen 
dent living movement from its outset in the early 1970s (DeJong 1979, 
1981) and was most clearly recognized as a national goal with the 
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Dis 
ability advocates and researchers have concluded that we must bring 
the goals and policies of other disability laws and programs, including
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the Social Security disability programs, in line with the independent 
living goals of the ADA (National Council on Disability 1986, 1988; 
DeJong and Batavia 1990).
While there is general agreement that independence is the goal, this 
consensus may be somewhat illusory because different people mean 
different things by "independence." The term is often used loosely and 
ambiguously to refer to two distinct, and often conflicting, objectives. 
These are:
1. the ability to live in the community and out of institutions, even if 
this ability is a direct result of government or philanthropic subsi 
dization (which I will refer to as the support goal), and
2. the ability to live self-sufficiently in the community through one's 
own employment and resources (which I will call the employ 
ment goal).
The ADA, with its Title I employment provisions, clearly empha 
sizes the employment goal. However, both goals address valid objec 
tives of the Social Security disability programs, which cover some 
individuals who are incapable of work. 1 Each reflects a different objec 
tive of the system, and the contrast between them represents the basic 
tension between the aims of subsidizing those who need assistance and 
rewarding those who can make the effort to be productive. Ideally, pol 
icy decisions concerning eligibility and benefits should be based upon 
a careful balancing of likely effects on each of these two independent 
living goals.
Independence and In-Kind Benefits
Most analysts agree that obtaining in-kind Social Security benefits 
is extremely important to the ability of people with disabilities to live 
independently, from both the support and employment perspectives. If, 
for example, individuals who require full-time personal assistance 
(e.g., attendant care) cannot obtain such services, they will not be able 
to live in their communities. If beneficiaries will eventually lose their 
health coverage as a result of accepting employment, it is not in their 
interest to take a job that does not provide long-term assurance of at 
least comparable benefits or their cash equivalent.
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Advocates often argue that it makes little policy sense to tie eligibil 
ity for disability benefits to the ability or decision to work. Individuals 
with disabilities will need these benefits to live in their communities 
whether or not they have a job; linking them through employment- 
based eligibility criteria will only decrease the incentive to work. The 
disincentive is likely to be particularly strong to the extent that the ben 
efit is not available through employment, as is the case with some in- 
kind benefits. Despite recent legislative efforts to eliminate work disin 
centives, people with disabilities remain concerned about eventually 
losing their in-kind benefits. This concern will persist as long as the eli 
gibility-employment link remains.
In-Kind versus Cash Benefits
Recognizing the importance of in-kind benefits to the ability to live 
independently also does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that such 
assistance must be or should be provided in kind. Presumably, if all 
other factors were equal, the individual with a disability would prefer 
an added cash benefit to an in-kind benefit of equal value. The cash 
benefit would offer far greater flexibility for the individual to pursue 
his or her independent living goals. However, for a variety of reasons, 
many people with disabilities currently prefer the benefits they receive 
in kind rather than in cash, and many policy makers prefer to offer 
them in kind.
From the perspective of the policy maker, who is accountable to the 
taxpayers financing these programs, a cash benefit does not provide the 
assurance that the money will be spent in a manner that would satisfy 
taxpayer concerns. This security is critical to ongoing political support 
for the program. For example, a cash benefit in lieu of Medicare might 
be used by a beneficiary for better nutrition or housing. While this may 
be a rational decision on the part of the recipient, taxpayers may resent 
this use of program funds, recognizing that they will ultimately still 
have to pay the bill if the individual becomes ill. Some policy makers 
do not trust beneficiaries to make accountable decisions. 2
From the perspective of beneficiaries, an equivalent cash benefit has 
two significant drawbacks. First, individuals are concerned that a cash 
payment does not guarantee the ability to purchase the service previ 
ously obtained through the in-kind benefit. For example, if private
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health insurers will not offer coverage at any price to people with dis 
abilities, the cash benefit in lieu of in-kind insurance will be of little 
use. This problem could be remedied through certain insurance market 
reforms, such as guaranteed issue (assuring coverage) and community 
rating (assuring affordability). Second, beneficiaries are concerned 
that, even with such reforms, there will be a political tendency for the 
cash amount to be set below the level necessary to obtain adequate ser 
vices.
For these reasons, cash in lieu of an in-kind benefit is probably not 
politically feasible in this country and will not be considered further in 
this paper. However, a system based on vouchers, Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs),3 or tax credits providing a "cash equivalent" limited 
to the purchase of specified services would satisfy the accountability 
needs of many policy makers. With respect to a tax credit, making it 
"refundable" and therefore available to individuals with no tax liability 
could equitably provide support for all individuals who require ser 
vices.
The feasibility of this cash equivalent approach depends largely on 
whether it can be structured to satisfy the significant concerns of bene 
ficiaries and their advocates. There would have to be some assurance 
that the voucher, MSA, or tax credit would be sufficient to obtain the 
needed service over the long term.
In-Kind Benefits and Public Policy
Eligibility and benefits ideally should be based on empirical evi 
dence of how to achieve the independent living goals of support and 
employment in the most cost-effective way. While several researchers 
have identified a Social Security disability work disincentive generally 
(Leonard 1986, Muller 1989, Burkhauser and Haveman 1982), none 
has specifically considered whether there is a greater disincentive asso 
ciated with in-kind benefits. Similarly, there has been little study of 
other implications of providing benefits in kind rather than through 
cash equivalents. In the absence of such empirical research, we must 
rely upon economic theory in conjunction with our knowledge of the 
behavior of beneficiaries.
According to conventional economic theory, receiving disability 
benefits in kind or through cash equivalents should not fundamentally
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affect the individual's decision to seek gainful employment, all other 
factors equal. Based on a strict rational choice model, the individual 
would compare the aggregate value of disability benefits, both cash and 
in kind, with the aggregate value of a job package, including salary, 
vacation, and all fringe benefits. If the job's benefits exceed the social 
program's benefits by a sufficient amount to compensate for the value 
of the person's labor, the individual will seek and accept employment.
However, it is clear that all other factors are not equal in comparing 
in-kind benefits and cash equivalents. Many of the benefits in kind cur 
rently available to people with disabilities would not be available or 
affordable to them in the market. The most obvious, again, is health 
insurance. Health insurers in the individual, nongroup market typically 
either exclude people with disabilities from coverage altogether or 
make such coverage extremely unattractive due to specific exclusions 
and limitations for preexisting conditions (Griss 1988; DeJong, Bata- 
via, and Griss 1989). Whether it is feasible to implement significant 
alternatives to the current in-kind benefit structure will depend partly 
on whether such other factors can be made equal through public policy 
(Batavia 1993).
This paper focuses on three in-kind benefits that are considered very 
important to people with disabilities: health insurance, personal assis 
tance services, and assistive technology. It examines what disability 
benefits are currently provided, how individuals are eligible for such 
benefits, whether these benefits are adequate to allow people to live in 
their communities, whether this approach is helping individuals to seek 
work, and how we can restructure eligibility and benefits to encourage 
independence. The paper's basic premise is that both the support and 
employment goals are more likely to be achieved to the extent that peo 
ple with disabilities are able to control their lives. Due to the inherent 
flexibility of cash equivalents, this form of assistance potentially offers 
greater control than do benefits provided in kind.
Health Insurance
Access to health care is key to independent living for many people 
with disabilities. On average, such individuals have greater health
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problems and higher rates of health care utilization than nondisabled 
individuals (Lubitz and Pine 1986; Belong, Batavia, and Griss 1989; 
LaPlante and Miller 1992; Rice and LaPlante 1992). Ironically, people 
with disabilities also have much poorer access to private health insur 
ance than do other members of the population (Griss 1988; Burns, Bat 
avia and DeJong 1991; Agency for Health Care Policy and Research 
(AHCPR) 1992; National Council on Disability 1993a; LaPlante, Rice 
and Cyril 1994).4
People with disabilities who are without health insurance, or with 
out adequate coverage, are likely to delay treatment of minor health 
concerns until they have escalated to major problems. For example, an 
individual with a spinal cord injury can develop a life-threatening 
decubitus ulcer (bedsore) in a matter of days without detection and 
appropriate treatment. If an urgent problem occurs, such individuals 
potentially compromise their financial ability to live independently. 
Ultimately, our society often pays both indirectly through uncovered 
care and directly through the public assistance programs (DeJong, Bat 
avia, and Griss 1989).
How Do People with Disabilities Currently Receive Health Benefits ?
The primary public health insurance programs for people with dis 
abilities are Medicare (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, hereaf 
ter, "the Act"), and Medicaid (Title XIX of the Act). Eligibility for 
Medicare for people with disabilities is based on eligibility for DI. Eli 
gibility for Medicaid is based on eligibility for SSL Both cash benefits 
programs, DI and SSI, use the same definition of disability: the inabil 
ity to engage in any gainful activity due to a medically determinable 
impairment that is expected to last for a period of 12 consecutive 
months or to result in death. 5
When Medicare was established in 1965, it primarily had an acute 
care orientation and did not focus on the chronic care needs of people 
with disabilities. In 1972, DI beneficiaries on the disability rolls for at 
least 24 months were made eligible for full Medicare coverage. This 
waiting period has been severely criticized, because some beneficiaries 
have a life expectancy of less than two years and the conditions of oth 
ers with longer life expectancies may deteriorate if they do not receive 
the treatment they need in the first two years. In 1992, there were 3.57
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million individuals with disabilities enrolled in Medicare, at a cost of 
$14.3 billion (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
1994, table 8.B2).
Medicaid also was established in 1965. However, unlike Medicare, 
it had a long-term, chronic care orientation from the outset. Section 
1901 of the Act, the introduction to Medicaid, states explicitly that the 
purpose of the program is to enable states to furnish medical assistance 
"and rehabilitation and other services ... to help attain or retain capabil 
ity for independence or self-care."6 Consequently, from the beginning, 
Medicaid has been more closely attuned than Medicare to disability 
issues. In 1993, there were 4.9 million individuals with "permanent 
and total disabilities" receiving Medicaid, at a cost of $38 billion (HHS 
1994, table 8.E2).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Provide Adequate Support?
Medicare now covers a broad set of acute care and rehabilitation 
services, including inpatient hospitalization and physician services. 
Also covered are inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation services at a 
rehabilitation hospital or unit, an acute care hospital, a skilled nursing 
facility, a Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation Facility (CORF), a 
therapist's office, or the patient's home. While the Medicare benefi 
ciary's cost-sharing requirements have increased substantially over 
time (HHS 1994, table 2.C1), most beneficiaries are satisfied with 
respect to these covered services.
However, Medicare coverage is weak in the areas of preventive or 
wellness care, long-term and maintenance care, and prescription drugs. 
It has been criticized for its primarily acute care orientation and its lack 
of catastrophic stop-loss protection, particularly in light of the increas 
ing chronic and long-term care needs of an aging population (Griss 
1988). Several legislative proposals, such as the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988, have been launched to address these shortcom 
ings. Thus far all have been unsuccessful, largely due to the difficulty 
in financing these expensive benefits in a manner that is politically fea 
sible.
Medicaid coverage for people with disabilities is fairly comprehen 
sive, partly because the federal government requires, as a condition of
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program participation, that mandatory benefits be provided to those 
who are eligible as categorically needy (such as SSI recipients). 7 These 
benefits include inpatient and outpatient hospital services, lab and x- 
ray services, services in a skilled nursing facility, early and periodic 
screening, diagnosis and treatment, and family planning, physician, 
and home health services (Batavia 1989).
Medicaid appears to provide adequate coverage generally, although 
much depends upon how each state implements its own Medicaid pro 
gram. While state plans must be consistent with federal requirements, 
states vary in their rules interpreting these standards and in the extent 
to which they cover optional services. Some states, such as California, 
are relatively generous in their coverage. Others cover the bare mini 
mum. Overall, payment rates for Medicaid services tend to be substan 
tially below market rates, and many beneficiaries have difficulty 
finding providers who will accept Medicaid payment (Griss 1988).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
As suggested, despite substantial legislative efforts, there appears to 
be a continuing work disincentive associated with the fear of losing 
health benefits. Throughout the 1980s, Congress enacted laws designed 
to allow disability program participants to accept employment, under 
certain conditions, without suffering a precipitous loss of cash or 
health benefits (National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities 
(NARF) 1988). The major health insurance work incentive provisions 
are as follow:
• The Social Security Amendments of 1980 allow DI beneficiaries 
whose disabling conditions continue after losing DI eligibility to 
retain Medicare eligibility for up to 36 months and to avoid a sec 
ond 24-month waiting period before becoming re-eligible for 
Medicare if they become re-eligible for DI within five years.
• The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act of 
1986 made permanent Section 1619 of the Act, allowing SSI 
recipients to receive cash benefits while gainfully employed and 
to retain Medicaid eligibility if their income is insufficient to 
obtain necessary medical services.
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• The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 allows DI bene 
ficiaries who would otherwise lose Medicare benefits after the 36- 
month extended Medicare eligibility period to pay premiums to 
maintain their Medicare coverage (i.e., the Medicare buy-in). It 
also requires states to pay for the Medicare buy-in for certain low- 
income individuals.
Despite these provisions, in December 1993, only 35,299 of 5.98 
million disabled SSI recipients participated in the Section 1619 work 
incentive program (HHS 1994, tables 7.F5 and 7.A3). Overall, 
throughout the history of the disability programs, regardless of signifi 
cant incremental changes in the laws likely to cause work disincen 
tives, relatively few beneficiaries have become employed and left the 
disability rolls (Muller 1989). 8 This suggests the need for more funda 
mental, comprehensive reform of our approach to encouraging people 
with disabilities to seek gainful employment.
How Can We Better Satisfy the Goals of Support and Employment?
As a general rule, the work disincentive associated with health 
insurance is proportional to both the generosity of the health benefit 
that could be lost and the likelihood that it will be lost and inversely 
proportional to the generosity of the health coverage or cash equivalent 
that would be obtained through employment. Consequently, both sides 
of the health care equation must be addressed to encourage disability 
beneficiaries to work. 9 Currently, the program benefit to be lost is sub 
stantial, and the employment benefit to be gained varies according to 
individual job skills and employment opportunities, but would be 
unavailable for many workers with disabilities.
The best way to deal with both sides of the equation is through pol 
icy reform that offers access to coverage whether or not the individual 
is employed or changes jobs. Developing truly "portable" health insur 
ance was one of the primary objectives of the great health care reform 
debate of the 103rd Congress. Unfortunately, the focus of the debate 
was the Health Security Act (i.e., the Clinton plan), 10 which proved to 
be unduly complex, bureaucratic, unaffordable, and ultimately unac 
ceptable to the American public. Other alternative plans could achieve 
the objectives of health reform, including the independent living goals 
of support and employment, without creating a bureaucratic behemoth.
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One encouraging approach developed by the Heritage Foundation 
would offer direct tax credits to all individuals, irrespective of employ 
ment status, based upon their health care costs relative to their 
incomes. 11 Under this proposal, insurers would have to make their 
plans available to all people including people with disabilities, who 
would receive the purchasing power to obtain a health plan of their 
choice (with at least catastrophic coverage). If the individuals accepted 
employment, the amount of their tax credits would be reduced accord 
ing to the increase in their incomes. If they experienced high costs in a 
particular year, the credit would increase, thereby automatically reduc 
ing their financial burden. 12
Another approach, developed by the National Center for Policy 
Analysis (NCPA), would allow beneficiaries to apply the actuarial 
value of their Medicare or Medicaid benefits to purchase a catastrophic 
health insurance plan with a large deductible (e.g., $3,000) and to 
establish a Medical Savings Account (MSA) with the remaining funds 
to pay for amounts up to the deductible (NCPA 1995). The MSA could 
be structured to allow the beneficiaries to accumulate savings from 
year to year without compromising eligibility. The savings could be 
used for any of their independent living needs. As with the Heritage 
proposal, the amount of the government contribution to an MSA could 
be reduced as income increases. By eliminating or greatly diminishing 
the link between eligibility and employment, these approaches would 
significantly reduce the work disincentive.
Personal Assistance
About 9.6 million people with disabilities require the help of 
another person with basic personal maintenance, hygiene, and house 
hold tasks to be able to live independently (Kennedy 1993). The term 
"personal assistance services" includes aid in the following activities:
• personal or bodily care functions, traditionally referred to as activ 
ities of daily living (ADL);
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• meal preparation, laundry, light housekeeping, handling money, 
shopping, and transportation activities, traditionally referred to as 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL);
• reader services for blind persons; and
• interpreter services for deaf persons (Litvak, Zukas and Heumann 
1987; Nosek 1992; Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992).
Under the "independent living model" of personal assistance, particu 
larly favored by many working-age people with disabilities, the dis 
abled individual actively recruits, selects, manages, and directs his or 
her own provider of services, known as a "personal assistant." 13 The 
assistant typically is neither trained as, nor supervised by, a health care 
professional. The disabled person is a consumer of services, not a 
patient, and the assistant is accountable to the consumer, not to a super 
vising nurse or agency (DeJong 1981; DeJong and Wenker 1983). This 
model was developed by people with disabilities as a reaction to the 
perceived paternalism of health care professionals giving care under 
the "medical model" (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992).
How Do People with Disabilities Currently Receive Personal 
Assistance Benefits?
The majority of individuals who require personal assistance cur 
rently do not receive it under either the independent living or the medi 
cal model; they receive assistance through informal supports, such as 
family, friends, and volunteers (Kennedy 1993, Rutgers Bureau of Eco 
nomic Research and World Institute on Disability 1990). This informal 
support model has been criticized because it often fosters an unhealthy 
dependency-based relationship between the disabled individual and the 
unpaid caregiver (Batavia, DeJong and McKnew 1992).
In response to these criticisms and to the growing need for personal 
aid in the population, government programs of paid assistance have 
been established. The main federal initiatives that offer personal assis 
tance and other home-based services to disability beneficiaries are 
home health, homemaker, and chore services financed under Medicaid 
and under the Social Services block grant program (Title XX of the 
Act); services under Medicare when home-based assistance is associ-
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ated with a recent hospital stay; and similar services for disabled senior 
citizens provided under the Older Americans Act.
The independent living model has been adopted by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs in its Aides and Attendant Allowance Program and 
by several states in their Medicaid and Social Services programs. For 
example, Massachusetts, California, and Pennsylvania have incorpo 
rated independent living concepts into their interpretation of the federal 
regulations governing community-based services (DeJong and Wenker 
1983; Zukas, Cone, and Leon 1984; Allard and Spence 1986). Other 
states provide home-based long-term care services under a more medi 
cally oriented model using agencies and medical supervision (Litvak, 
Zukas, and Heumann 1987; Egley 1994).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure Provide 
Adequate Support?
Whether individuals who require personal assistance services 
receive the support they need under the model that they prefer depends 
in large part on the state in which they live. In its 50-state survey of all 
publicly funded in-home service programs, the World Institute on Dis 
ability (WID) found that 42 percent did not cover both personal and 
domestic services, 22 percent do not cover services seven days per 
week, 50 percent did not serve persons with incomes above the poverty 
level, and 67 percent did not allow aides or personal assistants to help 
in personal care involving medications, catheters, suppositories, or 
menstrual needs (Litvak, Zukas, and Heumann 1987). While some 
states have since improved their coverage, most still do not conform to 
the independent living model (Nosek and Howland 1993; Kennedy 
1993).
Thus, most states have not responded to the preferences of many 
people with disabilities for personal assistance services. To the extent 
that states or agencies have attempted to fund personal assistance ser 
vices, most have done so in an uncoordinated and nonsystematic man 
ner. Few provide such services in a way that offers consumers 
maximum control over their lives, optimally supporting their ability to 
exist independently in their communities (Nosek 1992). Many pro 
grams retain strong elements of the medical model, including reliance 
on institutional placement (Kennedy 1993).
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In addition, states typically have not provided adequate funding to 
meet the substantial need for such services and have developed a vari 
ety of rationing mechanisms to limit their financial responsibility. 
These include eligibility criteria that limit enrollment to those "at risk 
of institutionalization" or to people with physical disabilities; coverage 
rules that prohibit funding for certain nonmedical services; rules pro 
hibiting funding for assistants who are related to the recipient; limita 
tions in the number of hours of services covered; and restrictions 
concerning the site of services.
One reason for such approaches is that states are concerned over 
"the woodwork effect" (people who are receiving assistance from rela 
tives or friends coming "out of the woodwork" to request funding) and 
adverse selection (i.e., the tendency of disabled persons to move to 
those programs and insurance plans that offer the most generous bene 
fits that they need) (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992). For exam 
ple, it is generally acknowledged that many younger disabled persons 
decide to reside in California because it has a comprehensive in-home 
support services program based on the independent living model.
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
As in the case of health insurance, the extent of the work disincen 
tive is directly related to the generosity of the benefit. In those states 
with very generous personal assistance services programs, the work 
disincentive appears particularly strong. Personal assistance services 
are not covered under any private health insurance plans available 
through employment or in the individual market. 14 Consequently, if an 
individual were to eventually lose his or her personal assistance bene 
fit, he or she would require a very substantial income to be able to pay 
for such services out of pocket. Without having access to such services, 
the individual would have to rely on the assistance of unpaid friends or 
relatives, if available.
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How Can We Restructure Eligibility and Benefits 
to Encourage Independence ?
To meet the need for personal assistance services equitably, and to 
reduce adverse selection, a national personal assistance services policy 
is needed (Batavia, DeJong, and McKnew 1992; Nosek and Rowland 
1993). Such a policy should provide a comprehensive approach to 
financing assistance services and helping disabled persons to recruit 
competent, dependable personal assistants. One national model is the 
Department of Veterans Affairs program, which provides funds directly 
for personal assistance services based on need to qualified disabled 
veterans, regardless of employment status. This model would have to 
be adapted to protect against the woodwork effect in serving the much 
larger civilian disabled population.
A possible approach would be to implement a system based on tax 
credits, MSAs, or vouchers, similar to that suggested for health insur 
ance. In one regard, this approach would be easier to apply to personal 
assistance because there are no significant barriers to purchasing such 
services through the general market. The primary challenge would be 
to develop an equitable and efficient mechanism that is not easily sub 
ject to fraud and abuse for purposes of determining the appropriate 
amount of the credit, MS A, or voucher.
Assistive Technology and Durable Medical Equipment
Just as personal assistance services can compensate for lost func 
tional capacity, assistive technology can also help people with disabili 
ties to live independently. In certain circumstances, it can even provide 
a cost-effective means of reducing the need for certain kinds of per 
sonal assistance. Examples of assistive devices used by people with 
disabilities include whfeelchairs, augmentative communication devices, 
page turners, environmental control units, and amplified listening 
devices (Seelman 1993).
Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey suggest that 
about 5 percent of the civilian noninstitutionalized population currently 
uses assistive devices, excluding eyeglasses (LaPlante, Hendershot,
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and Moss 1992). About 1 percent of the population indicated that they 
did not have at least one assistive device that they needed, primarily 
due to financial considerations. For many of these individuals, the abil 
ity to obtain such items would significantly enhance their ability to live 
more independently and productively.
How Do Disabled People Currently Receive Assistive 
Technology Benefits?
Medicare Part B covers the purchase or rental of certain devices that 
qualify as durable medical equipment (DME), such as wheelchairs. In 
addition, it covers prosthetic devices, orthotic devices, and certain 
medical supplies. Yet, DME suppliers received only 3.5 percent of all 
Medicare Part B payments in 1990. Medicare accounted for 17.8 per 
cent of DME, while private insurance paid 10.4 percent, and individu 
als paid 67.3 percent out of pocket. The vast majority of Medicare 
DME expenditures are for such medical equipment as oxygen, 34.4 
percent; prosthetics and orthotics 18.8 percent; and tube feeding 17.2 
percent (Committee on Ways and Means 1991).
States again vary as to the generosity of their Medicaid coverage, 
although this is generally limited to fairly basic durable medical equip 
ment. While motorized wheelchairs tend to be covered, most other 
devices that would support independent living are not. Those SSI 
recipients who are on the Plan to Achieve Self-Sufficiency (PASS) Pro 
gram may set aside funds to purchase assistive devices without com 
promising their program eligibility. Also, some state vocational 
rehabilitation programs provide assistive devices to support an educa 
tional and vocational strategy. However, most people with disabilities 
who need "nonmedical" assistive devices pay for them out of pocket.
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Provide Adequate Support?
Medicare does not pay for services or devices "which are not rea 
sonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury 
or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." Many 
assistive devices are routinely disallowed because they are considered 
"convenience items." Motorized wheelchairs are denied to individuals
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who can operate a manual wheelchair in their homes, even if they 
would need the motorized wheelchair to transport themselves in their 
communities (Griss 1988, National Council on Disability 1993b).
As with health insurance and personal assistance, whether Medicaid 
beneficiaries receive the assistive devices they need depends on the 
state in which they reside (National Council on Disability 1993b). No 
state covers the full range of needed devices; items such as environ 
mental control units are virtually never included under state Medicaid 
plans. 15 Two significant policy barriers to obtaining assistive devices 
under Medicaid are the requirements that the recipient demonstrate 
"Medical Need" and obtain "Prior Approval" for the device. Interpreta 
tions of these requirements, and the extent of the barriers, vary from 
state to state (Seelman 1993).
Does the Current Eligibility and Benefit Structure 
Encourage Employment?
The current system promotes employment to the extent that it pro 
vides individuals with the assistive devices they need to seek and main 
tain jobs. For the most part, individuals do not receive the work-related 
devices they need under Medicare or Medicaid. Conversely, the even 
tual loss of eligibility for these programs would consequently not 
impose a significant work disincentive, except to the extent that needed 
medical devices, such as oxygen, would be lost. For individuals with 
requirements for such covered durable medical equipment, the work 
disincentive is likely to be substantial. Again, the link between eligibil 
ity and employment is problematic.
How Can We Better Satisfy the Goals of Support and Employment?
The major difference to be considered in analyzing personal assis 
tance services and assistive devices is that some assistive devices are 
currently covered through private employer-based health insurance. 
However, this varies from plan to plan; very few health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) cover DME to the same extent that Blue Cross 
plans do. If other payers do not improve their coverage, Blue Cross 
may eventually have to cut back to remain competitive. From a policy 
perspective, this suggests that the playing field should be leveled
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among different health plans through a uniform minimum benefits 
requirement. If all private health plans covered DME, the work disin 
centive associated with such equipment would be reduced.
Another alternative would be to remove assistive technology and 
DME from the health care financing system and to subsidize them in 
another manner, such as through tax credits, MSAs, or vouchers. As 
with personal assistance services, this approach would give individuals 
with disabilities flexibility in choosing and obtaining the devices they 
need to live independently. Like personal assistance, it also raises con 
cerns as to how to restructure the financing of services. A major issue is 
how to determine the amount of the credit, MS A, or voucher.
Conclusions
The benefits that are provided in kind under the Social Security dis 
ability programs have a profound effect on the capacity of people with 
disabilities to live in their communities and to seek gainful employ 
ment. An analysis of how health insurance, personal assistance ser 
vices, and assistive technology are currently provided suggests that 
they satisfy the support goal to a greater extent than the employment 
goal. From the low numbers of beneficiaries who have left the disabil 
ity rolls, it now appears clear that further tinkering with the system's 
work disincentives is unlikely to achieve independent living objectives.
More fundamental change is necessary. We must reexamine the pre 
mises of the current system to determine whether they are consistent 
with the system's goals. Services that are currently provided in kind 
could be offered in a number of different ways. No special significance 
should be attributed to the fact that they are currently provided in kind 
except to the degree that they would otherwise not be available or 
affordable to people with disabilities. To that extent, reforms should be 
implemented to eliminate barriers to an accessible market for such ser 
vices. The focus must be on meeting the basic support needs of the 
individual while encouraging self-sufficiency.
The cash equivalent approach advocated in this paper is particularly 
compatible with these goals for two reasons. First, it is philosophically 
consistent because it treats people with disabilities in an integrated
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manner with other people while recognizing, through the subsidy, the 
additional financial burdens of disability. It thereby implicitly acknowl 
edges that disability is a normal aspect of the human experience. In 
contrast, the current system treats people with disabilities in a segre 
gated manner, as if they were a separate species. Second, the cash 
equivalent approach would require less bureaucracy because it would 
be administered largely through existing structures (i.e., the tax sys 
tem).
Whether we continue to provide services in kind or through vouch 
ers, MSAs, or refundable tax credits, the issue of eligibility will remain 
critical. This is particularly true if we divorce the benefits now pro 
vided in kind from the present cash benefit programs. Current mecha 
nisms for determining eligibility are grossly inadequate and are at odds 
with the goal of employment. New approaches, including different def 
initions and review methods, will be necessary to assure that only indi 
viduals with significant functional limitations are eligible for benefits 
and that these individuals receive the benefits they need to live inde 
pendently (Batavia and Parker 1995).
Linking eligibility to work is not necessary and is counterproductive 
to the extent that it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy convincing benefi 
ciaries that they are unemployable. There is no compelling policy ratio 
nale for providing benefits in kind, and by doing so we send the 
implicit message that we do not trust beneficiaries to make decisions 
for themselves. Alternatively, by providing cash equivalents regardless 
of employment status and phasing them out as income increases, we 
can offer people with disabilities greater control over their lives, and 
we are more likely to satisfy both the support and employment goals.
In pursuing this approach, it is essential to recognize that people 
with similar impairments and functional limitations can vary dramati 
cally in their need for services and that some mechanism would have to 
be devised to determine the appropriate amount of the credit, MSA, or 
voucher. Ideally, this determination should be based on a valid and reli 
able assessment of each individual's functional capacity and need for 
services. Unfortunately, we currently have only relatively simple, 
unsophisticated approaches to assessing functional status, based 
largely on ADLs that are subject to manipulation (Batavia 1992).
An alternative to basing a cash equivalent on functional assessment 
would be to use a significant cost-sharing requirement to induce indi-
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viduals to be cost conscious in their decisions. For example, we could 
permit a refundable tax credit for a specified percentage of service or 
coverage costs based on income (e.g., 90 percent for people with 
incomes up to 200 percent of the poverty level, 80 percent for incomes 
between 200 percent and 300 percent of the poverty level, etc.) up to a 
maximum amount (e.g., $15,000 per year). This approach raises cer 
tain equity issues that will have to be seriously considered in structur 
ing the credits, MSAs, or vouchers.
It must be emphasized that whether or not a cash equivalent 
approach will benefit people with disabilities will depend entirely on 
how it is structured. A poorly designed program using MSAs, for 
example, could lead to substantial adverse selection that could destroy 
the Medicare or Medicaid system. Careful attention must be paid to 
ensuring that a plan does not simply provide a windfall for those who 
are healthy, depleting the low risks from the general insurance pool and 
imposing higher costs on those who are less healthy (American Acad 
emy of Actuaries 1995).
While systematic reform is necessary, it need not occur all at once. 
Given the incremental nature of our political system, it would be pref 
erable to achieve these changes in several stages. A first stage might 
remove barriers to the establishment of a competitive market, in which 
people with disabilities would have access to services currently pro 
vided in kind. Subsequent stages might entail the creation of tax cred 
its, MSAs, or vouchers to offer greater access to these markets and 
might involve the implementation of demonstration projects to test 
these approaches.
Whichever specific approach is adopted, and however it is imple 
mented, we must boldly reform our disability programs. A system that 
does not service the long-term interest of its intended beneficiaries can 
not and should not be sustained.
NOTES
1 It is the author's belief that the vast majority of people with disabilities are capable of gain 
ful employment. Individuals with very substantial functional limitations, including respirator 
dependency, high-level quadnplegia, and mental retardation, have been able to remain productive 
in the public or private sector However, it is clear that some individuals, such as those with very 
severe brain damage, have disabilities that preclude employment.
2 In the worst-case scenario, policy makers are concerned that some beneficiaries may use the 
cash for entirely unjustifiable purposes, e.g., for the purchase of alcohol or illegal drugs Such rare
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situations, which are occasionally revealed through the press, can jeopardize support for an entire 
program.
3. An MS A is a tax-advantaged savings account, similar to an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA), which could be used for certain specified purposes (e g., medical costs, long-term care, 
personal assistance services) and could accumulate from year to year (Goodman and Musgrave 
1992)
4. People with certain conditions, such as diabetes, spinal cord injury, and acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), statistically have higher than average health care costs. People with 
other disabilities, such as blindness, deafness, and mental retardation, have close to average costs, 
but are often perceived and treated by health insurers (defined broadly in this paper to include 
commercial insurers, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, managed care plans, and self-insured organiza 
tions) as costing more than average. Individuals in both groups find it difficult or impossible to 
obtain affordable health insurance unless they have access to a group policy.
5 Code of Federal Regulations (C F.R) 404 1505, 1995. Washington, DC. U S. Government 
Pnnting Office.
6. U.S C Section 1395, The Social Security Act, as amended, Title XIX, Section 1901 (as 
added July 30, 1965), Public Law 89-97 West Publishing Co 1992.
7. However, at the time of this writing, Congress is considering legislation that would give 
states far greater discretion in setting their Medicaid policies unencumbered by federal require 
ments.
8. While there are numerous possible explanations for the small number of beneficiaries who 
leave the rolls, I believe that it is a result of a combination of three factors: (1) the substantial psy 
chological investment that beneficiaries must make in initially demonstrating their inability to 
work in order to establish eligibility, (2) a basic distrust that the government will fulfill its end of 
the bargain to provide continuing benefits once they become employed or to reestablish their eli 
gibility if they lose their jobs, and (3) an inability to obtain equivalent benefits through employ 
ment.
9. One study has found that disabled persons employed part-time are significantly less likely 
to have any insurance coverage than those employed full-time or not at all, suggesting that dis 
abled individuals who cannot make the transition directly to full-time employment and those who 
are only capable of part-time employment are likely to have a substantial work disincentive 
(Burns, Batavia, and DeJong 1994).
10 The Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600 and S. 1757 (103rd Congress).
11 A bill based on this approach, the Consumer Choice Health Secunty Act of 1993, S. 1743, 
was introduced by Senator Don Nickles (Republican-Oklahoma) in the 103rd Congress, 1993.
12 Among the advantages of this approach are that it could be designed to offer universal cov 
erage, shift the system from employment-based to household-based, thereby offering full portabil 
ity of coverage when one changes employment status, provide the type of protection that is most 
needed, catastrophic and long-term care coverage; stimulate competition among health plans, 
thereby containing costs while maintaining access and quality; enhance consumers' cost con 
sciousness while maintaining their autonomy and control; and subsidize people who have undue 
financial burdens (Batavia 1993).
13 Under this model, personal assistance has been defined as "Assistance, under maximum 
feasible control, with tasks aimed at maintaining well-being, personal appearance, comfort, 
safety, and interactions with the community and society as a whole" (Litvak, Zukas, and Heu- 
mann 1987).
14 It is reported that some long-term care policies are beginning to offer personal assistance 
services as an option.
15. To the limited extent that they are available to people with disabilities using state funds, it 
is typically through the vocational rehabilitation system on a discretionary basis.
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